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The Hawaiian movement tor statehood is part of the bloodstreaa ot 
Hawaiian historT. Of necessity, therefore, this thesis is an account or 
those econoaic, political ard cultural forces which bear upon Hawaii's 
qualifications tor full-fiedged -.bership in the A�Mtrican union ot states. 
This study, it is hoped, wUl furnish sufficient proof that no factor in 
Hawaiian development has long been able to de4 the magnetia which has 
pulled theM 111d-Pacif'ic islands closer ard closer to the nrr wellsprings 
ot AJErican lite and government. Offered alao is the proposi tion that 
this magnetism is still at work-that it almost certai.nq will make state­
hood for Hawaii a reality. The time element, alone, remains debatable. 
Due to her isolated, strategic location, her vulnerable econoi\Y, and her 
dependence upon shipping, Hawaii's plea for statehood, justq or UDjustq, 
will be weighed at any specitic mo ment with one eye on the state of world 
affairs. She will be granted statehood onl.7 when the American Congress is 
convinced that she is read;r to meet arrr threat, intemal or extemal, to 
her existence as an equal political unit in the American coDIIIOnweal th. 
One further idea is subaittedz that the nations adhering to totalitarian 
ideologies have yet to otter an ex&JIPle of conquest so devoid ot force or 
so indicative of political, cultural am economic rltality as the American 
conquest or the Hawaiian Islands. While the Hawaiian-propelled IIOV'ement 
for statehood is the cnlw1Mt1Dg proof of the success of this conquest, 
this thesis can do little more than suggest the full story. It is hoped 
that the future will bring fewer works on Hawaii's scenic and cultural 
2845�Y7 
ill 
attractions and more, serious studies of o ne  of.the remarkable ac hievements 
of American oivllizatio n. 
This thesis is baaed upon the regrettab� few secomar'7 works or 
value on Hawaiian his toey, United States gonrrDE nt documents, and magqine 
and newspaper articl.e a. Of particular value have been the materials furnished 
by the present Hawaiian delegate to Congress, llr. Joseph R. Farrington, the 
'l'uhington, D. c., Office of the Hawaii Stateho od Collllission, the Ho nolulu 
Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser. The st� of the questio n of 
, 
CoJIIIIIWli.• in the islands :was gre a� aided b;y two pamphlets furnished b;y 
lira. Violet A. Sllverman of the Hawaiian Historical Society. The author 
did not have access to such valuable materials as Hawaiian newspaper flles, 
the publicatio ns of the Hawaiian Historical Society and the Hawaiian 
Archives. 
For the making of history and historical research both a ple asure 
and a cballenge, the writer is indebted to all those faculty members of 
the University' of TenDessee History Depart.nt under whom she has taken 
work. Dr. Ruth Stephens not onq suggested the subject of the thesis but 
gave the author that counsel and encourageaent through eveey stage o r  
preparation which made this stu<V" possible. The thesis has been improTed 
b;y the helpful suggestio ns of Dr. stanley F. Folmsbee and Dr. LeRoy P. Graf. 
Ho aclcnowle dgments would be complete without mention of the unfalling 
co nsideration and helpfulness of the start of the University ldbrar,r. 
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THE EARLY YEARS 
Ultimately the people of the Uaited States must anner this 
questiona shall the Territory of Hawaii becom8 a state? Tocla.y the 
movement tor Ba.waiian statehood is so strong that every Congress is 
oontronted by a bill to enable the people of Ba.w.ii to beoame fUll­
fledged citizens, privileged to help choose the President, to be rep­
resented in the Congress, and to vote tor their own governor. 
The story of this movement begins 'With the Polynesian's who 
settled the Hawaiian archipelago centuries before 1776. Bad these 
people been more aggressive , more hostile to penetratfon by the white 
man, o:ne ot the nineteenth-century colonial powers might have been 
tempted, by the lure of OC8111118roial profits, to subdue the islands by 
force while the youth.tul United States was still imiDersed in the task 
ot eettl.iDg a new continent. Or, as the story progresses, had the gov­
ernment of Great Britain followed more c losely the activities of its 
sea captains, Cook and Vancouver, American traders aDd missioD&ries 
would have made little progress in the British coloq or protectorate 
whioh might have resulted from suoh interest. 
111thout an understalldillg of the geography of the islands , of 
their discovery, of the Dative people, am of the early American aDd 
European influences, one cam1ot •igh justly the prime arg\DII8nt of 
statehood proponents r that Hawaii is aDd has been, almost from the 
tilDe of discovery, an American frontier am an American compnm1ty. 
2 
But first comes the setting tor the sta:tehood stoey. llhat 
lfark T'wain called •the lovliest fleet ot islands that lies anchored 
in � ooean•1 is �omposed ot twnty isl..a.Dds. ranging from large, 
volcanic masses to coral reefs. Ot these. seven volcanic islands• 
lliihau, D.uai• Oahu. Kolotai, IaDai• llaui• and Ba.waii are i.lJhabited. 
The reJZ&ining isl.al:ids are little more tban masses ot rook or coral. 2 
From northwest to southeast. the archipelago extends some 1.600 miles, 
the principal islands spanning about 390 miles. The populated area 
ot the islands is 6.!149 square miles.3 
Due to a geologic past ot eruptions, earthquakes and tidal 
waws. the pr:baey topographic characteristic ot the islands is rugged-
ness. The island ot Hawaii• or Big Isl.al:id• boasts t1IO mountain peaks 
over 13.000 teet high. while its. area. already two thirds that ot the 
entire group. continues to grow by volcanic el'\tptiona.4 Only about a 
� h.osimile ot letter. s. L. Clemens to H. P. Wood• Nov­
ember 30. 1908, in alter Francis Frear. llark: Twain am Baw.ii (Chicagos 
Privately Printed by The lakeside Press. "i§li.7). taoing page 243. 
�ranois Carpenter, The Faoifio 1 Its lAnds aDd Peo� (lieW 
Yorka American Book Compan:y. l§lai). l7·l�lph s. ndall 
and A. Grove Day. Ba.waii s ! History (Hew York: Prentice-Ba.ll, Inc •• 
1948). 3. . 
3coll1er•s ll'orld Atlas and Ga.zetteer (New Yorka P. F. Collier 
and Son Corporation, 1�) • 62; StatehOod tor Ha:-.ii• HeariDgs, Pur­
suant to Bouse Resolution 3034. SubCommittee of the Coiiimittee on !erri­
tories, 74 Ccmgress, 1 Session (lrashingtona UD.ited states Government 
PriDting Ottice, 1936). 9• 
�deriok Silllpioh. Jr., �cause It Rains on Ba•ii.• The 
NatioD&l Geographic )lagaziDe, XCVI (llOYeDiber, 1�9). 578. 6oo.-
3 
tenth of' the area of' the isla.Dds can be described as approximateq 
level. The level• fertile areas are f'olUld in the 'ftlleya and :aarrow 
coastal plains. while the mountain slopes provide forest laDd and graz-
1ng areas • oahu has the best harbors • Honolulu and Pearl. There are 
no h.rse rinrs or la.k:Bs.5 
A year-round temperate clime.te • averaging about 74° F • at 
Honolulu. is ma.rred by an UliBven rainfall which :ma.kBs irrigation a 
moesaary adjunct to agrioulture.6 
ll'ith its principal isla.Dds � jut south of' the Tropic of' 
Cancer. Hawaii's location allllost midw.y between the Americas and Asia 
ma.kes obvious its atra.tegio position both oOJIIII8roially and militarily. 
As they were the supply depot f'or the sailing vessels of' the last cen-
tt117' • the islands are the center f'or modern sea and air route� • To the 
United states their importance is implicit in their formation. with 
Alaska and American Samoa. ot a defense line tor the ma.inl..alld.. Their 
title ot the •crossroads of' the Pacific" is no misnomer. and it is a 
-
matter of' some surprise that it was 1778 before they became known to 
the civilized world. 
On Jan1ary lB. 1"178. the English captain. James Cook• sighted 
Oahu. 1 Whether this event was the discovery or the rediscovery of the 
islands• the tact remains that the world at large was una:ware of Hawaii's 
5George B. Cressey. Asia's lAnds am Peoples (llew York a McGraw­
Hill Book COJrJp&ey. Inc •• 19li4). 7; Carpe'iiter. !E.!. cit .. 470. 481. 
6colller•s. 2R.!. �· 166. 
7Jobll. lf •
. 
Vandercook• � CaDe (!lew York: Harper and Brothers. 
PUblishers. 1939). 2. -
4 
existence until that date. 8 Cook had b"n aent by the Barl of Sandwich 
in aearoh of a sea passage trcm the Pa.oitio to the Atlantic around North 
aerioa.9 Although he continued northward after a ahort atop to tab 
10 on .upplies at Kauai, Cook would later characterize his discowey as 
one "which, though last, seemed in � respeot. to be the aoat iapor-
tant tba t had hitherto been •de by Europeans throughout the extent of 
the Pacific Ooean.•11 ReturDil:lg in Wovember o� the same year, he sailed 
along the coasts of Jlauai and Big Iala.nd, traded w1 th the DAtives and 
reoeiwd visits frca their ohiefs, and finally stopped in Big Island'• 
Xea.l.akekua Bay in JI.Duary, 1779 • 
Although Cook was first treated with great kindness, relatione 
with the natiws soon deteriorated due to the cOiltinuous demands of 
8J. c. Furnas, �tcay' of Paradise (Bew Yorka William Sloane 
.Usooiates, :rnc., 19�), 109. For a dlacuaaioa of evidence of pre­
vious Spauiah diacowey, see OSgood l3'arq &Dd Glenn s. Dumke, A B1atoey 
of the Paoitic Area in Modern !imes (Boatona Roughton Jlifflin-Cam.pauy, 
1949), 161, iAd J•me•A. W11liamaon, Cook ai1d the OpeDing ot the Pacific 
{!lelf York 1 The Jlao)fi llau CCIIIlp&Jl1', 191i8'J. 2N:f • -yor a retutati OD. ot the 
Spanish theoey, see Iu;ykeudall aud Day, op� cit�. 13, &D.d hrnas, op. 
cit .. , 108. -- · -
9-r&Dderoook, op. cit
i4 
l-2J Williauon, �cit�, 188-198J Jtu7-
bndall and :Day, op�"O!t., • ---
lOJazLderoook, op� oit·�. 3J hnlas, .2!. cit., 110. 
1lquoted frCIIIl Cook's JolU"'I&l by William Bllia, Polynesian Re­
searohea, During A Reaidenoe of led¥. tight Years in the Sooie'tY""'&nd 
SilidWioh Ial&iida TJew Yorka T. au • lfArPir, 183,).·1'r, 9. I s1Iglitly 
Cl!Herent woriing, w1 th the same meaning, is foUDd in A Voyage to the 
Pacific Ooe&DJ � • •  Performed UDder the Direct!.cm of Capta!ii8· C'Oo'k';­
dierke, &iid GOre, 1D the fears 1'N6, Irr7, 1t78, 1(7lJ, 1780, coiiiPITed 
trca 'EheTar!Oiii Ai'Oo'iii's ot Tha--:r-'royageHillierto"'""PiiDlfiliiQ (Phiia­
� Piibiisbed by Robert""15iiiiver, 1818), It, 53. 
5 
Cook's party tor supplies, the relations or the ships' companies with 
the native women and the natives• habit or taking whatever caught their 
tancry. When, a.tter leavillg on February 4, it was neoesaa.ry to return 
tor repairs, Cook tolmd. the natives hostile, and a controversY' over a 
boat stolen tram one ot the ships led to a skirmish in 11hich Cook, tour 
ot his men, and same natives wre killed on February- 14, 1779. Cook's 
aecond-in-cC)JIIID8nd �ged to settle the dispute, recovered the bodies 
ot Cook and the others and sailed north again in Jrarch. 
Short though the first visit ot the white man was, he left his 
mark on Ba�i. The trouble resultiDg in Cook's death undeceived the 
natives as to the godl.ila!l nature ot the whites. Seoondl7, in breaking 
I 
the native k:apua (taboos}, the white men demonstrated the impunity 
with which these native lan could be ignored. In. the third place, the 
white man left, in venereal disease, the first or a long list or tor-
eign diseases which were to contribute so much to the decline ot the 
native population.12 The designation, Sandwich Islands, Cook's salute 
to his patron, was another legacY' which would not be supplanted until 
JIIB.DY' ;years later by' the native name, Hawa.ii.13 
The people Cook found in the Hawaiian Islands had one thing in. 
common with him--they, too, had been sea adventurers. Between the fifth 
�rely and Dumke, 21!!. cit., 126, 168; Fur.Das, 21!!. �' 110.112. 
13Bardy and Dumke 1 � cit., 125 • 
and eighth centuries, l4 Polynesian pioDeers had sailed in outrigger 
canoes from either the Samoan or the Carolil:le group to Ha"Wai.i.15 
6 
Since, as it has been said, only climate and scenery are Ilative 
to BA'118.ii, 16 these first Ba:waiians, or later migrants, must have bro-ught 
domestic ani.Jials and plants, including sugar cane. Isolated f'ram their 
South Sea relatives after the fourteenth century, the Hawaiians de­
veloped their own culture. Although ca.nnibalism evidently -.s not a 
part of' that culture, infanticide, animal saorif'ices and same human 
sacrifices were,17 While his irrigation ditches and terracing attested 
to remarkable engilleerillg abilities, the Dative confined his f'armillg 
prl..arily to garden plots, si�e he spent much of' his time fishing.l8 
The Hawaiian commoner lived under a f'eudallstio system of gov­
el'JJIIIIBnt and land ownership. Be provided produce and labor to chief's 
in return for protection against raiders • Prescribing his every 
l4ror various estimates of the time of this migration, see 
Harold Whitman Bradley, The .American Frontier in Ba:waii, The Pioiieers, 
.!1.§2.-J.Bl.t3 (Stanf'ord Uniwnity, calitornia: s�tord tJniversity Press, 
19li2);-Ii:J Hardy and Dumke , �_cit., 1661 Xuy:kendall and Day, �cit., 
5; D. L. Crawford, •ua:•ii-�-.&tern Frontier,• Review of RiVI"� 
XCI-XCII (January, 1935), 59; Vandereook, 2E.!, cit,, 7. -
15Ibid,; Kuykendall and Day. 2E.:. cit., 5. 
16 . Silllpich, � cit., 573. 
17Bra.dley, � oit., 4; Simpioh, loo. cit,, 585: Vandercook, 
� ci�·· 7: Kuykendall and Day, .2E.!. cit,, ll; Furnas, .2E.!. cit., 34, 110, 117-11 • 
18Ibid. 1.1.4-115; Vandercook, .21?.!. cit. 7; Theodore Korgan, 
Hawaii, A CentUry 2!_ Econaaic Change, �6, Ba.rvard Economic Studies, 
iilii i "[cambridge, Ya.ssachusettsa Harvard University Press, 1948), 7:S. 
. ' 
activity were the kapus, which i"crmecl the basic law i"cr social rela­
tions, g09'8rDIIII8nt and religion. In denying certain privileges, the 
7 
kapus relegated women to an interior position, although chiei'tainnesses 
sometimes acted as regents and received certain marks of' respeot. Des-
pi te the power ot the chief's, no individual leader had gained control 
over the entire island group at the time of' discover,r.19 
�ss vigorous, less aggressive than some ot his southern rela-
tives, the Hawaiian ottered little resistance to white penetration. 
His tendency to absorb readily the white man's culture (in both its 
good and bad facets) demands apecial comment since the early, basic 
trend toward Americanization ot the islands came mainly through subtle, 
cultural influences, not by i"orce. But the Ha1miian paid dearly tor 
Western culture. Dis adoption ot Western Tices and his susceptibility 
to diseases ot both Western and later Oriental origin slashed the esti­
mated 300,000 population ot Cook's day to about �.ooo by 1823. The 
end of the nineteenth century tound the natives mustering only ten 
. 778 20 percent ot their numbers in 1 • 
Despite their numerical decline, the Hawaiians did not sutter 
the c cmplete eradication ot their culture. The present-day English ot 
1� •• �cit., 116, 126, 'Bardy and Dumke,� cit., 166. For fuller detaila ct early economic organization in Hawaii, see 
Korgan, �cit., Chapters II and III. 
20run.s, � cit., 106, 119, 123•l2Lu Vandercook, 2E.!. cit., 
50.. 52. 
8 
the islands is enriched qy expressive Hawaiian words.21 While the 
full influence of Hawaiian culture had never been determined to any 
exact degree� the authors of a recent book were praised because: 
Instead of Britinf, a volume in which the emphasis 
is upon the influence or civilization 1 upon the Hawaiian 
people, • • •  /f:hey7 have p-ovided a collection of anecdotes 
which, colleetTvely, suggest the extent to which the subtle 
influence or Hawaiian tradition and environment has molded 
the thinking of European and American residents or the 
archipelago.22 
In the interaction of American and Hawaiian cultures during 
the whole period or Hawaiian independence is to be found one or the 
keys to the present statehood �estion. Those who would object to 
the distinctive cultural overtones or the islands have failed to 
recognize the traditional pattern of American growth and develop-
ment� which has successtully encompassed three such varying pe.tterns 
or living as that of New England, the old South� and the Southwest. 
In this respect� Hawaii as a state would but add a new chapter to 
an old book. 
21For examples, see Simpich, loo. cit., 595-596; and Furnas� 
� cit., 119n. For a description oT'iiiotliir cultural reJIIIlant, the 
EUia�oe, see Mark Twain's account of 1866, included by Frear, � 
Cit:", 298. For Hawaiian DDlsic, as adapted f'rom American songs, par­
tiCUlarly hymns� see ibid., 10-11, 295; and Furnas, � cit., 193-194. 
2�rold Whitman Bradley in "Reviews of Books," The Pac ifio 
Historical Review, XI (lla.roh, 1942), 111. Mr. Bradley ureferrlUg 
to Bob Divis and George Armitage, Hawaii, U.s.A. (New York: Frederick 
A. Stokes Company� 1941). 
9 
Of' one particular native mentiCG must be nade, for Kameha.meha I 
was the central figure of the era in which Hawaii "grew up." The death 
-
of his uncle, king of Big Island, in 1782, signalized the beginning of 
a number ot civil wars, gradually engulfing the entire archipelago. 
Grasping this opportunity, Kamehameha by 1810 had merged, through 
conquest or cessicm, all of the islands into the Kingdom of Hawaii.23 
The resulting ability of the Hawaiians to meet foreign penetration as 
a unit ma.de feasible the islands' maintenance of independence through 
turbulent years. By providing peace and order, Kamehameha encouraged 
agriculture, fishing and other enterprises. His use ot white men as 
both military and civil advisers set a pattern for his successors.24 
It has been suggested that his absolutist rule, in obliterating the 
responsibility of the chiefs to the people, paved the way for great 
social and political change. His death certainly marked a great re­
ligious change.25 
The native Hawaiian re1igiCG was not unlike tba.t of the ancient 
Greeks, but its pantheon offered in its god of the spirit, Kane, a 
deity somewhat similar to the Christian divinity. While idols were 
23aardy and Dumke, � cit., 169-170; Bradley,� �, 9-10; 
Kuykendall and Day, � � �29. 
2"Hard;r and Dumke, op. cit., 170; Furnas, � cit., 121. 
25Ibid., 121-122; Hardy and Dumke,� �, 170-171. 
10 
used, it is believed that the Hawaiians worshipped them only as sym­
bols of more ephemeral things.26 
By 1819 the vitality of this religion was ebbing rapidly. The 
chief support of the religion had been the kapus, and, for some thirty 
years, the natives had observed that foreigners, natives tra�ling 
abroad, and even their chiefs, while drunk, either violated or ignored 
the k:apus without suffering divine punishment. Evidently only IOLmeha-
meha•s insistence upon the old rites bad kept the native religion alive 
for some years pa.st.27 In 1819 the new king, Ka.mehameha II, or Liholiho, 
violated one of the most vital kapus by eating with the women. This ex-
ample, plus royal orders to destroy all idols and shrines, sounded the 
death knell for the ancient faith.28 
At the time the native religion was falling into disrepute, 
New England Calvinists were facing, in the Unitarian movement, the 
specter of dissent. As part of an effort to strengthen their position, 
the Calvinists created the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions.29 
26To Enable the People of IDLwaii to Form A Constitution and a 
State Govei=iuaent, Hearin�, PiirBiia.nt to HOiis'i"Res'Olution !6!4, COiil- -
mittee on Territories, 1 Congress, 1 Session (Washin�ont United 
States Government Printing Office, 1935), 2-3. 
40-41. 
27Bradley, � !!!!• 8, 124-125; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 
28Bradley, op. cit., 125; Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Restless 
Rampart (Indianapolis:--ni'e Bobbs-llerrill Company, l94l), 20; Hardy 
and DWDlce, � eit., 174. 
29Bra.dley, � �· 121-122. 
11 
A few years later, . the plight of an Hawaiian boy, Harry 
Opukahaia, stranded in New Haven, Connecticut, led the American Board 
to train him and three other Hawaiian youths for missionary work in 
the islands. Opukahaia died in 1819 before ccmpleting his schooling, 
but his story was a stre11g miasianary impetus. There were novr volun-
teers for work in the islands, and, an October 15, 1819, Boston saw 
the birth ot the Sandwich Island Mission. Among its outstanding members 
were the Reverends As& Thurston and Hiram Bingham. 
In Jla.rch, 1820, the brig Thaddeus arriv ed in Hawaii with a 
cargo perhaps as meaningful for Hawaii as any that ever entered its 
ports. The New Englanders were granted leave to establish missicms, 
and, by July, bad stations on three islands. At the year's end the 
statian school had a bout ane hundred pupils. 
The Bible was completely translated into the native language 
by 1839,30 and KM.hu:manu, an ea.rl.y' c e11vert and regent for Liholiho and 
his younger brother, aided missionary progress b,y her insistence that, 
as soan as the chiefs learned to read, the commoners were to be taught.31 
Potent allies of the missionaries were their own wives and ohil-
dren. Their presence invalidated the charges of the anti-missionary 
whites that the .Americans were the vanguard of foreign aggression. The 
efficacy of the white man 1 s medicine and doctors, too, was a pOW'erf'ul 
�uykendall and Day, op. cit., 43-44; Furnas, � �� 128, 
145; Hardy and Dumke, �cit., 1"f!:r75. 
Slrurna.s, � cit., 133-134. 
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force for con version. Also, aware by 1820 of the dishonesty ·or some 
of the traders, the natives began to ally themselves with the mission-
aries in the tight against the abuses and immorality that were a part 
ot the early trading relationships with both Americans and Europeans.32 
The missionaries supplied real needs.33 They were successful, gen-
erally, in the tight tor law and order, while great strides were made 
in reducing illiteracy. So successful was the purely religious phase 
of the missionary work that, by 1848, Hawaii was considered a Christian 
nation; and, in 1863, the American Board turned over practically all 
of its financial and administrative duties to the Hawaiian Evangelical 
Assoc1aticn.34 
The greatest objection or the trading and foreign elements, 
h011rever, was to missionary interference in government, whereby blue-
laws and governme ntal reforms were instituted. Since native priests 
had always been advisers to the chiefs, it was scarcely surprising 
that, by 1824, Kamehameha III's government was consulting the priests• 
successors with regard to royal policy. A generation after 1820, five 
32Ibid., 129; Barber, op. cit., 21. Perhaps the traders were 
in full accord with :Mark Twain's 'C"<iDiii'ent, "Hart sad it is to think of 
the multitudes who have gone to their gravts in this beautiful island 
and never knew there was a helU" Reprinted by n-ear, op. cit., 288, 
from a letter written by Twain to the Sacramento Union, "1iar0Ji;J.866. 
3� • -l'"Urll&S 1 � 0 it • 1 138 • 
3'Bardy and Dumke, op. cit., 175; Kuykendall and Day, � eit., 
132-133; Sylvester Kirby Stevens, American Expansion � Hawa.i-r;-1842-
1898 (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Fennsy lvania, Inc., 
T9'4b) ' 31. 
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ot the missionary group had resigned to take up government positions. 
They tended to follow policies tor the protection of the people against 
the traders and other foreign elements; and, naturally, they were amen­
able to missionary intluence.35 Among these men were Dr. Gerrit p. 
Judd, able adviser in economics and foreign affairs, and the ex-
Reverend William Richards, by 1838 a �eader in Hawaiian diplomacy 
and constitutional development and, in 1846, the first minister of 
public instructian.36 
The Boston Board of Commissioners discouraged participation 
in political affairs, but the missionaries were in an odd position. 
To refuse requests tor advice would alienate the king and thereby en-
danger missionary progress. Also, to relinquish political influence 
would place their trader adversaries in a superior position. So the 
missionaries continued in governmental activities.37 Although lacking 
in political training, the missionaries were sincere in feeling they 
would provide the native government with more honest advice than would 
the commercial interests.38 
Some missionaries found their way into the economic lite ot 
Hawaii. Such was former ministerial student, J. A. Brinsmade, who, 
35Barber, �cit., 23; Furnas, 2.f!. �� 145-146. 
36Ibid., 146; Stevens, op. cit., 9-10; Bradley, op. cit., 308-
310,.319-323, 413-418, 428 et �� Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 
66-671 69-10, 73-75, 8le 
- --
37 Barber, � !!.!:_, 23-24. 
38Furnas, op. �� 146-147 • 
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with two partners, by 1833, had organized Ladd and Company, which 
handled most of the missionary business affairs and, probably through 
missionary influence, got a royal land grant for experimentation with 
a sugar plantaticn. Two other missionary workers, Samuel N. Castle 
and Amos Starr Cooke, established a wholesale and retail firm, the 
continued success of which numbers it among the "Big Five" of modern 
Hawaiian economic life. The missionaries frankly wanted business in 
dependable, moral hands, but Honolulu businessmen, understandably, 
were enraged at their economic power.39 In defense of this develop-
ment, one authority has written: 
There is no reputable evidence to support the charge 
that the missionaries deliberately misused their position 
to advance their own interests, and there is much evidence 
to indicate that they and their children were pushed into 
a favorable economic position by events over which they had 
only a minimum of control.40 
Of primary importance in the missionary role of bringing about 
American orientation of Hawaii was the strengthening of ties with the 
mainland. The missionaries, through their influential friends at horne 
and through the American Board, Dade their desires felt in the State 
Department. They had close relations with American naval officers 
39Ibid., 150; Barber, � cit., 25; Bradley, 2.E!. cit., 236-238, 244-246, 253; Vandercook, .£E.! Cit., 33, 155. -
�r ol d Whitman Bradley, "Reviews of Books," The Pacific His­
torical Review, XIV (June, 1945), 232-233. Mr. Br�dley was reviewing 
a boolt by Ale:zander )lac Donald, Revolt in Paradise: The Social Revo­
lution in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor (New Yorb Stephen Daye, J:ii'C:"; 
1944).-
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visiting Hawaiian ports and usually saw to it that commissioners and 
consuls appointed by the American government were men sympathetic with 
their interests. Their development ot tine sohools6 especially oahu 
College. brought to Hawaii in the gold rush years ot 1849 and the 
1850's the children ot Calitornians6 and many ot the missionary chil-
dren became prominent in Hawaiian atfairs6 thus perpetuating American 
influence. 41 Furthermore. their work stirred up American interest in 
Hawaii. Even the New York Journal 2!_ Commerce reported on their ac­
tivities. John Quincy Ada.ms6 in the House of Representatives in 1843, 
praised their work and gave their success as one ot the main reasons 
why the United States should support Hawaiian independenoe.42 
Another link with .America forged by the missionaries was the 
introductian of democratic principles. The native comm.aner found 
that he had a soul as important to the missianaries as the soul ot a 
chiefJ and, as democratic government developed in the islands, mis­
sionary influence provided political ideas basically American.43 
But the main influence ot the missionaries was more subtle l 
• • •  it was a simpler age. Those with a conviction of 
right--and the people ot the Thaddeus were utterly convinced-­
then differentiated little betWeen the rightness of their 
4ls-t;evens, �cit., 28-29; Ray Lyman Wilbur. "statehood for 
Hawaii, n Atlantic J.fcintli!y.' CLXVI (October, 1940), 494; Hardy and Dumke, 
� cit., 175; FUrnas, � cit., 131; Walker Matheson, "Hawaii P�eads 
tor '!titehood, n � Nor�.Aii8r!"can Review, CCXLVII {Spring, 1939), 132. 
42 
. 
Stevens, �cit., 7-8; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 175-176. 
See also footnote � 
4�rnas, � cit., 137; Ste"''ens, 2!!. cit., 9-lo. 
theology and the rightness of their clothes. their customs 
and their way of life. It was impossible for them to think 
of teaching the one without the other.44 
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The missionaries did not leave New England--they brought it with them. 
And so caretully. if unconsciously. did they tend this transplanted 
culture. that it became an inextricable part or Hawaiian life. During 
the reign of' Kamehameha IV (1854-1863). British prestige tended to 
overshadow the missionaries. but their work during the early. crucial 
years. when Hawaii was first learning western ways. served to vitiate 
and negate any later f'areign inf'luences.45 But .Americans were also 
competing suooesstully with the British in another sphere. 
The cmmnerce of' Hawaii between 1778 and 1830 was monopolized 
by furs. sandalwood and whale oil. Sandalwood was a product of' the 
islands; the other two were significant as commodities in trade which 
found Hawaii a convenient shipping center.46 Although there was some 
overlapping. each of these cmmnodities had its awn span of suprenacy. 
A publication of 1784 ocmoerning Cook's last trip mentioned 
Cantonese interest in furs picked up on the coast of North America. 
Traders in search of profits immediately were intrigued. In 1785 
the Chinese-financed. tur-trading expedition of' Captain James Hanna 
returned from the .American coast via Hawaii. thus setting the Pa.ttern 
44vandercook. �cit •• 12-13. 
45sarber. op. cit •• 24-25; Matheson. loo. cit •• 131. Bradley. 
op. cit. • has an eieen:eiit account of' the early in'ISsl'onary work in 
ChApters_ III. IV and VII .  
46.aalph s. Kuykendall. •Early Hawaiian C011D11ercial Development. n 
The Pacific Historical Review. III (December. 1934). 365. 
tor future tur tra.de routes . Between 1786 and 1787 some eight Tea-
eels stopped in Ha'W&.ii while pursuing this trade and, in August of 
1789, the united States was first represented by the Columbia. In 
a decade "fur trader' had become almost synonomous with 8Yankee," 
and earlier British dominance disappeared. 47 
.Alllerican traders,  denied their former British trading haunts 
with the end of the Revolution, had been searching tor new fields 
ot prot! t. The Blllpre ss 2!_ China's voyage in 1784-1785 had given 
momentum. to the Chinese tra.de, but .AJ!lericans we re handicapped by 
haTing no goods acceptable at Canton in exchange tor the exotics of 
the East. The f'ur trade, in sea otters and later in aeale, tilled 
the bill.4B ' 
The fur trade served to point up the n.lue of the islands as 
a oonwDient supply depot, an excellent wiDteriDg spot tor traders 
sailing in the northern seas and a place of rest tor the hard-working 
crews . These advantages were· put to work by the American fur traders 
who stopped in Bi.waii between 1800 and 1815, either en route to the 
nortltwest ooast from Cape Born or from the North .Amerioan ooast to 
China. The value of the Hawaiian porta was iDCreased by the growing 
47Bra.dley, op. oit., 12, 13, 15, 17J BLrd;y and Dumke, � oit., 
169. For a va.eyin'g"iooomt as to the t!rst 1hip to use Ba:w&ir&sa­
way-station in the tur trade route to China, see )(organ, op. oi t., 57-
58. Bradley's account, used in this paper, is  well doczenter.-
�r&dl•7• � cit., 13-14. 18J Hardy and Dumke, � cit., 131. 
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facilities for repair and refitting of ships.49 After 1815 the tur 
trade lost its supremacy in Hawaiian commerce, and b,y 1828, had ex­
pended its foroe.50 But another commodity already had developed which 
far outdistanced the fur trade in its effects upon Hawaii. 
The possibilities of the sandalwood trade were recognized as 
early as the 1790's, but the trade received its tall impetus after 
the return of British-American peace in 1815. This trade tended to 
vacillate from low to high points throughout the era of its dominance .. 
The high peaks of the trade came in 1817-1818, 1821, and 1827-1829. 
By 1831 the trade had lost all importance. Factors in the decline 
were the diminishing supply and quality of wood, the surfeiting of the 
chiefs' needs for American goods exchanged for the wood, the increasing 
indebtedness of the chiefs to American traders, and finally the shift 
ot the Chinese to better sources.51 
But the brief span of the sandalwood period produced results 
out of all proportion to its length. While the Hawaiians, especially 
the commoners, received little lasting benefit from the trade, it 
brought the islands to the attention of American commercial concerns, 
49Bra.dley, � �� 21-23, 25-26. 
50Ibid., 72, 74. 
5libid., 53-55, 26-32, 57, 60-66, 116-117; Kuykendall and Day, 
� oit., 41. 
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Interested the miuionaey-minded in the needs of the natives, and led 
the State Depar-tment to appoint a camaeroial agent to the islands.52 
The question of the sandalwood debts, in addition to the prob-
lem ot increasing numbers of deserters tram whaling ships, brought 
Captain Thana• ap Catesby Jones, ccmmumding the u.s.s. Peaoock, to 
Hawaii. Going beyond his instructions, Jones negotiated with the Ha­
waiian govei'DIILellt its first formal treaty in December of 1826. The 
matter of the payment of debts was settled separately, the treaty it-
self pro'rlding most-favored-Dation• s provileges, Hawaiian cooperation 
in apprehending whaling ship deserters and aid in the sal'V&ge of AJleri-
can shipwrecks. The U'l1i ted states govei"Dilent took no aotion regarding 
this treaty, but Alnericana in Hawaii, even in 1837, considered it bind-
ing, aDd the Hawaiian rulers kept ita pro"fiaiol18 through fear of United 
states reprisala.53 .� 
52Furn&s, op. cit., 119·121; Vandercook, �cit., llu KUykendall 
and Day, � cit., li2=43; Bradley, op. !!:!:• 12()"'flra.i'a'Y"&nd D\:lnke, � 
oit., 1� · 
'53p.or text of treaty, see David Htmter Killer, ed., Treaties and 
Other InterD&tional .Aota of the U'l1i ted States ot AJDerioa (Washington I 
tiiiited States Govermnent 'Prin:efng office, 1931=- ), III, 269-272; 
ibid., 273-281, presents extensive notes on the treaty. Killer refers 
to this treaty as •Articles of Arra.ng-.nt.• For account ot Jones• 
v.l.si t, his orders, the petitions of New EDgland whaling interests lead­
ing to the expedition, and a copy of the tax regulations imposed by the 
Hawaiian Xing to pay the sandalwood debts, see House Report Bo. 92, 
28 Congress, 2 Session, 1-6, B-14, 18-19. Hereatter cited aS"!oUie 
Report !To. 92• For high opinion of House Camnittee on Foreign illairs 
ot the ethoaoy of this non-official treaty, see ibid., 3• See &110 
KUykendall, loo. cit., 379·380; Bradley, op. cit., 105-110; Kuykendall 
and Day, op.--ort'.:;I; Hardy and Dumli:B, op;-o'I't.; 179• For the role of 
United sta"ti's!iiVal officers as ambassadors In'iarly years, see Matheson, 
loc. cit.
4 
131, and Senate Executive Document lio. 77, 52 Congreu, 2 
'!i'ii on, • Hereatter this doolD.ent Will be ortidas Senate Document 
!2.!.11· 
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Sandalwood, in its day, was the principal medium of exchange, 
and only sugar would replace in vol"�:Gm the export of a native product.54 
It was now the turn of a third trading interest. 
Ha"W&.ii 's location near the southern wba.ling grounds and the dis-
covery of the llha.ling areas ott Japan, whose ports were denied to for-
eigners, brought whalers into Honolulu Harbor as early as 1819 or 1820. 
Growth of the trade 118.S so rapid that in 1829 almost two hundred whaling 
ships visited Hs.ll&.ii. The whalers found a new use for Hawaii as a. point 
of transshipment--whale oil was brought to Hawaii by the llha.lers and 
tra.nsported thence in other ships. Aga.in, as in the :f'ur and sandalwood 
trade, the vessels were mainly .American.55 
One of the results of the early trade 'W8.s the great increase in 
the foreign population. Contemporary estimates of 1817-1818 placed 
the number of European and .American residents at between one and two 
hundred.% Another development was that Ba:waii had become more than 
a convenience to specific enterprises such as the fur and whaling trades. 
It had become an important world distributing center. The islands serYed 
both as a gathering point for goods from the Pacific area to be shipped 
to all parts of the world and as a temporary storehouse for American, 
Asiatic, and European goods intended for the Pacific area. 
54�lldall, �cit., 368; Furnas, � cit., 120. 
55Furna.s, .2E.!. cit., 123, 148; Stevens, 2E.!. cit., 11; Bradley, 
.21?..!. cit., 79-80, 215; Hardy and Dumke, .2E.!. �. 177; Morgan, �cit., 
75-7� 
�raday, � cit., 34. 
21 
Important not only as it indicated the growth of trade but as 
it emphasized .American c0111lDercial predaminance was the presence by 1831 
in Honolulu of nine American-controlled mercantile houses, four of them 
dating from 1823.57 
While one authority bas written that the " • • •  sandalwood trade 
was the foundation of the earliest noticeable American influence in 
the Hawaiian Islands • • •  , tt58 the tact cannot be overlooked that 
the earlier fur trade was dominated by Americans. It might be safer 
to say, as does another writer, that American traders in general 199re 
second only to the missionaries in bringing about a weakening of the 
British influence in favor of the yoWJ.ger D&tion.59 
In order to evaluate the vital contribution of the trader and 
the missionary to the growth of .Allerioan bias in the islands, it is 
necessary to gauge the in.i'luenoe of the three early European entrants 
into the arena of foreign activities in Hawaii. While the first French 
attempts were repulsed and the Russian activities never received the 
Czar's aanotion, the British made decisive inroads on the emotional 
and intellectual life of the islands. 
French activities in the islands before 1830 were not menacing 
and came, oddly enough, from the machinations of one individual, Jean B. 
57XUyteDdall, loc. cit., 381, 383; Bradley, � cit., 118. 
58:Br&dley, .2£:. cit., 119. Bradley writes (page 18) of the 
reference by the re�lanimok:u, in 1826, to the United States 
President as "our chief in America. • 
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Rives. who accompanied Liholiho to London in 1823 as his secretary. 
At Liholiho's death, Rives went to France 1llhere, through pretense of 
having weight in the Ha:waiian govermaent, he gained French governmental 
sanction and private financial support for an e:x:pedi tion that lftl.S to 
establish a French colony and a Roman Catholic mission in Ha:waii. 
After an unsuccessful attempt in 1826, a second expedition 
reached Halftl.ii the next year. The Hawaii� govermaent disavowed Rives' 
actions, but reluctantly permitted the colonists to disembark and finally 
allo-.ed them land for cultivation and construction of living quarters. 60 
By 1828 only seven colonists, three of' them missionaries, remained. 
Except for the followers of the governor of Oahu, Boki, whose loyalty 
to the royal house was suspect, the priests found few supporters. In 
two years they gained about one hundred converts. 6l 
When Bold threatened rebellion in 1828, the priests were sus­
pected of complicity, and the govel"'JJJent forbade further native partici-
pation in Catholic services. Partly because some converts di:sobeyed 
this edict and partly because the goven:DZ�Bnt felt that two religions 
might cause dissension among the natives, the two remaining priests 
118re expelled to California in 1831, the government paying their way.62 
60George Verne Blue, "The Project for a French Settlement in the 
Ha.1VB.iian Islands, 1824-1842." The Pacific Historical Review, II (:March, 
1933 ) , 85-89; Kuykendall and Day• 2E.!_ cit., 56-57; Bradley, 21?.!. �· 185. 
61 . Blue, loo. oi t., 9o-9lu Bradley, 2E.!. cit., 185-186; lil.rdy and 
Dumke, 2E.!. cit ;;Y'f9-;--
�lue, .!22.:, cit •• 96; Hardy and Dumke, !E.!.�. 179; Bradley, 
2E.!. cit., 204. Bradley bas an excellent discussion of the political 
aspects of' this affair on pages 203-211. 
Undoub-tedly, American missionary influence -.s arrayed against the 
French Catholios .63 The American Board later uphe ld this attitude in 
announcing that it was the duty of its missionaries to point out the 
•errors • of Catholicism.64 'lhile these events ended the French in-
-
fluenoe tor a few years, this insult to the Catholic religion and to 
French natioll&ls would rankle . 
Having no religious implications but more serious political 
effects , the Rus sian move on the islands had come some years earlier.  
The important fur-trading post of the Russian .AJra rican Compaey at Sitka 
(in Alaska ) tolllld Hawaii a convenient s ource of supplies . Following 
two exploring vessels in lB<i,., a ship, sent by Alexa.nder Baranov, chief 
Sitka agent, in 1809, liB.S believed by one of its non-Russian passengers 
to be on a colonizing mission, but no such attempt was made .65 
In 1815 Ba�ov sent Georg Anton Scheffer, a German physician, 
to Hal'IB.ii ostensibly to salvage the contents of a shipwrecked ·Russian 
vessel. But Scheffer was soon writing to of'f'ioials of the Russian .Ameri-
can Camp� that he had been granted land on Oahu. However, when he be-
gan construction or a tort at Honolulu, reportedly under the Russian flag, 
he was ordered to leave . 
Going to Kauai, Scheffer by 1816 had agreements with the chief 
of the island which provided a Russian protectorate over Kauai and Niihau 
63�11 and Da.y, 21?..!. .2i!?.!• 57: Bradley, � =lli• 207-209; 
stevens ' 21?..!. �. 15 .  
�l'&.dley, .2£.!. cit ., 187-188. 
6.5Ibid., 47-48; Kuykendall and Day, � 2J:!:., 35 . 
and a sandalwood monopoly for Scheffer• s company. In return� the chief 
was to get Russian military support in ousting Kameha.meha ·I from oahu. 
Scheffe r reigned supreme on Kauai for almost a year, but .American traders , 
having acted as interpreters for Scheffer, reported his activities to 
Kamehameha I, whose order for expulsion 1118.S probably received gratefully" 
by the chief, now weary of Scheffer' s insolence . After a brief resis-
tance, the Russians were toroed to leave in 1817 • 
Scheffer attempted to get ottieial bacld.Dg for his scheme but 
the Czar repudiated his activities,  as did Baranov. The Czar probably 
was mindful of the strong British claims to the archipelago, but Great 
Britain DBither took the Russian moves seriously nor made aey attempt 
to strengthen her claims on Hawaii through colonization, as was strongly 
urged at the time by a British :uaval of'ficer • 66 However indifferent 
Britain seemed, no other nation' s  hold upon the islands was so obvious 
in this period • 
Most significant was the fact that the British had a clear claim 
to Ha'WB.ii by virtue o� Cook• s  discoYery in 1778. Nor were the impli-
cations of Cook • s  vis�t lost upon the islanders . Despite .American trad-
ing supremacy after 1790, Irameha.meha I and his chiefs retained great 
admiration for Great Britain. Other factors f'avorable to Britain were 
pleasant associations with visiting British naval officers and the loyal 
services rendered !Qunehameha by two of his most trusted advisers , Isaac 
Davis and John Young, both former English sailors . Marrying native 
66:eradley, � cit., 49-52,; Kuykendall and Day, 2.2.!. cit ., 36. 
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women and settling in the islands, these two men at various times acted 
as governors of' individual islands . Two other Britons held military 
and naval positions under Kamehameha .67 
From 1792 to 1794 captain George Vancouver made three trips to 
the is lands . In the latter year he :negotiated with Kamehameha I and 
the chief's an agreement which he believed invo lved outright ces sion of 
the islands to Britain. although the Ha:waiians probably intended only 
to secure British proteotion. Various ciroUDIStances .  including Parlia-
m.ent 1 s  preoccupation with other matters . defeated further action in 
support of Vancouver' s �· Ka.mehameha I desig:oated himself in 1811 
a subject of George III. but. again• evidently did not propose thereby 
to place his kingdom under British sovereignty-. After Vancouver 's  
visits , few British naval vessels stopped at the islands . but the at-
fection for Britain l&sted, as did the impression of British para­
mountcy.68 Kamehameha I only discontinued his use of the British flag 
during the War of 1812 in order to assure the United States of Ha.1118.ii ' s  
neutrality. In a compromise flag. raised in 1816. the Union Jack 118.s 
relegated to one corner and: red, white and blue stripes were added. 69 
67The saying of the Hawaiians , regarding the British and .Ameri­
cans at this time. was. "The English have men-oi'-war, but the Americans 
have only whalers and tra.ding-vesse ls.8 Quoted in petition of New Bed­
ford citizens to President Adams (n. d.} ,  House Report No . 108. 29 
Congress , l Session, 12. See also Bradley, � cit ., 41'=42�7-38. 
68Ibid •• �-W>; Hardy and Dumke, � cit., 172; KUykendall and 
Day. 33-34. 
�s • .!!E.:. cit., 122; Bradley, 2E.!. cit., 1..6-47; Kuykendall 
and Da.y, � cit •• 37. 
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When, in 1810, Kameh.ameha I, possibly in fear of Russian desi'gns, 
begged George III to send a British man-of-war to Hawaii, he found it 
necessary to repeat his request before he received a reply, which, llhi le  
very friendly, gave no indication that Britain regarded Hawaii as a 
protectorate .7° 
In 1822 Liholiho spoke or putting the islands under British 
protection, 71 and it was Liholiho ' s  fate to die while on a visit to 
England in 1824. The British government instructed Lord Byron, who es-
corted the bodies of' the king and his wife to Hawaii, to take the islands 
under British protection if any foreign power seemed likely to seize 
them, but there was no implication of outright annexation. Ho�ver, it 
was during these months that the first British consul arrived in Hawa.ii, 72 
and the pro-British attitude of' the Hawaiian royal family did not die 
with Li.holiho. 
The early years of Hawaii ' s  life on the world stage , 1778-1830, 
were years of' fusion. Into the crucible went four main elements : 
( 1) the :ca.tive HAwaiian civilization, (2)  trade , (3 ) missionary activi-
ties ,  and (4) the inf'luenoes of France, Russia and Great Britain . It 
70.S radley, .2E.!. oi t . , 48-49. 
71K'aykendall and Day, .2E.!. cit ., 47. 
72Ibid. ,  47-48; Stevens , � cit .,  14; Bradley, £E.!. oit ., 101 . 
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported in House Report !2!,_ �� 2, 
or the good impression mde by Lord Byron in Ha•ii, and further stated 
that the " • • • English government had contrived to possess itse lf' ot 
a very large share of the conf'idenoe of those islands ." There is a 
:f'urther statement that the British consul-general, in 1826, claimed 
Hawaii "'IB.s under English sovereignty • 
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is notable that the last-na:med e lement, with the possible exception 
of Great Britain, was mainly active through informal channe ls . The day 
of diplomacy was sti ll in the offing . 
But the most significant development of the era 'WB.S that , while 
great European powers alternately evinced interest and disinte rest in 
the is lands , the Ama rioa.n sea captains and merchants plied their trade 
and the Yankee missionarie s taught the Bib le, bound not in leather but 
in New EnglAnd wrapping paper .  73 A new patte rn for conquest ha.d al­
ready come into being . 74 
�radley, � cit . ,  52, expresses this same idea. 
14chail"DiU1 John Quincy Adams of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in 184; spoke e loquently of this new type of conquest • See 
Senate Report � 227, 53 Congre ss, 2 Se ssion, 121 . He reafte r cited 
as Senate Repo rt No . 227. For an outline of the important events in 
these early :years, see extracts from c .  c .  Bennett, "The Hawaiian 
Directory and Historical Sketch of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Is lands , "  
ibid., 155-156. 
CHAPTER II 
THE GROWTH OF A KINGDOlt 
One statehood quali1'ication claimed tor Hawaii-its historical 
American orientation--requires increasing attention in the review or 
the years from 1830 through 1890. But bases of other averred qualiti-
cations--years of independent existence and practice in self-goverraD8nt, 
economic stability, the successfUl blending of ma.x:ay racial cultures into 
a democratic society and a long-standing public school system--must be 
traced through the period or Hawaii's  growth or :aational maturity. 
In their :uainte:cance or independence. the Hawaiians. atter 1830. 
chiefly dealt with three :cations : France, Great Britain and the United 
States. 
A lull in Catholic persecution after 1832 ended in 1837 with the 
re:f'usal of residence to three priests (two ot whom were French) and 
Kam.ehameha III 's  decree against the teaching and practice of Catholicism. 
Another era of native Catholic persecution reached a high point in 1839. 
But, in that year fear o:f French retailiation and other taotors brought 
about religious toleration.! 
!Bradley, � ci5•• 287-294; KuykBIJdall and Dq, � cit •• 58-
60; Furnas, � cit.,  1-152. For the extent of persecution, its 
causes and the .American missionary role in it, see Bradley, 2E.!. citi' 
293-298. and Hardy and Dumke, 2l2.!. cit.,  180. That the policy or to er­
ation, later guaranteed in Ha"'IB.iian constitutions , was enforced is evi­
dent in the fact that in the 1890' s  there "Were 29,685 Protestants in 
comparison with 20, 072 Catholics .  See the report ot Captain G .  P. 
Scriven and Lt. J. Y. 14. Blunt in Senate Report � 227, ,53 .  
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But the French, self-appointed defenders of Catholicism in 
the Pacific, were past mollification. Naval Captain c .  P. T .  Is.plaoe 
arrived in Honolulu in 1839 and forced a treaty, the main provisions 
ot 'Which guaranteed Catholics freedom and privi leges equal to those 
ot Protestants and emoted a 120, 000 bond tor future good behavior. 
lAplace then required more : the tria l of accused Frenchmen by foreign 
jurors se leoted by the French consul and entry of French liquors with 
a limited duty. These clauses not only introduced partial e:rtra-
territoriality, later gained by Great Britain, but made void a previous 
BLwaiian law ba.mli.ng importation of intoxicants . 2 
Despite the beginning of construction of a Catholic church and 
establishment of mission schools by 1840, tension over re ligion and 
liquor ilDportation continued. The Catholic charges of discrimination 
in the marriage and school laws brought protests from the French consul 
and demands in 1842 from another French naval ottioer. The King ' s  ret-
erenoe to his emissaries en route to France to resolve outstanding dif­
ferences persuaded this ottioer to abandon his demands .3 
The Anglo-French recognition of Ha:wa.iian independence in 18!0 
did not ease tears ot French aggre ssion, although the 120,000 bond was 
returned in 1846. A new treaty signed in this year still contained 
2senate Document � ]1. 33-34-J Bradley, � cit., 291-292, 311-
314, 317-319; Kuykendall and Day, 2.P.!. cit ., 6o-6�Hardy and Dumke ,  .5?.1?.!. 
cit., lBQ-181, 183, 629J Furnas , � cit ., 152-153; Commissioner L. Sev­
erance to Secretary of State D .  Webster, March 12, 1851, Senate Docu-� � J:L,  as . -
3stevens, � j�·· 15J Hardy and Dumke ,  � cit., 1811 Intykendall 
and Day, � oit .-;bl ; Bradley, � cit. ,  418-420. 
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undesirable features tor Hawaii . After 1848 old troubles were stirred 
by a new consul and led to a visit in 1849 by Admiral de Tromelin1 who 
met the re:f'usal or more demands with a short-llved1 destructive occu-
pation or various Honolulu buildings . a.i'ter which he and the consul lett. 
A futile Hawaiian mission to France to gain reparations tor this action 
and a more e quitable treaty was f'oll0118d by French Commissioner Emile 
Perrin' s reaffirmation. in 1851, of' de Tromelin's demands . Howver, 
Perrin's  discovery of' the King ' s  plan to cede the islands to the United 
states in event or further French aggression led to a temporary agree-
:ment and the threat of French arms never again plagued the islands . 
A treaty, effective in 1858, relieved Hawaii or some objectionable res-
trictions and provided tor the abrogation or others atter a ten-year 
period. In 1873 these remaining restrictions were repudiated by the 
Hawaiian gover.ament.4 
But the French were not Ha11aii '  s only international problem. 
�le the British gover.ament seemingly never desired possession or 
Hawaii, British residents or the islands were concerned over the sharp 
decline of' British inf'luenoe f'ram 1815 to 184o5 llhen .America:o. COJIIID9rcial, 
l.Jsenate Document No . Jl, 64-65, 68-74; Kuykendall and Day, � 
cit., 72-73, 110; Hardy &iid Dumke, � cit ., 184-1851 629; Stevens , 2.2.!. cit., 50-53; Richard 11'. Van Alstyne, Great Britain, the United States,  
and Ha-.iian Independence , 1850-18551 "  The Pacific Historical Review, 
IV (March, 1935 ),  16, herea.tter cited a'B"1"Hawaiian Independence ;6 
Osborne E .  HOoley, �waiian Negotiations tor Reciprocity, 1855-18571 " 
� Pacific Ristorical Review, VII (Jrme 1  1938), 140. _ 
5�ndall and Day, .2E.!. ill!,, 58-59; Bradley, � cit.� 281-282, 
299-300. For text o£ the treaty, see Senate Document No . Jl, 3 .  
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agricultural and missionary activities tar outdistanced British efforts . 
By 1830 Britain had lost to the United States, in �waiian eyes, the 
role of guardian. The brief but startlillg resurgence of British trade 
from. 1840 to 1841 only tended to align British and American residents 
of the islands in two hostile camps • Several Hawaiian court; decisions 
against British subjects in which the opposing litigants were either 
Americans or had .American support fed the !'lama .  Complaints over these 
decisions and other matters brought the �val commander Lord George 
Paulet to Honolulu in February of 1843.6 
)(eamdlile, Hawaiian envoys ll'.l.lliam Richards and Timothy Haalilio 
had succeeded by April of 1843 in gaining a written promise of reoogni-
tion of independence from Britain, as well as strong assurances of sim-
ilar aotion by France and Belgium. Then news o£ Paulett s seizure of 
the islands arrived in London. :Meeting Paulet • s  first demands, the 
Hawaiian gover.ta��ent, upon furt;her British requests , had ceded the islands 
to Britain, contingent upon final action by the London govermDSnt, which, 
it was felt, would refuse the cession.7 Paulet r s  virtual dictatorship 
of five months ended with the arrival of his superior officer, who 
6arad1ey, � cit., 265, 270, 333 , 394-397. 399-400, 409, �-
428; Kuykendall and Day, 2R.!. cit., 65-66. 
7Aotillg Co�roial Agent W. Booper to Webster, March 7, 1843, 
Senate Document No . If.., 41-48.: extracts from. Jame s F.  B .  Marshall, 
HAn Unpublished Chapter of B'a;waiian History, " Harper' s :Magazine 
(September, 1883 ), in Senate Report; � 227, _ 138-141; extracts !'rom 
James Jackson Jarves ,  The History of the Hawaiian Islands ( 1846),  in 
ibid. ,  W.,.-149.: Bradley, � cit .,4'2'8-434, 447-450; Kuykendall and 
Day, � cit ., 64-66J Stevens , � cit ., 3..4-16. 
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returned the islands to the King on JUly 31.8 While the British govern-
m.ent was quick to stamp Paulet• s action as una.uthorized, it used the lewr 
ot occupation and praadsed recognition to settle the complaints ot its sub-
jecta against the Hawaiian goTeruaent and to insure French recognition ot 
Hawaiian independence . The tiDal joint declaration ot the two powrs rec­
ognizing Hawaii•  s independence came on November 28, 1843 • A new English 
treaty was signed reluctantly by the Hawaiian ld.ng in February, lBW.I., tor 
it extended to the British the same two restrictions upon Hawaiian sov­
ereignty contained in the Laplaoe treaty.9 
After this time, increasing .Anglo-French cooperation seemed aimed 
in part at preventing .AJaerban possession ot the islands. The Hawaiian­
American annexation negotiations ot 1854 brought strong protests f'rom 
B ri ta.in and even talk ot war.10 
The reigns ot Kamebameh& IV and Kamehameha V wre markedly pro-
English. The tom.er• s preterenoe tor Bngliah institutions was shared by 
hie halt-BD.glish queen, Emma. The introduction ot the Anglican Church 
by these two 118.8 one manifestation ot the British trendJ another was 
�radley, � cit. , 436-W.aOJ Stevena, op. cit. ,  19J Kuykendall and 
Day, �. cit. , 6'{-0ff;--rurn..s, on. cit. , 154-lm 'lrirdy and Dumke ,  op. cit. , 
181-1'82'; - .;;.&.;.. - - -
9For text ot the �lo-lllwaiian treaty ot 1844 see, Senate Doo1111ent, 
No. 77, 61. See also, E .  ITerett, u. s. ll:l.nister to London, :So §ecretary 
ot StAte .A.. P. Upshur, J.ugust 5, 1843, ibid., 133; Bradley, � cit., l05-
J.I,3J Kuyt&Ddall and Day, op. cit., 68-8), van Alstyne, •Bawa!Iiii"'"EiLpen­
denoe, 11 15-16. For text 0'!'1:;lii'Joint declara.tion see, Senate DocUIIlent No. 
n. �. ---
10 6 Ibid., 87, 102-103, 125-12 , 120 ;  Richard w. Van .Alstyne, ed.,  
"ADglo-aencan Relations, 1853-1857," 1'he .Ailerican Rl.atorical Review, 
XLII (April, 1937),  494-498. HereatterGrted as 1.Angio-ill8r!can Rela­
tions .• See alao, Stevena, op. cit., 66-f$, 71 J Van Alstyne, •:sawaiian 
Independence," 19-22. - -
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the gradual disappearance o:f Americans :from the cabinet. An unsatis­
factory British treaty in 1846 was :followed in 1851 by a treaty reliev-
ing Hawaii of' all c laims -qpon its sovereignty. The nonexecuted British 
Coolie Convention will be discussed later, but visits of' Hawaiian royalty 
to London continued to disturb the United States . Whi le British con-
cern in the lB70 1 s  over the Hawaiian-American Reciprocity Treaty was 
eased by the conviction that it would p revent annemtion, the British 
did protest the renewal granting the United States the use ot Pearl 
Harbor. The role o:f the British pos sessions as a market :for Hawaiian 
sugar threatened .American commerce :for a short period, but in 1874 the 
Americans won another round with the e lection of' Kalakaua to the Hawaiian 
throne instead of' the pro-British Emma •11 
British-Hawaiian relations during these years, with the exception 
o:t the Paulet seizure, we re  mainly concerned wi tb. Hawaii 1 s attempts to 
gain a .:fair and equitable treaty of' canmerce and :friendship and Britain' s 
watchful concern over American and French moves toward annexing the 
islands . But the continued English proclivities o:f the royal family, 
l�mrs Relating � �  Foreign Relations of' the United States,  
1878 (IJashington : Gove rnment Printing Ottice , l878J, 382-4Qti, herea:tter 
cited as Foreif: aelations; ibid •• 1879, 512-520, 525-526; ibid ., 1888, 
Part I ,  86CP3 , 774, 788, 799:S00; Senate Document No . JL 130, 155-
158 ; Kuykendall and Day, .2f.!. (it., 72, 105-107, ll4,'1:3o::l32.; Blake 
Clark, Hawaii the �- State Garden City., New York : Doubleday and 
Company., Inc . ,l94TI,78:SO; Hardy and Dumke , � cit ., lB4., 629; 
Stevens , .2£!_ cit ., 157, 177, 183, 185 ; Hooley, � cit •• l4o. Britain' s  
dec reased concern over the Reciprocity Treaty is sh01m in an extract 
:from a dispatch, Sackville-West to !Drd Salisbury, November 7, 1885, 
quoted by Allan Nevins ,  Grover Cleveland A Study in Courage (New York : 
Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933), 550. - -
in addition to a heavy British population in the is lands ,  left a 
pe rmanent stamp upon Hawaiian life •12 
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Unlike Britain and France , the United States made no attempts 
at forcible seizure of the is lands, but, as the nineteenth century 
advanced, Ame rican-Hawaiian diplomatic relations assUJIII3d mounting sig-
nif'icance • Roever, this development primarily ste:mmed from Ame rican-
born or American-descended island residents 'Who created for the United 
States an undeniable special interest in Hawaii . While the missionary, 
in time , was overshado118d by his merchant, trader or planter brother, 
their combined influence made negligible the f'act that the conduct of 
the only United States representative from 1820 to 1839 finally led 
to his re call at Hawaiian. request . Hosti le in his attitude toward the 
mis sionaries ,  di sreapect:f'ul to Hawaiian govermnent authorities ,  and 
dis liked by Ame rican commercial and whaling interests , Ame rican Com-
mercial Agent, John c .  Jone s had been the subj ect for recall requests 
since 1829. About this t:lJne French and English observers noted that 
almost all the prominent foreign residents of' Honolulu 11e re  A:merioa.ns . 
The most numerous foreign e lement, they controlled most of the success-
f'ul merchant firms and we re  the principal agricultural experimenters . 
Bot only by' 1836 did Americans pos se s s  .tour-fifths of the alien-owned 
property and merchandise in Honolulu, but s oon most of that city bad 
12Furnas , .2E.!, cit ., 163 ; Barber, 2£!. cit •• 24-25. For strong 
view c.t British ro le in maintaining Hawaiian independence , see Van 
Alstyne , 8Hawa.iian Independence , "  15. 
come to join the Americans in their celebration of the Fourth of 
July.l3 
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Unsuooessi'ul attempts from 1839 to early 1Bq2 to gain .American 
reoog:ni tion of Ha'WB.iian independence and the almost three-year missionary 
effort required to get an .Am3rioan p ledge of protest against the lAplace 
affair were balanced . against a :tlourishiDg, mainly .American-controlled 
trade between the North .Am3rican 116st coast and Hawaii . MeaJllllhile, 
Califor.oians read Honolulu neWBpapers and Hawaiian .Americans enthusias­
tically watched the American advance to the Pacific coast.14 
In view of the practical non-eXistence of an official American 
policy toward Hawaii, it is not surprising that President Tyler and 
Secretary of State Webster hesitated over the request of Ha'WB.iian envoys 
William Richards and Timothy Haalilio in December of 1842 for reoogni-
tion of Ha"'IB.iian independence . But factors were brought to their atten-
tion by the envoys, by John Quincy Adams and by other Concressmen--:taotors 
such as high public interest in Oregon and California, the opening of 
China ' s  door, naval schemes tor Pacific bases,  British and French threats 
�radley, .2E.!_ cit . , 89-93, :?01-:?�, 265-268; Stevens, � cit ., 
2,  2:? . See Foreign. Relations , 188:?, 564, tor official Ha.'WB.iian par­
ticipation in the .American holiday in 188:? . 
lllsradley, � cit., :? 10, 402-408, :?15-:?16, :?92-:?94. For pe- . 
tition from thirty-eight American citizens in Hawaii, protesting Lap­
lace • s threatening words against American missionaries and asking for 
protection from any future happening of like mture, see Journal of 
� House !!!_ Representatives !!!_ 2 tmited State&. 26 Congress, ises­
sion (Washington: Printed by Blair and Rives, 1 0),  9!14. Hereafter 
cited as House Journal. 
�o Hawaii and Hawaiian missi onary and commercial tie s--Which made 
ominous Richards '  threat that refusal or recognition might lead to a -
British protectorate • There emerged• therefore • in a note to the Hi­
waiian envoys , the so-called Tyler Doctrine . 15 In part, this note stated• 
The United States • • • are more interested in the 
rate or the islands . and or their GoveriJJDent, than � other 
nation can be ; and this consideration induces the Pre sident 
to be quite willing to declare • as the sense of the Government 
of the United States, that the Govermnent or the Sandwich 
Is lands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to 
take pos ses sion or the is lands as a conquest. or for the pur­
pose or colonization. and that no power ought to seek for any 
undue control over the existing Gove:rrJJDent, or any exclusive 
privileges or prefe rences in matte rs of commerce .l6 
Congress and the gover:nments or France e.nd Great Britain were 
notified immediately or this new policy. Remaining in force . with few 
deviations, until 8llllSXAtion. the two basic tenets of this policy were 
( 1 )  that the United States had special interests in Hawaii which no 
other nation could equal; and (2) the United State s would scrupulously 
respect Hawaiian s overeignty and independence and would dema.nd the same 
conduct from other nations . There followed in 1843 the appoin'bll.ent of a 
commissioner of diplomatic rank to represent the United States in Hawaii .l7 
15Bawaiian envoys Haalilio and Richards to Webster, December 14. 
1842, Senate Document No . IL 37-40• 6; Stevens , .2E.!. cit • • 1-3. 5-12: 
Bradley, op. cit . ,  1Jil:Ii44� n.; Ra.ndolph G. Ad8li!.B-;-wAbe l Parker 
Upshur, " in Samue l F. Bemis,  ed. ,  The American Secretaries of State and 
Their Diplomacy (lfew York : AlfredA. Knopf, 1927-1929), V, 81 . -
l.6webster to Haalilio and Richards ,  December 19. 1842. Senate 
Document, !To . 77 • 40. -- -
� 17House Document � 2.2,. 27 Congre ss. 3 Session, 1-2; House 
Journal, 27 Congress 3 Session. 250; Senate Document No . J:L 5Wo; 
Bradley • .2E.!_ cit.,  !J,4-Q4,6; Stevens , .2£.!_ ttj;5 3-5. l>;"""iiitheson, loc . 
cit .,  131; KUykendall and Day, 2E.!.. cit., - ; Clyde A. Duniwa.y, 
"'i5&ii:iel Webster," in Bemis,  � cit ., v. 56; St . George Ieakin Sioussat, 
"John Caldwell calhoun, "  in ibid . ,  v. 223. 
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News of the Paulet seizure in 1843 aroused .American public de-
mands for a protest. There was a request to London to disavow Pa.ulet 1 s 
action. and reassurances were not long in coming. llhi le the United 
States mini ster in London la:lpt close watch. lfa.shington rea.f'.firmed the 
Tyler Doctrine . but the whole question was settled with the return of 
the islands to the King and the j oint recognition by France and England 
of Ha:wa.iian independence. The United States • with tradi tio:cal aversion 
to European alliances.  refused to join this pact but voiced again its 
respect .for Hawaiian independence . 18 
The missio:cary and economic influence continued to over-shadow 
unfortunate diplomatic appointments . The tirst two commissioners. serv­
ing in succession from 1843 to 1849, were replaced because of unsatis­
factory c onduct.19 
The forties brought the occupation of Oregon. the gold rush and 
the oooupation of' california, the latter event termed by one author as 
"the greatest step to1mrd the 8.lll1BD.tion of Hawaii . 1120 These years 
lSp-oreign Relations . 1879, 520; Sena.te Document !!!_ Jl, 51-56, 
65. 1o6-116. For protest of u. s. Commander lAwrence Kearney against 
Paulet • s  rule. July 11, 1843, see Hooper to Webster, August 15. 1843, 
ibid ., 51, 53-54. For appeal of' Hawaiian King to the United States tor 
aid in restoring :native rule , Kamehameha III to Pre sident Tyler, March 10, 
1843, ibid ., 49-51. See also Bradley, .2:e.!_ cit., 452-456, 463; Stevens 
2.E.!. �. 16-20; Kuykendall and Day, 2E.!. cit ., 68-69; Van Alstyne , 11I:Ji-
waiian Independence, n 15-16. - _ 
19w.ller, 2E.!_. oit., V, 6o2-6061 Senate Dooum.ent !2.!_ I/_,  63-67, 
85; Stevens, 2.E.!_ cit., 12-13, 2o-23 ; Kuykendall and Day, .2E.!. c;t., 73-
74; Sioussat, loc . cit ., 223�; St . George �akin Sioussat, Ja.mes 
n -Buchamn, in Bemis, 2.E.!_ cit ., V, 329-330. 
20J.rdy and Dumke ,  2E.!. cit ., 407. 
also brought to Hawaii an unstable, often \JD.desirable, .American pio-
neer e lement, ma.de more restiTe by' west coaat expansionism and rumors 
ot filibustering expeditions . Hawaiian tears ot the latter were real 
enough to be coJQIIIIUii cated to Washington. But, despite growing public 
and official recognition of Hawaii • a strategic and c ommercial value to 
the United States, there was little public desire, except on the West 
Coast, tor annexation of the islands before the Civil war.21 · 
Under Presidents Taylor and Fillmore a more able diplomatic 
representative carried on the !yler dictum of upholding Hawaiian inde· 
pendence . In the former' s  administration a treaty of commerce was nego-
22 tiated, becoming effective in 1850 . 
While the de Tromelin aotion had brought only slow and inetf'ec• 
tual Aaerican protest, the later demands of Perrin brought to the United 
states in M&roh of 1851 a provi sional cession of the islands , to became. 
effective in ewnt of further French threats . Webster, � line with 
the Tyler Doctrine, ' pramised United States na:va.l protection tor the 
islands , but stressed the maintenanoe of independence and warned Aaeri-
can residents, no longer citizens, that they need not expect Uaited 
21For San Franci sco-based tilibuaterta& plans , see SeDAte Bxecu­
tiye Document Bo. 16, 33 Congress, 2 Session, 101, 108·109• see 8lao 
liiiiti bOCumenOo :-71, 120 J XU7kendall and Da.y, op. oi t. , 74; Steveu , 
2.f!_ cit. , 42-liS.- - - -
22aenate Bxecuti:ve Document Io� 1, 32 Congress, 1 Se88ion, 9• 
For text ot treatj', see ll.il:er, a·Oit';, V, 591-599• See ibid. , 6o6-
628, tor extracts troa sOUl"Ce .a ri�ll&inly :u.nuscripts ot tlie 
State Department Archins, cowring the negotiations tor this treaty 
and the preTious proposal by' Ba.waii in 1838 tor a cCIIIIIeroial treaty. 
See also steTenB, op. cit., laS-49 J Xuybndall and Day, op� oi t� , 74, 
lOl a  Hardy and I>um1ti; op.-oit. , 629J and Mary 1f1lhelm1n'i"'fill'rams, 
•John )(iddleton Clayton,*iii"'!imis, !E.! cit. , VI, 14-15 . 
States protection or connivance in annexationist movements . Whi le  
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there was much Congre ssiODB.l and press criticism of 'lebster • s  failure 
to accept the ces sion, the policy tended to bolster the UDi.ted States 
in the eyes of the Hawaiian govel'"l:Dilent, which had considered anne:mtion 
only as a last resort. and prevented further Hawaiian move s to1118.rd Brit­
ish protection.23 
Despite its policy of suppo rting Hawaiian independence •  the 
Pie rce administration, with lr.i.lliam L. Jlarcy as Secretary of State, 
found temptation too great llhen internal Ulll"est, fostered by native 
concern over their population dec line , Ame rican re sidents ' annexation-
ist sentiments , threats of California filibustering expeditions , and 
foreign dissati sfaction with goverumental land and tax policies, brought 
the King to doubt his ability to maintain his throne . By February, 1854, 
he was willing to cede his ld.ngdam to the United States in return for 
financial support for himseli' and dependents • By May informal negotia-
tions were in progress with increasing Hawaiian public support, but 
when Kamehameha III died in Decembe r, the treaty' had not been signed . 
In January, 1855, his succes sor notified the United States that negotia-
tions 'W9re terminated. Fai lure of these negotiations was due , in Hal'IEI.ii• 
to the delaying tactics of Prince Alexander Li.holiho, the future 
23senate Document No . IJ., 82-98; Journal of the Senate of the 
United States � America,� Congres s ,  1 Se ssion""Twash'ington : A. Boyd 
Hamilton, 1851-1852), 572; stevens , .2E.!. cit •• 50..58; Kuykendall and Day, 
.21?.!. cit ., 73; Robe rt McElroy, Grover Cleveland The � and  Statesman 
(New Yol'k : Harper and Brothers Pub lishers , 19231:' II, 4bJ Clyde Augustus 
Duniway, "Daniel 'Webster" (2nd term), in Bemi s ,  .2P.!, cit., VI• 108-109• 
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Kameh.ameha IV, who, with native leaders, feared f'urther incursions of 
Ame rican pioneers , as well as native trea-Quent unde r .Amerloan juris-
diction si:milar to that aooorded Negroe s • The American residents , llhile 
having gained missionary support for cession, still included elementJ 
who felt their economic and political ambitions would best be fostered 
by an independent republic • But American acceptance of the treaty as 
drafted 110uld have been doubtful, due to Hawaiian insistence upon state-
hood status and a large financial settlement for the Xing. Following 
the failure of negotiations , increased .American interest in the islands 
was overshadowed by events leading to the Civil ll'ar, although the We st 
Coast maintained its expansionist dreams. But Hawaii, in 1854, had 
made its .first bid .for statehood. 24 
From 1854 until the end of the Civil war, the outstanding dip­
lomatic events 11e re : ( 1 )  failure of the Hawaiian bid tor a joint guaran­
tee of its independence by the great powers , (2) declaration of the 
United States against European meddling in Ha:waii, with a pledge to 
110rk against any fillbustering activities and provide naval protection 
�eD&.te Doc'tiiiiSnt � IL 102, 117-130; Stevens , .2h cit ., 6o-
65, 69-76; H. Barrett Lear.ned;-"william Learned Maroy, " in Bemis , 2E.!. 
cit ., VI , 147, 29o-291J Van Alystyne , "Hawaiian Independence , " 19�. 
xrtfole I I  of the treaty (Senate Document 1!2.!. 11.• 123 ) reach _ 
The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be ineorporated into 
the American tbion as a State , enjoying the same degree of sov­
ereignty as other States ,  and admitted as such • • • to all 
the rights, privileges, and. immunitie s of' a State as aforesaid 
on a perfect equality with the other States of the Union. 
' i  
-
tor its island interests, and {�)  the appointment in 186� of a minister 
resident to the islands, a move most gratifying to the Bawaiians.25 
Because of the annexationist sentiments of Pres1dent Johnson and 
himself, it was with reluctance that Secretary of State Seward in 1868, 
in vin of impending elections, keynoted by calls tor econODJ¥ and iso-
lation, had to refuse the suggestion of his seeret agent in Hawaii 
that the time was ripe tor pushing annexation. Under President Grant, 
in 1869-1870, the !merican minister in Hawaii was urging a nave.l base 
at Honolulu and reporting alarm at growing Hawaiian sugar trade w1 th 
British possessions.26 At first apathetic, the Grant adllinistration, 
by the 1871-187� period sul:lni tted its minister' s  suggestions regarding 
&llD8:x&tion to the Senate tor its vien and sent a military commission 
to s�y Hawaii ' s  strategic and commercial possibilities .27 The Reci­
proci t;y Treat;y of 1876 will be discussed more tully later, but the Ha,-es 
administration reaffirmed AJD.erican respect tor Ha.waiian independence 
and instated that reciprocit.y privileges belonged e�lusively to the 
25van .Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence,"  22-24; Hooley, leo � cit. 
1�5-1�7; stevens, op. cit. , 79, 84; XU:Tkendall and Day, op. cir.;-'1� 
110, 114·115 ; Senali'!>OO'Uiient !2.!. 11• 10, 1�0-1��. - -
2�niater Edward KoCook to Secretary of State w. H. Seward, 
September �.  1866, Senate Document No. 77 ,  1�'-1�5. For the correspon­
dence concerning thi question of •nDei'atr'on of the Hawaiian islands, 
see correspondence between McCook and Seward, June 7, 1867 and July 1�. 
1867, ibid. ,  1�5-1� and Seward to z. s. Spaulding, July 5, 1868, ibid., 
140. Jlso see, Stevena, op. cit.,  106-110; Clark, op� cit. , 11; Senate 
Doeument � 11• �-JliS.- - - -
27ror text of Grant• s letter of aubmi ttal, April 5, 1871, and 
dispatch ot Minister H. A. Peirce to Secretary of State Hamil ton Fish, 
Februaey 25, 1871, see Senate Document Jl'o� 77, 12-15. For the work of 
the milltaey commission, ibid. ,  15o-154"'j'Ste"""Vens, op. cit. , 110-ll�J 
Barely and Dumke, � cit. , Ii07. - -
United Sta. tes. Under President Ge.rtield, Secretary Blaine vigorously 
defended these exclusive privileges and intimated that foroe would be 
used to protect the Hawaiian govermnent from foreign pressure for like 
considerations . Although he opposed the Briti sh Coolie Convention, which 
would have given the Bri tish musual privileges, and suggested some tom 
of .Alnerican immigration to stem the tide of Oriental labor to Hawaii, 
Blaine followed the !y"ler pattern of reaftirming HAwaiian independence 
and preferred •commercial assimilation" to "material a.nnexa.tion.•28 
Blaine ' s  succe s sor, Secretary Frelinghuysen, departed tram this 
doctrine somewbat by suggesting that the United states would protest 
any domestic policy which might hurt American investments or discourage 
further foreign capitalization. But he , too, felt commercial relations 
were the be at means to stre:agthen Hawaiian ties with the United States.29 
The Cleveland-Bayard c ombination di d not depart tram the old 
pollcy, although President Cleveland, in a message to Congress in 1888 
28 Secretary of state J. G. Blaine to Minister J. !1. Comly, Dec-
ei.ber 1, 1881, SeDate Document No . 77, 165, 166; Secretary of State 
W. )(. Evarts to domty, lUgust 6, 1818', Foreign Relations, 1878, 4o4-l.p)6J 
Blaine to Comly, JUne 30, 1881 and November 19, 1681, ibid ., 1881, 624-
626, 633-635 . Stevens , op. cit. ,  154-158 ;  Joseph B.  Lockey, "James 
Gillespie Blaine,"  in �.� cit. , VIII, 119-121 J Philip Marshall 
Brown, "Frederick T. Frelinghuysen,w-in ibid. , �� Donald Rowland, 11The 
United States and the contract Labor Quesaon in HJ.wa.ii, 1862-1900,11 
The Paoitic Historical Review, II ( September, 1933),  255-258 , hereaf'ter 
"Cited as 1contract Labor. 1 
29aeoretary of State F. T .  Frelinghuysen to CCIIlly, !fay 31, 1882 , 
Foreign Relations, 1882, 343-34lu stevens , � �' · 158-159;  Brown, 
ioo. cit., 35. 
spoke o� the •natural interdependenoy and mutuality of interest" between 
the united States and Eawaii.3° Be opposed in 1887 a British loan of 
two million dollars, which would have been secured by HAwaiian goveriJJ��ent 
revenue .31 In the same year Bayard re-voiced Frelingblllsen• s  sentiments 
in stating that the c amrDercial interests of the United States " 
must not be jeopardized by internal confUsion • • • •  •32 
• • • 
With the coming of the Harrison-Blains administration in 1889 
and the appointment of John L. Stevens as minister to Hawaii, American-
Hawaiian relations entered a �inal phase which will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Two outsta.Dding diplomatic developments of Hawaiian-American 
relations during the period were the formulation of and adherence to 
the Tyler Doctrine and the constant jockeying between reciprocity and 
a.xmexation moves on both sides of the Pacific . Before discussion of 
the Reciprocity Treaty, some understanding of the general economic de-
velopment of the islands is necessary. 
The whaling trade, due to suocessi ve discoveries of new grounds 
ooxrvenient to Ha118.i.i, was the governing economic factor of the middle 
years of the nineteenth century and reached its peak period between 
1845 and 1860. Whether or not one accepts the statement that Hawaiian 
30roreign Relations, 1888, Part I, xv. 
3lwevins, 2E.!. cit., 550; Foreign Relations, 1887, 558-562, 564, 
568-569. 
32seoretary of State T .  F. Bayard to Minister G. w. :tlerrill, 
Ju� 12, 1887, ibid., 580.581. 
economic wellbeing "was almost completely dependent upon the whaling 
' . 
fleets•33 during these years, it . undoubtedly was the life of the Hono-
lulu mercantile business • Its decline in Ha:wa.ii was due , not only to 
the illness of the 'Whole · trade , but to the use of San Francisco as a 
more convenient port .34 
The trade , through its demand for meat, put livestock raising 
on an organized basis ;  it increased govel'"IU!Ient revenues;  and, of course , 
benefitted the msrohants and the shipyards . Hawaiians , proving fine 
sai lors, . shipped out in such n\DD.bers that some have charged that this 
movement contributed to the population decline, although this effect 
is debatable . The deve lopment of Hawaii as a whaling transshipment 
point led to the export of i s land  products that otherwise 1110uld not 
have le:rt the islands . Whi le the early social effects were detrilnental 
to native morality and economic stability, adjustment to western life 
and the presence of a reputable foreign population of some size tended 
to counteract the more unfortunate whaling influences in later years .35 
One important domestic effect of the decline in the whaling trade 
1m.s the disappearance of the great stimulus to small-scale , diversified 
farming, llhich had supplied the whalers with vegetables and other foods . 
33xu:yblldall and De.y, 2.1'.!. �. 90 . 
3ltxorgan, 2.£.!. oit ., 76-77, 140, 151, 146; Kuykendall and Day, 
2.£.!. cit ., 117-118; Bradley, .2£.!. cit ., 215 . For the local whaling trade , 
see Kuykendall and Day, 2.£.!. cit., 117-118, and Morgan, 2.£.!. �� 82. 
- For description of the various llbaling grounds and annual Honolulu in­
come from whaling in thirties, see ibid . ,  76, 81. 
35Ibid ., 81-82, 149-150, 85, 149; Bradley, 2.£.!. cit ., 227. 
·' 
This eti'ect would certainly be deplored by those contemporary critics 
of Hawaii • s  centralized, mo:ney-orop agriculture , despite one authority ' s  
opinion that whaling "probably retarded the development of large plan-
tations , which involved bard work, -heavy investments , and high risk 
of failure .•36 The predominance of Ame ricans in the whaling trade is 
amply mirrored in the fact that, in one twe lve-year period, 4,402 
AlDerican ships vied with only 405 of all other nations . The trade 
played its part in 'tJ1ng American interests to Ha.waii .  37 
But general commerce also brought Honolulu revenue • After 1830, 
driven from the Alaskan coast and Oregon by the Russians and British 
Hudson' s Bay Company respectively, Americans monopolized Hawaiian trade 
with california, Mexico, Feru, and Valparaiso, Chi le ,  which in the 
1840 ' s beoa.ms an important link in Hawaiian trade. The American-
dominated trade between California and Hawaii tended, in time , to 
:make the two areas almost interdependent . By 1863 it was reported that 
Alllericans dOJDina.ted .four .fifths of Hawaiian C O'IDIDSrce , while they contin­
ued to cOJDl!Vi.nd the multiplying general and retail merchant establishments 
of Honolulu}8 
The era of the whalers pa.ssed over into the e ra  of sugar but Am-
erican predom1nance remained the common denominator .  Contemporary to 
both eras , however ,  were vari ous attempts to develop other agricultural 
36xuykendall and Day, .2£!. ill!_, 90. See also Morgan, .2£.!. cit . ,  151. 
37stevens , � cit . ,  40; Senate Document !2.!_ 11., 39. 
38Ibid., 131; Jarves ,  � cit ., 151-152; Bradley, � citi
' 219-
227, 392; Kuykendall and Day, 2.P..!. cit., 87-88; )(organ, .2£!. cit . ,  oo, 
Stevens , 2.P..!. cit •• 23 , -40. 
and industrial enterprises .  Salt 'WflS early an important export, reach­
ing a high point in 1847, with small amounts being exported until 1881.39 
After same experi:llentation in the twenties and thirties in cot-
ton production and manufacture, little cotton was grown until the American 
Civil 'lllr when a considerable amount was exported. But, by 1875, the 
lure of sugar and unfavorable production f'aotors led to the virtual aban-
do:mnent of' this orop . Today it is sti ll a dormant agricultural possi­
bility.40 
A number of coffee plantations appeared in the 1840's,  and 
coffee , as an export, reached its peak about 1870. Tending to suffer 
from drought, blights and floods , as well as labor scarcity, coffee-
grawing became a small-scale, individually run enterprise . It still 
has a minor role in Hawaii, and its greater development is advocated by 
those who oppose the plantation system..41 
Rice culture, a.f'ter an early failure, had a boom period in the 
1860 • s ,  followed by a setback. Thereafter the production of' rice steadied 
and for some years was second only to sugar. It oam.e to be mainly an 
enterprise of the Chinese in the islands .42 
39.Korge..n, � cit., 96-97 • 
.40Ibid.3 159-160; X\lykendall and Day, .2£.!.. cit. ,  94-95; Bradley, 
.2l?..t. cit., 363- 64. -
l,.J.IUybDdall and Day, � oi t., 94, 121; )(organ, � 2lli• 161-164. 
42sena.te Doo\DDBnt No. II., 131-132: Kuykendall and Day, .2R.!. oit ., 
94-96, 121, Bradley, .2E.!. oit., 248-250, )(organ, � oit ., 97, 164-l.b'lr.' 
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lfsntion has been made of the wbaling trade influence on live-
stock raising . Centered on Oahu and Big Is land, ranching at one time 
rivaled sugar in the production of v.ealth and by 1870 bad reached a 
stable position which it kept until the end of the century. Exports 
were mainly in hides and tallow. Goats and sheep also were raised in 
some quantity.43 
An important economic development and a necessar,y predecessor 
to the rise of sugar was land reform. The feudal system of landholding, 
under 'Which nsi ther foreigners nor IlA ti ve col!lllone rs awned land in f'ee 
simple, had been attacked since the arrival of the white man as a deter-
rent to foreign capitalization, which, in turn, would have increased 
native employment opportunities . Early opposition to land reform. by 
the missiollAries, who teared alien control of the land, disappeared as 
they recognized in land O'II'DSrship an incentive for the natives, who 
were indifferent to persoD&.l economic success . The King and chiefs, 
standing to be the greatest losers and tearing fUrther haole encroach-
menta could not long re sist the combined CCIDDiercial and missionar,y pres­
sure . The first break came with the recognition in the "Declaration 
of Rights" in 1839 and the Constitution of 1840 that the people had 
propert.y rigbts .44 
43Ibid., 168-172; KUykendall and Day, � cit., 96, 121-122. 
�or a trans lation of the ttneclaration of Rights• see , Sanford B .  
Dole, "Evolution of Hawaiian land Tenures,• (read before .Ba'ftiian Bls­
torical Society, December 5, 1892), in Senate Reiort No . 22_7, 99 . See 
also Jlorgan, 2E.!_ cit.,  123-128; Bradley, EE.!. ci • •  277� 
A Land Commission set up in 1845 to investigate and settle land 
claims evolved the principle that the King, the chiefs and the common­
ers were each entitled to one-third of the la.nd . By lla.rch, 1848, the 
l.and had been divided between the chiefs and the King, the nng • s  part 
being subdivided into govel"..D!Jent and royal property. On these lands 
of the chiefs , King and gove:rnment the commoners ma.de their claims . 
Already allowed to buy govenDII8nt lands in fee simple ,  the native s, to 
account for their one-third of the land, in 1849 -were allo11ed title 
without charge to the lands they occupied and cultivated.  Despite a 
lessening of restrictions on foreigners in 1847, it was 1850 before 
they were able to hold and sell land in fee simple . The commoners ma.de 
little economic gain from this reform, since they tended to lose their 
property through sale or foreclosure, preferred port town life, and often 
found their grants too small and scattered to support a fami:cy-. How-
ever, the refonn did raise their social status and legal rights . As 
feared, the haoles 11ere the gre at gainers and, by 1896, ol'lned fifty 
seven percent of the taxable land • 45 
The last great economic development of the period, sugar, had 
its begiDnings in the l8201 s  when the first p lantation effort failed. 
But small-scale production continued• a long w1 th more plantati�n experi­
ments • E:�ports grew fram 8•000 pounds in 1836 to 750,000 in 1850, at 
4Sxorga.n, 2R.!_ oit., 130-133, 135-137. 139. For other discus­
sions, of the land reform, see Stevena, � cit.,  33-3lu Kuykendall and 
Day, � cit., 70-71; and Sanford B .  Dol8; loc . cit., 100-1�. 
... 
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least eleven plants tor manufacturing sugar being in operation by 1846. 
The depression following the Gold Rush boom of 1.848-1851., plus drought 
and labor scarcity., reduced the plantations by 1857 to only five of the 
largest . This survival based on bigness hastened the trend toward the 
plantation system in contrast to the earlier plan of individual planters 
' 
sending their cane to central mills . After 1857 the number of planta-
tions began to increase again and., by 1861., there we re  twenty two . Be-
tween 1855 and 1872 exports of sugar increased almost thirty eight 
times • Overexpansion during the Civil ll8.r _ when exports increased ten 
times between l86o and 1865., brought bankruptcy to a number of planta­
tions in 1867.46 But expa.nsion s oon resumed., and- although greatly 
benefitted by the Reciprocity Treaty., 8It is not possible to take seri-
ously the legend that Hawaiian suga� was in the doldrums ., or declining., 
WII;i1 rescued by the Reciprocity Treaty.-47 
Because of the convenience of having the laborers live on the 
plantations ., because of the need both of the happy-go-lucky natives and 
the non-adjusted foreign laborers for a.id in obtaining the necessities 
ot life ., and because there 11as a remnant of the missionary concern tor 
the les s  ab le ., plantation paternalism developed. While more huma.ne 
and socially less  restrictive ., this sys tem prodmed a hierarocy from 
�organ, � en·· 1'14-175., lTI-178., 178-1811 Kuykendall and 
Day., .21?.!, cit., 92•9'• 9; Stevens ., 2E.!_ cit., 35-36. For other de-
taila ot the early sugar industry., see Vandercook., � bit • ., 9-ll. 
22-25; Bradley., 2E.!. oit., 2l.t2-247; Morgan., � cit., 11 • 
47 8 Ibid • • l l.  
the Honolulu board member to the field laborer that was not too dis­
similar to the old feudal organization of society.4B The persiste110e 
50 
ot this pa.ternaliJStic sys11em of agriculture into recent times has pro­
duced one of the objeotioni to statehood. 
Another objection, the great Oriental population, also figured 
in the rise of sugar. The decline ot the native population, in addition 
to the failure of the Hawaiian to make a good field band, led the Royal 
Hawaiian Agricultural Society in 1851-1852 to import some 300 Chinese 
laborers on five-year oontraots . A previous aot of the legislature had 
legalized contract labor. The continued rapid decline ot the native 
people spurred the immigration of some 55,000 laborers between 18Tf 
and 1890, about halt ot whan were Chinese . A1 though an excellent 
field laborer, the Chinese tended to leave the plantation for the oi ty 
or tor saall far.ms or shops, while the government, oanoerned over the 
great rise in the Oriental population, began looking for other labor 
souroea .49 
In 1878,  the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration brought in the first 
group of Portuguese fran the Maderia Islands . This was the begiMing 
ot a migration that lasted 1mtil 1913, when some 20,000 persons had 
come from the :tladerias or the Azores . These laborers were a great 
�Ibid., 187-188 ; vanderoook, � �' 54. 
49Ibid. , 53, 56-57; Kuykendall and Day, � cit.,  96-97, 156; 
Hardy and DiiililCe, op. oi t ., 6811 stevens, op. oi� 'm;J Furnas ,  op. oit . ,  
1331 Alex Ladenson, •& Background of tlii""'!aiilian-Japa.nese lAbor con=­
vention of 1886,"  The Paoitio mstorioal Review, IX {December, 194£>), 
389, 393; Rcnrland,-rcontraot Labor,* 249-256, 254. 
suocess,  but proved too expensive, due to the high transportation 
ooats and higher wage soa.lea.50 An attempt to bring in Polynesiana 
pro-nd uzusuooesstul, while neither Europeans nor AJnerioans were at-
51 
tracted to the islands tor w.rious reasons . But Europeans did oome in 
small numbers, Bol"W8gians and Germans in 1881, Galioians in 1898, and 
a few Americans the same year.5l 
Therefore, Japan had hardly entered the international soene be-
tore Hawaii was requesting diplamatio recognition as a prelude to a 
labor agreement. Foiled in attempts in 1860 and 1867 to get even a 
oammercia.l treaty, the Hawaiian oauul-general in 1868 :managed to send 
to Hawaii 149 Japanese, without ottioial Japanese approftl. These 
· laborers tilled the sugar planter• s bUl, and he wanted more . Despite 
a oaameroial treaty with Hawaii in 1871 and the tempting offers ot the 
Hawaiian Board ot Dnmigration, Japan retused to send more laborers to 
the islands . Fina.lly, after ma.:ay more inducements, the Japanese gov-
el"Dilent in 1883 agreed to pemi t voluntary emigration. Despite ex-
oeptioDAl oare by the Hawaiian goverD�:D.ent to insure good trea1ment tor 
the Japanese laborers, Japanese oam.plaints led to a labor c onventi on 
signed in January, 1886. Allowing tor tree emigration, the treaty also 
provided tor Japanese dootors and interpreters, tree diplamatio and 
501Ca:y'kendall and Day, � oit. , 156-1571 Vanderco ok, 2.! oit., 
57-591 Rowland, •contract Labor, •'""25.4. 
51L&deucm, loo . oi t. , 389J Vandercook, op. oi t., 55-56, 64J 
RowlandJ •ccmtraot Labor�. See Ladenson, ioo .-erE. , 389-390, tor 
reasons ..ey- Americans and Europeans did not oane:--See also , enclosures, 
Camly to Evarts, Deocber 22, 1879, Foreign Relations, 1880, 595-596. 
consular oontaot with the laborers , and tull responeibill ty ot the 
Hawaiian goverDD.ent tor the well-being ot the Japanese . Under this 
agreement, which ended in 1894, more than 28,000 persons · came to Hawaii ; 
but the movement ot Japanese to the islands continued tmti.l 1908, when 
some 180,000 bad c ame  in, ot wham 126,000 lett eventually • .52 
1'he opposition ot the 1JDi ted Sta. tea goven:mumt, especially 
tmder Blaine' s  guidance, to Oriental immigration baa already been 
noted. It continued to voice its disapproval against both Japanese im-
migration and the return to heavy Chinese i.mmigrati.on in the years trcu 
1882 to 1885 and 1890 to 1892.53 
By 1890 there were 12,360 Japanese, 15,301 Chinese and 8,6o2 
Portuguese in the islands, although, ot 20,536 planta ti.on laborers, 
only 10,991 were tmd.er the contract system. Despite much public and 
ottioial cri tioism. in the tJni ted States ot oontraot labor, the govern­
ment ot Hawaii shared with the planters ' association an expenditure ot 
t3,000,000 in the late eighties and the nineties to bring in laborera.54 
But Hawaii bad imported more than laborers;  it bad imported the prob-
lsm ot making an East-west melting pot a demoora.tio aooiety. 
52vanc�erooolt, op. cit., 59-60; Kutbndall and Day, op. cit., 157; 
La.denaon, � oit., 390-'ij;O'j Rowland, •contract Labor,• 2-,;;oj Forbes IJ.Ddsay, 
"Hawaiian Problems ot To-Day, " The .blerioan Review ot Reviews, XL 
(Septaaber,. 1909), 3()6. - -
53Senate Document No. i7, 138-l4l; Foreign Relations 1868, Part 
II, �-349; il)id., 1861, 61'(-lil9; ibid., 1B83, 555=556, 564-566; ibid., 
1884, 281-281.i; !'bid., 1885, 470, 415-476; ibid. , 1886, 528 ; ibid., 1888, 
Part I, 834, 864-865, 868-873; Rowland, •contract lAbor," 256=2$2, 259-
262. 
54st.vens, � oit. , ll.J.&.-145 ;  Lindsay, � cit., 3()6. 
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Economically the islands bad passed from the sea.soDal and un-
stable whaling trade to gem ral tre.de and the plantation system of' 
a.grioulture . with sugar the chief' crop . Economic development bad 
brought l.a:ad reto:rm. large numbers of Orienta.! residents and still 
closer ties with the tfnited States .  But the link which 118.S to tie 
the is lands pel"DDAll8ntly to the .Ame rica.n economic system. was the Reoi-
procity Trea.ty. The story ot this trea.ty is one of' the most importiant 
segments of Bawaiia.n history. 
The Hawaiian gove:rmll8nt a.ttempted without succe ss in 1848 and 
1852 to intere st the United states in a. treaty whereby' Hawaiian sugar 
products would have free entry into the tmited Sta.tes. the latter ga.in­
ing reciproca.l privileges tor some of its products .  In 1855. duriDg 
the Pierce a.dmi n1stration. a. trea.ty •s actualq ��er:otiated and ratified 
by the Hawaiian govel"DIII8nt. The 1Jnited States Senate . however. after 
consideration unti l 1857. never ga.w its approval. Opposition of' 
Louisiana sugar produoers • tears as to its effect upon most-favored-
nations cla.use s  in other treaties .  a question ot constitutionality. 
the feeling that Hawaii would deriw the chief benefit• and public dis­
interest were responsible tor the Senate action.55 
Despite advocacy by the lJD.ited States minister to Hawaii and 
Senate interest in the 1863-1864 period. Secretary of State S8118.rd 
55ror text of' treaty see . Senate Report No . 227, 45-47. See 
a.lao , Ralph s .  KUybDdall• !. HistOry � Ba11&.ii {Hew York : The Mac­
millan Comp�. 1926). 211,; Stevens ,  � cit • •  47-58-59. 78-83,; Hooley. 
� cit., 128-130. 132·133, J.4o-J.46J Thoiia'SA. Bailey, A Diplomatic 
History of' the American People {New York : F .  s .  Crofts and Co ., 1§47), 
3rd Ed.,� 
felt the treaty would not be •advisable8 since, among other things , it 
would reduce war-time revenue; .56 
The e:ad of the CiT.i.l War boom 1li th a concomitant drop in sugar 
prices brought anHawaiian economic crisis and new demands tor reci­
procity. llhi le expressing a preference tor an:ae:mtion, Seward in 1867 
authorized nsgotiationa ending in a treaty signed in llay, 1867. Again 
Hawaii ratified and again the Se:oate, after long delay, defeated the 
treaty in Ju:.ae , 1870• llhile preoccupation with reconstruction problems, 
Congressional animosity toward the Johnson acbdnistration, loss ot rev-
enue , and particularly a consti tutio:nal question as to whether the 
Se:nate could act upon a revenue-reducillg measure lV&re important, a sig-
nificant development was the tear of obstructiDg a.nnexation. This 
latter tear stemmed tram the idea that reciprocity would satisfy that 
element in Hawaii which had been desirous of annexation as a means ot 
gaining economic stability. There was little evidenoe of Louisiana 
sugar opposition in the defeat. By Febnary, 1873, public agitation, 
prope lled by economic troubles, forced another Hawaiian try tor a treaty. 
The King 111B.S persuaded to otter the U'nited States the use of the Pearl 
:Harbor lagoon as a naval base , but lack of .American interest in the 
entire question and native indigD&tion over the Pearl Harbor offer led 
to cessation ot efforts . But further Hawaiian agitation brought King 
56senate Document No . 11, 10, 132; John Patterson, nrhe United 
States and Ha11aiian Reciprocity, 1867-18701" The Pacific B1storical 
Review, VII (March, 1938 ), 15-16; Stevens , op. cit. , §6J}7; Ku:ybiid&U 
aDd Da.y, 2R.!. cit., 115. 
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Kalakaua to the U'llited State s in 1874 partly to strengthen the hands 
ot his reciprocity envoys . A treaty was signed in January of 1875, 
ratified by both countries, but, due to a requirement for a CongreesioDAl 
enabling act, was not effective until September 9, JJ376.57 
As enacted, the treaty provided tor the tree entry of fifteen 
Hawaiian products, including sugar, molasses and rice, into the UJ1ited 
States,  with reciprocal favors for American products , mainly manuf'a.c­
tures .58 Yost important, from the .American viewpoint, was the amend-
ment to Article IV, inserted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations . 
It stated z 
It is agreed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty 
that so long as this treaty shall remain in force , he will 
not lease or otherwise dispose or or create a:r:ry lien upon 
8.liY port, harbor, or other terri tory in his dominions , or 
grant any special privilege or rights or use therein, to 
8.liY other power, state or goverDD�Bnt, nor make any treaty 
by, 'Which 8.11¥ other mtion shall obtain the same privileges, 
relative to the admission of any articles free or duty, 
hereby secured to the United states .59 
57For Hawaiian ratification of' the treaty of' 1867 see , Seward 
to McCook, October 5, 1867, Senate Document No. 77, 139-140. For 
President Johnson on the importance of' reciprocitY and annexationist 
sentiments see , extracts trom. message to Congress, December 9, 1868, 
ibid ., ll.,2. Also see , ibid .,  133, 139, ll.&B-150, 160..163 , William Y. 
Jlalloy, compiler, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols 
� .Agreements Between � United States � America !:!!!!, Other Po-wers, 
177b•l909 (Waahington : Government Printing Office , 1910), I, 918-919,; 
Co3ressional Record, 10 Congress , 2 Session, Vol. 3, Part I (WELshing­
ton : Gove !'JliDSnt Printing Office, 1875 ), l..Wu Henry w. Temple, ttwillia.m 
H. Seard, • in B�� .2£!. cit., VII, 113 J Stevens , � cit., 97�8, 
100..1o6, 116-119, -125J KUykendall and Day, S?.!. crt.-;-IT6, 149-151. 
58valJ.o7, 2.£!_ cit., 1916,; KuybiJda11, � cit., 252,; :Morgan, 2.P.!_ cit., 212. 
917. 
1875, 
�oy, op.�i.&. I, 917. For whole treaty, see ibid., 915-
For Gra.nt • s  s u  1 to Congress tor enabling act, December 7, 
see Foreign Relations, 1875, I, :xxvii .  
Thia had the ei'f'ect oi' preventing any other power gaining territorial 
or political preferences and, in denying reciprocity' to any other na­
tion, this clause meant the end ot the further growth ot trade with 
60 the British possessions • This amendment made approval ot the treaty 
by the United States possible. As noted in the appendix to a report 
ot the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1894 : 
The Hawaiian treaty' •s mgotiated tor the purpose ot 
securing political control ot those islands, making them. in­
dustrial� and CcmlllllerOially a part ot the United States am 
pre'V'enti!Jg any other great power from acquiring a foothold there, 
which might be' advers& to the welfare and aatety' ot our Pacific coast in time ot war • 1 
Real concern that the growing trade ot Hawaii 'With the British poa-
sessions ot Australia, New Zeland and British Columbia would give 
Great Britain first commercial and then political supremacy in the 
islands was o:ce ot the chief motivations for passage ot the treaty.62 
The importance of •Reciprocity, the Wonder ..,rker..63 is ditti-
cult to exaggerate • The unbe lieva.ble increase in sugar production 
(a ten-told export increase in fifteen years ) • the strengthened economic 
6ostnens , � oit., 125-126. 
61•The Ba111Liian Treaty, A Review ot its CoDDercial Results,• 
Se:aate Report � 227, 103. Hereafter cited as "Ha111Liian Treaty.11 4 
62ttuawa11an Treaty,• � cit., 103-J Korga.n, � cit., 211-212, 
stevens, � ott., 126-127. See also Xuykendall, 2.1'.!. �. 253, aJld 
Barber, � oi •• 30. 
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ties with the U!lited states 8.IId increased attention to Hawaii as a 
strategic base , better wages,  the stimulus to improved transportation 
8.IId govermnent public work& are discussed at length by JDa.IJY authors . 64 
But more pertinent to the statehood question are the following results 
of the treaty: (1)  the native Hawaiian was pushed turliher into the 
bacqround, since he neither liked nor -.s ski lltul in plantation man­
agem!nt or labor; 65 (2) the planters 1 use of poor land led to •dis­
ad'V8Jitageous application of labor and oa.pitalJ .66 (3 ) the treaty forti-
-
tied the trend toward a oJ:�e-crop economy; (4) the treaty probably' ac-
oelerated the concentration of capital and economic control in fewer 
hands ; and (5) it stimulated further the importation of Oriental 1Abor.67 
In ge:aeral it tended to emphasize the nry points which would bring 
ori tioism to Hawaii as a prospective state : concentrated wealth, the 
plantation system of social organisation, a heterogeneous population, 
and the lack of economic diversification. But it tended also to fore-
doom the moiJ&rOhy, since it concentrated eoonami.o, social and, conse-
quently, political power in the hands of the ney elements most critical 
of the native gover.ament.68 
�rgan, .2i!.!...c§t •• 193, 213-215J Stewns, .2E.!. ci§2• l41J IDly'ken.-
d&ll, .
� c�t ., 257-25 J !UykendaU and Day, � �. ; Barber, 
2R..!, OJ. t.; 3 • 
65steveu, � cit., 143; Edwin G. Burron , Ha:waiian Americans 
(Hew Havena Yale UDiversity Press, 1947), 41-43. 
�rgan, � cit., 215. 
67Ibid•J Stenns , � cit., �-143; Kuykendall, � cit.,  256. 
68steveu, 2R..!. cit •• 141. 
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The treaty might be abrogated by e ither power at't;er September 9, 
188:? . By this date United States opposition, canposed of tears of a 
Pacific c oast sugar monopoly, the argument of lose of revenue , Oregon 
charges that the chief benefits went to San Francisco, criticism of the 
contract labor syst� and dislike of competition to domestic sugar pro­
duction and east coast refining industries ,  had reached a high point.69 
Both the Arthur and Cleveland administrations pressed tor s imp le renewal 
ot the treaty, but again the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered 
an amendment in April of 1886 . Include d  in the treaty as Article I I ,  
i t  read, i n  part, that the Hawaiian King 
• • • grants to the Govel"IDIJ9nt of the thi ted States the ex­
clusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the 
Island ot Oahu, and to e stablish and maintain there a coal­
ing and repair ,aation tor the use of ve ssels of the United State s ,  • • • •  
Even with this added inducement, it 'WB.s January, 1887, before 
renewal was approved. The United States had to ease the Hawaiian tears 
as to the e ffect of Article II on its sovereignty before the King 
would sign the new agreement. Going into effect in Novembe r  of 1887 • 
this treaty gowrDSd commercial re lations unti l annexation. The United 
States did not take advantage of its Pearl Harbor privileges before 
69•B!Lwaiian Treaty, " � cii5• 10:?-11:?.; Morgan, .2:e.!. cit • • 21:?, 
2161 KUykoDdall and Day, �Jit., 9-160; Hardy and Duiii1Ce , � cit . ,  408-409; Stevens ,  .!e.!. �' 0, 162-164, 165-167; Donald Jfarquand­
Doze r, •The Opposition to Bil.�ian Reoiproci ty • 1876-1888, " The Pacific 
Historical Review, XIV (JUDI• 1945 ) · 158-160; Foreign Relations , JJ379, 
Part I, 529-541; ibid ., 188:?, 545·546, 552-555, $57, 558-561, 561-56:?, 
57:?, 574. . 
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JraUo;r, 2E.!. cit., I, 919-920. 
&llllexa.tion, so that, in geDSra.l, the reDell&.l merely continued the 
etf'ects of the previous treaty. 7l 
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While the Reciprocity Treaty was working its wonders, the final 
. 
etf'ects of early missionaey work in education was also becoming evident. 
By 1890 some sixty percent of the native population was literate . When 
various factors had brought a. serious decrease in the effectiveness 
of the lllissionaey common schools ( a.s di:ff'erentiated from boarding schools ) • 
the govermaent, in 1840, had established a. public school system, soon 
directed by a. cabinet minister. As the system developed, former sec-
tarian influences disappeared; English schools were established, the 
use of the Hawaiian lAnguage finally being discontinued a.s an educa-
tional medium; American textbooks came into use ; and some forty percent 
of the teachers by 1890 were American. By 1888 all English-language 
public schools were tuition free. but public seconda.ey education had 
yet to a.ppea.r in 1890.72 However, public education was but one phase 
of Hawaiian politioa.l development during the period. 
Hawaii 's  first WTitten constitution of 1840 produced innovations 
in a.n e lective House of Representatives and a Supreme Court. But the 
7lCoJllressioDAl Record, 49 Congress, 2 Session, Vol.  18, Part I• 
914-915.; Part II, i2BS-i2§.j; Jlerrill to Bayard, November 8, 1887, 
Foreign Relations, 1887, 588-592J ibid.. 1888, Part I, 835-837. 
72Acoording to a. witness in the 1894 Senate investigation of 
the 1893 revolution, not more than one-twentieth of the schools used 
the Hawaiian language by that time , Senate Report No . 22.J, 269. Frear• 
.2l?.!. cit., 141, 14.3, l46a Kuykendall and Da.y, � cit . .  -82, 241-
243; Stevens, .2.2.!, cit ., 9, 14.5; Bradley, � cit., 127-132, 135-136, 
147-154, 338-353, '354-365. . . 
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hereditary House of Nobles was but an extension of the counoil of 
chiefs 'Which had been for many years an important law-• king body, 
since the long minority of �hameha III had tended to make the king­
dom an oligarchy rathe r than a m.onarohy. Old, too, was the peculiar 
official, k:uhina nui, who had powers of V9to and consent o'V9r all the 
King ' s  actions . The basic law of the kingdom had grown up in the tlven­
ties when various decrees and c ode s ooftred murder. thett, Sabbath­
breaking, gambling and adultery. J.tter Kamehameha III ' s  brief fling 
at absolutism, during which he abrogated most of the se laws , a fairly 
comprehensi'V9 penal code was e stab lished in 1835 . The next year, the 
chiefs • aware of their political ineptne ss, had begun the search for 
a mentor, and their choice, William Richards , in 1838 delivered a group 
of le?tures on political s cience and economics, based mainly, it would 
seem, upon the Bib le and the Declaration of Independence . As a result 
of these lectures, a dec laration appeared in 1839 which guaranteed to 
the people their rights of lite , liberty and the products of their 
minds and labor. It also provided a broad civil code . Another result 
was the constitution. which restated the rights of 1839 and was notable 
tor two things : (l) it stemmed fran the fe lt need of goftrn:i.ng author­
ities for detiniti'V9 political organization and represented the King ' s  
voluntary recognition that his subjects had certain rights , and (2 ) 
the King remained, with the kuhina nui ,  the e:x:eouti'V9 , legis lative and 
judicial head ot the ld.ngdom, despite the constitutional provision 
tor three branches ot gover.aaent.7' 
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In 1842 the setting up ot a board to control goTel"Dil8D.t revenue 
and taxes brought � economies and an ewntual end to the national 
debt. By 1844 John Ricord, Jllerican•born attorney general, bad devised 
an organi&aticmal plan, supplementar;y to the constitution, which was in­
stituted in a seriea ot Organic .A.ots .  1'hese acts, dating trom 1846 to 
1�, provided tor ti ve executive departaents and their open.tion, 
a pri� council which took on the attributes ot a cabinet, and an ia-
prO't'ed judicial system, 11'1. th ciroui t and district courts under a 
superior court. Civil and legal codes were improwd during the forties 
to give the ld.Dgdom a comprehend ve basic set ot la.w8 . 
While no foreigners were elected to the legislature before 1851, 
a .._u group ot foreigners, mainly Americans, bad by 1850 gained con-
trol of the judicial and exec uti Te depart.enta, as well ae baving be-
come iaportant policy makers . A monarchy with houses of nobles and 
commoners, seen b7 some as a British derivative, was aotuall7 an out-
growth ct Hawaiian govermaental histor,y, while the 111"1 tten consti tuticm, 
universal suffrage and town meetings eloquentl7 bespoke American ideas . 
7'For a complete translation of the Constitution ot 1840, aee 
Senate Report llo. 227, 121-127. For con.ati tutional development, see 
Jams, ioo . c'I't.",J:ril-143; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit. , 40, 49-55J 
Bradley, of. Olt., Z'fl-'2:77, �7-,10, '19-325; Benr;y �rs, •con­
eti. tuticma iifi'W'r;r ot Hawaii, • in lit rbert B. A.dama ,  ed. , Johns Ropld.D.8 
Uniwrsity Studies in HistOrical and Political Science (Baitiiorea  
fhe JohliS Hopa:iis Prise, 1896), Xir(Jaauaey, 1896), 10-17. 
Certainly the Ame rican miasioiiAries had done much, indirect:cyr, to 
forward the idea that the common people had certain rights • 74 As King 
Kalakaua would admit, much later, in a speech to the American Congress , 
"Your laws and your civilization have been in a great degree our mode l . a75 
� 
An improved constitution of 1852 provideds ( 1) detinite separation 
of powers between the three branches of gowrmDent, {2) further checks 
upon the King, a lthough he retained absolute legislatin veto, (3 ) par­
tial ministerial responsibility through annual rep?rts to the legisla­
ture ,  ot which the ministers were members , (4) enlarged :membership of 
the lower house which origillll.ted revenue bills, and (5 )  definite pro­
vision tor universal suttra.ge • 76 
No significant changes in this cons titution were made during 
Kamahameha IV ' s  reign ( 1854-1863 ), but his brother, Kamehameha V (1863-
1872 ), desiring more po11er and tear1Dg the effects ot universal auf-
trage tan.rd increasing American influence , refused to support it . 
calling tor an extra-legal convention to revise the constitution, he 
found the maj ority of delegates opposed to hi s wishe s . A deadlock over 
TOting qualifications led him to dissolve the convention, abrogate the 
constitution, and impose a new one , effective in August, 1864, more to 
'14mtylamclall and Day, ...2E..t. cith f$-72; Chambers , loc .  cit ., 
16-17; Bradley, S!.!_ cit ., 326-332; Jarves ,  � cit ., 150..151; Stevens , 
2.£!_ cit ., 25-28. 
'75eongreas1o:aal Record, � Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 3, Part I, 144. 
76chaabers , loo . oit., 17-20; !.'ay'kendall and Day, 2."2.!. cit . ,  75 ; 
Semte Report � 22.1, 16o'Jstevens , 2."2.!. cit., 38-39. 
his liking . This constitution of' 1864 made the tollowi.Dg cha.nge s of' 
illlportance : ( 1) removed the guarantee ot vote by ballot and provided 
property and literacy franchise qualifications, (2 ) weakened the sep­
arati on of' powe rs , (3 ) provided a unicameral legislature , (4) allowed 
removal of' judicial oti'icials, formerly appointed tor lite , and (5)  
gave the privy council le ss control over the nng and the King more 
control over the cabinet. The King was responsible to no oDe . Op-
era.tive for twenty-three years, this constitution started a long con-
troversy between its supporters and those llho preferred the more 
democratic Constitution of' 1852.77 
Reestablishment of universal suffrage in 1874 was the only one 
ot liJSllY amendments which met with success during the brief' reign of 
Llmalilio .  But the new ld.ng, Kalakaua , elected in 1874, used every 
powe r afforded by the Constitution of' 1864 and turned universal sui'f'rage 
to hi s  benefit by appeals to the native voters . His dismissal of' un-
obliging cabinets and susoeptibili ty to bribes and adventurers marked 
the years tram 1876 to 1880. From the latter year until 1887, Kala-
k:aua • s  rule became more que stionable nth odd deals with sugar baron 
Claus Spreckels , legalization of' the sale of liquor, unparalleled ex­
travagance leading to a great pub lic debt, and provision for government 
licensil:lg of' the sale of' opium. Even progress in leper treatment was 
injured by government sale of' em.mptions from segregation requi rements . 
17chambers, loc . cit . ,  2o-22; Kuykendall and Da.y, -� cit., 111-114; Stevens , 2R.!, cit. , 9l; Senate Report � 227, 16o-1� -
' 
Raci�l antagonism wa.s deliberately aroused, while the King advocated 
a retum to the native religion and embarked upon an ambitious scheme 
for leadership of a Polynesian League, a confederation of the South 
Sea islands .78 
These policies produced opposition leading to the organization 
in 1887 of the Hawaiian :IPa.gue , composed of' foreigners and soma natives . 
The J.aague majority wanted only reform, but a radical minority wanted 
a republic and eventual American Bllll8xation. Election of a reform-
minded legislature was blocked by the King ' s  contro l of e lections through 
bribes and ballot-box stuffing. Therefore, the 113ague armed i tselt in 
event peaceful change became impossible . In addition to the political 
!'acto rs, goven:DDental extravagance and increased taxation were made all 
the more baneful to the planter and commercial interests by an economic 
depression. It took only public knowledge of the King ' s  connivance in 
an opium license bribe to ignite the tinder box. A :IPague-led mass 
meeting in June of 1887 was intimidation enough to force the King to 
accept a new constitution, effective in July. The KiDg no longer could 
act without cabinet consent, appoint membe rs of the House of' Nobles, 
'Which became elective, nor arbitrarily dismiss the cabinet. The latter 
78steTens, .2E.!. cit., 91-9lu KUykendall and Day, op• cit ., �-
164, 1.66-1691 Hardy and Dumke, � cit ., 4il-412J Chambers, � cit ., 
22-23 . For American political Iiifluence in Kalak:a.ua•s reign, see 
Stevens, � cit . ,  117-118, 148-149. For llark Twain ' s  favorable im­
pressionsOf Uula.lilio, see Frear, � cit., 31-33 . For treaty of 
confederation between Samoa and Ba:wi!I", see enclosure , dispatch, 
:Merri ll to Bayard, llaroh 29, 1887, Foreign Re lations, 1887, 569-570• 
body was responsible to the legislature which oould both remove the 
oabinet a.nd override the King ' s  veto by a two thirds vote . tess lib-
eral were property qualifications for both the Nobles and their electors, 
which put this body almost completely under foreign control. The re was 
a literacy qualification for electors of lower house members . Further 
foreign influence was gained by providing suffrage tor all foreign 
residents willing to take an oath to support the constitution. 79 
Unrest continued, however, due to native antagonism toward the 
increased power of the foreigners and the degredation of their highest 
representative , the King, and also due to dissension among the reform. 
group . A pro-native insurrection in 1889 was quickly put down, but, 
in 1890, due to native support of the Xing's  party and division of the 
reform party, the latter lost its legislative majority and a coalition 
cabinet came into office . The King ' s  attempt to rev1se the constitu- · 
tion tailed and his death in early 1891 brought his sister, Liliuokala.ni, 
to the throne . While she took an oath to support the constitution, 
Queen Liliuokalani ' s desire for power was to prove both stronge r and 
more meaningf'll  to Hawaiian history than a� abso lutist tendencies of 
her predecesaors .80 
79ohambers, loc . cit.,  23-27; lnlyken.dall and Day, � .cit., 1.69-
171; Stevens , 2R.!. cit. , 11i.9-"153 ; Hardy and Dumke, � cit., 4� For 
text of 1887 constitution, see Merrill to Bayard, July 11, 1887, Foreign 
Relations , 1887, 574-579. For resolutions adopted at mass meeting on 
June 3o, 1887, see Merrill to Bayard, JUly 30, 1887, ibid., 583-584. 
B�ndall and 1)1.y, .2E.!, ,cit., 171-173; Stevens , � cit ., 19o-
192; Hardy and Dumke , 2J?..t 9!v 412; BeDJJett, loo . cit .� 156-159; Merrill to Blaine, August 1• 1889, senate Document No .-:Jl, 174-176. 
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The years traa 1830 through 1890 saw the beginning or fuller 
developaent of those cbaraoteristics which today either enhance or 
detract trcm Ha.waii '  a standing as a prospective state. Upon some of 
these characteri stics, it is too soon to pass judt;ment. In 1890, 
Hawaii had only begun to assimilate her Oriental population. It would 
be li8D1' 7ears before the paternalism of the plantation system would 
COlle to grips wi. th organized labor. The intrinsic wakness or strength 
ot a money-crop econ01111 had yet to be tully tested. But, on some ques-
tiona at least partial judgaent is poseible . It was to Hawaii ' s  oredi t 
that a scant th1rii7 years after Dmehameha I united the islands , a pub-
lie school eysta had been established, and its advancement •s sur-
prisingly similar to public school growth i:a. the lJDi ted sta tea .  IJ&waii , 
by 1852, was approaching selt-govel"ZZIle:a.t, although the Xing still re-
tained considerable power. Honver, dem.ooratic advance bad been illlpoaed 
tram above ; it was not the result of popular initiative . This tact 
. .  
partly explains the later retreat toward abeolutism. But another tao-
tor in that retreat was the growing antagonism of the natives toward. 
foreign political influence, a signal in itself of advance toward po-
litical maturity. By 1890 BLwaii had developed the structure tor self-
gove�ent and a growing popular desire to exercise it. 
In maintain:lng her inclepende:aoe, Hawaii was indebted to the 
jealous concern of Great Britaill, France and the U'Jlited States that 
no one of them �ain the opportunity to seize her. Obviously, she 
could not have withstood actual attaok tr0111 any of these nations, 
but their jealousy would have lost much vitality bad Hawaii not used 
it to play one power ag&inat the other. Furtherm.ore , unlike China, 
B!Lwaii never c losed her doors . By maldng her porta a"9'8.ilable to all 
comers, no nation, for cc:mmercial gain, found 1 t necessary to seize 
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the islands . When her feudal land-holding syste or her law threatened 
to proTOke foreign interference, she made them conformable to to reign 
standards . When forced treaties ate at her sovereignty, she worked pa­
tiently but persistently for better teras . Probably Hawaii ' s  mainte­
nance ot independence was her outstanding achievsent in this period. 
H!Lwaii, the state , should have no trouble in dealing with her si sters 
atter her long experieMe in international relations . 
The moat obvious dewlopnent of the era was the continued pro­
cess of Americanization. AJuricans bad preached Hawaii ' s  sermons , helped 
write her constitutions , taught her children, developed her econauy and 
becane her ci tizena . Since 1843 H!Lwaii had be:aefi tted tram the protec­
tive cloak of the r.yler Doctrine, and, since 1876, she had shared the 
wealth of the American economic systam. By 1890, Hawaii bad few virtues 
and few faults for which Americans were DOt, to a cme extent, responsible . 
CBAPTBR III 
TEE YBARS OF CHANGB 
Perhaps no P.,riod in Hawaiian history Ties in inoident, paoe and 
c ontrOYersy with the years from 1890 to 1898, but aost signitioant to 
the statehood issue was Hawaii ' •  att.a1!Dient of territorial statue . In 
general, despite political uphee:val, the pre'ri.ouely outlined economic 
and cultural trends which would later attect the statehood question 
continued with li ttl.e change . Bowver, the period brought climaxes in 
the tielde of Hawaiian-American diplomatic relatioDJJ and domestic po­
ll tical growth. 
:aawaUan-AIIerican diplomatic relationa tram 1889 to 1892 
centered around sporadio attempts to etteot a more oomprehensi ve reci­
procity treaty. In early atteapts the Hawaiian Reform Party cabinet 
was handicapped by DAtive tears ot jeopardising island autonC���Y--a.n 
apprehension the political opposition uaed tell!Dgly. Furthermore, 
Kalakaua, on three oocaeiOD81 refused to eanotion negotiatiODII; the 
cabinet lost poll tical 1trength in the election ot 1890 ; and �rican 
interest strayed. By Kay, 1890, negotiationa had come to a halt. 
Disturbed by Congressional debate on taritt changes �oh would 
threaten reoiprooity' benefits, the Ba.waiian oabi.D.et had seen the tree.ty 
e.s a meana ot assurillg long-term continuation of those privileges upon 
whioh the Hawaiian economy so largely depended. Other objectives wre 
a larger number ot duty-tree products to enooure.ge diverlitioation of 
agrioul. ture and industry and the lont-sought, detini ti ve .a.erioan guarantee 
of Hawaiian independence . .Also desired tor Hawaiian granra was a share 
in &D:1 bounties or other benefits accorded AJierioan producers of similar 
gooda . The Harrison-Blaine administration seemed �ainl.y' concerned with 
bobtering AJaerioan predominance in the islands and answering Ifawaii • e 
threat to seek non-AIIerioan o01111118roial fields it reciprocity benefits 
were ourtailed. 1 
Despite Mini ster John L. SteTens ' stout aupport of a stronger 
treaty and his warnings regarding tariff ohaDgea, the Monnl.,- T&ritt 
Bill was passed in October, 1890 . Bliail:tating all tariff duties on 
foreign sugar and granting a bounty to Jlaerioan producers, it deatroyed 
Hawaii ' s  advantage over other foreign sugar growers . For a time it 
eTen nullified beDeti ts to other treaty-stipulated Hawaiian products, 
but this etf'eot was rectified bJ Congressional action. Two fe&ra later 
steTens estimated that sugar planters and their associates had lost no� 
leal than 112.ooo,ooo, while Queen Liliuokalani called tor legialatiTe 
measures to stem a depression she attributed to �rioan tariff poliof• 
A November legislative request was tultilled in �oh, 1891, 
when Hawaii reoaDIID8noed treaty' ugotiations. It was hoped that an en­
larged tree list would develop agricultural products to replace the 
lll'oreign Minister J. Austin to A. Rosa, et al, October 4, 1889, 
House ot Bepreaentatives Executive Document Io�-qa�3 Congresa, 2 
sesaioi; 2749. Bereil'ter oite4 as HOUae DOo"Uii'eiit :ro. 48. See also 
Merrill to Blaine, September 7, 1889';'""T6rd. , 23=24;-vfnli"ter John L. 
Stevena to BlaiDe, October 1, 1889, Februaey 7, 1890, Febwaey 10, 
1890, with enclosures , ibid. , 26-27, }5-36, 37-qB J JUlius 11'. Pratt, 
Bxp&naionists ot 1898 {!iltfmore t The Jolma Hopld.D.a Pren, 1936), 
36=31, Ll-li2; S'Wvena, op. oit� , 196-199. 
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sorely pressed sugar iDdustry in island cteonOJI¥• Although the treaty 
was a political issue in the 1892 election, even the nativistic Liberal 
Party' curbed its oppodtion, so "''ita.l was the treaty to the economy. 
This time, honver, American politics intervened. President Harrison 
tailed to sign the treaty because ot ita cormeotion with the whole 
taritt issue, illlminent elections and opposition by domestic economic 
interests. The victory ot the Democrats in 1892 ended turther moves 
toward the treaty' • 2 
B;y late 1892 Ba:waiian-.uaerican relations had reached a stalemate. 
So prOIIlinent had these relations became, that, in 1890, the United states 
raised stevena to the rank ot miDister plenipotentiary. Yet political 
oondi tiona in the two countries pre'ftnted turther ceunting ot boD.da. 
Hawaii needed and desired greater eccmamic concessions tram the 'O'nited 
States . But it bad little to otter in return except greater intringe­
m.ent upon its sovereignty, a step the 1889-1892 cabinets tound impossible 
to take because ot growing DAtive na tiODAli811l. Jfo American president 
dared otter more c0110esaiona without CCIIIIlensurate returns . The idea. 
ot a protectorate, as virta&ll7 proposed early- in the tirst series ot 
negotiations, had been rejected by- Secretary ot State Jla.roy as early 
2stevens to Blaine, Jlaroh 20, 1890 , May 20, 1890, Jla.y 28 , 1890, 
September 5, 1891, October 15, 1891, February 8, 1892, November 14. 
1890, House DooU.ent Bc. !,B, 51, 53-55, 84-87, 73J SteveJm to Secretary 
ot state J. W. Foster;-fo'Tember 20, 1892, ibid� ,  116-118, 97-107J 
Liliuoka.lani to Legislature, Speech, lla.y 26, 1892, ibid., 94; Congres­
•ilmal Record, 51 Congress, 2 Seaaion, Part IV, 36Yt-38, 3760 ; Biiliii 
to BILirii'Oii';lfoftllllber 27, 30, 1891, in Albert T. Volwiler, editor, 
The correapondenoe Betrien Benjamin Harrison and James G. Blaine, 1882-
19t)� (Phit&aeiphla.t !h8 liaerican Ph!iosophicusooiev; 1940), 21m, 
'!Eiftu, op. tit.£2 188, 200-202, 205 J luybnd&ll and Day, op. cit., 175J 
Pratt, op. oi ., -.48. - -
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as 1854, as it -.a again by stevens in 1892. With the suspension ot 
nego�ationa, that idea lost more prestige, and ita alterD&tive, annex-
ation, gained in ste.ture in many eyes, both Hawaiian and .Aaerican. By 
189� it was e'rl.dent that a ome  drastic political change in e1 ther Hawaii 
or the tJ'n1 ted States would be necessary- before closer relations could 
become a reallty. By 189� such a change in the islands was undern.y.3 
Already outliDed through the reign ot Kala.ltaua., d0111.estio po­
litical grnth reached a turning point in 189�. In any summary, emphasis 
belongs on the tact that early constitutional growth in Hawaii was under 
the guidance, to a great extent, ot the llli.saionary ela.eat. Aa the 
.Aaerican Board beoame less active, those whites were lost who held the 
middle gr01D1d betwen the Datives and the haoles less interested in 
pnaka wellbeing. Lost, too, as time nnt on, wre two aouroes ot 
native leadership, the politically adept �ebameha dynasty and the 
chieftain class .  Race ante.gonism, spurred by leprosy segregation la1f'll 
even before the tremendous increase in foreign investment and popult.• 
tion JU.de its -.rk, flared openly duriDg the reign ot J;,lmalllio (1873-
1874) . Kalakaua' s penchant tor de&Spctism, extravagance and corruption 
had brought on the wh1 te-led reTolution in 1887, which merely inoreaaed 
the tension. A Dative insurrection in 1889 against the Reform Party 
�Steftns to Blaine, September 17, 1890, Hou1e Document Jo. 48, 
&9J lfarcy to Gregg, .April 4, 1854, House ot Representat!Tes Report­
Jo. 1355, 55 Ocmgreae, 2 Session, 70. Henatter cited as House Report 
"10:' 13$'. Steftns to Blaine, February B, 1892, ibid� , 8�J SteTens, op; en:-, 202-20�. - -
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administration was quelled, but both Kalakaua and the tuture Queen 
Liliuokalani had been, at the least, interested and hopetul byst&D.dera. 
The leader ot the reTOl t, balt-caate Robert W. Wilcox, deapi te proven 
guilt, was acquitted by a native juey, so  intense was DAtive feeling 
against the 1887 constitution, which Wilcox tried to overthrc:nr. The 
landing ot American troops to protect AJDerican lite and property in 
1889, as in the election riot ot 1874, set a precedent tor the greater 
revolution 7et to come. 
xal.akaua 1 s death in 1891 brought to the throne the controversial 
Liliuokalani, a mature W'aD&D ot education and experience in both poli-
tics and social work. Most striking, hannr, nre her courage and 
will--both ot which she eaployed toward regaining royal powers lost 
in the Constitution ot 1887, to which she took oath reluctantly. 4 
4m,.se ot Repnsa.tative� Bxeoutive DooUIIent Bo� 47, 5� Congress , 
2 Sessioa, 19'r-199, bireai'Gr o 'tid as louse booument1fo":"47; Merrill 
to Blaine, lla.y 8, 1889, July 26, 1889, AUgust 1, 1689, Seplimber 7, 
1889, House DocUD�eDt Bo. 48, 5, �-18, 23-24J Article 22, Constitution 
ot 1887, House DocumenTNO: 47, 340 J Lili uokalani to COIII1li ssioner James H. 
Blount, n. d. f��� Blountto Secretary ot State w. Q. Gresham, July 17, 
1893, ib1d. ,  �9 , 1 J stewna to Blaine, Febru&17 5 ,  1891, House Docu­
ment No. 48, 74-75J Ste'ftlll 'to Blaine, October 17, 1889, BovelDber""4;'"" 
�t,Jbif%-30• 32• SeD&te Report 11o� 227, 195-196, 28�-286, 292, 312, 
4�9- , 497, 506, 524=5�. Formi'iior political developments, 
1889-1891, see steftns to Blaine, November 14, 1889, Februaey 10, 1890, 
Jlay 28, 1890, J'wle 26, 1890, August 19, 1890, September 25, 1890, Nov­
ember i4, 1890, House Document Bo. 48, 33-34, 37, 55, 66-68, 10, 72-73J 
Senate Report No. 227, 524-525.-,..ordiacuasions ot Liliuokalani' s 
ch&r&cter, see-sin"i&" Beport Bo. 227, 177, et p&asimJ Stenns to 
Blaine, May 21, 1692, and Stevens To Foster;-OatOber 19, 1892, House 
DocUMDt lio. L.B, 92, 96. See also !Dqbndall and Day, op. cit. ,  174 
and SteftD'&, op. cit., 192-193• 
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upheld by the Supreme Court ot Hawaii, Liliuokalani won a 
Tictory against the llmiseicmary• taction in appointing her own ooali-
tion cabinet. The tollcnrillg months were quiet, although the -.ry Stevena 
asked tor the presence ot an JJilerican warship during the 1892 elections . 
These electiona brought into the legislature three parties t the National 
Ret ora, or Queen' s  party, the ltmissicm.a.ry• Reform Party', and a Liberal. 
Party, made up ai.Dly ot •lcontenta suoh as R. 11'. lfiloox. This latter 
party, while anti-white, allied i tselt tor some months with the Retora 
group because ot it. opposition to the influence of the Queen's marshal, 
c .  B .  Wilson. rogether, these parties ousted three suocesaiw cabiDets 
chosen by the Queen. But some ot the Liberals, disgruntled at lack 
ot representation in the all-Reform cabinet a.ppointed in llovember and 
impatient at cabinet delay in remo'l'il:lg Wilson tram ottioe, threw their 
night to the Queen•s  party. !here followed in succession the passage 
ot an opium-sales licenaing bill and the Rete�-· opposed bill establish­
ing a national lottery. Finally came the voting out ot the Reform cab­
inet on rhursday, Januazy 12, 1893 .5 
5In House Document No . ha, see the tollcnring dispa.tohesa Stevens 
to Blaine, ,.'bruary 22, 159!; '77-78; �ril 4, 1891, 81 ; August 20, 1891, 
82; February 8, 1892, 87 ; Jlay 21, 1892, 91-93J stevens to Foster, Sep­
tember 9, 1892, 94; September 14, 1892, 95 ; ODtcber 19, 1892, with in­
closures, 96-107; October 31 and November 1,  1892, 108-109; November 8, 
1892, 110 . See also Senate Report No• 227, 290-293, 295, 312, 323-324, 
519-520, 761-764; Blo1mt to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document 
No. 47, 114; ibid., 94; J\llius 11'. Pratt, •!be Hawaiian Revoiu'aona a 





A detailed description or eTents ot the week following ia not 
pertinent to the s tatehood issue . Briefly • with a. friendly cabinet 
in offlce . the Queen prorogued the legisla.ture on Sa.turday. That a.tter­
noon ahe tailed to get her cabinet• s aignatures to a new constitution 
which she pl.&Dned to impose through executive action alone . This oon­
sti tution 1r0uld have deatrOJed white political dominance . The cabinet 1 1 
rerusal to sign had been advised by a group o caposed mainly ot white 
planters and businessmen who formed that afternoon a C ommittee ot S&tety 
ot thirteen. The Queen IUlllounced a postponCIIUllt in the procla.iming or 
the new c onstitution. but the Committee c ontinued to be active . On 
SUnday a canvass  ot arms and men a'V&ilable tor its support was made and 
a mass meeting called tor the tollowing da.;y. Disturbed by these e'ftnts, 
the ca.bf.net, on Monday • persuaded the Queen to deola.re publicl;y that 
she had been under pressure trca native a.gi tation and would make no 
further a tt.pts at extra-constitutional change • Her marshal was un­
a.ble to get the Committee to ca.noel either ita own a.otivities or its 
mass meeting, while the Committee could not persuade auy ot the cabinet 
to enter ita plot to dethrone the Queen. The Queen' s supporters called 
a. c ounter mass :aeetiDg at which her apology was a.ocepted. )(ore sig­
nitioant was the COIIIIIIi. ttee • s mass aeeting; at which the action or the 
Q.ueen 1111.8 denounced and the Committee authorised to take all s teps nec­
esaa.r;y tor public satety. It would eeem, laon'Ver, that the majority 
a.t this meeting did not have in mind actual reTOlutionary a.otion. rhe 
Committee then a.sked Jtl.nister stevens to land troops tram the u. s.s.  
Boston, a request tultilled in the late afternoon in s pite ot protests 
15 
from the Queen' s govermaent a.nd the governor of Oahu. Several •et-
ings on Monday and Tuesday morning completed the Committee ' s plana tor 
overthrow of the govermaent. On tuesday afternoon, tram the atepa of 
the Goven:lllent Building, a Provisional Govermaent wa.s proolaiaed. Reo-
ogni tion of the new goverJ:IIIlent by Jlinister stevens came before the 
Queen' s  subn.i ttal under protest or the surrender of the Honolulu station 
house where a large royal polioe force was under arms. This recognition 
was later approved by W'ashi.Dgton as •discreet a.nd in accordance wi. th the 
facts . "  lfi th the surrender of the royal barracks and palace on Wednesday, 
the islands entered upon a new political venture . The Revolution had 
occurred without lou of lite .  6 
The proclamation of January 17 set up a Provisional Govermaent 
•to exist until terms of union with the United States of America han 
been negotiated and agreed upOll.• A. council of tour men, with Sa.ntord B. · 
Dole acting aa president, was to handle executive duties . An additional 
ad"''isory council ot fourteen men was appointed to •have general legislative 
6Quotation tram. Foster to stevens , January 28, 1893, House Doou-
-.ent No . 48, 133 • Some of the best sources tor intorm&tiOll on the ReTOlu­
li'Oii are found in teati.llloq before the Senate CODIIIlittee on Foreign Relatiol181 
December, 1893, to February, 1894. Senate Report Bo . 227, 173, et p&18im.1 
and House Executive Doolllllent lfo . 47, 1ihich contains �corresp"'idenoe &Dd 
report of CCiillill!ssioner Blount-:-Sii' e specially in House DocU..nt ITo. 47 • 
Blount to Gresham, JUly 17, 1893, 114-120, 123-128; QUeen' s  co:nstrEU't!On, 
581-590J Minister W. H. Col"Jl'Rll to Blount, April 24, 1893, 27-30J 
Uinister J. F. Colburn to Blount, April 15, 1893, 30·35 J s. B. Dole to 
Stevena , January 17, 1893, 99J Queen' s  ministers to Blount, lfay 31, 1893, 
82 ; Damon-Blount Interview, .&.pril 29, 1893, 47J in House Document Ho. 4Ba 
Stewns to Foster, January 18, 1893, with inolosurea, 120-131; iii "!iii--
ate Report lfo. 227, 31-39, 176, 218-219, 221-223, 293, 297, 493. Fe 
also Pratt, op. cit. , 79-81, 83-84, 86. 
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authority.• With the exoeption of the Queen, her cabinet, and her mar-
abal, all other officials ot the deposed monarobi}r were requested to 
continue their duties . The Ccm.sti tuticm of 1887, lrh.ers it did not con-
tl1ct w1 th the terms of the proclamation, continued in force . This 
proclamation, aigned only- by the Committee or Safety, obviously did not 
inatall a gover.aaent chosen b,y the people nor responsible to thaa. 
Amcmg ita aota,  while in power, 1ntre the repeal of the opium and lotte17 
bills, proTieicm. for a national guard, and the diatribution of crown 
lands aaong the natives in an effort to stop bn•k:a population decline . 
It seems to have provided aaple proteot1011 tor the Queen and •de no 
poli tioal arrests. On the whole, it was an able goveruaent and held 
firm a£&inst all attspts , foreign or dCDestic , to dialodge it trca 
power.7 
This govel"DI8nt sent to ll'aahington a five-man commission to ne-
gotiate a treaty ot am:J.e:xation. Aa President Cleveland was later to note, 
no time bad been lost. The cCIIIIIIlission sailed two days after the Pro-
visional Govermaent had been prool.aimed. rhirty'-two days later, Harrison 
reoCIIIDI8nded to the Senate a treaty for ratification. RequeatiDg apee� 
action, Harri son denied aDJ �erican responsibility for the Revolution, 
llhioh, he wrote, resulted f'rom Liliuokalani • s  attempt at unconstituticmal 
7Quotationa trca Proolaaation, House Docaent Xo. 471 322 J see 
also ibid., 321-323, 327J Blount to Gresh&lll, JPri1 26, 169;, ibid. ,  20; 
SeDAte Report llo. 22.7, 225, 227, 247, 260 , 306, 312, 358-359, 369-371, 
ZiBS, 504, 51li"Tiieo.-JL Davis, 8The Hawaiian Revolution, • The Nineteenth 
century, XXXIII (llay-, 1893), 830, 834; J[Qykendall and Day-, op� cit. , 179. 
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action and the general iDAbili ty of the monarchy to provide security 
and good civil administration. Harrison further stated that restoration 
ot the Queen was "undesirable, if not iaposeible,•  and that only AJuri­
can aid could bring it about without great disorder.8 Be found annexa-
tion preferable to a protectorate tor guarding �rican island interests , 
which he characterized aa "not wholly selfish. •9 The treaty so recom-
Bl8nded pro'ri.ded, in essence, that the islands "become and be an integral 
10 part of the terri tory of the United States• 1 that the existing gov-
el"DIUnt contilme until Congre88 pro'ri.ded a permanent goverD��ental struc-
ture J that further Chinese imlligration be prohibi tedJ and that a tiD&ncial 
settlement be Dt&de tor the Queen and her heiress •11 It ia notable that 
the Hawaiian cClllllld aaioners, while requesting •tull, oaraplete and per-
petual political union• w1 th the United states, suggested a looal goTern­
ment like that in the territories--not statehood� 12 Later in arri T1ng 
8Presic»nt Harrison to the Senate, February 15, 1893, Senate 
Bxeoutive DooUIUllt Ho. 76, 52 Congress, 2 Session, 2, hereattir cited 
as SiDAte DOOuaent ro; 75J see whole menage, ibid. ,  1-2. See also 
President Grover Cle?eland to Congress, December 18, 1893, Rouae Document 
l!Jo� 47, iTJ Foster to Harrison, February 15, 1893, SeDAte Dooaaent lo. 76, 
'2=0J�'ftlla to Foster, Ja.nuary 19, 1893, iiouee l>ooUIIellt Wo. liS, 131-1327 
Hawaiian J(iniater J. Kott Smith to Foster, February 3, 18� Senate 
Document l!Jo. 76, 26; Dole to Foster, J&Daarf 18, 1893, ibid. ,  23J dam­
iiilasioner'i""".£'o-roaterl' _
February 3, 1893 - February 11, 1893, SeDAte 
Doo'UIIleDt � 12_, 28-�. 
9Preaident Bllrriaon to Se:aate, February 15, 1893, ibid. ,  2.  
10 -Treat,, ibid. , 7• 
llibid., 6-9. 
l2c01111111iaaionera to Foe ter, Febl"\l&ry 4. 1893, i bii. , 39• 
78 
in Washington were the spokeaen tor the Queen. whose purpose was to 
block the treaty'. The Queen, on January 19, ad wr1 tten to Harrison 
and stated that stewns had aided the revoluticm&ries . She further 
wrote that her surrender had been made with the idea that the United 
States would make reati tution tor the "wrcmgs" done her and her gowrn­
:unt.l3 
Meanwhile , on Febl"U&l7 1, at Prcni.sional Gowrnment request, the 
Aluricu flag was raised over Hawa.ii and .Aaerican troopa occupied gov-
erDUDt buildings. At no time, it 'WOUld seem., did the Provisional 
Governaent allow, or Jliniater stevena attempt, Allerioan control of gov-
ermaent administration. This protectorate , according to Stevens, was 
necessary to give the Provisional Gowrument time to organize efficient 
police and military forces. He •phaaiz:ed that a poorly defended gov-
ermaent would be prey to inter.terenoe by the British, to a.n Oriental 
uprising• and particularq to trouble frOIIJ. the large Japanese populatiou, 
whose spoke8JI&ll, a cOIIIIIIissioner, long had been dallanding suttrage tor 
his •peror• s subjects . Seoretaey Foster approwd this protectorate 
insofar as it was needed to maintain oi'vil order, but he disavowed any 
step which might jeopardize Hawaii ' s  sovereignty. steTeDs, evidentl.7 
feeling his action in line with this policy, kept the flag flying, 
although American forces on land were gradually reduced. While the 
13JJ.liuokalani to Jllrriaon, JamJ&ey 19, 1893, House Document 
:tlo. 47, �1; SteTeDa to Foster, January 26, 1893, House Document io. 
48, �-133· 
protectorate probably served to ease tension, it was a step neither 
necessary nor in line with aerioan pollcy.14 
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In Washington Liliuok:alani • s protest went \Dlheeded by' the Harri-
son administration, which, fran all evideDOe, had been prepared for 
some time to push annexation .at the first opportunity. While the Queen 
also sent President-elect Cleveland a plea to consider her case against 
stevens and the Provisional Govel"DD.ent, time beoaae her tirst all;y. 
Despite a favorable Senate oamni ttee report, the treaty was not rati-
tied before Harrison' s  term of ottice ended. Possibl;y the Senate had 
awaited the views of the new exec uti ve.15 
Cleveland• s views, it his  immediate action is any indication, 
were tonned as early as late February. W1 th a brief message, he with-
drew the treaty from the Sel:late on March 9 and then sent to Hawaii a 
special investigator. By not sending a Senate-approved representative 
ot diplama.tic rank, Cleveland unnecessarily exposed himself to muoh 
14senate Report No. 22.7, 32-33, 203, 306, 338, 3!40-3h2, 473-474, 
553-556, 582; stevens tO'Joitir, February 27 and llarch 1, 1893, and 
Stevens to Gresham, Karoh 15 and 24, 1893, Provisional Govermaent to 
stevens, January 31, 1893, Stevens to Wiltse, Februaey 1, 1893, Stevens 
to Foster, February 1, 1893, 111ltse to Secretary ot the Navy, February 1, 
1893, Foster to stevens, Februaey 14, 1893, Stevens to Gresham, .April 4, 
1893, House Dool.lllent � �� 137-139, 14D-l41, 143-145, 149-153, 4.88-4.89. 
15uuuokal.&Di to Cleveland, January 31, 1893, House Document No . 
471 401-402 ; Foster to Stevens, Februar,y 22, 1893, House Document No."'"'Ij1J, 
1Ii'21 Pratt, op. cit. ,  61, 69-73; stevens, op. oit. ,  195, 2o8-212J Mitb.e-= 
son, loo . ci":t.; 1;lU Donald Rowland, "The li&.m&hment of the Republlo 
ot Haiiii, '1l""'1''ie Pacific Historical Review, "[f1 (September, 1935) ,  202, 
hereafter cileU as "Repubilo ;8 Ha:ray and Dumke ,  � cit ., 413. 
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cri tici!!'Dl• His choice of a representative, Commi ssioner James H. Blount, 
was a retired Georgia Congres.-.n and one-time Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Attaira. While Blount denied having a:t13 preconceived 
ideas ccmoerning the Hawaiian R8volution, his later testimony revealed 
an attitude, it not ot hostility, at least ot great doubt toward the 
events ot the Revolution and the question ot anne:mtion. His previoua 
Congresaional activities had not favored expe.nsioniBlll tor the United 
states.  Blount further testified that the only admin.istra.tion view 
with which he lett the U'llited States was to end the protectorate, it 
po•sible . He felt, he said• that his only job was to get intormation.16 
Blount' s instructions were to gather facts about the Revolution, 
its causes , and the sentiments ot the people toward it and annexation. 
It opportuDi ty attorded, he was to otter his senicea toward a settle-
ment between the two taotions, royalists and reTOlutionaries . For this 
job Blount had •p&rUI.OUJlt" authority in Hawaiian-American relations in 
the islands . Arriving in JlAroh, 1893, Blount taced no easy task. With 
the great unoert&inty as to which regime--i;he monarchy or the provisional 
govel"DID8D.t-<10uld eventually be in power, the tears ot reprisal must 
have colored much ot the teat� given Blount. Furthermore, his main-
te:aance ot secrecy, a policy he felt w.l.se, must also have hampered a tull 
l.6c1enland to Ccmgrese, December 18, 1893, House Document uo. 47, 
T; Senate Report liO e 2211 385-389, l.,o3-4Q6; Nevins, StUdf, 552J MoJ!ioy. 
op. cit. ,  II, 53;ll'lan HeTins, editor, Letters ot GrOTer Cleveland, 
l'B5'0=t9tfe (Bo•tona Boughton Jlittlin Cca�, 19;'3'), 312J iontgomeey 
�ler. "Walter Q.uintin Gresham," in Bemis, � _
cit., VIII, 243, 245, 
247J Pr&tt, op. cit�, 121-123; George Roscoe DUiibO&i; Principles ot 
Foreign PoliC'f'"uiClir' the Cleveland Administrations (Phii&deiphla a -
Uilverai'ij' of Pannsyl'ftnia, 1941), 4bJ Bouse Report No. 243, Part 2, 
53 Congresa, 2 Session, 1 .  - -
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investigation. Provisional Goverunent supporters accused Blount, not 
without juatice , of giving royalist testilaOD¥ the greater weight. His 
two illtervinll with the Queen, however, both with Provisional Goven:ment 
knowledge, seem to have been entirely w.i. thin the spirit or his  task. 
No doubt, galle.nj;ry toward the Queen, as well as a certain distaste for 
both faotions, played its pa.rt in his attitude toward his mission. 
Blotmt ' s final report was sent from HOnolulu on JUly 17, 1893• His 
departure from the isla.nds,  after refusing to remain as AJilerican minister, 
followed 1hortly, while Hawaii remained ill a quandAry as to tuture AJneri­
can polioy toward 1 t.17 
One other result or Blount• s Ti si t was the ending of the proteo-
torate on .April 1. Whatever the mderourrent, there were no demonstra-
tions either of joy or sorrow by island residents at this event. Blount 
felt the continuance of the protectorate neither necessary nor oond.uoive 
to a fair investigation. stevens protested this action in view of what he 
considered a Japanese menace , but Blount thought this fear unwarranted.l8 
l7Gresbam to Blomt, Maroh 11, 1893, Blomt to Gresham, April 6, 
1893, .April 26, 1893, Ma.y 24, 1893, JUly 31, 1893, House Document No . 47, 
1-3, 4-5, 13-15, 21-22, 68, 164J Dole to Willis, January 11, 1894,-ren-=­
ate Executive Doo1.111ent No. 46 53 Congress,  2 Session, 19, hereafter 
'O'It.ed as Senate Doo\lllen o-:-[.6, Senate :aerrrt �· 227, 201, 309, 389•392, 
394-396, 412-414, 447, 45o-45m Blount to res --; June 1 and Kay 24. 
1893, House Document � g, 163, 155; Rowland, •Republio,"  205. 
l8captain c .  L. Hooper to Blount, April 2, 1893, Blount to Gresham, 
April 6, 1893, .April 26, 1893, July 17, 1893, Admiral Skerrett-Blount 
Interview, April 8, 1893, Admiral J. s. Skerrett to Blount, A.pril 1, 
1893, Ji)uae Doo1.111ent llo. 47, 8-9, 6-7, 21, 102-103, 11, 8;  Senate Report 
uo. 221, 305, 339, 34;;-m, �1�, 561. - -
The main conclusions of the Blount report wre a  (1)  that the 
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TOting out of the Reform Jlinistey--not the Queen' s  attempt to proolaiJI. 
a new constitution--was the immediate cause of the Revolution; {2 ) that 
stevens had actively and knawln&ly assisted the revolutionaries with 
the purpose of achieving annexation; (3)  that the Queen surrendered 
with the idea that the United States would re-establish her throne, 
once the facts concerning the Revolution were known; (4) that the Revo­
lution was led by men at least half of whom held allegiance to foreign 
countries--mainly .AJaericans and Bri tiah; (5 ) that the people of Hawaii 
wre against both annexation and the Provisional Gove:rm11ent; and (6) 
that economic motives involving hopes tor a sugar bount.y and special 
legislation to protect contract labor, as well as a desire for the 
economic benefits of a Pacific cable and Pearl HArbor im.pro'Velllents , 
were vi tal parts of the move tor revolution and an.nexation.19 
Even with due consideration for his difficult working conditions 
and the pressure of time, Blount displayed, in his report, little real 
Ul!ldersta.nding of Hawaiian hiatoey, and some of his statements about 
that history were inAccurate . Perhaps the fairest judgment would be 
that, in his zeal to see fair play for the native Hawaiians, he tailed 
to take into account the dominant forces which had developed from Hawaii ' s  
past. His judgment of stevens • activities, a contemporary aeries of 
19Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document � �· 115, 
117-121, 125-127, 129-130, 133 · 
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events, was tairly accurate . What he did not realize was that, while 
.Alurican expansioniSJIL in 1893 was having its first great public test, 
it had been active as a foroe in Hawaii since 1B2o .2
0 
Although he accepted the BloUD.t report in tull, it was October 
before CleTel.and asked the advioe of his cabinet on �waiia.n policy. 
Based ma.inly upon the ideas of Gresham and .A.ttorney-General Richard 
Olney, the policy selected was essentially to use � lU&ns short of 
force to restore the Queen to power. It was also decided to drop the 
annexation treaty trom further consideration. Like the BloUD.t report, 
this policy did not became public knawledge UD.til Jovember.21 
1'he new minister to Hawaii, Albert s. Willis,  was instructed to 
inform the Queen of the President• 1 belief that steTens had been in-
atrumental in the overthraw of her govermaent. Furtherm.ore, Willis 
was to promise the Queen Cleveland' s  a.id in her restoration, provided 
she would agree to a general &JII18sty and to the a.ocepta.noe of all ob-
ligations assumed by the Provisional GoTermaent. Having achieved the 
20 Bl•unt to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document Bo. 47, 108, 
135 J Senate Report Bo . 227, 228, 310-312, 324; bOle to W11Iri,""l>eoember 23, 
1893, House l&eoutiw-Doc-laent lfo. 10, 53 Congreu, 2 Session, .40, here­
after cited as House Document N-;;;-"{oi KcBlroy, op. cit. , II, 57-58 ; 
Schuyler, loo . clt. , 2li5 J Rowland, ..,.Republic, "  �; -r&i'ins , study, 554-
555 ; BaileJ, op. olt., 472. 
2l:acnrl&nd, "Republic, • 205 J Bevins ,  StudJ, 555-557 J KcBlroy, � 
oit.,  II, 59-61 ; Sc�ler, � cit. , 245-248. 
Queen' a agreement to these conditions, Willis, in the name of the Presi­
dent, was to aak the Prort sional GownBent to relinquish power.22 
Willis, in a tense, excited Honolulu, tirst approached the Queen 
on BoTember 13 with CleTeland' s proposals . But the Queen was adamant 
in her deaire tor revenge--she talked in teras of exile, confiscation 
ot property, and even beheading . Her attitude oaused W'illis to feel 
. 
that restoration would also mean absolutim tor Hawaii. While uneasi-
ness mounted; Gresham curtly instructed Willis to inform the �een that 
she must either accept the Prelident • s condi tiona or lose his support. 
The Provisional Gowna�t, •eamrhile, through ita washington represent&-
tiTe, cited to Gresham the world-wide recognition ot the ProTisiona.l 
Govermaent• s legallt;y. It turther stated that the united states bad 
never been accepted by it as a mediator, nor had the united states ob-
sorTed the international rules goTerning •ediation. It warned that 
restoration would require either toreign troops or a blood1 reTOl t. 
But CleTel.u.d, ill :bis &mlual me88age, had alrea� announced that, in 
Tiw ot the Blount report, his only honorable recourse was to •undo 
the wrong that had been done by those representing us .•23 However, 
�resham to Willis, October 18, 1893, Rouse Document Ho. 47, 
xxi-xxii J Schuyler, loa . cit., 248. Stevens• resiguatlon b&d"Deenao­
oepted earlier. SeeGreshii to stewns, April 25, 1893, and stenns 
to Gresham, Kay 18, 1893, House Doo'IDlent Ho. J.,B, 154-155· 
- -
2'u.aaage to Congress, December 4, 1893, Foreign Relations, 1894, 
xi .  See also W1llia to Greshaa, November 6, 11, and 16, 1893, and Gresham 
to Willis, Howm.ber 24 and Deoamber 3, 1893, House Document Bo. �. 164-
167, 169-171J L. A. Thurston to Gresham., Deo•bir 5, 1693, i'6ICT.;-:L71·176J 
Willis to Gresham, November 16, 1893, and December 5, 1893, HOuse Document 
No. 70, 1•3, 6-7J Rear .Adlliral John Irwin to Secretary of lfa�, Ja.mar;y 2, 
�;-Bouae BxeoutiTe DoolDWlt lo. 76, 53 Ccmgresa, 2 Session, 6-7, here­
after cited as Houae Doo1111ent !2.:_ 15': 
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the difticul ties encountered in the person ot the obsti.D&te Q.ueen led 
Cleveland and his cabinet, on December 7, to decide to place the whole 
matter in the banda ot Congress .  24 
As a result ot this decision, Cleveland sent to Congress on 
December 18, 1893, a speoial Mssage. He admitted the inability' ot the 
executive to act further. :Ere wrote that his action had been hampered 
not only by the Queen• s attitude but by' •untortunate public miarepre-
sentation of the situation and ezaggerated statements of the sentiments 
ot our people • • • • • Hie offer to cooperate in llDJ legislative action 
•consistent with American honor, integrity and m.orali ty• seemed to indi­
cate that he hoped the Congress would continue to work tor restoration. 25 
Willis earlier had reported more signs that a restored monarchy' 
would hardly produce the best ot gaver.aments.  But, just before Cleve-
land• s message to Congress, Willis reported limited conoessiou by the 
Queen. Fi�ly, on Dec•ber 18, the Queen agreed not only to tull amnesty 
and assUIIlption ot Prortsional Govermnent obligations, but to govermaent 
meier the 1887 Constitution. But her action came too late. For, when 
Willis informed the Provisional GoTermnent of the Queen• a agreement to 
Cleveland' s  conditions and ot the President' s expectation that it would 
"pram.ptly relinquish to her her ccmatitutional authority, " the Provisional 
Govei"DIIl8nt stood tirm.26 Sanford B. Dole &D81r8red that the project ot 
2lwevina, Stu�, 559·560· 
25clewland to Congress, Deo•ber 18, 1893, House Doo111118nt � !7_, 
iii-xrt. �otations on xri . 
26willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, House Document lfo. 70, 35J 
see also ibid. ,  34-35J Willis to Greshaa, Deo.a'ber 9, 18, 19, '2o,' 1893, 
and Liliuoiil&Di to Willis , December 18, 1893, ibid., 17-30• 
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&lllWX&tion would be dropped only until the ad.Terlt ot a new A.JDerioan ad-
ministration. He refused to accept Blount• s report as final or to reoog-
nbe the right ot the united states to mediate between the Queen and hia 
gowrmunt. Finally, he retused to aooept the propoli tion ot the Presi­
dent that the Provisicmal Gowrmaent should step down tor the Queen. 
Dole ocm.aidered the whole matter at an end with the newa ot Cleveland' s 
su'tmittal ot the problam to Congress . The deteat, already admitted b7 
the President in his message fi-ve days before, had arriwd in tact.27 
With growing military str.ngth, with aounti.Dg popula.ritr, and 
with the c on"riction that the aerioan people would not allcnr torce to 
be used against their Hawaiian ld.nd, the Provisional Government became 
increasingly confident. In a subsequent series ot notes ,  Dole charged 
lrlllis and the slow-moving, secretive Clewland policy with the re spOJ18i-
bility tor his gowl"!IMnt• s haTing to bear he&Ty" Dlilit&.ey expenditures . 
E'nn lft.llis telt that the failure publicly to a.nnounoe that the united 
states 'WOUld not use torce to restore the Queen had created an explosive 
atmosphere in the islanda .28 
27Dole to 111llia and lf.lllis to Gresham, December 23, 1893 and Gres­
ham to Willie, J&mlaey 12, 1894, House DoolDIGt llo. 70, 35-�, ,44, SeDAte 
Report llo. 227, 459; Dole to lft.llls ,  Deo8iber 29-;-!S9'3', House Document 
iio. �,o; -
28SeDate Report No . 227, 304-305, 257, 250, 357; Admiral Skerret to 
Secretary or la-vy, J\Die-m3',-x8'93, JUly 25, 1893, August 14, 1893, Septem-
ber 12, 1893, October 10, 1893, House Doo\D.eJlt llo. ha, 504-5o6; Dole to 
Willis ,  December 27, 1893, House lieoutlw Dooui8i'tBo. 79, 53 Congress, 
2 ses aion,4-5 , hereafter referred to ae House Doolllll.eD.tNO. 79J Willis to 
Gresham, January 12 ,  1894, House Bxeoutin Document ito.�,� Congress, 
2 Session, 2; Dole to Willis, January 11, 1894, Sina'W"Doouunt lio� Jt,, 
18-23J lfillb to Gnahul, January 16, 1894, Bouse &outlve Doouiiilt-ro. 112, 
53 Congress, 2 Session, 2-3; Dole to Willis, February 14, 1694, sen&t'i"L""Cu- · 
tive Dooum.ent Bo. � 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2-4J Bnia,, Study, 557-558J 
iO'irroy, 21!!. oit.,  II, 67-68. · 
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After turning the Hawaiian questiQD. over to Congress, Cleveland 
scrupuloualy kept it intormed ot all de'ftlopments and supplied it 11'1 th 
all diplaaatio oorreapondence .29 
The Cleveland policy gained no n.w lease on lite at the hands of 
congress . The Senate CODIIBi.ttee on Foreign Relations conducted a lengt� 
i.n'ftstigatio:n of American inTol'ftlllent in the ReTolutio:n tram December, 
1693, to early Febru&l'1, 1894. Its report has been T&riously described 
as •r.aartable•30 and •an amasing series of contradiotiona .•31 The re-
port of the chairman mauaged to clear e'ftryone in both the Clenland and 
ItLrriscm. adainistrations of illlproper conduct, 11'1 th the exception of Stevens ' 
declaration of a protectorate, which was oh&raoterized as invalid and 
dangerous as a precedent. Only the chairman subscribed in full to the 
report. The tour Republican members of the committee, while accepting 
in main the chairman' s findings, claimed that Cle'ftl&nd had no right to 
question the legal1 ty of the ProTi.aional Go'ftrDI!lent o:noe it had been ac-
corded diplou.tic represent& tion. :rurthermore, they tel t the ao t1 T1 ties 
ot Blount and Willis had been disturbing to island affairs and prejudicial 
to the Provisional Gowrmaent. The tour Democrats of the oOIIIIDittee , two 
ot whom favored annemtion, roundly critici&ed SteTens as being inatru­
mental in the OTerthrow of the monarolJ¥ and subject to strong rebuke.32 
29clenla.nd to Senate, February 19, 1894, Senate Document � ,!e, 1.  
30Pratt, 2!. oit. , 183. 
31stevens , � oi t. , 265 . 
32seD&te Report llo. 227, 1-36 J So hurler, loc . cit. , 249 J Nevins, 
Study, 561; Stevena, op. cit:'"; 265-266 ; Pratt, op. o1t.;""l.83. - - _ ,___ 
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!he partisan character ct these dissenting opin101l8 is indication 
enough ot the tenor ot much ot the Senate debate upon the q'!8sti0111 ot 
the Revolution and annexation. It was Jlay 31, 1894, betore a re·solution 
tiDally was e.greed upon. It declared tor non-interference in Hawaiian 
domestic a.ttairs, a.nd, in the old Tyler tradition, declared that the 
United States would not sutter other nations to interfere . The House, 
with less debate , had passed, on Februa.r.y 7, a eet ot resolutions ot 
similar meaning but also declaring against annexation a.nd Stevens ' 
oonduot.33 
From the events ot the revolutiona.r.y period and the AID.erioan in• 
volvaent therein arose three points tasoina.ting to contemporaries and 
historians alike a ( 1 )  the a.otual ertect ot the attitude and activities .  
ot Miniater stevens upon the success ot the Revolution; (2 ) the motives 
tor and wisdom ot President Cleveland ' s  policy; and (3) the primar.y 
causes ot the Revolution. 
Partisanship characterized both Hawaiian and .American testi.moll7 
concerning the e'ftnts ot the Revolution, but there emerged tram this 
maze some definite ta.ots . Stevens landed .Dierioan troops against the 
protest ot the Queen's  gOTerum.ent. The main boq ot these troops was 
80 located, during the most critical day-s ot the Revolution, that a:rq 
royalist attack upon Provisional Gover.ament headquarters alaost certainly 
33c!ilrea81aaa1 Record, 53 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 26, Part VI, 
5499-5500;�4., hrt II, 2001, 2007-2008; tor Senate debate, 8ee ibid. ,  
Part I, 19-31, 61-73, 127·132, 204-206, 430·434, 482, 523, 567, 621-
628, 694•707; tor House debate, see ibid.,  Part I, 397�1, and Part II, 
1813-1822, 1825-1852, 1942-1969. 
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would haft endangered .AJaerica.u sailors and marines .  However, despite 
auch e'Vidence to the c ontraey, this location did atf'ord a.u aT&ilable and 
central posi ticm tor protection of' Aaerioan lite and property. The con-
duct of' the troops was iapeecable. There were no threatening dell10ll8tra-
tiona or even patrols, and the men 'were c losely confined to their encamp-
ment. However, it is difficult to avoid the c onc lusion that the very 
presence of' these troops was a source of' intimidation to the Queen. 
While estimates as to her militar.y and police force s  T&ry, their numbers 
aust have been sufficient to partially explain the call by the revolu-
ticmaries tor JJnerican troops to land in the interest of' peace and order. 
Even before the troops landed, it was probably the well-known annexa-
tionist s entiments of' stevens and his diplomatically improper contacts 
with revolutionary leaders , rather than any sense of' military interiority, 
which dissuaded the Queen' s cabinet fraa emplo.ying force of � nature 
against the CCIIDI1i.ttee of' Safety. Finally, stevens ' immediate recognition 
of' the Pro'Visional GoverDI!lent must have weighed hea'Vily in the Queen' a 
decision to surrender. Whether stevena was the aost discreet of' con-
spirators or merely the most assidious of' ministers in the protection 
of his country• s interests , his attitude and action undoubtedly gave 
comfort to the revolutionaries.� 
3f4col"Jlnll to Blount, .&.pril 24, 1893, Colburn to Blount, .April 15, 
1893, c .  J. Mocarthy to c .  B .  lll aon, Jlay 1,  1893, .A.. s. Cleghorn to 
stewns, January 16, 1893, Foreign Minister Samuel Parker to stewns, 
January 16, 1893, Dole to Stevens ,  January 17, 1893, Blount to Gresham., 
May 6 and JUly 17, 1893, waterhouse-Blount interview, Jla.y 2, 1893, 
Skerrett to Blount, Jl$.y 20, 1893, House DocUIIlent l!Jo. 47, 27-30, 30-351 
599-6oo, 572, 591, xviii, 6o-61 ,  117-119, 123, 12�tr, 141, 55, 72J 
Fartisanship, too, dominated c ontemporary estimates ot the 
motives and wisdan ot President Cleveland' s policy in blook:ing annexa-
tion. '!here were charges that Cleveland had allowed tree n.in to Gresham' s 
perecmal emni t,. tor .Blrrison and the late Blaine, a close friend ot Steve111 . 
The President ' s  decision in favor ot restoration ot the Qu"n brought him 
under tire tran church groups , sympathetic to the Hawaii&n missionaries ' 
heirs . He faced the tull flood ot expansionist propaganda, as exeapli• 
tied in the wri tillgs ot Captain .A. T. Mahan and Admiral George E. Belknap 
and the criticism ot expanaionist-m.inded political opponents . If Cleve-
l&nd was not actually distrustful ot Harrison' s handling ot the Hawaii&n 
question, he was openly auspicious ot the speed with which the treaty 
ot annexation had been negotiated. But Cleveland' s main motives seem 
to have beena (1)  concern that the will ot the Hawaiian people as to 
govel"lDD.8llt &nd annexation be carried out; (2 ) opposition to expa.uaionism 
and a.zme:m.tion. as an •erican policyJ &nd (3)  determination that AJnerioan 
national honor not be sullied by a:ny aoquisi tion ot terri tory und�r doubt-
tul ciroumstanoea . Cleveland' s policy attained success in only two par-
tioul&rs, a 'brmporary delay in expa.ndonism a.nd the presentation to the 
ibid.,  57-59 J Hawaiian Commissioner• to Foster, February 3 &nd 11, 1893, 
senate Document llo . 76, 29 .. 41 J Senate Report llo. 227, 184-186, 208, 
232=233, 3o7-30a-;-;:;r-:;40, 345, 369 .. 378-379, ;ar.�-385, 1#+-1#>, 
449-450, 452, 454, 457' 469, 472, 491, 493-494 .. 499-500, 513, 543, 550-
551, 568, M&ps Nos . 1 &nd 9;  Bailey, op. oit� , 470; Pratt, op� cit� , 85, 
91, 93, 95-99, 104, 107-109; Sohuyler-;-Toc . oit., �J steviiiS,c;p: oit.,  
222-229 J Nevins , Stu�, 551. For ste'V8'ii'S"' •iUi'eia. ti oni at sentiments, -see 
Stevena to Blaine, February 8, 1892 and Apri 1 2, 1892 . Ste'V8ns to Foster, 
Noftlllber 20, 1892 and February 1, 1893, House Document No . 48, 87-88, 
90-91, 114-115, 134-1:;6. - -
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world ot an e:x:ample of high nattcmal morality in dealing w1 th a small 
nation. On the debit aide, Cleveland showed, at the vary least, a lack 
ot foresight in his selection or an iaaue in which to display national 
morality. Whether morally right or not, the Provisional Govermnent had 
been correct in stating that the issue as to who would govern BiLwaii had 
been settled w1 th the Queen •s  surrender. Without foreign aid, the Queen 
never could have regained her throne . Cleveland had not the power, nor 
would Congress grant the power, to give that aid. There ia the farther 
question aa to whether a nation has more right to enhance its national 
honor at the expense of a weaker government than to enhance ita economic 
or territorial status . Finally, the cumbersome handling of the Cleveland 
policy kept the islands in a state of tur.moil tor almost a year. Cleve-
land could have accomplished his purpose, w1 th leas harm to BLw.ii, by 
simply announcing the permanent withdrawal of the treaty tram turther 
o onaidera tion. 35 
35cleveland to Congress, December 1893, House Document No. 47, 
iii-Tl Senate Report Uo . 227. 127-137 J Cleveland to senator Wil!ramF. 
Vilas , iliiy 29, 1694; C!i'velind to Richard Olney, JUne 19, 1897 and 
July 8, 1898, Cleveland to Associated Preas, January 24, 1898, Cleve­
land to Thomas F. Baya.rd, February 13, 1895, Charles F. Adams, Jr . ,  to 
Cleveland, November 18, 1893, Bevins , Letters , 353, 478, .502, 491-492, 
311-378, 339 l A. T. Mahan, •Baw.ii and OUr FUture Sea Power, • The 
Forum, rl, (lfaroh, 1893 } ,  1-ll J George E. Belknap, Boston KeraTCl'; 
January 31, 1893, Senate Report Uo. 227, 169-171J H. c .  Lodge, *Our 
Blundering Foreign Pollcy,1 fh8 FOrum, XIX (llaroh, 1895 ),  8-10, 16-17l 
Davis, loo . cit.,  S3!u Schuyler, loo . cit. ,  243-24.5, 247, 249-250, 208-
269 ; Jlo'l'lrO'y;Op. cit.,  II, 45, 5'9';I,"lnj!J Bevins, nucv4 552-554, 558, 
560-562J Rowland, *Republic, • 203-204J Bailey, op. c • • 71-473 l 
Dulebohn, � ott., 41-43• For a defense ot Barrisonfa quick work 
on the 189Ttrea:ey, see John w. Foster, Diplc:matio Jlemoirs (Boston a 
Houghton W.ttlin Company, 1909),  II, 167-IM. 
AA to the primary causes tor the Revolution. the following a.re 
the main theories t  (1 } a conspiracy by the small. secret Annexation 
Club to make Hawaii an American territoey; (2 } a. mov•ent by the sugar 
intere sts tor econanic gain through absorption into the American econCIIIic 
syatemJ (3)  a moral crusade against political and personal immorality 
w:L thin the Hawaiian government and courtJ and (4) a drive tor a govern-
ment which would provide econcmi.c and poli tioal aeouri ty trao. both 
toreign and dao.eatio threats . 
The first theory rests upon the role which amexation Club mem­
bers played in the Revolution and a atateJUnt. ade on *-Y 27 • 1892. 
by one muiber in whioh the aotual events of the Revolution almost 
wre predicted in detail.  '!'his theory maintains that the Queen ' s  move 
to abrogate the Constitution of 1887 was merely the mi stake for which 
these men wa1 ted. although � supporters ot the ProTisional Gonrmaent 
later denied a.ey knowledge ot a revolutionary plot previous to the Queen ' s  
aotion. However • w1 thout at least the tacit support ot muoh ot Ha:waii ' s  
population. either through sym.patey or inditterenoe . it i s  not likely 
that the Provisional Gover.maent oould have stood long . Whatever the · 
role of the Annexation Club. ita motives were shared by a much larger 
group . 36 
The pioture ot the Revolution a.s the work ot the Hawaiian sugar 
barons • discontented 1mder the )(oKinJ.ey 'farif'f' and eager tor JJD.erioa.n 
36Pratt. op. oi t. • 57-62 ; Pratt. loo . cit. , 286-288 J Stevena • 
op. cit • •  2o6-20tr,"'2�. 217; Senate 5Po'rt lo. 227, 22�. 300. 
'Ii52'-153'; 508 . 
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bounties and expenditures on e. oe.ble a.nd Pearl I:larbor improvements , ha.s 
many flaws . The leading sugar baron, Claus Spreckels, was very late 
to join the annexationist mcvam.ent--al.m.ost tour months after the Revo-
lution. The sugar planters stood to lose, under .AJnerican laws , their 
profitable contract labor system, a.nd the continuance of the bounty sys-
tem was dependent upon the whim of Congreee.  Although sane planters 
supported the Revolution, sound business principles hardly pointed to 
annexation as the best solution to their problems . However, since most 
revolutionary leaders owned sugar stock and most haoles were affected, 
because ot sugar' s  economic dominance, by any variation in its pros-
peri ty, the desire tor e. govermnent proTiding economic stability would 
concCIIIIIli tantly mean a gonrmunt protecting sugar interests and inwst-
menta . The theory that sugar was the basic cause of the Revolution 
through its responaibility tor the .Uiatic population increase , which, 
suppoaedly, drove the whi tea to revolution to prevent Oriental political 
control has less to recommend it. lfhile the tear ot Asiatic dCJDinance 
was a force in the later moves for anneDtion, this tear had not tully 
developed at the time of the llevolution.37 
37cor.awell to Blount, April 24, 1893, and Blount to Gresham, 
July 17, 1893, House Document No . 47, 27-30, 133 ; Pratt, loo . oi t. , 
274-275, 278-280; liLr�,op. cit. ,  413;  Kuykendiire.ii<r"lla.y, 
op. cit. , 175 J Rowland, "Republio,"-ml"i'""'i'vins study, 555 ; Senate 
liPortllo.  227, 301 ; Stevena, op. cit. , 214, 2J.Ln. ;  Rlcha.rd D. Weigle, 
•Sugar and tlii' lJa'ftiian RevolutiOii;w-""'ihe Pacific B1storice.l Review, 
XVI (February, 1947 ), 57·58, W.u William I. RUss ,  Jr. ,  •me Role ot 
Sugar in Hawaiian .Aimexat:l.�f � 'fhe Pacific Rt.storical Review, XII (Deceaber, 1943 ),  343-344. �-�. 
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All to the moral c rusade, there baa been suggested a resurgence 
of missionary wrath against a goverDRent, �erable to charges of 
bri'bel"J, which enacted die tillery, lotteey and opium bill a .  Further­
more, the theoey runs, there was revulsion againat the immorality of the 
Queen and her court. But the �ueen had been accepted in the beat Bi!l:wi-
ian social circles and the mdence as to her :iJDm.orali ty was almost 
exclusively hereaay. The opiua and lottery billa , hardly excuses for 
a revolution, would have increaaed the revenue of a govermaent not too 
wealt}J1. The former possibly would ha-n allowed the legal control ot 
a long-existing opia trade and the latter, by ita own terms, provided 
for the expenditure of the lottery income on badly needed public works • 
Whi le the need for improvad morality, both political and personal, may 
han been recognized, it was hardly a main force in bringing about the 
Revolut1on.38 
The last theory, the desire tor a stable gonrDmeDt, seems to 
ban been the underlying cause of the Revolution. Undoubtedly the AD.glo-
Saxon sense or auperiori ty had ita part in this wbi te-led revolution for 
gonrmaent by Jaerican standards , but Hawaiian history had hardly provan 
Eanaka political abilities to be outstanding. The property-holding ele-
menta no longer could trust a native-c ontrolled govermnent to protect 
their financial interests . A recent near panic in wi thdrawala tram the 
postal savings bank was but one more indication of the need tor sounder 
38aenate Report No. 227, 176-177, 214-215, 301, 584, 761-764J 
Wlmde:nberg-Blount lnterTI"iw;lla.y 15 , 1893, House Doo'llllent No . 47, 91; 
Pratt, loc . cit., 275-277, 280-284; stevens , op. cit., 192-19�:-- - - -
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govermaent fi.DaDcillg. There seemed to be a c onTiction that the monarcq 
could no longer unity politically the fractious, heterogenovs population 
of the islands. With the ousting of the Reform cabinet, followed by the 
Queen's  threat of a. new constitution d�g the property-holding interests 
even partial control of the govermu.ent, the Revolution was at han4. While 
' 
the presence of a sympathetic Alllerioan minister may have intluenoed the 
timing of the Revolution, the monarchy was at the point of disintegration. 
It could no longer meet the needs of its p011er.f'ul white subjects and reai� 
dents . The past made it inevitable, too, that, in seeking the fulfill­
ment o.f' its need for protection and stability, this white element ahould 
turn to the United states . 39 
As to annexation, it seems clear that, at the time of the Revolu-
tian, a majority of the people of Hawaii were opposed. While most of the 
foreign element was favorable, with the exception of same of the English, 
the native vote surely would have defeated the issue in a:rry plebiaoite.40 
39Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, Cor.awall to Blount, April � 
1893, House Document No. 47, 115, 133, 27-301 Damon-Blount interview, 
April 29, 1893. lbld.744Tstevens to Foster, January 18, 1893, House 
Document No. 48, 121J Bailey, op. cit� , 469; Rowland, "Republic,6 201; 
iteT!Us, "SE\i(fy;-551;  K�kendall and"15ij, op. cit. , 175 ; Stevens ,  op. cit� , 
227-229j-,;ratt, loc . cit • •  284, 293-294f1'ra�op. cit�,  36; Seiiite­
Report No. 227, lSo,'" l9tl, 194, 204, 207, 218, 22�0';'"'2'38, 211, 311, 
447-448, 451-452, 503-504, 510-511; Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893, 
House Document No . 47, 19-20. Foreigners paid an estimated four fifths 
ol the taXes .  See "Snate Report � 227, 497. 
�lount to Gresham, April 26, 1893, May 24, 1893, June l, 1893, 
July 17, 1893, Wundenberg-Blount interview, June 5, 1893, Damon-Blount 
interriew, April 29, 1893, Petiti ons aca.inst a.nne::m.tion to Blount, 
n. d. , House Doo\1118nt No . 47, 24, 66�, 11,· 133, 97, U,, 683-68lu Senate 
Report lo. 227, 197-199, 509J McElroy, op. cit., II, 57• ------ - - - --
Long before the Sena.te re solution of May 31, 1894, ended all 
hopes of immediate annexation, Provisiona.l Government leaders were pre-
paring a new government tor Hawaii . Willis, shortly after his arrift.l• 
reported much excitement about rumors that the Provisional Government 
was pliJllliDg a republic• while specters of attack continued to trouble 
both the government and the r.o.yalists , each suspicious of the other.41 
The Provisional Government obviously had been a temporary affair, 
its only purpose beillg to govern lmtil annexation was achieved. With 
annexation now a thillg of the future and with even goverDIIIent supporters 
beccmiDg increasingly critical of oligarchic control, sane more sa tis-
factory political structure was demanded. The reTolutionary leaders, 
honver, had in mind some definite qualifications tor this new govern-
ment. It had to keep the revolutionary element in control and it had to 
provide a clear right-ot-way tor eventual annexation, not only in its 
nature, but in its appeal to the American people .� 
In its provisions of Me.rch 15, 1894, for a constitutional conven-
ticm, the Provisional Government took care not only to keep the revolu-
tionary group in the majority, but to exclude aey A4iatio influence . 
The convention was to be composed of eighteen elected delegates in ad-
dition to the Provisional Government' s  president and executive a nd 
4lwi1Ua to Gre sham, November 6, 11, and 18, 1893, House Document 
No . 48, 164-166, 169-170; Stevens, op. oit. , 267-269. - - - -
42will1s to Gresham, February 14 and 15, 1894, Sena.te Executive 
DooUIILellt No. 57, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2, 11, herea:f'ter cited as senate 
Document iO: 'f57J Kuykendall and Day, op. cit. , 183J Pratt. op. oit., lBBJ 
Stevens, op. Oft. ,  270-271J Rowland, 'WiipUSII'c,"  206-208. 
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adTisory councils, the latter elament cCIIIIII&JldiDg nineteen votes .  The 
elected delegates and their elector• had to be o£ Hawaiian, ,AJnerican or 
European descent and had to take an oath to support the Provisional Gov-
el"DDaent and disavow � intent to re-establish the m.onarob;y. As a re-
sult, the convention wa.s dominated by men of .Derican birth or descent. 
A royalist mass meeting, held j,pr11 9, with an estimated two to three 
thousand people in attendance,  protested the oath requirement and the 
lack of proTision tor a plebiscite on the completed constitution. Its 
resolutions proTided tor non-cooperation in the elections and claimed 
that the oath stipulation disenfranchised native Hawaiians, who, ot 
course, would feel loyalty tor the monarcey-. 43 
The elections,  held on May 2, were orderly, with an estimated 
one-halt to two-thirds o:t the registered voters pa.rticipa.ting, and the 
first session o:t the convention was held Jlay 30·  Dole aoted as president 
ot the convention to which the executive council submitted a proposed con-
sti tution upon which debate was based. Dole later attributed authorship 
43n1Us to Gresham, March 24, 1894, Senate Executive Document 
No. T7, 53 Congress, 2 Session, l-2J Willis to Gres&aill, jprll 14, 1694, 
Siiia.ii Bxecutive Document No. 92, 53 Congress,  2 Session, 2,  hereafter 
cited as Senate Doc\Dilent No. � Willis to Gresham., April 5, 1894, 
Senate Executive Document No.""'13'5, 53 Congress, 2 Sesaion,l-2J Stevena, 
op. cit. ,  271; Pratt, op. or:E.-;-189J Rowland, •Republic,  • 209. The Pro­
ruicma1 Govermnent, iii'""fe'bruary, 1894, separated the office of President 
from. that of Foreign Jtinister, thus adding an additional member to the 
Executive Council. See Act 63, Provisional GoverD�LeD.t, February 8, 1894, 
Senate Executive Document lo . 21.• 53 Congress, 2 Session, 3• 
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of this c onstituticm.a.l dratt, which the c onvention changed c onsiderably', 
to himself and L. A. Thurston, with close review by "a dozen or more 
thoughtful men. •44 
It the careful pro"t'isions tor the convention had not presaged 
the type of govenmt.ent which would result, the correspondence of Presi­
dent Dole with a Columbia university political science professor would 
have made prop��cy easy. In thi s correspondence, Dole quite frankly 
stated that same restrictions upon the franchise power ot the natives and 
Portuguese would be nece ssary it "good goverma.ent" were to be attained.
45 
Dole expressed the belief of s ane that, at the risk ot "same permanent 
discontent, " gover.maent should be kept tram •c ontrol ot the irresponsible 
element • • • • •lt> 
The Republic which came into power on July 4, 1894, was headed 
by a president, elected by the legislature tor a term ot six years , and 
a cabinet appointed by the president. Members ot the bicameral legisla-
ture had to be literate in either the Hawaiian or English lu.guage and 
h4oole to Professor John William Burgess, December 18, 1894, 
Henry Miller Madden, editor, "Letters ot Sanford B .  Dole and John W. 
Burge ss, • The Pacific Historical Review, V (�h, 1936),  75 . See also 
Willis to Gre8li&ili, Jlirch 24, 1694, senate Executive Document No . 77, 53 
Congress, 2 Session, 1-2 ; Willis to Gresh&m, May 10, 1894, Se'Dite "'xecu­
�ve DooUIIleDt No. 103, 53 Congren, 2 SessionJI 1-2 ; Willis to GreshAiil, 
l�A'i"'3i, 1894, and 1Uii'e 2, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 117, 53 
Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; XuykeMail and Da7, op. cit. ,  184J ROii'a:nd, 
•Republic , " 210, 212-213 . - -




meet certain property quali!'ica.tions, those for Senate members being 
considerably higher than those tor members of the House of Representatives .  
Also provided was a. Council of Sta.te, representing equally the House, Sen­
ate and president, with emergency appropriation powers during legislative 
absences, as well as duties a.s advisors to the president. IJ.tera.oy in 
Hawaiian or English and strict citizenship or denizenship requir«menta 
applied to all electors, while those voting tor senators needed additional 
property qualifications . The literacy qualification practically elimi-
nated Oriental suftra.ge. Both legislators and voters had to take an 
oa.th to support the �public and to repudiate the monarchy. Naturaliza-
tion provisions barred fran oi tizenship a.ll Orientals except those born 
in liLwa.ii .  Finally, a special provision in the new constitution author-
ized the president, with cabinet c onsent, to negotiate an &mlexa.tion 
treaty with the United States, subject to Senate ratification. One of 
the reasons for barring Asiatics trcm the suffrage was the fear that the 
United states would find Oriental voters unacceptable. Like the Pro-
visional Goven:anent, the �public was democratic neither in oon.Qeption 
nor operation. It was essentially a stop-gap structure to guarantee 
revolutionary control until final union with the united States was 
attained. 47 
Royalist hopes of eventual return of the monarchy were fUrther 
dimmed when, in response to Liliuokalani ' s  request that the United 
47Sena.te Report Ho. 681, 55 Congress, 2 Se ssion, 90 ; House Execu­
tive Document No. 256, ;;-congress, 2 Session, 8-29lherea.tter cited as 
HOUSe Document No .�6J Chambers, loo . cit.,  34-38; Kuykendall and Da.y. 
op. cit. , 184; Rowland, •Republie ,�;m. 220 ;  Stevens , op. cit. , 272"; 
Pritt, op. oit. , 191-192 . - -
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States not recognize the new goverDment, Willis replied that the 
Senate resolution ot non-interference constituted the final AJnerican. 
decision. In late .August, Willis, who had conditionally recognized the 
Republic on JUly 5, presented Cleveland' s acknowledgement ot the estab-
lisbment ot the new goverment. He said that the right ot the Hawaiians 
to choose their own form ot govermaent had "been tomally aok:n01rledged 
both by the executive and legislative departments ot the united states.n4B 
Recognition ot the Republic was extended by all other powers having re­
lations with the islands .Is 
_ The new Republic had, eoananioally, an. auspicious beginning. The 
Wilson-Gonnan Tariff Bill ot 1a94, by abolishing the American sugar bounty, 
restored to Hawaii its favored position under the Reciprocity Treaty. 
Politically, the Republic soon had trouble . A long-planned royalist 
attack upon the govermnent was disc overed on the eve ot its scheduled be-
ginning, January 7, 1a95. A goverD�J�ent assault upon the Waild.ki head-
quarters ot the plotters cost the lite ot one prominent gover.mnent 
supporter. During the next tew days , as the royalists were rounded up 
.tram the surrounding hills to which they tled, there were several sk:irmi-
shes . In all, three royalists were killed. Several sentences ot death 
hawrillis to Gresham, August 27, 1894, Foreign Relations , 1a94, 
359J see also Cleveland to Dole, August 17, 1894, IeVins ,  L8ttera, 363-
364; Cleveland to Dole, August 7' la94, and Gresham to lfillis, August a, 
1a94, Foreign. Relations , 1894, 35a-359 ; Willis to Gresham, July a, 1894, 
House Document Jo . 256, 1-2; Willis to Gresham, June 23, 1a94, Senate 
Leoutlve DOCllll'iii-E lto. 156, 53 Congres s ,  2 Seuion, 1-2. 
lSDv'kendall and Day, op� oi t., 1a5 . 
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and life imprisoiDD.ent were passed by a military camnission upon royalist 
leaders . However, these and many lesser sentences were eventually sus-
pended or commuted, � pardons being granted. This treatment earned 
for the Republic new respect. By February 2 Willis reported that busi-
ness had resumed its normal course.  M$.rtial law, declared January 7, 
was lifted in llaroh, and, by Jane, HAwaii was peaceful again.50 
Liliuokalani, who was detained as a suspected plotter, on Jan-
uary 27, 1895, issued a statement in which she renounced a.ll rights to 
the throne, reoognized the republican govel"DDIleDt as legal and took an 
oath to support it. She was later granted a full pardon and her citizen­
ship rights were restored.5l 
Throughout the disturbance HAwaiian Mini ster Thurston assured 
the aerioan goverDment that the Republic could meet all domestic chal-
lenges . However, his publication of letters implying that the Cleveland 
50wn,llis to Gresham, January ;o, Februarr 2, February 2;, Jlaroh 7, 
llaroh 20, April 25, 1895, Willis to Richard Olney, July 5, 1895, January 6• 
1896, Willis to Adee , September 4, 1895, Willis to Uhl, June 26, 1895, 
Foreign Relations ,  1895, Part 2, 818-820, 823, 84o, 851, 854, 861-862, 
867, 664-865, 861, Willis to Gresham, January 11, 1895 , House Bxeoutive 
Dootaant llo . 282, 53 Congress, ; Session, herea!"ter oited as House Docu­
ment 282,-;:4J Xu;ykend&ll and Day, op. cit. , 185-186; Stevens, op. ort':', 
r!!"f4=2ffi Pratt, � �� 196-200 . - - - -
5lu,liuokalani to Dole, January 24, 1895, Foreign Relations , 
1895, Part 2, 820-821 J Willis to Olney, October 29, 1896, Foreign Rela-
tions , 1896, ;sa. -
.· 
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administration had encouraged the royalist revolt led to a request tor 
his recall . The Republic ocmplled.52 
Its strength tested and found suf'ticient, the government turned 
to another problem--labor supply. 1fi th the return of reciprocity bene-
tits under the Wilson-Gorman bill, the need for labor rose . However, by 
1896, the Japanese camposed almost one quarter of the population. There 
had been recurrent uneasiness regarding the Japanese during the whole 
decade. The fears expressed by Minister Stevens have been noted. Willis, 
too, wa.s disturbed by the growing n'IDbers of Japanese .  Consequently, the 
govermaent again began encouraging Chinese illlmigration. There was scme 
thought o£ importing American Negroes,  but it was felt the South would 
resent suoh a move . From 1895 to 1897, despite restrictions , Japanese 
continued to out-number the Chinese and occasional European immigrants . 
Convinced that Japanese immigration agencies were ignoring the new res-
tricticns, the government in 1897 refused to admit over a thousand Japanese. 
This step, inviting, as it did, Japanese ire, was indicative of the deep 
concern felt about future Japanese immigration. There was an immediate 
reaction tram the Japanese govermnent. The diplomatic exchange became 
52Thurston to Gresham, Jan\UI.%7 20, 1895, House Document Bo. 282, 
4-5; Gresham to Willis,  February 21, 1895, Foreign W:riister Ha�� 
W'illis, May 3, 1895, Willis to Uhl, J1me 3, 1895, Foreign Relations, 
1895, Part 2 ,  876-878, 880-881. For Hawaiian-AJnerican controversy re­
garding AJD.erican citizens involved in royalist revolt, see Foreign Rela­
tions , 1895, Part 2, 819, et passim. For controversy over Biiwa11an­
d8iiiAUd for prosecution lmdir Jlnerlcan neutrality laws of American arms 
smugglers tor shipu.ents of arms to royalist revolutionists, see ibid • •  
867, etJdssim. For discussions of revived Congressicma.l debate over 
B!Lwa.il"'i expansionism as result of revolt, see Pratt, op. cit.,  200-





heated, and arbitration was unsuccessful. Finally, after the annexation 
resolution in 1898 made the united states anxious for settlement before 
Hawaii formally transferred its sovereignty, the islands paid Japan 
t75,000, although never recognizing Japanese claims as justified. After 
&Jmexation there was a rush to bring in as much contract labor as pos-
, 
sible before American lawa became effective. Although Japanese immi-
gration was again restricted in 1899, almost 30,000 Nipponese arrived 
in the 1898-1899 period. Chinese immigration stopped immediately upon 
annexation. By 1900, in spite of all restrictive tactics,  the Japanese 
made up two fifths of the islands ' population.53 
Long before its settlement, the immigrant dispute emphasized the 
precarious nature of c ontinued independent existence . Th� appearance 
of a Japanese warship in Honolulu HArbor in 1897, while the dispute was 
in progress,  had been frightening . Frightening, too, were the growing 
Asiatic population and the inability of the govel"'IIJlent to solve sa tis-
taotorily the problam of labor supply. In the background, as always since 
1876, was the fear that Congressional tariff changes might plunge the 
islands into depression. Annexation took on brighter hues .54 
53alount to Gresham, April 6, 1893, July 17, 1893, House Document 
No. 47, 6-7, 103;  Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, House Document No . 
'1o; �J Senate Report No. 227, �-343, 482; JloKinley to Congress,  Decem=­
De'r 5, 1898, Foreign Iiili't!Oiis, 1898, l.xxviii ; KUiYkendall and Day, op. cit., 
186-187, 189; Rowland., •contract Labor, " 265-266; Thomas A. Bailey,'"""'t"j'a:pan• s 
Protest Against the .Annexation of Hawaii," The Journal of Modern History, 
III (Karch, 1931 ) ,  ¥-49. 56-60, hereafter Olted as Bailey, 1Japa.n.1 llr. 
Bailey feels that Hawaii did not, as same have suggested, create the immi­
gration dispute to advance annexation. However, as will later be pointed 
out, annexationists , both lilwaiian and aerican, did not overlook the propa­
ganda value of the dispute once it became a reality. 
54stevens, op. cit. ,  282-284. 
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A joint re solution in May, 1896, declared the Hawaiian legis-
lature to be llfi.rmly and steadfastly in favor of • •. •  annexation • •  n . , 
a sentiment it felt was shared by the Hawaiian voters .55 The 1896 vic-
tory of the Republican. Party in the United states , with a platform in-
eluding a.nne:mtion, amened well . Although :MoKinley had shown little 
pre-election interest in the subject, the annexationist-minded, both 
.American and Hawaiian, we re quick to reach hi s  ear. Their etforts were 
succes sful .  In .A.pril, 1897, the Hawaiian minister relayed t o  Secreta.:ey 
ot state Sherman the Republic ' s  desire for immediate annexation . Both 
the minister and other Hawaiian advocates used Hawaiian troubles with 
Japan. to such e ffect that Alr!.erican. action was probably accelerated. 
While McKinley insisted upon first attention being given to action on 
the .American tariff, Hawaii entered thi s is sue because the Reciprocity 
Treaty o cmplicated efforts to evolve new sugar schedules .  The sugar 
trust and sugar beet industry were working tor abrogation of the treaty. 
It has been suggested, with strong evidence , that one reason for MoKinley' s  
decision to try an annexation treaty was to com1ter this opposition to 
reciprocity and also to hasten action on the tariff.% 
The task of drafting the treaty went to John w. Foster, former 
Secretary of State . The new treaty differed little fran that of 1893 
except in dropping the financial settlement for the former Queen. Jga.in 
/ 
55SeDate Report No . 681, 91 . 
�theson, loc . cit. , 134; ;uykendall and Day, op. cit., 187; 
Bailey, op. cit . ,  473-474; �ster B .  Shippee , "William Riil'U"i"15i:y, "  in 
Bemi s ,  op:-c!t:; IX, 33; Pratt, op. cit . ,  215-218; Stevens ,  op. cit. , 
284-2��- - - - -
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Hawaii' was to bec ame •an integral part• of the United state s ,  llith the 
title of Terri tory of Bawaii .57 Also provided was a. canmi s sion of five, 
two o f  wham were to be Hawaiian residents , to reo ommend to C ongre s s  a 
sui table poll tical structure . Signed on June 16, 1897, the treaty was 
recammended to the Sena'ba for ratification on the same da.y by President 
McKinley. MoXinley wrote, • • • •  annexation is not a change . It is 
a o onsummation."58 The acc anpanying mes sage of Seoretary Sher.man, also 
probably the work of Foster, stated that the ideas of a CCIIDnercial union, 
an allia.noe and a protectorate had all been discarded as either inet':teotual, 
unfavorable to the United States ,  or inconsi stent with American political 
principles .59 
If, as has been suggested, McKinley was using the treaty to test 
public opinion regarding expansionism, he was sucoess:tul in provoking 
renewed discussion of .Alnerica. ' s  future role beyond its c ontinental bor-
ders . In Hawaii ,  quick ratification by the Senate and signature by 
President Dole had been aooamplished by mid-September, 1897 . The .Allle ri­
oan senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty :ta.vora.bly 
in July, but no a.ction was talcen during the s peoia.l sUIIDller ses sion. 
When the me. tter came before the regular s es aion, 1 t soon became evident 
57Trea.ty, Senate Report � 681, 96-97 • 
5�K1nley to Senate , June 16, 1897, ibi d . ,  66; see ibid. ,  65-67 . 
59s.oretaey of State John Sherman to l4cKinley, June 15 , 1897, ibid . ,  75 ; see ibid., 74-76 J Foster, � �· 172; Shippee , � 2.!!!.• 34. 
. .  
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that, despite mtlch support, a two thirds majority was unattainable . 
Responsible tor this deadlock were the Democratic opposition, some 
anti-expansionist sentiment among the Republican� and the powertul sugar 
interests , especially the beet sugar industry . There was an active, it  
not tonnal, Hawaiian lobby at work tor the treaty in 'Washington, and 
Dole ' s  vi s1 t in February was calculated to be of aid. Meanwhile ,  in 
the islands , sensitive as always to Congressional activities,  the anti-
annexation faction derived strength fran treaty delay, while earlier con-
cern over the Republican tariff policy toward reciprocity had shaken the 
econamy. Always present was continued apprehension regarding Japan.60 
With action on the treaty blocked, the MoKinley administration 
turned to the precedent of Texas ' entrance into the union to introduce 
in the Senate a joint resoluti on tor annexation on :Ma.roh 16, 1898 . This 
resoluti on made no progress . The accompa.nying report by the Committee 
on Foreign Relations exhausted all available arguments tor annexation--
political, strategical, economic , and historical. Possible Japanese ag-
gres sion in the islands was underscored. A resolution, introduced in 
the House in :r&Ly, also  received appropriate committee sanction. However, 
it -was the impetus of the Spanish-American War and Dewey • s  victory at 
Manila that finally brought succes s .  The House passed the joint resolu-
tion on June 15, 1898, by a vote of 209 to 91 . The Senate, by a vote of 
60roater, op. cit . ,  17lu Bailey, op. cit. , 474; Shippee , loc . · 
cit. , 37, 40; stevens , op. cit. ,  288-293'J'"iuYlC8Udall and Day, op:cTt. ,  
l'S7=188J Pratt, op. ci�2w.-225 ; ThCIDAs A .  Bailey, "The Unitecf "Stites 
and Hawaii Durini'"'the ah-JJDerican War, "  The American Historical 
Review, lXIVI (April, 1931 ) ,  552-553 , herea:tter cited as Bailey, 
"spanish-American War."  
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W! to 21, approved the measure on July 6. The President signed the reso­
lution the following day. 61 The joint resolution, as later explained by 
Jlc Kinley, accepted "the offered cession" made by _Hawaii in ratitying the 
1897 treaty.62 J:mplied, therefore , -.s the idea that the c onditions and 
tenu ot the treaty were to stand as it the treaty were actually ratified. 
The oCIIIDli.ssion appointed b1 lloKinley to study and rec<l1D1118nd a gowrDilent 
for the new territor,y ino luded President Dole and another B'll.waiian resi-
dent, lfalter F. Frear. The officials of the Republic,  under KoJriDley• s 
supernaion, were to guide island affairs 1mtil auoh goverJIILent was pro-
Tided. In the islands passage of the resolution was recei wd w1 th much 
elation. At ceremonies on .A.ugwst 12, 1898, Bllwaii formally �· a.nnexed.63 
.lt news of the aigniDg of the treaty in the summer ot 1897, the 
Japanese govenaent had protested vigorously. It claimed that annexation 
would alter the status � in the Pa.oifio , would jeopardize its interests 
and those ot ita subjects in the islands , and would interfe re with settlement 
6l:aeport, Senate CCIILlllittee on Foreign Relations , Jlaroh 16, 1898, 
Senate Report Bo . 681, 1·17J see ibid. ,  27-39, 47-48, 63-88, 98-107, 111• 
116, 118-119; Report, House Committee on Foreign At:ftLirs , May 17, 1898, 
House Report !lo . 1355, l-7J Congreslional lleoord, 55 Congress, 2 Session, 
vo1. 31, PiLrt'""Vft;-·om.9, 6712, o806. 
62uoi1Dley to Congress, December 5 , 1898, in James D. Richardson, 
A Ccapilation of the Messages and Papers of the Prelidents , 1789-1897 
Twash!JigtOn a GO'Viiment Pi'int!Dg of'hce,  -ram, i, 185. 
6�11Dley to Congresa, December 5 ,  1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 
lxviii , lxxvii, lxxviii J Hardy and Dumke, op. cit.,  414J Bailey, *Spani sh­
AJD.erican War, • 556J Kuykendall and D&y, op. ci"t:";J.88J Bailey, op. cit. , 475 J 
Pratt, op. cit., 320, 323·326J Stevens, iA9•t�  294; James F.'RJiodei; The 
McKinlely""iiid'iOosewlt .A.dminiatrations , - (!lew Yorka The Macllil1an 
Company, 1923), 114J W!iuam Fi'iDkl!ii 1n.ilough1ij', Territories and �n­
denciea ot the United states, Their Gonrment and ldiiiinistrat!Oii' ew 
York: S' CentUry: danpany, 1905), 62t:63. -
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of its claims against the Hawaiian government in the immigration dispute . 
The United States reassured Japan that its interests and rights in the 
is lands would be respected� and, finally� in December, Japan withdrew its 
protest. However� the State Department had taken the precaution to pre-
pare for a provi sional proteotore.te over Hawaii� if Japan became aggres sive .64 
As to the role of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of 
the Philippines in hastening annexation� Hawaii used every shred of this 
double-barreled opportuni� to turther itself in American favor. Upon the 
commencement of hostilities � the Republic went so far as to offer a for-
mal allia.n.ce . This offer was made despite danestic fear� in royalist and 
same foreign quarters� of Spanish reprisals . It was made , too, before 
Dewey ' s  startling victory at Manila. These attending circumstances in-
creased �erican appreciation of the offer and had their effect upon the 
passage of the annexation re solution. Living up to early pranises� Hawaii 
made Honolulu Harbor available as a trans shipment and supply base for the 
Philippine operations . American soldiers were royally entertained en 
route to the east� and coal supplies were made available to the United 
states .  Spanish protest was to no avail in stopping these un.-neutral 
activities . 65 
64wcKinley to Congre ss� December 6� 1897� Foreign Relations � 1897, 
xxii ; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit. � 188-189; Bailey� op. cit. , 474; Hardy 
and Dumke ,  op. cit.,  414; Shippee � loo . cit. � 38-� ; FOster� op. cit. , 173; 
Pratt, op. 'Of£'.�0-221; Stevens� op. c'I't:";' 287; Bailey, "Japan,-r-;Q-
52, 54..;;; %5"9· - -
65 W..theson, loo . cit . ,  13lu Bailey, "Spanish-American War, " 553-
5561 Kuykendall a.nd""DiY, op. cit. , 188 ; Pratt, � cit . ,  318-319. 
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!hie cooperative attitude ga'ft the anne:xationiata a new arg\DieAt--
Jaerioan moral responsibility' to annex the ielanda. aiDce the UDited states 
had allowed Hawaii to aaam.e ao vulnerable a pod t1011 in ita behalf. AA 
appealing arguaent. it had little basic value . ot greater wight in the 
public IliAd wa  the belief tha. t Bt.waii was irreplaoeable a a a •Y station 
in Philippine militar)r oper&t10D8. Onrlooted. however. wa.a the tact that 
there was a shorter. northern auppl7 route to the Philippine•• with the 
newly acquired Xiaka in the Aleuti&IUI well located tor a coaling atation. 
Alao the Ullited states already had been granted ewry militaey aaeiatazLoe 
which &1U18Dtion could haw obtained. That thia arggaent of ailitary 
aeoeaei t,. had little real. T&lu •• prOTell by the tact that SeD& te paaaage 
of the reaolut1011 came aeTeral da71 after SpUliah A.dll1ral Cener&'s  de• 
teat u.de .Aaerioan Tictor,y certain. lloat '9&lid wa.a the ars-ent ot Hawaii ' 1 
importance to Jaerican nat coast detenae and to protection ot Pao itic 
oCIIIIleroe. 1'he tear aroued 4ur1Dg the war that Admiral Cervera would 
attack the UDdetended eaat coaat ot the United states impreaaed the 
Jaerioan public with the value ot outlying na:nl deteues. fhe "fidem 
ot J&pe:Aeae or other foreign uae ot Hawaii as a atepping atone to the 
Aaerican Paoitic coast had taken em realit,-.66 
!here haa been a atrq opillion that the war and the &oquieiticm 
ot tAe Ph111ppiaes were not 011 7 an acceleration to. but probably the 
onl7 poali'ble mean. ot puahiDg through &DDemticm. !o tab auola a stand 
i1 to deD¥ the peculiar poai tion Yhich Bnaii had came to till in the 
.. 
66cc.acreaai.al :&.cord. 55 Ccmgreaa. 2 Session. Vol. 31. Part VII, 




Aaerioan eohelae. The ielancle 1D 1698 represented almost a oeatuJ7-ol4 
i.DTee'taellt by the UDited states not cml7 ot capital 8Ad business mow-
how, but ot jmerican oul ture, ..&aerican political ideology and .IJUrican 
labors. 1"he Tyler Doctrine -.s still 'ftey m.uoh alive, and the pic ture 
ot .A.Iiatio d<llliDation ot the i,slanda ._, no more palatable tba11 the earlier 
PreDOh u.d Bri t:l.ah veraicma. The Reoiprooi ty Treaty had joined lil'ft.ii 
1D41eaolubl7 to the Aaerican eocmCIIic s;ratea-·lkwaii was • dependent upcm 
the United States eocmCIIioally as it ._. tor ita continued indepezulence. 
FQothenaore, the atratepo w.lue ot the islands to the Aaerioan nation 
was adwrtieed by eney map. !he ooaoluicm, therefore, ot one authori-ty 
that the r1a1Dg tide ot "JJaniteat DeetinT' auat have 1Devi tabl7 joi.Ded 
Ba.waii ' a dependenoe upcm tbe United States to produce &DDe:xation ia Talid. 
The war aooelerated azmemtion--i t nei th8r oauaed it nor was necessary 
to 1 ta OOD8llllm&ticme 67 
The years traa 1.890 to 1898 had brought to Hawaii a revolut1011, 
tour type• ot gOftraent, and union to the United states. In thia short 
span the lcmg yeara ot work b7 the -.noan lliaaiou.ey, the .AJlerioan 
trader, aAd the .Aaerioan planter and bueine11 man had oCDe to fruition. 
The xanaJcas and the .Uiatios had to aooept with grace the tiDal reaul t ot 
c ontinued .ADglo•Saxcm efl'ort. Hawaii , in 1898, wa.a in the peouliar po­
sition ot haviJ:I& two seta ot lawa &Ad two Presidents, while it awaited 
CcmgreasiOD&l provis10D8 tor & pemaa t gOftl'llllent, but 1 t had beoCII.e 
the 'ferri tory ot Hawaii-a candidate tor statehood. ot the cultural 
111 
trends ot the era which would most affect statehood, the ria� apprehen­
sion oonoerning the large Japanese population was notable . 68 
Ot statehood i teelf acme mention had been mac1e or iaplied. In 
its supporting data, the SeDate roreip1 Relations CCIIRmi ttee report ot 
1898 included the statement that Hawaii was not ocaiDg into the union 
as a state, nor was she then so  qualitied. However, the atatement noted, 
• 
•rt Lnatebtl� will be a questic:m tor our suocessors and not for us to 
settle . •69 ADnexa tiODists Jolm 1f. Foster and L. A.. '.rhurston had agreed 
that territorial status was preterable to statehood. There was the al­
ternate' suggestion that Ba-.ii be made a part of the atate ot Oalltornia. 
Yet the tear ot Hawaii t a entraDCe into the union as a state wu cme argu­
aent agaiD.st azmeDtiOD.70 BYen a" the tull tlood ot expu.siOD.i• there 
was some ettort to &TOid the taint ot colc:mialism. 48 one aenator ra ticmal-
ised, " •  • •  we o&D reasonably expect that the people n acquire will, in 
due time and o:a. sui table ocmdi tiona, be a.zm.eu4 to the tJAi ted states as an 
equal part ot a selt-gOTe� Republio .n7l Suggestive ot atatebtlod were 
the statements ot the two heads ot 1tate .  President Dole in 189' Wl"'te. 
68vaaurcook, ope oi t. , 48. 
69aeu.ate �rt llo. 681, 51. 'fhis idea was attributed by SeD&tor 
s. D. JlcBneey ot Ulsiau. ro-t. A. ThurltOD. COiagresaicmal Record, 55 
Oqrese, 2 SessiOD, Vol. 31, Part VII, 6269. 
70ib14.,  6ll&J,, 6190, 62f::/J, 6663J Pratt, loo. oi t. , 288J roater, 
� � 171J Sa&te Report llo. 227, 259J �'i'"li'rHi'"'"Sears, •John 11ii'":lwm, 1D. Beils, op. clt.,l:f,T, Pratt, op. cit� , 323•324. - �  - -
nSeDAtor G. r. Hoar ot Jlatsaob.uaette . Coagressicmal Record, 55 
OongreSB, 2 Sessic:m, Vol. 31, VII, 6665. 
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" • • •  we have stood ready to add our country, a new star, to its Lthe 
United Statesy glor,y • • • • •72 In washington, f'ive year� later, Presi­
dent :UOI1nl.ey reminded Congress ot its re sponsibility •to give suoh shape 
to the rela.tionship of those mid-:Pa.oif'ic lands to our ha:ne union as will 
benef'i t both in the highest degree, rea.lldng the aspirations .ot the ocm-
muni ty that has cast its lot with us and elected to share our poli ti.oal 
heri ta.ge. • • .•13 It is not surpriaing that these beginnings of the 
statehood iuue should have produced thei r 01m legend-that Seoreta.:ey 
ot State 111lliam R. Day sent to the :S..waiian govenment, upon its demise, 
an .blerioan flag with an extra star. 74 Whatever the legends , HAwaii 
has never lost sight of that star. 
186. 
'12Dole to Willis,  Deo•ber 23, 1893, House Doollll.ent � 12.• �. 
73xoi1Dley to Congress, December 5, 1898, in Richardson, op. cit., - -
7� • •  op. cit., 17. - -
CBAP'l'BR IV 
BACKGROUID FOR THE S!A'l'IHOOD IIOVBDNT 
!he period trCIIl August 12. 1898. to 1950 baa been tor Hawaii 
a time ot preparatlcm tor atatehood. <De by one • Hawaii baa u.rbd up 
on i te ledger those qualltloa.tiona which law and precedent han pre'rioul7 
required ot aspirants to tull pe.rtnerahip in the .&aerioan 'IBlion. JTot al­
waya baa thia bookkeeping been done ocmaoioualy. While a 8111&11 group ot 
atal-.rta never oeaaed to orr tor statehood, a auoh larger part ot awaii ' a  
populatlon remained tor � years tairly ocmten.t with territorial statue • 
KoreoTer, there waa, 011 the part ot an intluential portion ot the Hl• 
waiia.n oc:.mtmi ty • a quiet but determined oppoai ticm to atatehoocl. Yet, 
d.iJIIaed thoup it waa by inditf'erenoe and opposition, the star ot state­
hood nenr oCIIlpletel7 ceased to shine in the Hawaiian alq. 
So oloaely woven into the fabric ot enryday territorial lite 
haw been the issues nlative to the atat.hood question that acme arti­
ficial di Tid on beoCID.ea neoessary tor the purpose ot adequate discussion. 
!he ref ore • coverage of the political de'ftlo�ent of the terri tori ty and 
what 111ght be called the formal aov-.nt tor atatehood will be reaeM"ed 
tor a later ohapter. 1'he present chapter, &1"ter a brief description ot 
the interw.l trCIIl 1898 to 1900 • will cover the eocmallic • social and cul­
tural development ot Hawaii to tbe preeant. Also included will be a 
desoriptd.• ot Hawaii ' •  role as the Paoitic battlcm of the United States 
and. the relation ot that role to the plea tor statehood. 
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Prom 1898 to 1900 Hawaii had a foretaste of the iuoonTellieu.oes 
aCIIletimes attendant upon &OTenlllent frCIII. a long distanoe. B7 Deoember, 
1898, the cCIIIIdssion appointed by President lloiinley had reported i te 
rec ... ndaticme for a political structure for Bl.waii and a bill creating 
suah a go'YerDUDt had been introduced in C�ress . Yet, a J'Mr later, 
lloliDley found it neceasary to remind Cc:mgreea,  absorbed in issues created 
by the Sp&Dish-aerican war, that this territory was in need of a definitiTe 
polltioal structure . Bnaii , aeanwhile , lmder two seta of laws, was haT• 
iDg clifticul ty in settl� queetione arisin& about public lands , Chinese 
immi&r&tion, copyrights, elections Nld the judiciaey--in short, the ew1'7-
4ay business of gownaent.1 
BP.wa.iian Ute -.e tu.rther diaturbed b;r an outbreak in Deo•ber, 
1899, of bubonic plague so eerioue that it was the end of April, 1900, 
'before qua�:tined Hawaiian porte were again free for CCIIIIIIe roe . Ill ef­
forts to control the disease, which cost eighty ll'Yea, a tire set to burn 
in.teoted buildings got out of control and destroyed ICIII.e thirty-eight 
a.orea ot the Honolulu sl'ma area. Lett w1 tb.out shelter were sCIII.e 4.000 
people, ••inly Japmeee and Chinese. .U a result ot this tire, Bt.wa.ii 
had a gllapee ot another future probl .. -the aui1111lation of the Japanese 
imaigrants . Koet eeTerel;r affected by the tire damage &Dd efforts to 
stem the plague had been the Japanese, eepeoiall;r the bueiD.eeB�Den whose 
�11Dlq to Congresa, Deoeaber 5, 1899, Foreign Relaticms, 1899, 
LII - LIII J 1\V'bndall and D&J, ;r·mt;·• 189. Por petition ot Honolulu 
citizens to Coagreee, Bovaber 2 , , requesting epeedJ provision ot 
a territorial cowrzaent, see CODgNsaiaaal. Reooiod, 56 Congress, 1 Sessicm, 
Vol. 33, Part r, 559. 
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trade 'Yirtllally oeaaed iD that aeoticm ot B'onolulu iD whioh their eat&b· 
prohibi tian ot turther A8iatio !aport., aa wll u an order to deatror 
oargoe pre'l'ioual7 ahipped in. Unable to get a satiataotoey til:wloial set-
tlemeDt tor their loaaea, the Japanese turned to their homeland gover.aaent. 
SCIIle three and one-ha.lt 78U'8 later, approldllatel7 halt the •ouut ot tbe 
Japa.neae olaime, t400,ooo, n.s appropriated by the Jmerioan Ccmgreaa • 
.Ureacly apparent, honver • n.s the aenai ti '1'1 tr ot the Japa.neae to haole 
dCIIIlin&JJOe 1D. the ialu.cla and their penchant tor appealiDg to Japaa tor 
ramedial measures iD time of atreas.
2 
The territorial gove!'ZIIlent pro'l'ided bJ Congress iD 1900 was scae-
thing new to Baaii, but there waa no oorreapcmd.inl 1Jmcrn.ticm iD the 
eoou�. SUgar still reiped. 
Despite oampeti tian tram Pllerto Bioo, the Philippine Islands and. 
Cuba, all reoentl7 brought under the illtluenoe ot the United states, the 
ngar iDduatey grew apaoe . By 1909 it :turniahed -plo;yment tor about cme­
tourth ot the islands ' population ancJ. fUrnished Diaety•tive percent of 
island exporla. The aclveree etfeota of short-liwd tariff legialation iD 
1913 were soon overacae during World War I and the poet-war boa. In• 
oreased ettioieDOyo 1D. produoticm and milli.Dg proo••••• 1D. the twaties 
eased the readjuataen't to a normal, peaoe-tiae world market. A hard blcnr 
n.s dealt the 1J:lduatl"7 by the Jones-costigan Sugar Control Aot, passed bJ 
�r, ot� oit., 131-132, 139J KU7bDdall and Day-, � oit�. 
190 J COD§NISicm& RiiO'rcl, 56 Ccmgreae, 1 Sessicm, Vol . 33, Jirt II, 1930 •  
the lJDi ted States Congren in 1934, which toroed a ten percent decrease 
in island produoticm. Honver, the Sugar Aot of 1937 was much more ta-
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vorable to Bawaii in inorealing Hawaii '  1 quota and eliminating her former 
. 
desiptl.cm as a toreip1 producing area. 'foday • the induatry operates 
mder the Sugar .Aot ot 1947, whioh allots to Hawaiian planters a produc­
tion quota ULounting to approxiaately fourteen peroent of American dcmestic 
needa.3 
During this century the sugar industry haa met JII8.IIY challenge• • 
scaroi ty ot land and sui table soil, irrigation and labor supply problema, 
&Dd adverse uaticmal. legislation. !hrough its volmtary, unincorporated 
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Jaeooiaticm, eetablisbed in 1895, and that body' a 
experiment ataticm, the industry has applied science to agriculture per-
haps more suocea�tully than &J:l1Where in the world. Its aohieTSlellts in 
irrigaticm, developaent of iaproved "t"&rieties of cane, soil conservaticm, 
and in the tight against para.Bi tee and pl.&Dt diseases deserve high praise. 
'!be HSPA.' 1 aoti vi ties have been wholly financed by the industry, eaoh 
member pl.&Dtation contributing in accordance with the amount of ita pro-
duotion. Beoauae ot its close ccmneotion with the sugar indua'bry and its 
interest in eftry ta.otor, eoonomi.o or politioal, connected with that in­
dust!"J', the HSPA has often been coupled with the •Big Five• in discussions 
ot econCIIlic ponr in the islands . It represents practically all the 
. 
3L1Dd8&7, loc . cit. , 308J Kuykendall and Day, op. cit. , 233-235 ;  
Vandercook, op. oir.;t'9J-I78J statehood For Hawaii, Bil'ii={ng�auant 
to S .  Con. 'lii.'i'B;Joint camdt'tee OD. Bilwail, 15 Congreu, 2 Session, 
136, hereafter oited aa Bearings, Con. Res.  18. 
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plantation cCIII.pa.niea 8J1d aintains an ottice 1n Washington, D. c . ,  to 
keep close watch on legislation affecting the sugar induatey-.4 
L1 ttle sugar refining, ezaept tor hame oona\DptiOD, is carried on 
in the islands. Most ot the sugar ia refined by the Western Sugar Re-
t1D.1.ng Corporation at San Franoiaoo and the Oalltornia and Hawaiian SUgar 
Ret1D1Dg Corporation at Orookett, California. The latter company, op­
erating the lArgest ntinery in the world., 1a owned by a u.jori t, group 
ot the island planta:tiona .5 
Sugar' a present position in the Hawaiian eooncmy ia easily assessed. 
In 19146, the industry p&id 137,500,000 in wages and •ployed a mcmthly 
�- llisoell&Deoua Document JJo. 151, 75 Congress, 3 SesaiOD, 
49-50, hireaf'ter ol'tiid aa seDate DooUiliiii' 10:' 151; Statehood tor Bawaii, 
Btaringe , on B. R. 49 and s. 114, SUbocmmi'i-Eie 011 Territories and &Ular 
lttalra ot the Ocaraittee em Public IA:nda, tJnited states Senate, 80 Congress, 
2 Session, 21-22, hereafter cited as Btar;!•• H. R. 49 and s. lllu Kuy­
kendall and Day, � oi i•, 227, 232 1 JOliDesley · Coulter. •The Terri tory 
ot Hawaii,"  in 1111II'am • lJaa , ed. ,  The -rioan IILpire , A Studt ot the 
OUtlying !erritories ot the tJnited st&:&;'a (dhloagoa fli8 tii nrs "i;-or 
chicago Press, 19Iib),�. ioc .  oit. , 308-309• Vanuroook, op, 
oit. , 44•45 1 Barber, !2!. oit. ,  43, �,""'W)J-264. For further detaiii 
canrias the aoti?itiea o?"llie HSPA and the denlopaent ot the industry. 
see Barber, � !it. , 52-541 Vanc:leroook, op� oit�, 44-16, 66-76, 126-J.W,.J 
Itu;ykeDdell aii4b'i7, op. cit. , 228J Si:apio'A,"'"):oo . oit. ,  571, 575, 597, 6001 
William Atherton DuP\V', lliiiii and Ita Raoe YrO&l:• (WashiDgtcmt Govern­
ment PrintiDg Office, 19�), 64�,-w-'7l'Jc0Uiter, � oit. , 235, 237, 239. 
5SeDate DoO\IUD.t Bo. 151, P• 50J Xu;ybndall and D&J, op� oit� , 2331 
Coulter, ioo. cit. , 239�.� exa.ot number ot sugar pl&alii cma now 
operatiDg-r.-cll'Rroult to determine, sinoe several ban been liquidated 
since World War II. Pre..._r figures varied traa 38 to 39• In 1946, there 
are 35• A aate eatiJaate at the present time would probablJ be aro\Dld 32• 
"bporl, Subocaaittee ot the OCIIIIittee em the ferritories, House ot Rep­
resentatives,• transmitted to Hagh F8terscm by Be:nry D. Laroade, Jr. ,  
January 24. 19(t,, in Bouse of lepreseutatins Report Io. 2.54, 81 Congress, 
1 SessiOD, 16. Be�o!ied aa tai'Oide, *Report, • i.Ud"""!!uae Report 
!!!_ 254, reapeot:i:nlJ• 
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average ot 28,000 •ployee• .  The previoua year it earned $6,000,000 in 
dividends tor saa.e 16,000 stockholders . Il1 191.$ its installa.ti.Oill and 
inv.stmenta wre 'ftlued at $175,000,000. In 1948 sugar and its b7-
produota brought the ielaDds an inocae ot $101,000,000. Both the tederal 
and terri tori&l. gowr.aaumta realise auch re"fenue trCID. this all-important 
iela.nd industry. 6 
!he sugar induatry today ie not w1 thout problmu . The ooata ot 
irrigation, he&"f1 tertdlilaticm., iDcreased lll8obanisaticm. and tra.neporta-
tton bear U&Tily upon the induetey. lAbor ooete continue to inoreaae, 
while the plantations auat proTide ,-ear-round employment in order to 
inlure a steac!T, eatietied labor toroe. :Efarfteti.Dg muat be dcm.e quickl7 
to &TOid loes , while ateady operation ot he&'YJ equipaumt and mill.iDg ma­
chiui"J ia manclatoey it protita are to be realised. Purtheraore, there 
ia the danger that meohanizaticm will reduce ao11 tertili t;y. 7 
'lhile ccallellti.Dg upcm. the increue 1n production per &ore du� 
the century and noti.Dg that sugar in 1947 produced 47 peroent ot the 
tor the tiaoa.l ,-ear eDdiDg in J'Uile, 1�, wrote a • • • •  the tuture ot 
6xa,t.Dd&ll and Day, op. oit., 235J abap1ch, loc . cit.,  6001 
statehood tor Hawaii, BtariDg8, Ciii'li • .a .  49, 50, 51,� �54, 55, ;6, 579, 1'm5' ana 1'758, cCiiiii!ttee on Public Landa, Houle ot Rep:reeenta­
tina, 80 Congreaa, 1 Se11icm, 182, hereafter o1ted as :aearinge, H.R. 
49-56J B'earizage, Can. Rea .  18, P• 633• 
1coulter, loo . oit. , 237-239J KuykeAd&ll and Day, op. oit., 227J 
Siapiob, loo . cit�J J. c. Furuae, -will Bawaii Beocae a State!, • 
!he Sa� Poat, Vol. 218 (�pril 6, 19¥), 133J Vanderooot, 
op; ci'E., nc;:ms, bU-puy, op. cit. , 64, 67-I:J:}. --- ----- - --
119 
thie baeic orcp ia in doubt due to production ooata ri ling above the 
current o allllodit, n.l1'18 .•8 Three pl&Dt&t10118• he noted. bad cea.aed op­
eration• at the end ot 1947. Ino reaaed m.echaniza.tion in order to reduce 
labor coata had ao depleted the aoil 
.
th&t tertiliza.tion expenaes had 
r1nn.9 
.UJ.7 ca.retul conaidera.tion ot Hawaii a.e a proapective ata.te o&mlot 
ipore the present oballenge, iaplied in Stainback• s report. to tbat in­
duat1"'1 which produces almoat halt Hawaii ' s  incCIU and pronclea •plo,_ent 
tor ao JIUm1 ot ita people . Hlatorio&l.l7, the eugar industey proapered 
not beca.uae Hawaii waa iclealq ai tuated tor auch an enterprise but in spite 
ot isolation tl"CIIL world markets • uneTen raintall distribution. uncertain 
labor auppliea and poor aoil . In a.ddition• the threat of j)gerican taritt 
policy changes haa a.lwa71 haunted the industry. !o meet all these ob-
ataclea required capital, cooperative planning a.nd centralized ort;anisa.-
t1on aeldca tomd in agricultural enterpriaea.  Whether this expenaiTe, 
'Vulnerable indultey can continue to proaper in the .taoe ot high produo­
ticm costa , eapeoiall7 the rieing wage daande ot la.bor, ia a Tital quea-
tion. Certainly the induetr,y• a place 1n Hawaii • a fUture eo on� ia 
disputable . J1q tuture atate gOTOl'Dilent will haTe the probl• either 
ot protecting the augar induatry or ot aidiDg in the diaoOTe1"'1 ot a new 
enterpriae to take ita place in the eoOD.CIJI1'• 
8tnual Report ot the Go'rimor ot Hawaii to the Secretary ot the 
Interior. nac&l fea.r liicl.ir"June 30, 19liB\Iiifi'1DitOiia ttDlted stil"e'l 
Go-vers.en.t Printiin.g Of'tice• 1949), 1-2. Hereafter cited as Almual Report .  
See alao ibid. ,  1,  67. 
9
Ibid�,  2. 
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A yoUZLger addition to the Bawa.iian eo em� baa been the pine-
apple ind.ustrr, ranHng only- below sugar in iaportanoe . It OCIII.pleMilte 
ita elder brother in that ita operaticme are 1uited to the higher, c older, 
more arid areas ot the idanda which are unaui ted tor cane production. 
Portmlately, there ia no irrigation problem here . Bxperimenta in the 
cc.�meroial production of pineapple were being made in the 1880• s,  but 
it waa not until a suooesstul canning process wa.a developed by- James D. 
Dole in the tirat decade of the tnntieth centvy' that the iDdustey hit 
tull •tride . Like sugar it early- beoam.e a highly oentre.li&ed industry 
rather than a field tor individual enterprise . Le•• th&n one peroent of 
the present produoticm is railed by small tamers . Like sugar, too, it 
early- found c ooperation more proti table than cCDpeti ticm. The Pineapple 
Gronr• Alaooiation of Hawaii and the Association of Bawa.iian Pineapple 
Packers wre orga.Jlized early. By the 1920• a ther. had been eetabllshed 
the pr.deoeseor to the pre1ent Pineapple Researoh Institute , ••� this 
industry in muoh the same fashiOA as the BSPA•a  experiment station aerYes 
sugar growers. �ooperati Te effort was especially needed to educate the 
world to the use ot pi:Aeapple, to which end auoh advertising was dOAe e 
FurtheftLOre, the industey has always met stiff CCIIlpeti tion trca other 
types ot canned fruita . !here was auoh expanaiOA ot the industry af'ter 
World lf&r I, but the depre 81iOA years were di.ftioult. AA a result, the 
Pineapple Produoera CooperatiTe Alsooiation, activo until 1943, waa formed 
to gauge induatey-wide productiOA to world ccma•ptian. Producing almost 
90 peroet ot the world' s  pineapple are nine ocmpurl.es, cantrolliDg thir­
teen plantationa and nine cann.eriea. Appl"O%im&tely- 10,000 workers are 
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81lployed on the plantations and in the oanneriea . An acid.1tional 11,000 
work during the harnating season of the aUIIIlD8r. Dcmillating the industry 
are the Hawaiian Pineapple Ccmp&D:f, Libby, McNeill & IJ.bby, and the 
California Packing Ccm:pa.ny. Besides oa.nned fruit, there are valuable 
'by-produota--juice, citrio aoid and cattle bran are foram.oat. This 
industry, like sugar, has made outstanding use of soientitic knowledge . 
Ita use of addi ticmal workers for harYeatiDg inoreases •ploplent oppor-
tunities in wh&t 1a an off-season on liiA!cy' sugar plantations . Like sugar, 
too, the crop is  alow to mature and auat be hal'Te sted ilaaediately if 
lol8es are to be aToided. The iaportance of timing in harTesting op-
erations, incidentally, makes both industries particularly TUlnerable to 
stri:tea. The Tal.ue of pineapple production awrages about t60,ooo,ooo 
armually • 10 
While thi1 industry, ftich grows Jaerioa' s seocm.d moat important 
canned tru1 t, has made great strides in soil oonsenation, the governor• a 
report tor 1947·1948 notes that it baa reaobed full eooncmio expansion, , 
unless present sugar land were to be oonverted to pineapple produotion. 
lOseD&te Doouaent Bo. 151, P• 53J Bearings, Con. Res . 18, P• 637J 
Statehood for ifawall, lfi&�s, Pursuant to H. Rea. 236, SuboCIIDII.ittee of 
'£he dOiilidtlei on the Terri rles, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 
2 Session, 705, hereafter cited aa Bearings, H • .Res. 236; "Should !Jawaii 
Be Admitted to Statehood Bow1," Town leetllig Bulletin, XV (Ootober 4, 
1949), 4, hereafter oi ted as Town.--veet!Dg Bulietlli; Kuykendall and Day, 
� �. 235-2391 �. op.CI"t. , 63, 76, 79, &h Coulter, loo . oit., 
i 81apich, loc . cit., 5990:000 . For turther details cODOe�the 
denlopaat of thi'i"liduatey, see Barber, .!2:. cit., 54-56, and Coulter, 
loo. cit., 247-250, 253-2541 and AJmual Report;o'T. Scme aouroea list 
one leas pinea.pple ocmpa.Dy" and pliiitaticm, see Hearings, H.R. 49-56, P• 183• 
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rus tact has led seTer&l ot the large pil1eapple produoers to search tor 
toreip producing areas suoh as j.,xico eel Cuba.11 
Animal produota rank third iD. iaportaaoe iD. HELwa.iian &£riculture . 
R$.110hillg, dont&iliag sugar and pineapple land-use, oooupies the highlands 
useleu tor orop productiOD.. In the tradition ot l&rge-eoale agriculture, 
the Parker Ranch is probably' the seoond larsest ranch under the American 
tlag. It has the larsest herd ot pure-bred Hereford cattle in the world. 
This ranoh, establlshed early iD. the last oentuey, has led the way iD 
breeding and iD. the introduction ot better forage grasses. .About one-
third ot the isl.&Dds • area is iD. grasi.Dg lands , while there are scae 
torty-tive ranohes ot 'ft.l'1'iDg lise . Together with poultry produots, 
'ftri.ous li nstook -.rbtings represented about elenn peroent ot the 
agrioultura.l w•e in 1947. The produota ot both beet oattle and dai17-
illg enterprises are oons1aed locall7. Oaly hides and skins are exported. 
Horses and mules are also bred, the latter tor plantation work. It is 
possible that iaproved anilllal tood will malte the islands selt-suttioient 
in aeat. Sheep, goats and swine are abo railed in oonaiderable D1Dben. 
In 19� the ocabined n.lue ot marketed beet cattle, hogs and. dai17 and 
poultr;y product. aaounted to an estimated tl2,ooo,ooo. In this tield 
aaall-scale agriculture see� to haTe taken hold, since animal product 
enterprises were operated, in 19l.t4, em same 2,800 tams • 12  
llAJmual Report, 2J SGate Docuaacmt lfo. 151, P• 53; Simpioh, loo • 
.!!.:!!· 600. 
- - -
12Sa&te DoolDeDt Bo. 151, P• 54; Axmual Report, 2, 67 ; Coulter, 
loo. oit., 224425, 25542'5'7J 15iilfayf. op. cit. , S}:SS; Bearings , H. Res .  236, 
PP• 687=668 ; Carpenter, � oit., 4�8'\i\ihood tor Biiilt, SeDAte Report, 
to &ooCIII.p&D¥ H. Re 49, �aiiiii'sa, 2 session, 3,'Aereaffir olted as Corctcm 
ReportJ O&rpenter, 2.f!. oit� , 473• 
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BDI.phasidng the agrioul tural dmi nanoe of sugar and pineapple is 
the f'aot that ill 1947, other trui ts, vegetables and misoell.&n.eoua orops 
aooounted for cmly f'ive percent of' the total a.grioultura.l illo<De. Of this 
total, rice , cotton and taro tonaed a IID&ll part. Of' more importance was 
cof'tee, raised Jl&inly on the lema coast of Big Ialazul. Beoause of' its 
excellent blending qualities, Kcma cotf'ee brings high prices on the main-
land to which most of' it ia shipped. This crop ia raised bJ 8111All fa.raera 
on au e stimAted 1,200 f'anaa . ID. the 19lt4-1945 season. the crop was Ta.lued 
at over tl,ooo,ooo. Approxill&tely 6,000 aores are devoted to truck tara-
1D.g, -.iDly in the hi�er a.rea.s . · 'frausportaticm problema , laok of' water, 
and insects have always plagued this endeavor. The value of' the truck 
crops dropped almost a. milllcm dollars betnen 1947 and 1948, due to 
mai.Dland cc:apeti ticm. Territorial la.n and &d"t"&'lced marketing praotioea 
have beg\Dl to overcame the pre'rious lack of' cra.cli.Dg and sta.ndardizaticm 
of' market trui ts and vegetables .  But Ba.waii continues to be dependent 
upon IULil1 illlported f'ood suppllea . Whi.le caapa.risona in the 88.DI.e year are 
not an.ilable, the total iaporta of' trui ts and wgetables in 19lt0 amcnmted 
to wll o'ftr a. fourth of' similar produce of' looal origin in 1947 • Hono­
lulu is the chief market tor ialand trui ta an.d Tegetables .13 
Because of' isolation an.d the a.bsenoe of' minerals, Hawaii • a  eooncmio 
1Nll•being almost certaiD.ly will ccmtinue to be dependent upon ita soil. 
Yet an.ly about aeTen peroent of' the land area is suitable for cultiw.tion. 
13jJ.uw&l Bsport, 45-46, 67; Bearings, H. Rea . 2;6, PP• 687, 690, 
692-693; Senate DOOument !!!, 151, I'P• 54=55J Cordon bport, 3J Coulter, 
� cit. , 257:1261. 
()D. thia land Ha-.11 must produce not cmly food but ita chief sources ot 
incaae. It is not surprising that money crops have dCIIlinated agriculture . 
The paat has been marked by a.ppee.la tor wiser use of la.nd, advice to 
eliminate the dangerous dependenoe upon shipping tor food and the great 
search tor a third money orop. .A.t various times, daal tor manutaoture 
ot oordage, rubber, rice, ba.nanaa, cottee, tobacco and the macadamia nut 
haw been culti"t'&ted. While a few ot these haT8 asaaed minor importance, 
problea ot transportation, labor and world ccapeti tion haw emluded these 
product• tr<D c onaiderati an as a third money crop. Crop experimentation 
has been encumbered by' the tact that Ha118.ii • s light cyole does not meet 
requinmenta tor many mainland, inoome-produoing crops . Sugar and pine­
apple, therefore, haw f'omd no important partner--and these products, tor 
'ft.rioua reasons, show little possibility ot further expansion. 1Ja118.ii • s  
main economic problems ot the future would seem to be r  (1)  develo:p1ent 
ot a third money cropJ  (2 ) intenai"fe soil oonservatl.on to proteot ita 
vital land resouroe J (3) increased and im.prowd production tor looal food 
needs J and (4) dewlo:r;ment, it p011ible, ot aaall, individual tanns to 
offset the centralized plautaticm 1yatea. '!'here are, at present, hopee 
tor increased export ot the macadamia nut, C&lUIA staroh, ngetable oill, 
and beet and poul'tz7 products . Air tra.uaport has opened the wa.y tor ex­
perimentation in exporting trozen fish and other foods . Air transport 
ha1 already- pushed the grcnring ot exot1o tlowra tor mainland markets 
into the llilllon-dollar bracket. The possibility ot orohard crops ia 
alao t.pting. Hawaii hardly need• to be reminded by ita govemor that, 
•The need tor reaearch in the econCIIlic adapta.bili ty ot other crop8 to the 
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soils and oltmate of Hawaii ' s  limited tillable areas is more neoeaaar,y than 
ever before if the fullest eoona:nio 'Value is to be obtained .tram the soil re­
source • •14 An increase in population of 26.7 percent between 194D and 1948 is 
another reminder that the Hawaiian soil must produce more revenue and more 
emplo;yment opportunities •15 
Closely &llied to agriculture are the forests of Hawaii.  A forest re­
serve system was introduoed early in territorial life and today forests cover 
almost one-fourth of the islands' &rea. Their ohief 'Value bas been considered 
their role as a source of water and an aid to better ra.intall distribution. OUt• 
side the reserve system are some native hardwood forests used OCIIIIleroially to s<me 
extent. Governor Stainback recently suggested that marginal lands oould well be 
utilized for the production of highly valued exotic woods, on a oommerci&l basis . 
SUch suggestions as this emphasize the determination and ingenuity with whioh 
Ha:wa.iian leaders are searching .tor new wealth in Hawaii ' s  soil.16 
The soil dom.iDates even Hawaii ' s  soant JUDufacturing enterprise• whioh are 
almost c<mpletely dependent upon agriculture . In this category are the one sugar 
re t'iD.ery, pineapple canneries, sugar Jlills, a can4&llufaoturing plant, coffee pro­
cessing plants, a oomDJ.eroi&l fertilizer oonoem, and the manufacture of locally 
grown cotton into a padding popular with the Japanese for household use. The manu­
facture of wallboard from b&g&ssee (residue from crushed sugar oane ) t'iD.ds & loo&l. 
market but bas strong mainland oODlpeti tion. other concerns manuf'a.oture suoh articles 
14Ammal Report, 2,;  see also ibid., 1, 29: Cordon Report, 3: Senate Docu­
ment No. 151, PP• 51, 55-56, 85-86,; Frilik J. Taylor. 8IAbor Moves in on ua....a.n:;­
l'lieSieiirctii Bv'ening Post, Vol . 219 (June 28, 1947),  100, 102,; Clifford :M. lierer, 
"ReViews ot Booke," T'lii""'Paoific Rl.storioal Review, III (lfarch, 19.34) , 97-98. Mr. 
Zierer was reviewing John Wesley CoUlter ' s  taiid Utilization in the Bawaiian Is-
lands (Honolulu; university of Hawaii, 19m;-" 
- -
15.&.nnual Report, 64. 
l6Ib1d., 2•3J SeDAte DoolDent :rro .  151, PP• 85-86,; Coulter, � !.!:.:!!• 
225, 255. 
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&I mattrenes , paper boxes , c oncrete pipe and ukulele s .  An earl)" indus-
trial deve lopunt, the Honolulu Iron Works, produces ma.ohiDel")", engineer-
ing suppliee &Zid saae s teel. However, its chief 1pecial:t)" il the production 
of equi�ent tor sugar mills , not ODl.)" in the islands but in the Philippius 
aDd s outheast China. Bxoept tor 111&11 concerns supplying local needs , it 
i 1 not likel)" that :u.nutao turing wi 11 pla7 a great role in Hawaii • s future •17 
Hawaii ' s  1eoond aost important res ource might � considered the sea, 
since o CIIIIIlerce still figures "fi tall)" in the lite ot the Paoi tio • s ohiet 
wa7-.W.tion. During 1947, Honolulu• a harbor was ho1t to 818 ehipa traa 
transoceanic porte . AI in the pa.1t, trade with the mainland dwarfs all 
foreign CCIIIJIIeroe , and, Iince Hawaii i 1  1ubjeot to United state s ooa1twise 
:aa"figati on law, all mainland oCIIIJD8roe must be carried on by Jmerioan •hips . 
Thi a o CIDDieroe is no saall fl.otor in the c ontinued strength of the Pt.oitio 
c oast maritime fleet. B:Eports and imports in both mainland and foreign 
commerce each averaged over ou hundred milli on dollars in value in the 
1937-194o period. 'W&r-time merchant marine loues ,  the war in ChiDA, 
dollar restrictions in varioua countries ,  and .Allstralian auaterit)" have 
brought a dec rease in foreign venels entering Hawaiian porta Iince 
18 World war II. 
IroD.icall1, the sea has not been too kind to the fishing industry 
ot this island o CDl11unit)". CCIIDD8roial tlshing does not tully suppl)" local 
17 Senate Document No . 151,  P•  55J Coulter, loo . oi t . ,  262-26lu 
K:uy"bD.dall ana Day, .2! olt.;�. - -
18a___ · 6o ... -�--�, Document No . 151, PP• 57-58, J Annual Report, 67J Simpioh, ioo . oit. , 571J craWford, op. oit�, 73. --- - --
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needs . RNtk1ng fourth in dollar "V&lue in the eo011<�q, inahore fishing 
has been lillli ted by the aall amount ot shallow shoal water aroUDd the 
ialauda-a result ot Bawai.i • a  volcanic origin. The surrounding waters 
abound in tuna., but deep-sea fishing bas been restricted because of the 
--.11 lize of the fishing boat•, spar1e kllowledge oanoenrl.ng the deep­
sea fisheries aud lack of autfioient bait for tmaa. C011gress in 1947 
appropriat.d funds to aid in overocaing the pre1ent obstacles to deep-
sea t11hing. Oa.oe these are su:naounted, tuna fishing can beocme a great 
eoancmio boon to the islands . In 1947, fish production was 'ftlued at 
over f3,ooo,ooo, but the islands have found it neoeaaary to import ten 
percent of their fish supply. There 11 one oannery produoiDg tuDa for 
export.l9 
.A. third resource tor Hawaii has proven to be 1 ts scenic and oli• 
matio attraoticma . One ot the moe� prcai.aing taotora in the Hawaiian 
economic picture is the tourist trade, already estimated to be the third 
acmey-taaker ot the islands. The native gove:r:maent had financed ocmatruo-
tian ot a tourist howl, and 'Visitors in the 1890 • a  noted Hawaii ' s  oha:na 
as a vaoa tian resort. With the aid ot a self-appointed preea agent, 
.A.le:zander HUme Ford, and the reports brought back by Spanieh-Jiaerioan 
war veter&D.8 and famous 'Viei tore euoh as Jack Lcmdcm, tourist trade 
grew duri.Dg the first two decades ot thia oentury. Holrever, it was the 
o cmbined ettorta ot the "B!g F1 ve• and the lla. taon Line in the 1920 • s 
19SeD&te Doo'UIIl8Dt No. 151, P• 55 J Carpenter, op. ·ott. , 474J Coulter, 
loo . cit., 261-2612; SlipiOll, loo . cit., 6o2 J  AJmual RiPo�J cordcm 
'&PO'rl";""';J Clark, op� · 204=2'� 
• 
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th&t led to the c onstruction of luxury liners and the ROJ&l Hawaiian Hotel 
to lure visitors. GoverDm.ent f'tmds wre added to those of private enter-
prise to spr.ad abroad iD:to:rmation about Ha'ftii' a exotic cha:nas . The 
tunds nre not spent in ftin. After a depr.ssion lapse, tourist trade 
soar.d, and about 30,000 'risi ted the islands azmually before World War II. 
In 1947 over 100,000 came to .Hawaii by air transport alone, lea:'l"i.Dg an 
estimated tlO,OOO,OOO in Bawa.iian cotters . Conetruction of m.ore tourist 
accQIDlllOclations is already underway. The provisicm of trauportation and 
hotel facilities within the moderate price range and further developaeat 
of tourist facilities in the outer ialands (i.e. , beyond Oahu) should 
greatly enhance the :��.oney-..,.ldng possibilities of this enterprise .20 
llore serious visitors to the islandtl have alao boosted Hawaiian 
wealth. Fran a purely- econanic standpoint, the UD.ited States a:nned toroea 
are big businees tor Hawaii. Bot only- do the military eervice s  purchase 
food and other supplies from local produoera and carry on considerable 
c onstruction work, but, iD 1947, the ccmbined. service payrolls, tor both 
civilian an.d military' pereo.zmel, amounted to almost tl47 ,000,000. Kuoh 
ot this money finds its way into Hawaiian cash registers in payment tor 
rent, food, retail goods , and rec reation. llhile this source of revenue 
has gradually decreased siD.ce the war, it ua.doubtedly will con.tinue to 
be a strong con.tributor to the Hawaiian eooncay. 21 
20Azmual Report, 67-68; Senate DoolBent llo . 151, PP• 6�-64J Fuma.s , 
op. oit. , 184-186; CoUlter, loo . cit. , �64=265;�ii:r, op . oit�,  64-65. - - - ----- - -
21Ibid., 227·230 ; AJmual Report, 68J Cordon. Report, 4. 
Vital to the economy ot the ilolated and scattered islands is 
tranaportation. Only one railroad now operates in the territo17, but, 
even before highway tra.naport became dcn1 nut, railways were used pri• 
marily tor cane transport rather than passenger servioe . The outatanding 
dewlopnent in post...a.r transportation �s been the growth of air traffic . 
In inter-i sland traffic , there is a scheduled passenger-freight line, a 
scheduled freight line , and several charter lines . It is expected that 
the volume ot busine81 will soon require anothe r soheduled passenger line. 
Both Pa.n aerie an .Airways and tTni. ted Air Lines maintain daily air service 
between Hawaii and the mainland, while Nortlurest Airlines more recently 
installed service to the Paoitio Bortn..st. There is also regular ser­
vice to the Orient and .Au1tralam.tl. To handle this traff'io in 1947 there 
were sixteen airports, exclusive of milita17 installations . While air 
traffic has now outstripped by a large liArgin sea transport in passenger 
load, both the lfataon Navigation Cam� and the American President 
Lines have regular pa18enger schedules tor the mainland run. By June , 
1948, hanver, t'ull pre""'118.r sohedulu still had not been res\118d1 due 
in part to air oompeti tion. Freight, of course, remains pred<��inantly 
sea-borne in ocean tra.neport. Air traf'tic has been even more etteoti ve 
in reduoing passenger trattio by water in inter-island travel. Further:more, 
tugs and barges are replacing steaaahip freighters . The :r:ater-Isla.nd 
Bavigatl.on Ccmpaey has out 1 ts s ervice in halt and may reduce present 
schedules in the near future. 22 
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Facilitating o 01111118roe and business alike is a highly developed 
cCJPI!Iun1 cation aystea which has expanded sane since the war. This eystem 
includea inter-island wireless telephone and telegraph eervice, land tele­
phones, tranaooea.nic radio telephcme a.nd telegraph, a.nd ship-shor. servioe.23 
Despite the discontinuance in 1947 ot two large sugar plu.taticms, 
c eTent the Gowrnor characterized as a •severe blow to the eoonellcy' ot 
the Territory, •24 and a number ot business  f'ailur.s, the gaqrnor• a amual 
report was optiaistic. Indices, such as bank deposits, w.lue ot business, 
establiebment ot new businesses and increased retail sales, all pointed 
to a sound eooncm.y, as had the same indioee tor the pre'rioue year.25 
Despite manifest wea.kneeses, the B'a:waiian eoon.cm.y in 1948 held 
prcaiee. But not so prcaiaing to Ja&Z17 duri.Dg the years had been the 
economic and poli tioa.l role which they teared the •Big Fi Te• would haTe 
in the State ot B&waii. Strictly defined, the term �ig PiTe• refers to 
the following Honolulu-based tactore or buainen agenoies a American :rao -
tors, Ltd. ,  c. Br8'nr a.nd Ccmpa.ny, Ltd.,  Alexander and Baldwin, Castle 
and Cooke, Ltd. ,  and Theo. H. Da.'ries, Ltd. Together these tiTe tina.• 
repreeented in 191¢> pla.ntaticms reapcmsible tor 96.5 peroent ot Hawaii • a 
total sugar production. Bach ot the three largest produced more than 
twatJ peroent ot the total. Sugar plantations independent ot these 
taotor• haw been rare in Hawaiian histo17. Usually' OTerlook:ed are three 
!'Amw&l Report, 68J SeDAte Doo1aent � 151, PP• 63, 76. 
24.a.u.ual· Report, lt6. 
25Ibid. , 23, �. 66-67 J Cordon Report, 4. 
... 
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IIID&ller agenoies a F. A. Sohaeter and Com.pa.ny, Ltd. ,  F. L. waldron, Ltd. ,  
and Bishop Trust Company. Time and usage have given the tel'Jil •Big Five• 
the erroneous connotation ot tive i'lailies or even five men. Despite 
agenoy ettorts to eliminate its use, the tenn remains aa inseparable a 
26 part ot the Hawaiian vooabulaey as Aloha, and ia uaed almost aa otten. 
This ageDCJ system grew out ot the need ot the early, isolated 
pl.&llt&tions tor a representative in Honolulu to handle cane shi}'aellts , 
puroh&ae supplies and :maohinaey, manage tands and aid in proouriDg labor. 
Aa the systea dewlopecl, the a�noies , in times ot depression, bolstered 
the plantations w1 th hea'9'1 lo&na or purohaaes ot •took. Gradually, too, 
they came to auperriae plantation insuranoe, aooomti.ng, legal, real estate 
and tax matters. For these services the taotors received ocamiesiona 
based an the gross proceeds earned b;r the individual plantations . But 
the mAin eocmanio ponr and protits ot the agenoies came, in time, to 
81D&D&te tram stook OWDership, interlooting directorates, family rel&ticm­
shipa and trusteeships . As previously stated, proti table sugar production 
in Hawaii required much capital, astute li&DAgaent and high organization. 
The "Big F1Te• turniahed these needs and reaped the protits . Obviously, 
those ba"rin« the greatest Toioe in the attairs ot sugar also came to have 
the moat power over the whole eoonc:ay. As in the past, both the taotora 
and the pl.a.Dtationa are organized aa OOIIIIILOD atook oampa.nies . otten the 
agency owns stook in the plantati0118 it serTes, while the plantation may 
26taroade, •Report, • loo . oit. , 17 J Vandercook, � oit. , 155, 158J 
Barber, op. oit., 67-f.:IJJ Xuy'iiiiQ'a.rr-&Dd Day, � cit. , 2"'(!-'Z'('Z: For Ger• 
man orig'IjloT'li'erioan Factors, Ltd., see .B&rrn;Op'; cit . ,  47J KuykBndall 
and Day, � cit.,  271 J and Senate DOolll.ent !To � 151, p-:o'{. 
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well own stock in the agency. Today there are approximately 16.000 stock-
holders in the plantation oampa.nies . Stock ownership in the agencies is 
less scattered. •sig Fi'Ye• atook oan be bought on the Honolulu stook Bx-
change • but its high prioe 1imi ts turn-oftr • and it tends to remain ill the 
same hands . In 1941 two ot the taotors •re almost etirely within family 
control.27 
Had the tao tors limited themselns to the sugar industry. however 
'rital• they would ha'ft &'Yoided much oritioim.. Howe'Yer. other tirma soon 
sought the counael ot the eaployers ot probably the ablest business and 
proteesioDAl lllinda in the islands . Scmetimes these firms ga:ve poai tiona on 
directors • boards to •sig Fi ..... • leaders . Gradually the •Big Fi .,..• spread 
out. not only because ot their business •mow-how" but because they bad cap-
i tal to inftst. While there ia disagreement as to the amount ot panr the 
"Big Fin" baa cCIIle to wield in the pineapple industry • it is sate to say 
that the t"aotor aystem has ne'V'er penetrated as deeplf here as in the sugar 
illduatey. What oontrol the ta.ctors ha'Ye g&i:ned in this industry dates :main­
ly tram the year 1932 ..m.en the depression would ha'Ye decimated Hawaii • s 
second industry without tinancia.l aid t"rCIII. •Big Fi 'ft 11 and mainland iDV'es-
tors. rwo ot" the largest gronrs ot" pineapples are mainland tirms. which. 
inoidentally, have al•ya worked easiq with the •Big Fi"". •28 
27D&Diel James. •Han.ii• s  Claims to statehood•" The ,Ulerioan llercury. 
LXIII (Sept.ber, 1946), 330-331; Bearings, H.R. 49·56.pp. 193-194; L&r­
oade• •Report," loa . oit� ,  16; Barber. op. oit. ,  41-!,2, 44-51; V&Dd.ercook. 
op. oi t. • 157 J c'O'Uiter,-Ioc. cit. • �; Kuyieiidall and Day. op. oi t. • 226-
"Z27 ,"'""2"f'Z. - - - -
28Btar1Dga. H.R. 236. P• 233; IAroade, •:&eport." loc . cit • •  17J 
SeDAte Doo1aent lfo. 151. P• ($; Barber. � oit • • �. 55=57J J'ii'rii'aa • .2:. 
cit. ,  183; CoUlter. ioc . cit�. 250 ; Kuykiii.Cran-"and Day, op. cit. , 272; 
CI&i='k. op. cit • •  236; :&ari:uga, Con. Res .  18• P• 637. - -- -
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A. "Big Fin" attilia.te ha.a been the Mateon lfa"rlga.tion CCIII.p&ny, Ltd. ,  
which tor � yea.re praotioa.lly controlled mainland-Hawaiian freight and 
passenger traffic . W1 th the a.id of the Un1 ted States Jfari time Cc.JIIi11ion, 
the aerica.n Presidents Li.1:le now otter• cCillpetition, while Matson attempt• 
to gain a. 1ntighty' intereet in Pan aerioa.n Airway• were checked tirat by 
the Ci nl .A.ercmautio s Bo&rd and la.ter by federal legislation. other ehip-
ping linea, hotels, docks , utilities, banks, reta.il &nd ll'holes&le atorea, 
export-ilaport buaineaaes a.nd insurance--all have bHn "Big Fin" interests. 
-aig F1 Ye" money and advice found its .._y into almost &11 eooncmio ven-
tures of note. Furthezmore, by wile JI&D&paent, auoh a.s retiring bonds 
in proaperous ye&re, the "Big Fi"Ye" and the plantation. maintained a. sound 
basis tor their varied operationa.29 
But to the -aig Five• came difficult times .  The first b reak in ite 
preatt.p came with the speoulation-born loues in the 1929 market crash 
&nd the effects on Hawaiian public opil'lion and Hawaiian eoonC111.7 ot the 
legislation, especially ccmoerni.ng labor, of the anti ... onopolistic lew 
Deal a.dlllinistration. So damaging were these two toroes &lone that the 
"Big Fin, "  in the early thirtiee, hired and heavily tinanced a. presa . 
agent to return the "Big liTe• to the good graces of Hawaiian public opino-
ion and to iaprOTe mainland impressiOlll of the islands . Isl&nd•inlpired 
articles and pictarea soon flooded the mainland press and magazi.Des .  Later, 
mainland writers, photographers and columnists nre lured to Bit.waii on 
29xu;,aDd&ll and Day, op. cit., 272-273 J Barber, .2!. oi t.,  43-1141 
Furnas , op. cit.,  183J Cl.&rk,"'Op.Ol'i., 236J Vandercook, op.-or£"., 156-157• - - - - - -
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pre•pa.id vaca.tions . A pa.rt of this campa.ign was the publication in 1939 
of John w. Vandercook' s Xing �· the publishing costs of which were shared 
with the publisher by the sugar industey. Simila.r efforts were made in 
the islands, especiallY' aaong students and tea.ohers, to press the values 
of Hawaii ' s  economic s7stem.30 
.A.ttributed to the •Big Fin" was a.nother measure to enha.noe its 
prestige--the instituting of a spying system to discourage employee cri ti-
cism of •Big Five• methods and policies .  The alleged policy of employee 
inti:m.idation will be discussed later in connection with the 1937 Congres­
sional investigation in Bawa.ii.31 
Despite all efforts, however, the assaults on "Big Five• power con-
tinued. Extremely damaging were the invasions of mainland fims such as 
s. H. Kres s  and Canpany and Sears , Roebuck Can�. This canpetition hurt 
•Big Five• interests in the retail trade . Also govel'DDI.ent defense con-
struction contracts prior to World war II brought in new firms, with their 
own persollllel, as well as new business ideas and methods . These contracts , 
too, provided minimum labor standards and goven:mumt accounting superrleion. 
The war-time in:tusion of new busineu blood is still ac� upon island 
business methods and orga.nisation.32 
Another challenge to the •Big Five• was the business debut in the 
1920 ' s  of the .American-born, American-educated immigrants ' children who• 
30Barber, op. cit.,  65-66, 81-90, 93-97; Kuykendall and Day, op. 
cit. , 272. - - -
31 Barber, � !!.:!:.• 77-79, 95-96. 
32Ibid. , 66-69.J Kuykendall and Day, � cit.,  273-274. 
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tor the first time , gave Hawaii a substantial and numerous middle class . 
Bven aa this second gee ration lett the plantati cma tor small buai:neues , 
tarms , oratts and proteuiona , mechanization turther depleted the D\Jilber 
ot workers which the "Big ll'ive" c ould, at the least, guide in their think­
ing and voting.  The last -.ar aaly stre��gthened this middle olus� Bank 
depoai ta increased two- or three-told between 1941 and 19!&6, while a.n esti-
mated 1,000 or more oe���.parativel7 poor islanders bad g&ined oam.tortable 
fortunes by 19-W;. !hese gaiJ18 were larpl7 made b7 restaurant owners , 
taxi c cmpt.ny operators ,  printers , theater owners and similar BliiAll buai­
neu people . .Aaong theae, the Chinese and Japanese were predCIIIiDent. 33 
The post-war o on.enaus ot opinion seams to be that Hawaii otters 
maJJiY' opportw:d. ties tor both SJIAll and large business and that the •Big 
Five," whatever its past ponr, is no longer iaperrious to able cCIII.petition. 
Bven in i ts 1trcmghold, agr!cul ture, 1118.11 tandng is on the increa1e • 
In that tield, where Hawaii pays plantation labor almost three times as 
much as does its o e���.petitor, Cuba, a sugar pric• drop c ould be veey in-
jurious to the plantation aystaa, where the •Big Five • s" baaio power 
ues .34 
The t rend ot testia0331' in the ftrioua Congressional investiga-
tiona into Hawaii ' s  readiness tor statehood certainly indicates a waning 
ot "Big Fi:ve• power. Illpressi'Yel7 nUIIleroua in the 1935 inwstigation nre 
33olark, op. oi t., 262 J KuykeDdall and Day, op. oi t. , 272-2741 
Barber, op . oit.;-ol.:olij' Taylor, loo . cit.,  25 . - -- - - -
�uyblldall and Day, op. oit � ,  2731 Taylor, loc . oit. , 102J  
A.nnual Report, 67 J Clark, op . cit�-266 ; Cordon Repo'rr,;. 
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charges that the •Big F.l:n" used intimidation to control elections and to 
quaah opposition to st&tehood. Fears were expressed that statehood would 
give the "Big Five" ocaplete control of the islands. Sane believe4 that 
many oitiaens would not testify againat st&tehood for tear of losing their 
jobs. Same opposed statehood simply because the "Big Fi Te11 supported it, 
the implication being that what the ageDCies wanted 'lluat be bad tor the 
ordinary oitiaen. •Big  F1Te11 labor poUoiea, too, were o rit:l.oizect. Testi-
m� ot other witneues refuting these oharge1 o ould not ocmpletely eradi­
cate their toroe .'5 � 19'7 investigation produced similar outburst&, 
but there was no way to definitely verify the repeated charges that JI18JlY 
opposed to statehood were afraid to appear before the o ommittee .36 The 
report of this joint oCIDIIli ttee gave considerable attention to the "Big 
F1 ve . " While justifying the existence of large-soale agriculture, the 
report stated, "Today Hawaii ' s  industry is largely controlled by a number 
ot closely integrated oorporat1ona ."'7 There was an analysis of "Big Five" 
atook nDership and the conc lusion that there was a "ta.irly wide" dis­
tribution of stook in industrialized a.griculture.'8 The oamni.ttee • s  
351Jearillgs , H.R. 3034• Testimoey aga.inat •Big Five, "  PP• 25-26, 
45-47. 57-58, 65, 71, 7,-7� 136, 1,8, 155-158, 191-192, 194-195, 208, 
233, 267, 269-271 J testimony taToring •Big Fin, " PP• 55 , 153, 181-182, 
201, 204, 209, 282,  229, 291 . 
36Hearings ,  Con. Res .  18 a Tes�aa, against •Big FiTe,• PP• 71-
!�f 55-56, 76, 81, 94, 157-158, 174-182, 20,-206, 225-226, 276-278, 283, ,a4, 448, li>S J testimony' favoring "Big Five, "  PP• 51, 65-66, 128-129, 1,1, 
1,,, 155-156, 282, 305-,o6, 389-390, 422, !,66, !,a,, 576. 
37 Senate Document � 151, PP• 65, 64-65.  
38Ibid. '  66, 67. 
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findings , howreTer, tended to mirror the contusion ot the testilaony. While 
admitting that eooncmio policies were detel"Dli.ned by very tn and that the 
nUIIlber of persons who prin.tely approached the cCIDDii ttee because of .tear 
ot reprisal was im.pressive, it did not find conditions as bad as in sane 
mainland areas where corporations held nay.39 But, by 1946, witneeaes 
seemed muoh less oonce1"!18d about the "Big Five.• There was testimcmy 
either obarging or acbaitting interloold.ng interests ot agencies, plant&-
tiona, and steamship linea, and there was same tear expressed regarding 
political and eooncmic control by- the "Big Five .• However, representatives 
ot what logically should have been the chief critics of "Big Five• power, 
the Congreas ot Industrial Organisations and the Aaerioan Federation of 
Labor, expressed the opinion that the "Big Fin" could no longer damiD&te 
the Hawaiian eoonCIIlY' or suppress labor. 11'1 th the e:meption of a few, the 
"Big Five' a" ori tics gave auoh more temperate apprai1all than in previous 
years. !to 
The final report of the 1946 oOIIDili. ttee, generally aooepted to have 
made the moat exhauative of all etu"Veys of Hawaiian lite, contains the 
following stateenta 
• • •  the Big Five dcainates a great portion of Hawaii ' s  eoon�, 
but this eooncmi.o d(l!!1nanoe has :not prevented the e sta.blis.l:ment 
ot mauy &Dd n.ried buaiDassea.  There are good prospects tor 
small busiDess in Hawaii . Further, the intluenoe ot the Big 
Fin has not pre'9'8l1ted the eZULOtaent of progressive legislation 
in the field ot labor, eduoatio:n, health, a.nd weltare .Lil 
39Ibid • • 68-70. 
�BN.rings, H.R. 2,36, PP• 113-114, 133-1.34, 138-139, 222-2,36, 359, 
474. W34.oz&85, 783-821. 
41r..reade, "bport, " loc . cit., 20.  - -
138 
The oamm.i ttee further tound nothing that " .  • • indioa ted the existence 
in business lif'e ot ool1uaion or fraud or aey agreement or o<Dbination 
in restraint of' trade . "42 
In the Ccmgresaional investigation of' Karoh, 1947, the "Big Five" 
was not :mentioned as an obstacle to statehood, although Seoretacy of' In• 
terior JUlius A. Krug characterized it as " . • • the potent eoon<Dio group.•43 
The 19� oCBDmi.ttee found soant attention paid by witnesses to the "Big Five ." 
There were statements that "Big Five" dcmination was exaggerated and that 
labor had broken its power. There was one mention of' f'ea.r of repria&l..J,4 
In the same year Senator· Guy' Cordon, as a result of hie investigation, 
stated a " •  • •  they dcminate the f':inanoial lif'e of' the islands only to 
'the extent that other large industries and corporations dami.Date fin&Dcia1 
attaira in the States ."  A&reeing essentially w1 th the 1946 oommi ttee ' a .tind· 
inga, Senator Cordon felt independent enterprise was tree to develop, pro-· 
greaaive eoonamic legislation possible and restraint of' ·trade not in evidence .� 
The results of' a sUrTey of' the buainesa-tiDanoed Hawaiian Eoonardo 
Foundation in 1948 tended further to explode danination obargea ag&in.Bt 
�Ibid., 20. For expreaaiona in 19� of' mainl.a.nd sentiment against 
s tatehood on the b&aia of "Big Fi ve• power, see various letters to oOIIIIIli. ttee 
and mambers of Ccmgreaa, Bnab��oi!to of B&waii To Fom A Consti tu­
tion and State Goveraent to be �e 'Oiilon oxiaii""Bqua.l Footing WffJi' lhe OrigiDal States, ili"a.ri'Dg, PUnuan"tt'oif.'R. 3Qi03;-HOu'ae C� 
"'ii""theTeiTitories, 19 Congress, 1 Session, 10, 21-24, 35-36. Hereafter 
oi ted as Hearing, H.R. 3643. 
43�s, H.R. 49-56, P• 45; see ibid. , 16, 118, 129, 182. 
�s, H.R. 49 and s. 114, pp. 24, 48' 273-274, 277, lt>5, IA1. 
4scordon Report, B .  
the "Big Five .• The survey toUDd that all Hawaii' s  831 corporations 
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had in total assets leas than one large mainland steel compa.n:y. It fur­
ther found 34,000 stockholders in these ccap&Zliea--a.n average ot one stock­
holder to every three families.  It  found that the •Big Five" controlled 
twenty percent ot Hawaiian corporation assets, while they were themselves 
cnmed by 4,500 stockholder• .11> 
To pio.ture the 8Big Five• as no longer an econanio power in the 
islands would be inaocurate . But the evidenoe points both to a decrease 
in their power and an increase in competition. In 1947 there were over 
38,000 business enterprises in lii:wai.i .  
47 
There seems no reason longer to brand the •Big Five• as a deter-
rent to statehood. It their testimOD1' is � indication, the Hawaiian 
people, t�elves, no longer consider the 8Big Five• a great political 
or economic threat. Furthermore , to a great extent, credit belongs to 
the leaders , past and present, ot these concerns tor the remarkable achieve-
menta ot Hawaiian agriculture and there tore Hawaiian econanic progress. 
Their predecessors literally created the wealth in sugar and pineapple 
which is still the basic source ot island revenue . Their policies have 
often been seltiahJ they have tended to taJce upon themselves too much 
responaib1Uty tor what they felt was island weltareJ but oertainly they 
have earned same share 1n Hawaiian wealth.4B 
�llewsweek, Vol. 32 (Ootober 4, 1948 ), 68-69. 
47oordon Report, 41 Barber, � cit. , 26o-262. 
48 Crawtord, loc . cit. , 73J Barber, op. cit. , 76-77 . 
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the •Big Fin" a  {1) they olung over-long to the pa.ternaliatio syst. ot 
•plorer-ployee nlatianahipeJ (2 ) they undoubtedl7 attcpted to wield 
aore poli tioal ponr than was their due J (3) they opposed · too long tlM 
growth of the lAbor UD.icm.J and (4) they have been over-eenai ti ve to ori ti-
oism and advice in the past. It seems evident that these mistakes of tbe 
•sig lin" tended to build up a resentment agairJ.at muagement and a solid 
tra.diticm of real or iJI&Cined grie'ftDOes aaong . •orkers which has led to 
an cner-depelldenoe or labor upon aey leaders who would ahcnr the way to 
higher liT.ing atandardA. Patel"D&li•, i teelf, auat han tended to •eaken 
the labo:r.rs • initiative and independenoe ot thought. If the labor aOTe-
ment in Hawaii today showa � ligna of i:laaturity &nd laok of respoDii­
bility, part of the blame tor .that 'W8&1mese lies with the •sig ftve.•!e . 
ot all the raotora eontributing to the decline of •Big Five" power, 
the rise or labor ltandl for•oat. So great haa labor• 8 power beocme 
that one of -the •stg Fin• leaders said ae'Veral ,..ar• ago, "It' s now the 
Big Six--the Big Five and Barry Bridgea .•5° The businessman was :r.ter-
� to the leader of the IDternatioDAl Longshoremen • •  and Warehouaaaen• s  
UDiOD, the strongest labor orga.nizatiOD in the islands . But Hawaiian labor' a 
upsurge to power has been reoent--almost precipitant. 
49:ror diiOUISiODI of p&W!'DAliiiDl in the ialanda, see ibide 1  70-74, 
252�53J X1J7kendall and Day, op. oit. , 271J Crawford, loo . o1'6., 73J rur­
naa , op. oi t. ,  186-187 J 'f&Dderooo'i;'"'ip. oi t. , 78-97. - -- - - ---
50!&7lor, loo. oit. , 25. D:l the spring of 1950 Barry Bridges was 
oonTioted of perjuey W'liiii'lJe swore he was aot a Ccaaunist and was sentenced 
to a priacm tera. As a result, he baa lost his Jaerio&D oi tisenahip. 
Hawaii ' s  begim:Linga under American scmtreip.ty found oontraot 
labor atill in toroe. Prior to the provilion of a territorial govern-
ment, measure• wre introduced in Congress, one passing in the House, to 
outlaw oontraot labor. Bonver, it was the Organic Aot of 1900 which 
tiDal.q made further contract labor 'ftluelen 'by pro't'idiDg that criminal 
prooee�s against labor oontra.ot 'riol&wrs oould not be carried through 
the oourta . This pro'riaicm applied 'to all labor oontra.ota , enn those 
entered into before the passage of the Org&Dio .A,ot.51 
One obstacle to effective labor organization was removed, but � 
hindrances �i:ned. Pitting an iaproTed pa:bernalia ag&inat unionizaticm, 
8111ployers, w1 th oonli4era.ble auooeaa for JII&DY ;years , turned publio opiJ:L:ion 
ag&inat labor •ag1 tatiml, • utilised a trespaaa law to bar organisers !"r(IIL 
the plat&tiODI, and periodically bettered •gea &Dd 11Ti.D.g standards to 
at• UZU"est. The Hawaiian public, itaelt, bad little Ullderatu.ding of 
the aima and methode ot orga.niz ed labor, often felt high-principled pa-
ternaliam. made uniona UDDeOeaaaey, ad, especially 1D earlier ;years, oon-
tased moves for better labor c ondi tiona with racial U111"8at. The later 
lDiion poUoy, eapeoiall7 of the C. I .  o., to aport mainland organizer• 
little versed in Hawaiian conditiona ant&gGQi&ed public opiD.ion. Even the 
WOrDrl del&7ed unionization. rhe7 had 110 tr&di tiODI o:t labor org&Dizat1011J 
their leaders wre uau&lq inexperieDOed, inept, &Del izsoli:ned to be per-
scmally am.bitioua . Baoial division and supicion, ad, later, juriadiotiOD&l. 
squabbles 'll'e&kened labor. Furtbenaore , workers, aoouataaed to peraODAl 
5lc�aiOD&l BMord, 56 Cqreas, 1 Session, Vol . 33, Part II, 
1983, 1965� III, 2319:12324, Rowland, •contract lAbor, " 266-2691 
Barber, op. oi t. , 57-59• - -
dealings 1li. th their aploJWr•• at tiret found the aore to:naal 'Uilicm.­
mana.caent rel&tionahip foreign. OYer all hung a tradi ticm.a.l Hawaiian 
cliataete tor uq aoti'ri. ty auggeetiTe of induetrial strite .
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'fhe •arly -.benhip in ekilled trade UD.ions. the first established 
in 1884. waa a.all and ue-.lly oaaposed of newoaaers trca the u.1nland. 
A oentra.l labor oo\ID.Oil and attilia tion with national orga.nisa tione did 
not deTelop until the early 1900' • • Bxoept tor a few strike• in 1919 and 
1920, these UD.ione u.de 11 ttle :lmpre .. icm. on territorial lite until the 
1930' •· 
Pl&ntaticm. labor diaturb&Doea came earlier. The u.joriq �roup ot 
plantation laborere, the Japt.Dese, tended in inoreaei.Dg numbers to settle 
pem•nently in the isla.nde and to oonaider plaut:ation labor their life ' s  
work. Conaequently, they eet out to iaprOTe working oondi tiona. Untor-
tunately, their aoti'ri. tiee �an a raoia.l oaste to early labor movaaenta 
whioh hurt both labor and the Ja.puaeae oomnmity. A eeriee ot strikee 
ga1Ding minor ocm.oeeeions began in the 1890' •·  The olilllax oame in 1909 
when a tour-taaJ1th etrike ooat the plantationa an eatiu.ted 12,000,000. 
Better wages and iaprOTed workiDg conditions reeulwd, but this strike, 
aroueiDg ra.oial tears, led to the searoh tor another labor aouroe . The 
Philippine Islands thereafter became the oenter tor reorui taent. » 
World -.r I ended, labor llllreBt brought the formation ot the Federation 
ot Japaeae Labor in Hawaii and the Filipino Laborer• ' A.aaooiation. SiJII.­
ila.r deaanda lll&de by both organisations nre rejeoted by the H.s.P.A.. 
52�uybad&ll and Dq, op. oit. , 274-276J FurDAa, loo . oit • • 13:�J 
Barber, ,!�?!. .!!!!..• f/J-10. - - - -
The reaultiDg strike in 1920, in which the Jap&neae held out tor seven 
aontha, gained a thirty percent w.ge increase &nd abolition ot caucasian• 
Oriental wage differentials. Destructive to the amount ot tl2,000,000, 
the atria indirectly oauaed the deaths ot sane 1,200 maabers of strikera 1 
families, who, e'ri.cted. frCII the plantatiou, bad crowded into intluensa• 
infested Hoaolulu. At this point the territorial legislature unsuocess-
tully petitioned Ccmgress tor rennal of Chinese immigration to overoCDe 
what it considered a J&paneae ooupiraoy. But further �pendenoe upon 
Filipil:lo labor did not end labor troubles • An eight-a.onth Filipino strike 
in 1924 was ma.rbd by extreme Tiolenoe . Thereafter labor peace u.rlced. 
pla.nta tion lite through most ot the 1930 1 s .  By 1935 one writer wa s  re­
portillg plantation wages higher than those enjoyed by mainland tana. labor.53 
Perhaps the oCDbined etteota ot the depression, increased mechanisa-
ticm. and a growi.Dg na t1 ve-born labor force in reduoi.D« plant& tion labor 
needs strengthenecl lii&D&pl&ent1 1 band duriDC the fourth decade ot the oen• 
tur;y. There was a Filipino strike in 1937, which resulted in a •ge in• 
crease, and a pineapple plantation strike . But minor atriba in 1939 lll&de 
no he&clway. Jloat significant in this period were the organizing efforts 
ot the I .t.w.u. , c . I .o. attiliate, whioh had entered Hawaii through or-
�saticm. of -.tertront W"Orkers • Under the leadership ot Jack w. HAll, 
active in Hawaii in the late thirties, the I .L.w.u. sounded out plantation 
53.lnd.rew w. Lind, Baaii 1 s  Japueae, .An J::Eperi:aent in Deaoorao� 
(Prinoeton, 1. J. a PriDOetoD Uii!wral'Ej' Preii, 19Gb), 20�; Iuy:teiil.l 
and Day, op. cit. , 279-282 J Barber, ft..:! t. , 132-135 J Crawford, loc . oi t . ,  
13· In 1� lliire was a gOTenaent- Mil attempt to recruit J.i'6'0'i ­
in southern Burope. See I.indsay, loc. oit. , 310. See ibid. tor contem­
porary alarm over Jap&uae labor acan.trii. 
workers . In 1939 the tirat election under the HatioD&l Labor Btl&ti0ll8 
Aot gave a c .r.o. local exclusive barsaining right• on one pl.alltation and 
the next year the tirat union contraot with a auga.r ocape.ny wa.s s igud. 
'fhe .Aaerican Federation ot Labor &leo ors&Dized one plantation. Bowenr, 
due to •ployer and •ployee relistanoe, these efforts were u.inly in the 
nature ot exper1Jients .54 
.l aeries of Pacitio coaat ahipping atrikes in the mid•thirtiea 
apread enthuliaa tor labor orpnisation to the Haniian wa.tertront. CDe 
of theae atriltea , cowring a three-month period in late 1936 and early 
1937, also brousJlt haae to the Hawaiian people their TUl.nerabiU ty to 
shipping atoppa.ges .  The tirst labor contracts we re  signed in 1935 be­
tween ehipping ccapudea &r&d locals ot the sailor' s union ot the Pacitic • 
.A.. F. ot L. attiUate. The I . L.w.u. became a strong toroe on the waterfront 
the nert year. Both this orgaDisation and the A.J'. ot L. participated in 
a atria againat the Inter-Island steamship COIIII.p&D¥ in 1938 in which 'ri.o­
lence tlare4.55 
�arber, op. cit., 59-61J Clark, � cit. , 172-173J Ku;ybtnda.ll and 
Day, op. cit., 2�'l'&ylor, loc . cit�,  J.OCr."""" �early activities ot Jaok 
B&ll,"'""iie"Cli'rk, � -cit. , 1$-172J *JJLw.ii-struggle tor Ccmtrol ,• ......  k, Vol. 29 (April 7,J.94,�6J and taylor, loo . oit. ,  102. For desoripUGil 
of pl.alltation working and liT!ns ccmditioiii'Tn-eii' thirties, see lllarizaga, 
Con. Rea . 18, PP • 633, 637J T&Dderoook, �� cit. , 102-103J DuPuy, op. cit. , 
l20-l21 J Coulter, loo. cit.,  2.42-243; C�,c;p:- oit., J.49-156J Barber;-­
op. cit. , 74. A r!Hin wa.ge scale• -.s a purred Dythe neoesei ty tor plan­
tations to meet Depar13aent ot Agriculture atand&rds in order to receive 
beneti ta under the Sup.r ccmtrol A.ot ot 1937. See Barber • !f!. 2!:!!.• 74• 
55!u7bndall and Day. !f!. cit. , 276-277J Barber, � oit. , 69, 221. 
But it was the ettecta of World War II which taah1oned Hawaiian 
labor into poslibl7 the strongest eooncaio toroe in the islands today. 
The transformation began in 1939 when the invading maiDland defense worker• 
brought w1 th the not only the higher mainland wage standards but inteo­
tious mthuaiaa tor unioniD. Deoiei"f'8 , honver, in oonwrti.Dg Bawaiian 
labor to organisation was the attitude and policies of the military gov­
el'llllent which took charge of the ialanda on Deoeaber 7, 1941. Throughout 
the war geura.l cCIIIIIluni ty resentment ot high-handed -.111 tary uaurpatian 
ot ci'rtl authority reilltoroed the laboring man' s conviction tbat hie par­
ticular grien.nces were Tery real. Wages and jobs nre trosen. Control 
boards, usually composed of an � officer and leading businessmen or 
planters , dealt w1 th recalcitrant workers • Fines u.d/or 1mpris0111l8Dt 
awaited worker• who atteapted to challge jobs or were absent trOifl. their 
assi gned tasks w1 thout permieaion. The imaediate d.anser to Hawaii du� 
the first months of the war ma.de these restrictians bearable, but, as the 
war moTed weat, discontent grew. '.rhere were charges, with &CIII.e tomdaticm, 
that the military gove1"1118l1t actiwl7 discouraged turther unionization. 
llea'VY work loads , as well as blackout and ourtew restrictions , praot1oall7 
eliminated mion activity during the first two rears . The aotive asber­
ahip in the unions auttered a precipi tan.t drop. llhile the plant& tiona tur­
:a.ished .A:I.my engineers with work cnnra, the war-time need tor sup.r led. to 
a policr of tree.zing plantation labor to the fields . Barred both tr011 
h1gher-pa.� construction work and enli1tment in the serrioea, planta­
tion labor resented its oontineent to a.....,i:a.gly non-essential wrk. !be 
auooesa of reTiTed I .L.w.u. organizing acti'ri.ties in 19� among certain 
olasaes ot sugar workers indicated that the Hawaiian worker was, at last, 
ready tor UD1cm1zat1cm.56 
Hawaiian maDAgement, meanwhile , bad not been blind to the changing 
labor clmate. Convinced by' 1943 that evidences ot irresponsible labor 
leadership and mount1Dg indignation over war-time labor restrictions boded 
ill tor post4ar industrial peaoe, business tirm.s organized the Hawaii 
Employer• s Council . By 1947 it represented a majority ot all Hawaiian 
business enterprises, amall and large, haole and non4hi te. Financial 
. . 
contributions to the Council' s  upkeep are made in acoordanoe with the 
size ot the individual member' s busil:less. It ha.s stated ita main ob-
jeotives to be the striking ot a bal.aDCe between the responsibilities of 
labor and JD&DAgement and the protection ot the interests ot the ge:aeral 
publio in labor-m&DAgement relations . It hopes &leo, through planning, 
to provide maximum employment opportunities and to further industrial 
peaoe. Undoubtedly, it also hopes to gain tor industry the high opinion 
of the · general publio . Reorui ted to lead its aoti vi ties was a mainland 
induatrial relations expert, James P. Blaisdell, supported by a trained 
staff. Following Blaisdell ' s  reoammen.dations, the Counoil has alread7 
made progress in standardizing eaployer-employee relations, working con­
ditions and wages throughout Hawaiian industry. :Hr. Blaisdell otten aots 
56x.u;,xeDdall and Day, op. oit., 2:77-2791 Clark, !1?.: oit.,  158·159, 
174-175J  Taylor, loo. oi t.,  1M:' -,or charges of m.ili ta17 intimidation and 
repression rega�tiii!Oii activities, see Iohiro Izuka, The Truth About 
CCIIIIlunism in Hawaii (Bonolulua Prifttely Printed, 1947),�-�k, 
op. oit. ,  l'71i-175. For resume of strikes, 19qo to September, 1945, see 
tii=Oade, "bport," loo . oi:t.,  Ezhibita, 712-714• During the aotual •r 
years, January, 19�--ugh J.ugust, 1945, there were a total ot 17 
strikes, in"VOlving approx:baately 805 men and a loss of approximately 
2,366 man days. 
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tor member tirma in negotia.tillg labor ooutre.ots. The existence ot suoh 
an organisation indioatea that private enterprise in Hawaii is  not cml7 
ali -re but alert. as in the put. to eveey new a.ddi tion to man 1 s knowledge, 
whether in agriculture or industrial relations, whioh liAY ad"ftll.oe ita 
oause. !here aeema preaent, too, it disguiaed, scme relllllAD.t ot the old 
miaaianar,y seal tor the �ltare ot all HAwaii ' s  people .57 
While the A..F. ot L· grew during the war and lent aid to an un-
suooees�l revolt ot a sugar worker• • looal trCIIl the I.L.w.u. in 1948. 
its progre88 o�ot ocmpare with the phencmenon ot the I.L.w.u. Workers 
in no tield ot •plo,aent have been rejeoted bJ the I.L.w.u. in its organ-
bing seal--to the lcmgehoraen have been added arohiteots, coolal , ottioe 
workart, teachers. d.ri-rere, govenment aplOJ'MB• laundry workers, tire-
men and nurses.  But most trui t.tul has been its work in the pineapple and 
sugar industries, o-rer wtd.oh it Jl01f e:uroitea an almost oCIIlplete monopol7.58 
The pa.ssa.ge by' the 1945 territorial legialature ot the Ha.waiian 
Labor Relation• A.ot, or •Little W&gner A.ot, • extended to plantation tield 
labor the barga� and organisational rights of preTious federal legia-
lation. Plantation elections folm.d workers not only overwhelaingly pro-
union but alaost unanimous in their selection ot the I.L.W. u. aa their 
barp.in:Jng agent. In the sUIDDier of 1945 the sugar induatey' signed with 
the I.L.W.u. the tirat industry-wide labor ocm.traot. whioh included 
57clark, op� oit.,  163-169; Taylor. loo . oit. , 100 ; J:uybndall and 
Day, 2!!. cit. , 2'83=2� - -
58ruruas, op • o1 t . ,  187 J !a7lor, loo . oi t. , 100 J XU7bndall and 
Day, � oi t. , 219'Jcliri'. op. oi t. , 174'::1'75'; --rii=oade, •Report, 11 loo. o1 t. • 
B:z:hiblti,-,m'J !hcmaa La:wrei.Oi '(5'1'Ji'ien, rbe Plot to Sovietize Ha..an- ­
(Hl.lo. Hawaii• T.H. a The Hawaii News Pr!iit8hop, 19M), 55. 
substantial age increases, proTilion tor olaslitication of jobs &nd a 
settlamen� of t1.500.000 tor back wages.59 
ot signitic&DOe in the union -�� since �he war has been the 
prll!tinen� role in JUIIber1hip and leadership taken. b7 workers of Japanese 
an.oes'tZ7, 11ho, in Jll.y ot 1�, represented almos� qo peroel!l.t of plan.ta-
tion. union membership. While oll!llllon. union 1llelllberahip of all races should 
aid interracial relations, the predCIDinece ot �be Japanese in a group 
ten.din.g to disturb cli!DII.unity lite ma,- bring tuwre criticism to the Japan•• 
as it did in. the early da7s of the ceatuey.6o 
The industrial troubles foreseen. by meabers ot the Ha118.1.i J!lllployer• a 
Council wre not laoki.Dg in 191¢ when. eTeey month 'brougat strikes or strike 
threata . Truold.n.g• transit, shipping an.d tuna-paokin.g ccap&Jlies &11 wre 
atteoted. But the aa1n. industrial ocmf'llct came �o reTolve &round the 
I.L. w.u. • a  campaign. w end paterDallsm. !he perquisite •Jst.l under 
which management turnished tree housing, utilities, an.d medica.l an.d rec­
reati onal taoili �iea oame un.der tire. The union. ll&.s oaugh� by 1urpriae 
when. the Ba.118.1.iau Pineapple Ccapan.y in. 1946 lent tul.l aupport to the cam-
paign.. I� turned OTer i �� houai.D.g to a aepara te agency, frll!l which workera 
could rent their hll!lea, an.d offered a pa.y booa� which more than cOTered 
the eattmated cos� ot tor.aer aerYioea .61 
59olark, .2!_ cit. , 176-177J Xuybn.dall and Day, op. cit., 285J 
Bearings, H.R. 236; P='097. - -
6Guaci. � �· 253-254, 253D· 
6�bM•ll and Day, op. cit. , 278-279, 282J Taylor, � cit. , 
101J Furnas, !f.! cit� , 187. - -
Uneaay over this "rietoey, the I.L.w.u. demanded m.ore of the sugar 
induatl'yt inoreued wages, a �-hour week, and a union ahop. When the 
induatry refused to meet the tull wage demanda, workers struck, Allgust 31, 
191.16, on thirty-three plantations. This 79-d&y strike is estimated to 
han coat the !erritoey' a  people 120,000,000, the strikers alone losing 
traa seven to eight million dollars in wa.gea. Oa.e pl&Dtation ia aaid to 
have lost $3,000,000. Further, a tremendous aaount of potential augar 
was lost while the mainland still was under raticming. The tiDAl settle-
m.ent abolished the perquisite system and boosted the average dail7 wage 
to onr sewn dollars. file additional coat to the s�ar industry am1uall7 
was estimated at between ten and seventeen million. One plu.taticm ceased 
operation. From this strike issued a move towa.rd inoreued mechanbaticm 
to counter rising wage ooata. .Uso, it offered proof of the 'V'Ulnera.bility 
of Bl.waii' s lll&in industry to strikes . The 1r0rker, suffering tram wage 
losaea, found hie tab-hcae pa.y leaa than before.62 
Mutual diatruat &Dd much bitterness marked union"118.D&gem8nt re­
latione during the strike . Particularly, the union found it difficult 
to understand the induatry1s  will:lngneaa to end the perquisite a;yatem. 
However, both labor negotiations and preparat1011 ot nrioua govel"DDD.ent-
required data. on wage a had been iDoreaaingl;y plagued b;y the lack ot agree­
ment at 8JJiY one time ot either govel"Dilent or pri'V&.te authoritiea as to 
62 Cordcm Repol"'t;, 14J IU)"kendall and Day, op. cit. , 283 J Tay-lor, 
loc . cit. , ioi-102; Clark, op. cit. , 179-182. - -- - - -
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the ezaot cash n.lue of perquisites .  PaterD&llllll1 s  ft.l.ue had been ex­
ceeded b7 ita clisad:nnt&gee . 63 
B'awaii meamrhile suttered u wsual. fraa shipping strikes. !heee 
strikes, origi.DatiDg either in Hawaii or the West Coast, had ccaplloated 
island life in 1934. 1936, 1939-w>. aud 19h6• !1»7 extended in length 
trcD 53 to 98 da7a • 64 
:a,. Deo•ber of 1945, n._.ric&ll7 at least, Bt.waiiau labor had ccae 
of &�•• The A.F. of L. repreeenwd 46 organizat1 0118 &D.d the o . I.o., 68. 
In add1 tion, there ore several independent and govei'Ja8Jlt •ploy .. UDione .  
Maabership, not inclll:tiDg govermaent a.ployeea, wa s  eatiu.ted to be be-
65 
twen 55,000 aud 60,000 b7 1947. 
Poli tic&ll7, labor had Jll&de tre-adou pJ.na. !he C .  I .o. Pcli tical 
Aoticm C<llllli ttee , organized llllder the leadership of Jack Ball, now regiC11D81. 
director for the I .L.w.u. , saw a Jll&jori'tf of ita approved candidates eleo-
ted to the terri to rial legiala tun in 19144.. It was thia legislature, in-
oideDtal.l7• which passed the •Little Wagner .Ao t . •  I t  baa been charged tbat 
tJle P .A..C ., bJ' appro'ri.Jlg popular candida tee , had u.de an iapreuion far 
iD ezcee • of its actual streD«ta• If it was juat a rt.lse to iapre.. po­
li tical aepiranta and union :aelllberehip, it oertainl7 succeeded. A Hl.lo 
6'rar.aas ,  on. cit., 188 J !aylor, loo� cit. , 101; Clark, op. oit., 
179-182. 
� - - - - -
64statehood for B'awaii ,  C<lllllluniat Paetraticm of the Hawaiian Ielan4e, 
Report Rei&tive to Tiiieatigation With Lterence to R.R. w. cCiDililttee OD 
Interior &nd Ineular .Attairs, SeDate, 80 Ocmgreaa, 2 Session, 10. Hire­
after oited aa Butler ._port. 
65:r..a,..._, •Report, • loo . oit. , Bzhibita , 709·711J luybDdall aud 
Day, op� o1��. 283. - -- -
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radio oCIIIIILent&tor has described the long line ot political candidates 
who 'WDt before the P.A.C . end.oreeaent oCilllli ttee on Big leland in l9b£>. 
In thi• election, P.J..c.-'b&obd candidates DlD.bered 51, ll&ill y Deaoorata, 
ot whca 35 nre eleotecl. 'fhe resulting territorial legislature, oonTelli.Dc 
Fe'braary 19, 1947, was deadlooked because ot an even. D1Dber ot Republi­
O&.D8 ad Demoorate in the lower house. For eighteen da;rs legislative work 
awaited. the outocae ot the atnggle tor the apeaker• e ohair • which repre­
aented oontrol ot the legiBle. ture . Jack u..ll and his lieutenante worked 
openly and teTerishly to gain the chair tor the Dsloorate--a. Tiotory wtdch 
would have meant Tirtu&lly a P.J..c . -oontrolled legislature . FiDally one 
Demoorat broke ranks and 'VOted with the Republlcana . S:l.noe the P.J..c . 
bad tailed in tbe eleotiau to tie the Senate , the I.t.w.u. ta.iled in 
what seems to have been a deliberate , long-plauned scheme to dCIDin&te the 
legielative branch ot the Hawaiian govel'llllent. 'fhe tilDe lost in moves 
tor power was never reo overed. � 1947 legialature aecca.plished 11 ttle . 
A1D.cmg the issues tor which the P • .A..C . had capaigned wre redistributioa 
ot lud to aall owners by ocmtisoaticm ot lazose estates, prohibition ot 
racial diaoriminat:lon in •plOJIMllt, exten&ion ot enstiz�.« labor legia­
laticm, vnliaited property tu.ation aDd govel"lllll8nt housing. It ia not 
surprising that Ball could tell a House investigat:l.Dg ccad ttee in 19� 
that Big Five political power wa.e dead. There nre, at this time, ez:­
pressiona ot tear tbat the Dem.ooratic Pa.rt7 had ta1len oaaple'bely into 
the hazlde ot the I.L.w.u. Beoause Qt the olose ccmneotion between later 
I .t.w.u. moves , both political a.ud eoscaioal, to the general question 
ot CCllllllunist infiltration of the islands, these developnenta will be 
61> 
described in the next chapter. 
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Labor reoeiTed the tull attention of Congressional committees a 
little later than had the •Big Five.• In the 1935 investigation, mentions 
ot labor conditions were rare .
67 Complaints were made two years later 
to the joint inveatigatlng oamnittee ot lcmg world.Dg hours and poor li'riDg 
oondi tiona on the plantations. 'lhe oommi ttee also ferreted out the tact 
that Hawaiian labor legislation lett much to be desired. The present 
delegate to Congress, Joseph R. Farrington, intimated that these short-
oaminga would soon be remedied. The joint oommi ttee • s report showed oon-
cern about existing restrictive measure s, suoh as the anti-pioketiDg law, 
a riot law giving police immunity in oases where they took pun! t1 ve action 
in dispersing labor demonstrators, a.nd an anti-trespass law, used by the 
plant&tiOD.8 to prevent organizers from reaching the workers. In general, 
however, the committee commended plantation labor conditions. .Among its 
reoCIIIJil8ndatioJ18 wre the establishment of a labor department and the 
adoption ot •a more detini te labor policy" by the te rritorial govenment. 68 
It oCIIIIIlented that " • • •  the Terri tory is substantially w1 thout modern 
labor legislation.• In this case the committee was thinldng of the ab­
sence of a child labor law and minimum wage and maximum hours law. f:$ 
�a H.R. 236, P• 133J O' Brien, op. cit. ,  1, 14, 16-elJ 
1'aylor, 1 00: 0 .: 25, 102J KUykendall and Day, op. oi t. , 199-200, 284. 
67Hearings, H.R. 3034, PP • 15, 70•71• 
688eD&te Document No. 151, P• 81; ibid., PP • 50, 70, 77·79J BeariD§S1 
con. Res .  18, PP• Tf-19, �� s, � olt., 133. 
69s.:aate Doo\D.8D.t � 151, P• 70. 
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True to Farrington' s premise. model"llization ot labor legillation 
was socm torthocaing. Provided tor ill 1939 waa a Department ot Labor 
and Industrial Relaticms. aotivated Januaey 1, 19�. Child-labor. -.ge-
and-hour and aooial-1nauranoe laws were puaed. lleD.tion baa alreacly' been 
made ot the •uttle ll'&gl1er Aot, •  the prcniaions ot which were d�lioated 
ill cml7 one state. W1so0l18ill, at the tiae ot pas sage ot the bill . Pra.o-
tioally all tede:ra.l labor legilla ti011 now extends to the ialanda • auoh 
as the Sooie.l Seourity Aot. JJaticmal Labor Relationa Act, e.ota givil:lg 
· apeoial proteoticm to railroad. fann and marl time labor • the Federal •­
player•' Liabili tr �t and the lair lAbor Standards Aot.7° 
IlL Tiew ot this leg:Lilaticm &Dd the rapid Ul1ioniu.ticm 'beginning 
ill the lut clay• ot the war, it wu not aurpria1Ag that the 19¥> ocm­
mittee found littl• fault with the Hawaiian labor situation. It reportecl 
labor legialaticm progres sive, the Labor Departllent capable , and UD.icm­
iaaticm atrcmg. SeDator Cordcm • a  r•port ill 1948 reYealed praotioall7 the 
aaae o aa.di tiona . 71 
IlL the aame 788-r GOTemor stainb&ok reported 'Tfley t&Y01"&bl7 on the 
110rk which the territorial Labor Dep&rbunt had been 4o1Ag, eapeoiall7 
ita auooesa in pro'Viding a more t.lperate o li•a.te tor diaousaicm ot labor 
10 .Am:lual Report, 20 J Lt.roade , •Report, • loo • o it.,  18-19 J DV­
bnd.all ad Dar. � oit.,  285. See Laroacle. •R•port,""'""loo . oit. ,  
B:l:hibita, 696-704-;-?oi""'iiRplete list ot labor legialatioii"'ii Do'OD in 
19lc6. 
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diepute a . He &lao pointed to several deTelOID8Dta which he thought indi­
cated a trend toward a aore at&ble labor ... •uagaent relatiCJUhip ill the 
i alaDdll . 72 
BJ any s tandards Bl.w.ii today quaUn.ee tor e tatehoocl, it the 
b&ee a of judpent be adequate labor legialation and equitable repreaeta­
tion of iohe labor1J11 MZL i.u the eoonCIIi.o and political oomoile of the 
territol'7• The labor lULiOill , b7 their mqualitied appron.l of atatehoocl, 
exhibit oontideue thai; they oan well protect their interee ta UBder a 
state gO'ftnaet. 73 
Honver, the peouliar "YUlnerabilitJ of the island eocm� and 
bland life to &J17 o ondderable iieruptlcm of ita ehipping aohedulea or 
the operati on• of ita baeio s� ancl pineapple induatriea laya upon labor, 
aa •11 as uu.gaent, a hea'ri.er reapollaibili ty tor publio wltare th&u 
therefore, of the o ... ate of various obaerTera, 1noluc1.1Dg the preaeD.t 
gonmor, upcm the audd.emaeaa ot the growth of 11Dioniam iD the ial&Dda , 
the tendenoy ot 11111on -.-bert to follow their leaders w1 thout quatiaa., 
and the iD.ezpe rieDOe of both �t &Del labor iD. iD.duetri&l relatiCJU . 
However, another obaener, with tirat-hand ezperieDCe iD. Bawaiiaa labor 
relatiODe , intormed the 19¥ iDTeatlgatiDg o�ttee that Hawaiian tiaplOJ'er­
•ployee relation• were iaprO'Ying rapidly in quality. Be turther felt 
12.AJmual bport, 9, 21. 
7�., H.R. 49 and s. 114, PP• 26-31, 53-56, 89-91J Bl&riDge, 
B.ll. 236, PP• 131-140. !he C.ntr&l lAbor Couaoil ot the A.r. ot t. 1i 
1� would not o CIIIIli 1; i taelt on atatehoocl beoauae of di 'rid em ot opi.Dion. 
Bawenr, ftrioue A.r. ot L• looale did support it. See Hearinga , H.!. 236, 
pp. l37 -138. 
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that the post-war labor disputes in Baftii provided no valid exouae to 
deDJ statehood. Consideration of both favorable and unfavorable o CIIIJII8nta, 
as wall as the history ot the labor mOTelllellt 1D. Baw.ii, ll&kes sCII1e oon-
elusions possible . The very vulnerability ot the islands to ship� and 
industrial strikes will, in all likellhood, develop in the Hawaiian people 
a public opinion more Wormed and more outspoka. on industrial. relatiOD8 
than il found in most mainland state s .  Such a public opiDion would be 
the s�rongeat defeue ag&i.nst indutrial rela t1onahip1 so poor aa to 
hurt beyond repair the Ha"Riian eooncmic s�ruoture. Furthermore, Hawaii 
is not alone in its DHd tor iaproncl labor41•uac-.nt relationships aad 
reaponaible le&der1hip within the labor unions . It seems safe to au•e 
that, 'b&rr1:llg the control ot labor UDicma b7 sulmtraive elaents, Hawaiian 
labor today otters no obstacle to statehood. More will be said later, 
however, oon�rning the possibility ot a strong subversive element within 
the lab�r m.ov .. nt. 74 
():La other aspeot ot Ba�i • s eoanC111.7 desenes mention-the land 
distributlon. !he gradual passing ot pri-.ate lands into the hands of 
foreipers after the great l&Dd. division llll.der the acma.roq has been des­
cribed. BTen before 1900 u.q were disturbed CTer the oonoentrat1cm ot 
large aaomts ot Hawaii • a 1oarce land in estates and plaDtaticms . I� was 
hoped that the provisions tor hCIII8steacl1ng, either on a tee staple or 
long-ters lease 'basis, ill legislation ot 1884 and 1895, would prcaote 
102. 
74 ...._1 Report, 9J l'unwl ,  � oit., 1BB·l89J !&ylor, � oit., 
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au.ll tara onerahip, eZLcourage di.,.rsitication ot agriculture , and pro­
ride tor the ci't7-ln1Dg, oaretree I&Dakaa a uans ot g&iDing ec011CIIlic 
security. Both the gaeral e ttecta ot this lepalation and the IaD•ka 
response nre diaappeilltiDg . !he Organic Act lett auch ot Ba.waii '  a land 
laws ataot, but Ccmgreaa later restricted lea••• ot gonl"JJUUlt lands tor 
agricultural purposes to tin years aad, in the case ot oorporatiau, 
l.i11lited the acreage . It was telt thi a  poUoy would le&Te more publio 
lands tor saall•p&I"'el purchase 'bJ' indinduala . these re atriot101l8, hmr­
ewr, pro'ftd inetteotin . Leaaea were later extended to titteen ye&ra 
and the lbd.t em. aoreqe •• repealed . Cougreu bad also prcnided that 
leased agricultural laRds could be withdrawn tor hauatea.ding at azq tuae . 
But the haaeatead1Dg opportani ti es did not prOTo Tery popular and tended 
to eDcourage land speoulat1011. UadaliD.ted, COilgresa passed the B'&waii 
Hcmes CClBII.i.11icm Aot 1n 1921. Lia1 ted to those ot at leut Oll8•balt 
Hawaiian blood, it eDOour&gecl hauateading 011 long-lease tenu. � 
about ten peroent ot the eligible �atiw a  took actn.ntap ot ita prmai•• • 
llore a110oeaatul 1n prnicling auburbu. hcae s1 tea than .all tanu ,  this 
aot has never tull7 •t the purpose• ot its initiators . An otticial sur­
Te'f in 19116 ot htaeateacliDg problema reaul ted in the au.geation that, ill 
the tuture , pubUo laDda be sold cmly tor hCIIle a1 tes , as ... 11-tara land 
allooationa had proTen iapraotical . Lands tor agricultural uae ahould be 
leaaed, the •"""'1 report turtber reoc.aellded. D1 praotioe , the tel'Ti­
torial gcmu'DI81lt haa leased agricultural lands tor a minimlD rate and a 
ah&re in the protits trca oult1T&tion. !his &rr&Dg•ent has been a aouroe 
ot oOilsiderable goTenaent reTeD.ue . 
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The 1937 i.ll"f8atigat1ng oCIJIIIli ttee reviewed the land polioiee of 
the territoq and reoCIIIIIIended ohanges in the Hawaii Bcmes Oaamission �t. 
It allo repor'bed that the territorial �overDDumt had reduoed propert;y 
taus in order te enc ourage home cnmership. The cCIIIDli ttee was displeased 
111. th the great preva.leue of · tenanoy in the ial&Dd1. But the general prob• 
lela of land diatributicm oe111tinued. 
LoDg a oritio of Hawaii ' s  l.&D.d distribution and disturbed 'by post­
war housiug and hcmesi te shortages on oahu, Governor Stainback in 19lls, 
iD o•pli&D13e 111. th the rindinga of a Land Laws Re'Yiaion Oc.miaaion, reo• 
..-ended the oreaticm of a �ovel'!llleu.t corporation to buy or contisoate 
l&D.cl, :laprove it, and sell it to proapeotive haae bllilden. A bill to 
oarey out this reo<IIDII8Dd.ation failed paaaage in the 191.6 legiala:Qlre. 
The inveatl.g&tiag oCIIIIILi ttee of l� found that the federal and 
territorial goverDUnta still owned 1,2.78 percent of tht la.Dd. Jlore dis­
turbillg was the distribution of the 57.22 pel"'ent in private ownership. · 
The largest estate awned 8.87 peroent of the total land of Hawaii .  This 
taaoua Bishop estate was eetabliahecl bJ a DAtive prinoe .. as a trust tor 
the educati on of Hawaiian bOJa and girls. J'ift;y estates owned 39·55 per­
oat, lea'riDg ODly 17.67 for all other pr1 T&te property 0'11118rs • 1!le 
oammi ttee oG�a�eD.ted, • • • •  there is a oonoentration of land holdilage in 
the banda of a tn persona, o•panies, or eatatea. but attempts ba:n been 
made to iaproTe the li tua tion. "75 
75r.a.z.oade, •:a.port, • loc . oit.,  20 J see al1o ibid., 15J KU7kendall 
and Day, � oit. , 203-210 J 'COra'o'ii'Riport, 9J Se:oate Doc\Dilent 157�PP• 83. 
85. 87J l'iii!eroook, op. oit., 159J Hearings, H.R. �. PP• 752, , 'nO, 
873-875. - -
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In 1947 the legialature appropriated tUDds tor fUrther 1ub-
diviaicm ot go-nnaent laada tor sale as house lite• • The liquidatiOR 
ot ane plantation on O&hu created aore aaaeaite poasibilities tor that 
crowded ial.&nd. By 1�, aooording to the Cordon report, there wa.s Uttl• 
ohauge iD. land diatributicm., and acute houeiDg lot 1ho:rtages an O&hu. 
!here has been auoh post-war critioia ot land owner1hip ccmoentration 
iD. view ot the growth iD. population &Dd. rise iD. housiDg needs . llhile 
th11 ai tuation pro'ri.des a ••rioue problea, there seems to han been 
U ttle tMli.Dg either on the pa.rt ot islander• or Congreseicmal cCIIDDi t­
tee• that it ia prejudicial to the 1t&tehood oauae.76 
!'be eoon<lllio 1truoture juat described supports a population whioh, 
in June ot 1948, nlll.bered an e1tiaated 51.0,500. During the years in 
wbioh the atatehood iasue has b .. n c!iaou•ecl, no lingle nbjeot has re­
oei wcl as muoh oCBIUllt as the heterogeneous u.ture ot th1• populaticm. 11 
ot the Cauoalian el-.nt little Deed be l&id. In 1948 it repre­
•ented the large•t etbDio group in the ill&llda-33.4 percent. .Also, 
trcn 1940 to 1948 it 118.1 the fastest growing el•ent with an increase 
ot 69.6 pereent. u it dCIDinates eoonCIIlic Ute through direot or in-
direot nurehip ot thnte-tourtha ot island properv • it abo oontinue• 
to be pre..tnent in the poUtioal and oultural Ute ot Hawaii, altholJ&h 
other raoes are caa.ing aore and more to 1hare cauoalian lead.er•hip. 
76&nnpl P\irt, 46J Cordon Report, 9-lOJ �kendall and Day, op . cit. , 
210. for Lacri em ot operations under Hawaii Homes CCIIIIIliasion A.ot, ae...--
Be&ringa, B.R. 236, PP• 573-575• . 
71 AJmual Report, 65. 
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Peraona ot Jaerioan anoeatry or mai nlud birth predCDinate in thia group, 
wb.ioh, by and large, baa been reapcmaible tor the aaasing clenlopaeut of 
the islands ainoe Cook' l cliiOOTerye rhe l.aDguage of the predcw1nent haole 
D&tional groups, IDgliah, baa remaiued the ohiet medi\111 of o C811lunioaticm, 
although various etbnio groups ocmtinue to uae their n&tiTe tongue• within 
their reapeotin oCliD'mi tiel ud there 11 current a pidgin Bnglilh often 
u1ed betw.en racial group1.78 
bltering 14.9 peroent of the populaticm in 19qa, the Bawaii&lll 
and part-BLwaii&ll  haft ahcnm. a ocmaiderable DUIII8r1oal inor.aae 1D. the 
last decade . Nling to denlop the aoqui1itiTe aen1e, th11 group teDda 
to lWD&in at the bottan of the eoonCII.io aoale, although it ha1 produced 
leadere 1D. almost enry tie1d. L1. tera te, a ttraoti T8 and d.raliD. to urba.zl 
lite, the Bawa11aua are cplOJed in skilled ud UJllld.lled. labor, ruohing, 
lbd ted aaall taraiDg, 1hipping and the Tarioua oooup&tiOill oODD.eoted 
w1 th the touri1t trade. !hey &lao tend 'bo appear ill great nwaber1 in 
minor goTe:naental joba, suoh a a polio-.en, part: keeper a, j&n1 tore and 
clerks . PoUt1oal17 the Hawaiian baa al"Ryl been aotiTe and hie Tote ia 
atill an illportu.t force il1 an7 oaapaiga.. Be u-.lly, hanTer, eleote 
haoles to ottioe. GoTe1"J211.8Dt a tteapte to draw the lil.waiian a'R7 trca the 
oity into hcaeatead areas :t.Te neTer praY• too 1uooeaetu1, ao tbat he , 
1till ia not a large property' cnmar. J:nteraar171Dg perhaps •ore than azq 
7Blbtd.. ,  64-65 J Coulter, loo. oi t. , 2f:/:J-270 1 DuPv;y, op. oi t., 94-
97; Taylor, loo . oi"S., 25J  Bt�oi'T.R. 3034. House cCIIIIiiiit'M em Terri• 
toriea, 74 C'Oiig'r.'i'i;J. Sen£an, Ji:7 31, 1935, P• 10. Hereafter cited. &I 
Bearill§, lfay, 1935• 
1.60 
race, the Hawaiians, aa a racial el•ent will• in time, diaappear in the 
aelting po�. but their contribution to the .uw racial tJpe developi.Dg in 
the i slands will be a t7pe ot continued ezistenoe. Socially the Hawaiian 
baa alwa.ya bad high cCIIIIlUDity' ata.ud1ng and is popular with all races. co.u-
aequentl7 • he otters no racial problea and has long been asaim.ilated into 
� .AJner:lcan culture . 79 
Chinese imaigratian• as preTiouaq noted. ceased in 1898, &Dd• 
titty' year• later, the Chineae ccapriaed only 5• 7 peroeut of the popula-
tion. Because ot their earlier arri T&l and aaller mmibers • the ChineH 
haw never met the utagc:mis .. ted out to the Japmeae. Tbia remailla tru 
despite the tact 'that they ban retained liiUly na.tin cuatams. have eatab­
liahed Chinatowns in the oitie1, and have D'IDerous Chinese organization• 
of all typea . The Chine se have taken tull adn.ntap of educational and 
eocm.CIIic opportuDi ties in the ialands • Today � are wealth¥• 'fhey are 
:aero banta • storekeeper•, banker• &lid proteaaional ••· 'lhile pri:llar:ll7 
aettled iJL urban areas • :many Chine ae are truok gardener• or IIDIAll tarmera • 
Since Chiu aDd the United states were allied in the last war, the Chineae 
did not share with the Japa.neae the uoeaait,' ot pro'ri.ng their loyalty. 
Their ecOJICDic progres s  during the war was aaaziDg. Today they cnm acre 
propezoty than the entire Japaaeae population, which ie more thaD. tin 
time a ae large aa the Chin81e group . In 1947 one Chinese tira outbid 
•sig Five• agents tor a pieoe of property, while another group invested 
79 · Burrcnra, .!l!_ cit. ,  W...-471 Barber, op. cit. , 237�1 Pumas. 
op. cit�. 17, 192-"190i""coilter, loc . cit •• mtlfiiJSa:y, .2! cit •• 90-91. 
Im'-mi';" 122-1241 .ADU&l Report, c;zr-� -
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owr a million dollars in a liquidated plantation to be converted into 
a housi.Dg area. During the war years they bought muoh proper'tf being 
sold oheaply by people fearing war destruction. Partly responsible for 
their econal1ic rise has been the hui, a partnership of varying numbers. 
which enables the Chinese members to get large sums ot money in a �  
hours to make ad'V8Jltageous business deals. The Chinese today bid .fair 
to occupy an econal1ic position in the islands tar out of proportion to 
their nUilbers . Whether this eoonal1ic rise will cause racial antagonism 
in the future ca.ma.ot yet be detezmined. In the past the Chinese, despite 
their business aownen, have caused 11 ttle resentment. As early as the 1935 
Congre11ional investigation, there were very favorable accounts regarding 
Chinese assimilation. Probably they will never be a racial problem, sinoe 
their numbers are small and they tend to inte:rurry with the haoles and 
especially w1 th the Hawaiians to. a muoh greater extent than do their 
fe-llow oi tizens of Japanese ancestry. 80 
Last of
.
the great racial invasions was that ot the Filipinos, now 
malc1ng up about 9·9 percent of the population. Begixming in 1906 the 
H.s.P.A., 111. th cooperation of the Philippine govermaent. sponsored Fili-
pino :llllmigration to oounter what was considered the econal1ic and sooial threat 
ot the Japanese. Jlainly tram northern Luzon, the Filipinos did not settle 
BO:aouae of Representatives Report Bo. 194, 80 Congress, 1 Session, 
27, hereatter cited as House Report No. 194J Be'ilrings, H.R. 3034. PP • 71-
73, 77-78, 107•109, 118, 128-129, 13r-I'32;Annual Report, 65;  DuPuy, op. 
cit. , 101-103J Coulter, loo . oit . ,  271-274; Burrows , op. cit. ,  �-55.1S7; 
'fiY!or, loo . oit. , 24-2�.- - -
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in the islands to the extent other races had. They would work a few 
years, 18.Te their 11011ey and re turn  hcae . Probably beoauae moat Fili-
pinoa considered their Hawaiian re sidence taporaey, did not bring their 
tamilies, and intermarried little, they baw not been assimilated rapidl7• 
!A 1932, when the Filipino Bxoluaion .lot endallgered the B!Lwaiian lt.bor 
eupplf, Hawaii J�&Daged to pt a apeoial proTisicm allowing imaigration, 
it neoe18&ry, with the appron.l of the Hawaiian goTernor and the Seore-
taey of Interior. Howanr, the depreaaion decreased the labor need, and 
oompar& ti Tely few were imported thereafter. · In 1934 the Tydings•lloDuttie 
Aot, proTidiDg tor eTeDtual Philippine independence, turther limited Fill-
pino �gration. Today a. quota ot fifty are allond in tlllited States 
territory ea.oh year. This ethnio group tends to remain on the plllltations 
and bas been reapcm.aible tor the rise in Hawaii ' •  illiteracy rate .81 
The Portuguese, tor whcm proportional tigurea are not available, 
ban den loped lesa rapidly thAn other Cauoaeian groupe, ...UU.y beoauae 
of a lack of appreciation tor education and an extraely poor eooncm:io 
baokground in the A.zorea and Madeiraa . They often haTe been olaued sep-
arately trca other Caucasians, probably because of a atr&in of :Moorish 
and lforth .A.f'rioan blood. Saaewbat uutable at tirat, they haTe .been 
assimilated well .  Today they are generally fot111d an the plantaticma, 
81Saate Doo1aent lfo . 151, P• !,2; Hearings ,  H.R. 3034, PP• 115-116, 
294, 313J Biar!ngs, Ccm. 'fi'i.-nl', P• 1441 liiiiua1 Report, 651 Vandercook, 
op. cit. , �a, loo . oit.,  1331 Furnas, op. cit. , 182 J Barber 
� "''n':", 59, 104-105,; D� op;-'cit� , 112-113,; COulter;" 10o. cit. , 2LJ., "284� K�lcenda.ll and Day, op. cit. ,  212. - -
on aall tanns and in the sld.lled trades. They have caused no racial 
di sturba.noe. 82 
The Koreans, representing only 1.4 percent ot the populaticm, are 
assimilating rapidly and are found in such businesses as tailoring and 
laundering. The Puerto Ricans, aak:ing up 1.8 percent, have proven good 
plantaticm laborers. Neither ot these groups pose race problema. 83 
In tact, despite the many races and cultures which have found cam­
man ground in the islands, the term •race problem" ha.s came to be aynon-
cmous with the name ot cmly one racial entity--the Jap&D8ae. 
By 1948 thia coutroversial group, torming 32.6 percent ot Hawaii ' s  
population, ra.nlt&d second cmly to the Caucasians in nuabers. Ita rate ot 
increase, however, during the 19�-1948 period ra.nked below that ot three 
other ethnic groups . Furthermore, the alien percentage in this group 
during the same time dropped trca 23.2 to 17 •9 peroent. The proportiou 
ot Japanese to the total population ha.s steadily declined since 1920, 
when it reached a high point ot �.7 peroent. It seems likely that the 
present trends ot a high allen death rate, low birth rate and increasing 
oi tizen percentage w.Ul continue, ��&king it improbable that the Japanese 
elament will ever again beccme an overwhelming majority among Hawaii • 1 
people.B4 
�oulter, loc. cit�, 
Clark, op. cit. , � -
83 Coulter, loo . cit., 
Report, 65. 
- -
27o-271J  DuPuy, 2.f!. oit., 105-107, 124J 
283-2841 Furl:las, op. cit. ,  182J ..Annual - -
�te Doouaent Jo. 151, PP• 4£>, 43J Bearings, B.R. 236, 
Bxhibita, 655J .AJmual Ripor:E,o;. 
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The previously noted intlux of Japanese between 1898 and 1900 
was tollned in 1907 'by the Gentlemen• 8 .Agreement between the UDi wd 
States and Japan. fhereafter, u:a.til 1924, when cCIIlplete ezoluaio:a. went 
into etteot, the Ja:panese e:a.teriDg the isla:a.da were main.ly •picture brides . • 
In the meantim.e, by :a.atura.l increase, the Japanese cc:aaUD.i ty had prO'riclecl 
Hawaii w1 th a large n•b•r ot dual ci tizena, sinoe Bawaiia.n-bor:a. Japanese 
were both .Alaerican ci tizeu and Japanese nbjeota under the la'W8 of the 
respeotiTe countries.  'fhe proviaicma ot a Japanese statute of 1924 al-
lowed Aaerica:a.-born Japanese to expatriate. It also relinquished arq 
claim to Japanese bom a1'ter 1924 unless they were registered a.t the 
Japan••• co:a.eulate within two weeks ot birth. The lethargy of the Jap-
anese dual ci tise:a.a in expa.triati.Dg became a source ot ccmti:nuiDg irri-
tation to other etbnic groups. Bot disloJalty, but inertia, the expense 
and effort ot the prooesa, and often retuaal to admit any claim. ot Japan 
upoll their lOJB.l ty ••• to haTe been the JD.&in el•e:a.t1 in the tailure ot 
JI&Jl7 to expatriate. 'fhere are still a considerable num.ber ot dual ci ti­
zena in the ial&Dds. 85 
.Another source ot irritation has been t.he Japanese language 
schools ,  although alien language schools baTe bee a part ot both aain-
land &D.d island lite in the past among w.rious na. tional groups • OrigiDally 
established when man.y Japane1e pl&m:led return to the hc::aela:a.d, the schools 
have ccme to serve Minly the followi.Dc purposes t (1) to enable the 
�er, op. cit., 139-l41J Burron , � cit., 2,  7J Dul'u\Y, op. 
cit. ,  lll J  B'eari:a.g""'"'i; Oon. les .  18, PP• �l�-�J.:4JO'Oiiieslional :aeoord.;-;6 
"'oiireu, 1 session, Vol. ��. Part IV, �71�. 
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.&1Derican-born� Bnglish-apeaking Jap&Jlese to caamuni.cate with parents and 
grandparents� (2 ) to strengthen cultural� family and religious custans, 
and especiallY' in recent years� (3)  to provide children, through their 
masteey ot Japanese , 111. th an econazdc asset in a community where much 
business is carried cn in Japanese. Ot course , there had been sCJD.e pur-
pose, particularly in the early years� to instill loyalty to Japan, but 
it would seem that this aim. has largely disappeared. 86 
Pri 'VILtely tinaDoed, the schools now sphaaize language study. 
lfhile they can be inapeoted by the territorial Depar'tment of Public In-
struction, to wbich translations of textboolal are a'ftilable� legislation 
in the early 1920's  to closely regulate the schools was declared UDOonsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court. Textbooks have acme mainly to deal with 
American subjects . In 1937 there were 186 such schools with an enroll­
ment of �.ooo pupils . 87 
The testimony before the various Congressional investigating 
committees indioates the following conditions with regard to the lauguage 
sohools a (1) the purpose ot the schools is primarily social and economio J 
{2 ) the schools do not greatly affect loyalty to the United StatesJ {3 ) 
the schools offer little interferenoe with public school instruction ex-
cept ineota.r as the long hours of tbf cCDbined schools may tire the chil­
drenJ and (4) the teaohing has not been too effective, while the children 
86aurrowa, op. cit., 64; Barber, op. cit. , 21.,6. - - - -
87Ibid. ,  142-143; Bearings, Con.  Res . 18, P• 656J Bearings, H.R. 
P• �. 
do not display much enthuaiama tor the achoola. The teatt.� support. 
the conclusions ot the 1937 iDTeatigating camrd ttee that the schools were 
88 not a menace and would eTentually diaappear. 
The schools were suppressed atter Pearl Harbor, but there baa been 
a movement tor their reeatablisllllent since the war. Same school proper-
ties have been conwrted into truata tor Teter&Da . Whether the introduc-
ticm ot the Japanese language into the public school syatea rill stem thia 
movament cannot yet be deter.mined.89 
Poadbly another tactor in developing anta.gcmiam toward the Japu.eae 
baa been their rise in econaaic power. One torce in the war-time decisi on  
not to tollowr the e:ample o t  the Pacific Coast in a wholesale intermaent 
ot Ha:waii ' s  Japanese was the realization that the Hawaiian eooncay would 
haTe been aerioualy crippled by the eli:ad.Dation ot an iaportant elaaent 
in Hawaiian agriculture and buainesa . The Jape.neae then represented 13 
percent ot the farmers and tarm managers, 59 peroent ot the workers in 
tood and dairy stores, 53 peroent ot em.ployeea in restaurants and bars. 
62 percent ot the owners ot retail stores, 51 peroent ot the c rattamen, 
and 30 peroent ot the sugar plantat1cm labor. u in the war years , there 
ia today practically no tield ot aaplo,.ent and business to which the 
88He&r�a, H.R. 3034, PP• 30·31, 81-84, 135, 179, 180-181• 237J 
B'a&�s, Con. Rea . 18, PP• 315-317, 328-332, 363-366� 470-472, 181J 
Sena boouaent � 151 , PP • �-h6. 
89Lind, � oit ••  257J Burrows, � .cit�, (,lp:LJ Bearings , H • .R. 236, 
PP • 45-46. sti"Irpijial'ng in the SUpr•�'ii'rtin the sUIIIIIler ot 1948 was 
the quest:lou ot the c onstituticmali't7 ot an aot prohibiting study ot tor­
eip lauguage preTious to the entrance ot a ohild into the tif'th grade . 
However, it wa.s the Chinese who were c ontesting this law. See .A.Dnual 
Report, 11. 
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Japanese do not c ontribute . They hold virtual aonopoliea over tlcnn.r 
growiD.g, oottee oultiw.tion. o0111111.eroial tiahing and eaployaent aa sern.nta. 
contributing to the proteuions in large numbers. the Japanese have oame 
to be a dam1nant element in Hawaii ' s  middle ola.ss. Fomerly tendillg to 
h&ve ita own buaineu organi&ationa, the Japanese O CI!!mtm1 ty during the 
war o<��.bined in sane oases with similar organi&&tiona ot other ra.oea • 
.&11 euaple -.s the disoautinuanoe ot the Ja.paneee Chamber ot Caameroe • 
the mabere ot which transferred to the Honolulu Chamber. However dis-
tastetul to scme element• ot both ••inland and island opinion, the taot 
reJIAiDs that the Ifawaiia.n eoanany today. it depri:nd of its Japanese ele­
:ment . would be sorely pressed.90 
The most consistent arglllllents. however, which have been offered 
.br those who oppose statehood beoa.use ot the Japanese population han re-
volved aro1md the queations ot Japanese loyalt)r a.nd bloo voting. In 
World war I the Japaneae ocamlmit)r shond up wll, its civiliana mald.ng 
large purohaae • ot Liberty Bonds and ita aervioeaen performi.Dg w.rioua 
duties on the ial&Dde. However. these contributions were soa.roely dramatic 
enough to dispel tears ocmceming their 10)'&1 ty in the 1930' e when the 
Japaneae Dation wa.s beginning ita territorial expanaiau.91 
90Ltnd• op. oit • •  17-18, 78·79J Coulter, loo� oit. , �. 261-262, 
275-276J Burrow..,--op. oit. , 62-64J Barber, op. oit., 1'30-'1,8, 144-1!0, 
15,·155, 174-176, �j'Cli'rk, ,2!. oit ., 10,--� 
91Barber, op� oit., 2''; Furnas, loo . _oit • • 1''' llatbeaon, _loo. 
oit.,  141. - -
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The record ot Hawaii • 1 Japanese 1n World war II oazmot be d11-
:missed so easily. The olose ot the war tound Japanese names oampriling 
80 peroent ot Sl:wa.ii '  s war dead and 88 percent ot her wounded. This aili• 
tary record was aohieTed despite earl7 d11oourageaenta that would baTe em-
bi ttered leas harq, lese loyal oi tizens . Del pi te outstaDdi.Dg service on 
December 7, 1941, and the following weeb ,  the Jaerioana ot Japanese an-
oeatl7, or A.. J.A• ' • ,  who nre members ot the Territorial Guard qre inao-
t1 'ft. ted on Jazwary 23, 1942, beoau.e ot general tears oonoerning Japanese 
loyalty'. Dratt 1nduo t1ona tor Japanese oeaaed and enlistments were refused. 
One group, aainl7 students at the llni:veraity ot llnlaii, TOluntaril;r became 
a labor battalion serving tbe .A.r:my BD.gineer Corpe at auoh lese pay than 
defense 1r0rk ottered. '!'his gesture should haTe prepared Iawaii tor the 
record its A. J.A. soldier• would make when they ware at last allond to 
proTe themselTes in oam.bat. Beginning in Septaaber ot 1943, &t .Wio, 
the lOOth ID.ta.ntry Battalicm set the pace tor the W42nd Combat 'l'eam in 
wbioh it was later inoorpor&ted. '!'he .&..J.A. • s ooneiatently serTed as 
ape&rhea.d units , both in Italy &nd l&ter 1n Fra.noe . '!'heir losees in dead 
and wounded were extraaely high, and their unit was reputed to haTe re-
oeiwd more deooratiOD.I than e.ny other 1n aerioan military h1sto17. In 
the Paoitio, .A..J.A. ' s  tran Hawaii were inn.luable as interpreter• • Their 
willingDe ss to serTe was demcmstrated � times, as 1n the response to 
the War Depa.rtaent oall in 1943 tor TOlatee r• • !line times as 1U:D:f 
9�er, op. oit. , 233J  Furaas ,  _loo . oit., 133 J Jlatheaon, _loo . 
oit. , 141. - -
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Tolunteered as had been requested. It has been suggested that the out-
standing record ot the A. J.A.. • s in battle was the result ot the cCD.pulsion 
felt by these oitizens to pro'ft their loyalty. Wha.teTer the motiTe, their 
loyalty could no longer be doubted.92 
lfi th the exception ot this battle reoord perhap1 no testimonial 
to Japanese loyalty 18 more ccmTinoing thaD the report made by Robert L. 
Shivers to the 1946 inTestigating committee . Kr. Shivers, in charge ot 
the Honolulu ottice ot the Federal Bureau ot Illftstigation trcm 1939 to 
1943, stated that, out ot an appro.xim&te 16o,ooo citizens and allen Jap­
anese present in &l:waii in 1941, cml7 1,400 were detained tor possible 
interm�ent and cmly 981 ot these were actually considered dangerou enough 
to intern tor the duration ot the war. To Kr. ShiTers these tigurea indi-
cated that an oTerwhelming u.jority ot island citil:elllt of Japanese an-
ceatry were loyal and tbat al1el1B, wbateTer their loyalties,  made no moves 
again1t ,AJaerican security. Mr. Shiwrs described the so-called ad'ri.soey 
groups ot outstanding Japanese cit11ens who aided hila trca 194D on in 
mald.ng what proved to be an accurate appraiea.l ot the general loyalty ot 
Hawaiian Japanese . Other A. J.A. leaders, as members ot the Oahu Citizens 
CODI!Ii. ttee, were praised by Kr. Shivers tor their outsta.DcliDg work in pre­
paring the Japanese conmnm1ty' for their role in war-time life .93 
92St&t.ent ot Lt. Col� ra.rrant L. TUrner, January 15, 191.i>, Hearings, 
H.R. 2�r_PP• 597-599; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit. , 267-269J Lind, op. cit., 83-84, lJb-149, 150-156, 156-163J Clark, op. oir.;l.27-130, 134-138,-xlj)-:--
147J Barber, op. cit. ,  234-235 J Burr01r1, "(;'p; m;, 203-207J Furnas , loc . 
cit., 17. - - - - -
93stataent ot Robert L. ShiTers, Bearings , H.R. 236, PP• 599-604. 
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Mr. Shinrs further atated, "There was not one dngle act ot sabo-
tage oCIIIIDi tted againat the war ettort in the Hawaiian Islands during the 
course ot the entire war." Continuing, Mr. Shivers denied all the stories 
of Ja.paneae sabotage which circulated throughout the na.tion immediately 
after the Pearl Harbor attack and throughout the war.94 Despite euoh 
authori ta.tive statma.ents, sane of' these rumors are still in popular 
vogue.95 
Fears, immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, that the 
truck farmers , doainantly alien Japanese, might sabotage the war effort 
by slowing dcnm food production led to a. campaign carried on throughout 
the islands by both haole and 4. J.J..  leaders to encourage food production. 
The reaction to this campaign was the doubling of' wgetable production 1 
betnen 1941 and 1942, while hog and tru1 t production shand great 1D.oreaae.96 
Such were the a.n&"Qrs of Hawaii 's Japaneae-Aalerioa.ns to the doubts 
expreued as to their loyalty in the years preceding the war. The investi-
gation committees of 1935 and 1937 bad been intmdated with charges again.t 
and defense of' the Japanese . By 194£> the Japanese question had beocme the 
chief obatacle to sta.tehood.97 i'he twin to the loyalty doubts,  the tear 
of' bloo voting, bas bad much less right to eerious consideration, since 
94Ibid., 605. 
95:ror Ja.paneee activities on December 1; 1941, and the rumors oircu­
la.ted as to ea.botage , see Clark, 2f!_ oit., 115-1271 Lind, � cit., 40-47. 
96clark, !E.! cit.,  128-133• 
97L1nd, op. cit. , 235. For tea� in which the Japanese were ot­
f'ered as an obstacle to statehood in the 1937 inveatigation, aee lJearings, 
Con. Res .  18, PP • 170-176, 220, 222-223, 227-230, 240-241, 247-279, 447-467• 
In both the 1935 and 1937 inveatigations there was an amazing amotmt of' 
testimony ta.vorable to the Japanese • 
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there bas been little evidence of � Hawaiian racial group "f''ting onl7 
tor peraons of its awn etlmio group. Bad the Japanese been guilty' of 
racial Toting to any great extent, their numbers would hATe long ago made 
this practice an outatanding feature of Hawaiian political lite. Such 
has not been the case. The report of the 1935 iDTestigatiDg committee 
and the cordon report of 1948 are in agre•ent em thi• po1nt.98 As to 
the future poasibili ty' of bloc Toting, a 1ociologist who ha1 made a 
lengtey study of the Hawaiian Japanese concludes that there is little 
danger. He bases his ccm.olusion on the diVision ot the Japanese between 
the two political parties, the political inexperienoe of the Japaneae C CIII.-
muni t7, and the tact that. e"Yen were bloc TOting practiced.. the likelihood 
ot the Japanese eTer becCIII.ing an actual majority of the island electorate 
ie 1apro"Dable.99 On this subject the report ot the 1946 committee •s in 
oCIIlplete agreement t 
• • •  suoh evidence of "bloc Toting• as exists among Americana 
of Japanese anoestr,r ia not likel7 to assume aerioua propor­
tions • because they • like other peoples are d1 vided amongst 
themselves by differences. political. social, and econamic .lOO 
ot the loyalty of the Japa.nese, the same cammittee stated, " •  • •  
on the record ot their beha:rlor and their participation in the war, Ameri­
can citizens ot Japanese ucestry can be 11 ttle cri tici&ed. •101 The more 
recent Cordon report is iD agreement.l02 
98s.nate Document � 151, P• 35J  Cordon Report. 6. 
99L1nd, op • .!!.!!• 237-238. 256. 
lOOtarcade, 8Report, " loc . cit. • 20. - -
101 Ibid. 
102cordcm Report, 7.  
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From all available evidence gathered by Congres sional committees ,  
fran sociological study, and fran the a.o�ons of the Japa.neae themselves, 
there appears no .foundation for continued doubt concerning 'the loya.lt,. 
ot Hawaii ' s  citizens of Japanese ancestry nor is it likely that they will 
ever abuse their "VOting privileges .  It o&mlot be expected that s o  large 
and obvious a group as Hawaii' s A.J .A. ' s  will not continue to be the 
source ot some racial antagoni81l-eoonamic oampetition alone , partioularl7 
in times of depreuion, will produce scme friction. However, denial of 
statehood on such a basis would hardl7 be justified in view ot the con­
tinuing problem of racial relatione in our southern atates.  It seems 
safe to assume that Hawaii ' s  long tra.dition of racial tolerance , the high 
percentage of intemarriage between racial groups and the lengthy experi­
ence of Hawaii ' s  people in lllMting the challenges of interracial relation­
ahipa would equip the state of Hawaii to handle canpetently any future · 
racial problems .103 
Of Hawaii ' 1 oul ture it need only be said that it o ontinues to re­
main that of an American oammunity. Of the oanpetenoe of its educational 
system, especially with reference to 'tr&i.ning in democratic ideals and to 
instilling loyalty to those ideals, the reoord of its products of Japanese 
ancestry i s  proof enough. 
There remains the question of Hawaii ' s  strategic position in re­
lati on to statehood. Despite the •phasis plaoed by annexationists upon 
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the strategic ft.lue of the islands, both military and naval inatallationa 
were dow to be establi shed. .Although troops were stationed ill Hawaii 
. in 1898, it was 1907 before Fort Shatter, the first pena.aneut army post 
was ready tor partial occupancy. Schofield Barracks, to bec<De in the 
late 1930 ' s  the large st regular army post in the United states, recei'ftd 
its tirst troops in 1909. In 1913 the Hawaiian Deparbnent of the J.rm:y 
was establi shed as a separate unit. By World War I a series ot military 
torts proteoted Pearl and Honolulu harbors .  The end of the wa r  brought 
the developnent ot air fields, including the enormous Hickam. Field near 
Pearl Harbor. During the first world war the ..A.rsey"• s duties were mainly 
those of guarding installations , although some local draftee s replaced 
regular troops t:ra.nsterred to the mainland. DaproTalllents during the war 
and the 1920 • s  were made , but real expansion in army facilities dated trCIII. 
1931. Throughout this de'ftlot:ment ot military strength O&hu has remained 
the focal point. .Army air force activities were great}.y increased after 
the 19� viii t of Chief ot sta.tt George c .  liar shAll. .As early as 1934 
plans tor military-ciTilian ooopera.tiOD in event ot attack had been studied.• 
In 1� these plans were tested in a tull-soale maneuver predicated upon 
an actual 1n'9'&sion ot the bla.nds . A ocmplete blackout and other acti'Yi­
ties entailed considerable cooperation fran ci'Yilian authorities and the 
civilian popula.tiODJ each acquitted itself wll. The advocates ot •Jfani­
test Destiny" were tully v.l.ndica.ted during World war II when Hawaii became 
a staging, tre.i.ning, transshipaent and supply center tor army and air force 
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operations throughout the Pacific area . It abo sernd as a recupera­
tive and recreation center tor oam.ba.t troops.104 
AI previously noted, the UDi ted States had had• since 1883. the 
right to use Pearl Harbor as a naval base . But no use could be made of 
the harbor until chaDnel dredging and the oonatl"UCtion of dook and shore 
taoill ties we re  undertaken. It was 1900 before the coaling depot at Hono-
lulu was given the status of a Dava.l station, ud 1 t was the same year 
before Congress appropriated funds tor dredging the Pearl. Harbor chaml.el . 
liava.l base construction did not begin until 1909, and faulty planning de­
layed succe81tul oc:111pletion ot the entire installation until' ·1919. Like 
the amy • real naTal expansion did not begin until after 1931. In 191!0 
came orders to triple base taoili ties. During World war II three D&V&l 
air eta. tiona 118re established. By 191.,4, due to accelerated effort, 11 ttle 
traoe of the damage inflicted in December of 1941 l"UU&ined. while Jll&lJY 
tapro�nta at Pearl Harbor had been etfected.105 
In 1939 the oosts of military and uval operations and install&-
tiona in Hawaii were r•mning around t35,000,000 annually. Undoubtedly 
this figure ia higher today • due to .xpanaion of ta.oili ties during the 
war an.d higher o osta . :Efi!Lwaii today is a central cOIIDJDand post tor troope 
and air forces in the Pacitio area as tar west as Guam. .&.t Hawaii is 
�Iialey to Congress. December 5. 1899, Foreign Relations. 1899, 
:a:rriii J Kufbndall &Dd Day. op. cit. , 214-215. 261J CoUlter, loc. oit. , 
290J Carpenter, op. cit • •  20i'Sfm.prili, loo . oi t. , 602; Barber,op; 'O'Ir.. 
194-195, 203·20��3-221. 
- - - -
105x�kaclall and Day, op� cit� ,  216; Carpenter. op. oit ••  20J 
Coulter, loo � cit •• 289-290J B&rber,"Op. ott • •  167-168 . - -- - - -
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stationed the comm.a.nder-in-chief of the Paoitio Fleet, who also is chief 
a.dminbtra.tive otticer tor Pacific United Nations trusteeships a. .. igned 
to the United states . The events ot the la.st decade haTe only emphasised 
the place of Hawaii in the DIAiDteD&DOe of national seouri ty. Whether a.s 
oi tis ens of a. terri toey or a. eta. te, the Ba'W&iian people hold a. speoial 
trust.1o6 
However, the cCIIlpeWDOe ot the Bawaiia.n people to uphold tha.t truat 
has not always been granted. Despite the fa.ot that the island people res­
ponded a.clmira.bly in eTeey wa.y open to them in lforld a.r I, Hawaii reaa.ined, 
in 'UZJ.'Y military and nava.l minds , primarily a vital defense outpost rather 
than an American canmuni ty having importance in and of itself. Dnplied 
was the idea. that a more restricted gowraa.ent in which the military would 
have a voioe llight be preferable to terri toria.l ata.tua, particularly in 
view ot the heavy Asiatic population. In 1932 this viewpoint was actuall;y 
expressed publicly by Rear Admiral Yates Sterling, Jr. FrCID. that time 
forward the civilian population of Hawaii was on guard, despite the re-
auuri.ng a.tti tude of Sterling• s successor, Admiral Henr;y Yarnell .  However, 
the 1937 Joint Congressional Committee cCIDDlented on the civilian coopera.-
tion w:l. th the mili ta.ry esta.blisblllent. It could find no reason to d� 
statehood on this oount.107 
llben the orisia of Deoem.ber 7, 1941, came upon Hawaii, one obser_ver, 
F.B .I. oftioia.l Robert L. Shivers, later described Hawaiian reaction a.s 
lo6 6o Btapioh, loc . oit. ,  2 J  Matheson, loc . cit., 1391  Barber, on. 
cit .,  13. -
- - - ..;.a.;. 
107Ibid., 179, 182-185; Senate Dooument � 151, P• 93J Bearing, 
Jlay, 1935, P• 4-6. 
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follon a "It was not the civilian population who was contused. Ncnrhere 
under the sUD could there have been a more intelligent response to the 
needs of the hour than was given by the antire population of these islands .• 
lit turther stated, "It is high time that the people of the United States 
should be told of Hawaii • s  contribution to this war, which is unequalled 
1n the annals of our oountry.•108 
llili t&ry and naval personnel familiar with the islands, such as 
Admiral Chester A. llimi tz , CCIIIIIWlder-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet during 
the war, Major General Charles D. Herron (retired},  in c am:mand in Hawaii 
f'rcD. 1937 to 1941, and Colonel Kendall Fielden, Chief of A:rmy Intelligence 
in Hawaii during the war, have all gone on record a.s having no objection 
to statehood frCin a. military point of view. On llaroh a. 1947. the liaoyy 
Departaent �tated that it bad no ob jeotions, a. view restated by it on 
Jla.rch 3. 1949, on behalf ot the Department of l(ationa.l Defense.109 
That the changed attitude of the military seems justified ia evi­
dent in the emphasis placed by Go"Vernor Stainback in his annual report 
upon the continued cooperation between the territorial govermnent and 
110 people and the llili ta.ry services . 
108statement of Robert Le Shivers, Blarings, HeR. 236, P• 6o5 . 
For Hawaiian contributions in World war II, see also KUykendall and Dt.y • 
op. cit., 257-258, 261-262J Btarings , H.R. 236, PP• 551-558, 728. - -
10%sa.rings, H.R. 49-56, PP•  63-72, 73-76, 224-229, 72-7'5J 
Statehood tor Biwaii • litarings • Subo Clllmi ttee on 1'erri torial and Insular 
POssesaion�cammittee on PUblic Lands, House of Representatives,  on H.R. 
49 and Related Bills, 81 Congress , 1 Session, 76. Hereafter cited as 
Bearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills . 
110ADnual Report, 4. 
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Based upon her record in two world wars and the considered opin­
ions ot both military and oi T.llian persODnel best qualified to judge. 
Hawaii ' s  etra tegio na:val and mili ta.ry importanoe is no reason to de� 
her statehood • 
.As stated at the begiDn:l.ng ot this chapter. there is no real sep­
aration ct the B!&:waiian mowment tor statehood trca. the ewr;yda.y lite ot 
the terri tory . In arbi tra.rily separating the formal statehood movement 
trcm the �iscuaaion ot Bawa.ii ts  economic• social and cultural ct.wlopnent. 
it was inevitable that the latter dieoussion should involve same of those 
issues upon wbioh the tate ot BLwaii ' s  petition tor statehood depends . 
Fran this discussion have o ome conclusions concerning same ot Hawaii ' s  
qualitioations tor statehood. Upon the question ot Hawaii ' s  general eco­
n<lldo stability• it seems evident that the OCIIlplete dependence ot the 
isl&Dda upon agrioul ture tor their incane. the uncertainty as to the tu­
ture ot the sugar industry, and the present exp&nBion ot both the sugar 
and pineapple industries to almost the tull limit which the islands ' area 
and soil atrord call tor the developaent of another money crop. Thia. �ow­
ever. is a problea which can be met under either territorial or statehood 
status. There would seem no justifioation tor de�g Hawaii statehood 
on this coUDt. Three other oonolueions reached in the discussion were 
that Hawaii ' s  petition tor statehood could not justly be denied because 
of the econ.CIIdc power of the "Big Five , "  or the presenoe in Hawaii ot a 
heterogeneous population in which Japanese play a large role. or the 
pod tion ot Hawaii as a strategic outpoet in .&lnerican defense . It seema 
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evident alao that Hawaii ' •  late achievement of unionization is no bar 
to statehood. This last oonolusion ia quaUtied, however. Any stroug 
subversive element within the labor movement oould, through the instrument 
ot strikes alone, greatly waken, it not wreok, the Hawaiian eoonaay. 
A discussion ot the charges that 1uoh an elament exists will be found in 
the following chapter alcmg with the tomal mov-.ent tor statehood. 
CHAPTER V 
THE FORII.lL JIOVBIIBN'l' POR ST.A.i'BHOOD 
In the setting ot economic , sooial a.n.d cultural develo:r:aents just 
described the tor.mal movement ot Hawaii tor statehood has played its role. 
Basic to any understanding ot the movement is a grasp ot the political 
structure c reated by the Organic Act which President llcKinley approved 
on April 30, 1900. Bf'teotive June l.4, 1900, this act, with its various 
a:aendaents, has served to this mid-oentury year as the constitution ot 
the islands . But the most signitioaztt taot about this constitution ia 
that it is the creature ot Congress. It can be amended, repealed or re-
pl.aoed by another form ot go'ftn:D�Lent at the will ot Congress.  In suoh 
changes the desires ot the Hawaiian people have no foroe other than. thro�h 
appeal to the aen.se ot juat:l.ce and belief in democratic principles ot the 
:men si ttiDg in the House and Senate chambers in W&ahington.1 This tre-
men.dous power resident in the national legislature stems trCIIl a tew words 
in the Const:l. tut:l.on. ot the Un1 ted Statea r •rhe Congress shall haw power 
to dispose ot and make all needf'ul. rules a.n.d regulations re specting the 
terri tory or other property belonging to the un1 ted States • • • • •2 
Indicative ot the good judgaen.t ot the c reators of the Organic Act 
and ot the aelt-gove:rning abilities ot the iala.n.d people is the tact that, 
l(Uy'bndall and Day, op. oi t. , 190, 194. 
2Art. IV, sec . III, 2.  
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despite n�erous amendmenta, the structure of the territorial gowl"DDI.ent 
today ditf'era eoaroely at all trail that set up in 1900. The oi tizens of 
this gowrsent, and thus ot the United states ,  were then detined as all 
' 
those who were oi tizens ot the Republic ot Hawaii on AugUst 12, 1898. For 
these oitizena and alien island residents , in ba:rmcmy with the traditional 
.AIIlerioan plan for territorial orpnization, there was pro'ri.ded an· execu­
tive branoh of govel"lllleDt consisting ot a. governor and a secretary. These 
ottioials were and are appointed by' the President ot the U'ni ted states, 
with the ad.Tioe ot the Senate , for tour-year terms . Heads ot e:xeoutiw 
departaenta are appointed bJ' the governor, w1 th the oonaent of the terri­
tori&l eenate . .Add1t1cmal executive departments may, and have been, ore• 
a ted by the territorial legislature . 
!he m.embers of the judioia.ry are all appointive . The judges ot 
the Bawa.iian supreme court and the five oirouit oourts of the Territoey 
are a.ppointed by the Pre sident for tour-year tems . 'the two judges ot 
the federal district oourt, also appointed by the Prelident, serve six­
year terms . District magistrates ,  approxill.&ting justices ot the peace 
and police court judges ,  are appointed by the chief justice of the terri­
torial supreme court for two-year terms . 
The territorial legislature, meeting bienially, is composed ot a 
senate ot tifteen JUIIIlbers, serTing tour-year tem.s , and a house ot repre­
sentatives of thirty .-bers, eerTing two-year tema . The members of each 
of these houees are ohosen by the qualified voter• • In general, the aots 
ot this body oover the same area as thAt of at&te legislatures . A tribute 
to the quality of its legislation is the faot that Congress has never used 
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its power to amend or void any law passed by the terri to rial body. More­
over, practically all Congressional legislation oonoel"DiDg Hawaii has 
been iDi tiated at the request of the legislature of the islands. While 
this body, suffering from inexperie:aoe , did not make too good a showing 
in the first few years, i te record since around 191� oCIIlparea favorably 
with that of the awrage state legislature. The aots ot the body' are 
subject to the governor• •  veto, iDcluding an item veto ot appropriation 
bills. A. two-thirds majority' oan override vetoes, however. All mam.bers 
of the legislature must have been island residents for three years. 
The most important official elected by the Hawaiians is the dele• 
gate to Congresa, who may introduce measures, se� on oamni ttees, and 
take part in Congressional debate, but who oannot vote . 
The federal gover.ament appropriates t30,000 bienially for legis­
lative expenses. !he Territory pays tor any additional expenses, suoh 
as those tor special sessions. These expenses usually equal or exceed 
the federal contribution. .Also paid b;y the federal goverDment are the 
salaries of the governor, secretary, legislators and judges of both the 
territorial and federal courts • 
.Aooording to the organic A.ot, suffrage 18 on the same basis as on 
the mainland, with the emeption of a li teraoy qualification, proficiency 
in either H!lwaiian or Inglish being acceptable. There is a residence re­
quirement of one year tor voters • 
The oaami. ttee appointed by President Molil:Lle;y to draft the Organic 
A.ot made several pro"risiona foreign to .&Jaerioan practice, such as propert;y 
qualifications for legialatora and for those who voted for the terri tortal 
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senators. Most ot these items were eliminated by Congress in its debate 
on the act. One e:meption was the pronsion that, it the legislature 
tailed to enact an appropriation bill, the gover.ament could continue to 
make necessary disbursements lmtil a speoial seuion pronded money. It 
was actually neoesaaey to use this ponr in the aecond aession ot the 
territorial legislature. The pronlion, ot course, gave the executive 
more power over the puree than ia usual in American gove!'DU!lt. So tar 
as can be deterained, this power waa used in only one instance ·' 
The terri to rial govermunt has developed rapidly in quali tr through 
the years. Much has been done by it to improve Hawaiian econamic and so-
cial lite-harbor improftments, highway construction, laud reclamation and 
hcmesteading movements. Ita em.plo1ees have had the ad"f'8.11tage ot a pension 
plan and job claasitication systea. Territorial citizens have reape4 the 
beneti ts ot a good accounting system tor territorial and local govenaenta. 
The legislature bas alwaya exhibited a readinesa to adopt constructive 
measures auggested by CongrHiional inveatigating committees and other 
federal author! tles. An Hawaiian state gove1'111118llt would not tind its 
predecessor laold.ng in J11&Z13" quallties wor� ot •ulation.4 
Since the Organic Act made no speoitic provisions tor local gov-
el"IIU!lt, the Terri tory continued to maintain the highly centrallzed 
'c�reasional Record, 56 Congre11, 1 Beasion, Vol. 33, Part I 
1871 J ib£7. Pirt II, 1919-1920, 1929-19�; ibid. , Part III, 2387, 24t2, 
�� Senate DooUID8nt lfo. �51So PP• 8-10, 12-i3a Btaringa, H.R. 236, PP• 
175-176, 179a Heai'iDgs, H. • 34, PP• 18, 318 a DUPai, op. cit., 29J 
lCUfkendall and D&y, op. cit., 194-195J 111lloughby, 2.2!. cl'E.-:o;-67. 
�kendall and De¥, op. cit. , 200-202; �. op. oit., 128-129J 
Hardy and Dumke, op. cit.,  � - - -- -
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poli tioal structure familiar to the island.s under the monarchy' and re­
public . Funds, even tor street and ourb ocmatruotion in the tartheat 
island, had to be dispenaed traa Honolulu. Furthermore, the people ot 
one oamauni ty wre being taxed tor 1mpro'9'81Mnta elsewhere in the island& 
in which they had no share . Caaplaints wre soon vooal enough to bring 
to Hawaii a Congressional oOIIIIli ttee, whose report in January ot 1903 scored 
this centralization and the remisanesa ot the territorial legislature in 
not proViding looal gover!lllents . 1'o the latter end, the oommi ttee recom­
mended Congre ssional action it the Territo:ey did not remedy the situation. 
Conseq\lently, in .April, 1903, the territorial legislature paaaed 
the county .A.ot. But this measure was declared unoonsti tutional on the 
grounds that some ot ita proViliona ran counter to the Orga.nio Aot. Fur­
ther legislative ettorta in 1905 and 1907 proVided the essential element& 
ot the looal goverlllllent system now in operation. 1'here are tour main 
counties a Hawaii, Jlaui, Kauai and the City and County ot Honolulu. The 
last-named ia a hybrid m\1J1ioipa.l-oounty' eystc tor the oi ty ot Honolulu, 
the island ot Oahu and various outlying islands , including Kure, 1,204 
miles to the nortluntst. Despite the exiatezaoe ot several oi ties ot ade­
quate size to be separate political units, there are no goTerDDents simi­
lar to those ot mainland m'IDlioipali ties. Kalawa.o, oOTering the leper 
ool� on Kolokai, ie a county in name only since it is adllinistered by a 
board ot hospi tala and settlement& and ia included in Jlaui county tor 
election purpoaea .  
These ooaty goftnmenta are headed by elected boards ot supervisors, 
the chairmen ot whioh act as ohiet executive ottioers, exoept in the Ci 't7 
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and County or Honolulu where a mayor is e lected separately trcm the board. 
!he boards are elected tor two years. other ooun.ty officials are in acme 
oases elected. in others appointed by the ohairaan ot the board or • 1n 
Honolulu. by the ma7or with approT&l by the superrtaora .  There are num.er-
ous appointive oCIDIDissions and boards which otten serve without sala.ey. 
There has been a considerable amount or contention between the 
territorial and oounty gowrDD.eD.ta oTer the tun.otions or ea.oh and the 
shariDg or tinanoia.l burden•. The oounty govenaenta haTe been pa.rtiou-
la.rl7 oonoerned oTer the illlpemanent oharaoter ot their charters and the 
un.prediotable demands or the legislature tor special tun.ds or services. 
The provisions ot a. state oonst:l.tution adoubtedl7 would resolve � 
ot these oontliots . lloreanr. the unhappy experiences ot the past should 
quality delegates to a constitutional convention to provide a. looal gov­
ermD.ent aystem. wll adapted to meet Ba:waiian needs .5 
Bnthuaiaatio poll tical a.oti vi ty has alwa.'18 marked the people li "f1ng 
under the gcmtrmumt just deaoribed. Territorial lite oaanenoed with a. 
three-party •7ata. Both the Damooratio and Republican parties were or­
ga.nized before the 1900 eleot:l.ona. but the Heme Rule Party. with a 
nativistic platto:na. dami.Dated the first legislature and sent. as Hawaii ' •  
tirst delegate to Congress. R. W. W'iloox. long-time politioa.l leader ot 
the nationalistic natives. Deapi te their daol1D1ng numbers. Hawaiians 
and part-Hawaiian• held a voting majority 1D the islands tor the first 
5senate Doo\lllent Bo � 151. PP• 13-J.4J Bearings. H.R. 236. PP • 176-
rn. 207-208J Jiaringa. lf.R.�34. PP • 61. 311,; ld11oughby. op. cit • • 68-
70 J �kendall and Day • .2.! �· 197-198. - -
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two decades of territorial exi stence . Until about 1930 they outnumbered 
other racial groupe in voting strength. The Home Rule Party continued 
to poll between aixteen an.d forty-one peroent of the votee through the 
1908 elections. after wbioh its strength deoli:ned. The Party disappeared 
after the 1912 eleotio:ns . otherwise third parties have played little 
part in Hawaiian politics .  The Socialist Part,y polled approzimately one 
peroent ot the vote in 1912. while two other third parties ga.i:ned small 
votes • one in the 1914 oaapaign. the other in 1922. 
In 1902 the Republican. Party• s candida. te • Prince Kuhio !Ollania:nole • 
was eleoted delegate to Congre ss. where he remained until his death in 
1922. Bxoept for Demooratio 'rlotories in 1922. 1924 and 1932. Hawaii •  s 
delegate bas always been a Republican. In taot, the Demooratio Party 
got a slow start, since it was not tilml.y established as the second party 
until 1908. It has :never had the support of the large eoonanio interests .  
Also, the Republicans han dominated the territorial legislature. where, 
w1 th the e::rception ot the 1900 election, they held a m.ajori t,y \Dltil 19!af,. 
In the legislative eleotio:n of that year. ae noted in the last chapter, 
the lower house was ewnly d1 Tided. The Republican Party f'i:nally won 
control by the election of one ot its representatives as speaker . The 
Democrats usually han to\Dld a stronghold ill looal goverrae:nt, espeoiall7 
in the City and Co\Dlty ot Honolulu, where the7 have elected more m&)"ors 
than. the Republicans. 
The political attiliatio:n ot the governor, ot oourse. reflects 
the party in oo:ntrol of the mtional admi:nistration. In torty-seT8ll years 
the Baniia.ns have had five Republican and tour Demooratio governors, 
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although, in numbers ot years served• the two parties will be about 
equal by 1952. 
One "ri tal tao tor emerged frail early poll tioal develop!lent . To 
stea the tendenoy ot the na t1 ves to oCIIlbine poll tical and racial alle­
giances. both the Republican and Democratic parties early included oandi-
dates ot the 'ftrious races on their tickets . Whi le their aim was primarily 
to win votes. the parties did Hawaii a great serrloe . By the time there 
denloped a large electorate ot Asiatic ancestry. Hawaii had a long tra-
di tion ot voting across racial lines. Undoubtedly this tradition bas been 
partially responsible tor the present 8111All amount ot bloo voting in the 
islanda .
6 
But the renewal ot another tradition--that ot statehood-.aa early 
anderway. The first suggestion ot statehood tor Hawaii seems to have 
been ottered by a Hew York state DeWSpaper in 18!e .  Thi s  was tolland by 
the figuring ot statehood in the 1854 negotiationa tor Bs:waiian &mlex-
ation to the United States. Yet these first stirrings ot the movement 
seem to have become almost legendary to the avarage Hawaiian citizen as 
issues such as reciprooi 'by and a.nnexation c laimed his attention in the 
latter nineteenth century. 7 
Therefore, the Territory was five years old before the first formal 
bid tor statehood was made. On March 16. 1903, Gowrnor s. B. Dole approved 
6s.ariDgs, H.R. 236, PP• 722-723. 896-8971 Hearings, H.R. 3034, PP •  
57, 119-126, 117·178 J Hearings, Con. Res . 18, PP• 43. 589-590, 6601 Senate 
Dooum.ent llo. 151, P• 33J Kuyliindall and Da.y, op� cit. , 195-196, 198-I99J 
BurrOW'II, op. cit., ¥. - -
1 Kuykendall and Day, � cit. , 287. 
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a joint resolution ot the territorial legislature petitioning Congress tor 
en enabling aot. Between 1903 end 1925 six DlOre suoh resolutions were passed. 
The unsuccessful petition ot 1925 was unique in its plea tor a grant ot pcnrer 
to the Hawaiian people to amend the Organic Aot. SUch a provision, ot course, 
would have given Hawaii practically the same control over its basic law as 
the citizens ot a state have over their oonsti tution. But the peti tiona tor 
actual statehood kept flowing to the east. By March ot 1949 Congress had re-
oeived titteen such pleas trCIIl the la11'1l&ld.ng body ot the islands . By 1915 
the almost automatic passage ot such resolutions provoked one island legi•-
lator to warn his fellows against allcnring statehood to beoCJme a job. The 
candidate tor Hawaiian ottice seldCD tailed to express his support ot state-
, hood. 'fhe lcear Republican Party ha.d a statehood plank in ita 1900 plat-
form and advocated ei tber statehood or preparation tor that status in every 
statement ot policy thereafter. The island Democratic Party first inserted 
a statehood plank in ita pla ttonn in 1910 &Dd has reiterated support tor 
statehood in praotioally every succeeding campaign. But this 1man1mous 
front did not reflect the actual island "dnpoint, so tar as tiDrmediate ao-
tion was concerned. outright opposition in &Cine quarters, particularly trca 
the great eooncmdc interests, and general disinterestedness ware the actual 
governing taotors . During the first twenty years the islancinrere busy with 
economic developaent and participation in World War I.  Fairly content with 
territorial •tatus, the average islander thought statehood a desirable goal 
8 but hardly a necessity. 
Baearings, Con. Res .  18, PP• I.23�5, 557-559J House Report Bo . 254, 
P• 4J Cordon Report, 15 ; Hearing, H.R. 3034, P •  8; Senate Document iG. 15l 




The first governor to eTince strong interest in statehood was 
Charles J. JfoCarthy {1918·1921).  He tel t that Hawaii 1 s progress and 
good aooount of herself in World War I desernd a higher political status 
and reoQIIIDended to the 1919 le�iala.tare the paaaa.ge of a. memorial to Con­
greaa . JloCa.rthy- informed the lepslature that Hawaii ' s  people were "tully 
• • •  OCIIlpetent" to ta.lte on the responaibili ty' ot state govel".DDleD.t.9 The 
le�islature pa.ased another resolution. ll'i th this impetus, Delegate PriDoe 
Kuhio Kalama.naole on Febraaey 11, 1919, introduced the first statehood 
bill in Congress . In the same month of the following y-ear he introduced 
a similar measure , which, like its predecessor, languished in the House 
Camni ttee on Territories . .A.s in the case of the first resolution of the 
legislature, these billa were to have many- descendants . Between 1920 and 
the end of the :tightieth Congress, there were twenty-eight such billa in­
trOduced. A high point came in the Bighty-First Congre ss, which, by­
Jiaroh ot 1949, had seen one bill introduced in the SeDAte and seven in 
the House. However, with regard to the tirat measure, Prince Ka.lamuaole 
was without support in hie cnm constituency-. The Honolulu St&r-Bulle'tf.n 
br&Dded one of the Prince 's billa as a "ridiculous propoaal.•10 Other 
island n8W'spa.pera were in agreement. At this time Japanese labor actiTi• 
ties and the strength of their language schools were causing m.uoh concern 
in the islands. As a result, many- citizens were doubtful ..., to the wisdam. 
9Hea.ringa, H.R. 3034, P• 8. 
lOQucted by- Kuy-kendall and Day-, � �� 288. 
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ot immediate atatehood. J.l'urthem.ore, BaliB.ii was more interested in the 
previoualy disoussed Hawaiian HCIIles CCIIIDiiasion ,Aot and the defense of her 
territorial rights as an integral part of the United States . This defense, 
as expresaed in her Bill of Rights, will be disoussed later. statehood, 
like the star it promised, was a thing 'risible but remote . It was kept 
in 'Vi81r, however, by suoh events as a apeeoh made bf Governor wallaoe R. 
Farrington in 1929, when he discussed the legal mechanics for becoming a 
state and the need for eventual statehood.11 
The first delegate atter Prince Kalania.naole to becCIIle firmly con-
vinoed that statehood was the only means of aeaurlng for Hawaii adequate 
attention by Congress was Viator s. K. Houston, who reached his oonolusion 
about 1931 . Ql December 9, 1931, he introduced an enabling aot whioh was 
to became the model for all those proposed thereafter. However, the dele-
gate did not have the support of the Hawaiian business interests and his 
bill waa tiDally doomed by the uproar -.anating tram the ·llassie oase •12 
The reverberations of the Massie incident provided one of the 
early decisive stimulants to a detemined drive for statehood. In Sep­
tember ot 1931 a group of what one author oalls ·�olulu hoodllJIII.s•l' 
11congresaianal Reoord, 65 Congress, 3 Session, Vol. 57, Part III, 
3175J ibid., 66 Congreaa, 2 session, Vol. 59, Part III, 238�1 House Report 
lJo. 254; P• 4J Cordon Report, 15 ; Hearings,  H.R. 3034, PP•  
"!iiiawDooum.ent Jo. 15:r, P• lJ Kuykeiida1J: and Day, op. cit.,  201, 288. - - - -
12iii!reaaional Record, 72 Congresa, 1 Session, Vol . 75, Part I, 
265; Bear !i, H.R. 3034, PP• 97, 99·101; XU,.bnd.all and Day, op. �· 288. 
13�11 and D&y, 2!. 2!.!!.· 221. 
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criminally- assaulted the wife of a naval officer. Unfortunately- for 
Be.waii, the "hoodlums" represented several ot the raoial elements in the 
islands . J.tter a trial in which the jury could. reach no verdict upon the 
e'ri.denoe presented, the naval otticer, his mother-in-law and two sailor• 
brought about the death of one of the defendants and assaulted another, 
an aerioan of Japanese auoeatey. Subsequently-, these four were found 
guilty of ma.nslaughter and sentenoed to ten-year prison te rms ,  sentences 
imaediately- commuted. to one hour. Seemingly, the mainlancl, where the 
press uudul7 colored ita accounts ot the case , c ould not aooept Hawaiian 
racial toleration as demonstrated in these trials where the word ot a 
Caucasian carried no more weight than that ot a mam.ber of another race .  
It has been suggested, too, 'that DAvy otticers tolm.d this case an excel­
lent sounding board tor their theoriea on cCIIIIDission govel'Dil8llt, while 
the .American west coast found. release for ita own raoial antipathies . 
j,t &J:I3 rate , Hawaii received muoh adverse criticism, most ot it unde­
serTed, and came under the cloae scrutiJl1' of congress. 
On January 11, 1932, the Senate requested an investigation of 
Hawaii' s c riminal  law prooedure, enforoement and administration. Sent 
to Hawaii was Assistant Attorney- General Seth Richardson, whose publlc 
hearings brought forth not only testimony c oncerning law administration 
but �uoh bitter c amnent on the "Big Five. "  An impartial and thorough 
investigator, Mr. Richardson reported that conditl.ons ,  while not nearly 
as bad as described in the press, indicated l.&m.esa iii criminal law ad­
ministration a.nd enforcement. In addition to rec<llliJDendationa for improve• 
menta in criminal law procedure , llr. Richardson suggested removal of the 
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residence requirement tor federal officials in the islands . He did not, 
however, think a c cmmisaion tom ot govermnent was nece nary or desir .. 
able. Mr .  Richardson. incidentally, would later be a stout proponent ot 
statehood. 
Congress was not slow to respond. There was a succession of bills 
in 1932 which proposed to eliminate the residenoe requirement tor officials 
appointed by the Pre sident and to establish mi litary or cCIDDlisaion forms 
ot goTer.ament. None ot these bills reached the floor ot Congress, but a 
greater threat was in the otting. In Kay ot 1933, Representative John B .  
R&Dld.n of 111ssisaippi introduced an administration .. aponaored bi ll to elimi .. 
nate the residence requirement tor the governor ot Hawaii .  Thi s  bill passed 
the House by a vote ot 237 to 119 .  .A.ctiDg on the flood ot protest fran 
the islands, Senators Arthur H. V&D.denberg and William B .  Borah, with 
other friends of Hawaii, delayed action in the Senate . Gowrn.or Judd of 
Hawaii appointed a three '11Wl, bipartisan ccanission, which had sucoess in 
· oonvinoing the Roosevelt administration that suoh a bill was lDlD.eceuary. 
In 1934 the bill was withdrawn trcm the Senate calendar. This olose brush 
with •oarpetbag• rule gave Hawaii a real soare . The islands hAd long been 
sensitive on this point. The Organio A.ot hAd provided that the governor, 
secretary, territorial oirouit judges and depar-tment heads , regardless of 
the appointing authority, should be territorial citiseu, thus insuring 
at least a ahort island reaideDOe . Certain federal officials, mainly judi­
oial, had not been included in this provision, however. When Congreaa 
began to disregard cuatca and approve appointments of non .. residents to 
these latter office s, the B'a:waiian legislature petitioned Congrese tor 
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stronger legislation. In 1921 the Organic Act was amended to provide a 
three-year re sidence requi rement for pre.otically all territorial and fed­
eral appoiDti ve otticiall except the aeoretary who apparently was over­
looked. 111th this assurance ,  Hawaii felt it ba.d secured for the future 
rule b7 oftioials 'All acquainted with its life and problema . It took 
the Massie case and its attem.a th to remind Ba'ftii that its gover.n:ment 
was still the child ot Congress and that the only permanent guarantee of 
ccaplete aelf-goven:aa.ent was statehood. From this period of threats to 
ita system. of campa.:ratiTelJ generous hane rule, one of the strongest mo­
tives tor an intensive statehood moTement 1prea.ng. BTen the "Big FiTe , •  
heretofore content with territorial atatu1, was iaprel8ed. Furthermore , 
rumor had it that the non-resident goTernor propoeed for Hawaii, ba.d the 
RJmld.n bill paseed, was Fiorello H. LaGuardia, whose vie'W'8 on labor and 
goverDment would soaroely haw agreed with those of Hawaii ' s  econanio 
leaders . 
Another result of the :Ma.saie case was the appoin-tment of a bi-
pa.rtiean cCIDIIi.ssion to study criminal law administration and prosecution. 
Most ot this bo� • s  rec CIIIIIMnd&tions were later enacted by the legislature 
to till same evident holes in Hawaiian oriminal law procedure .14 
U.C,ongressioDAl bcord, 72 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 75, .Part II 
1652, 119li2)1bla., hrt iff, 3393; ibid. , Part VII, 7355 J ibid., .Part 
XII, 13637J ibid.,  73 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 77, Part IV, 4Dil.J ibid., 
.Part V, 5217J FUrnas, loo . cit . , 1}4J Barber, op. oit., 105, 107•109J 
Lind, op. cit . ,  26-28J�r'Oii; op. cit., 123-�iKiijlamda.l.l and Day, 
op. o�;4 � 220-222, 224; DuPUr, op.-oit . ,  125, 128-129 J  Bearings, 
lr.f. , P• 15, 95, l#lJ UMrinss,-mi.�, PP• 31·32J Radford 1lobley, 
•awaii Looks Toward statehood, 1 !lie Chri stian Soienoe Monitor Magazine 
(Bo.,.ber 2, 1940 ) ,  7 • 
-
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It the Massie case and the Rankin Bill had stirred the long latent 
desire tor statehood, the Jones-costigan Act ot 1934 brought it to tull 
expression. The former incidents threatened BILwa11 • s political rights J 
the latter 11 terally encl&ngered an important source of ita bread and butter • 
.A.n amendment to the Agricultural .A.djustll.ent Act, the bill was intended to 
gauge sugar supply to dCIIlestio needs through quotas tor variows producing 
areas, while planters were to be subaidized tor crop reduction and main­
teD&D.oe of certain labor standards. It was opposed by' IILwa.i.ian sugar 
gro•r• on tour main oount u (1) Bt.waii was designated a foreign pro­
duoing area, ita quota, unlike mainland areas• , subject to ohallge J (2 ) 
the quotas established tor mainland producers were higher than recent 
mainland awrage produotionJ (3) Hawaiian production suffered a out esti• 
mated at between eight and ten peroent; and (4) island re:f'in1ng was limited 
to three peroent ot production. Further discrimination was suffered under 
the admiu� stration ot the law by the Secretary ot jgriculture. When redress 
through the ueout:l:ve and legislative bra.nohes was not torthcc:aiug, the 
sugar industry brought suit in the Ulli ted States District Court of the 
Diatriot of Columbia. It pled that the law, in diaor:l.miDating againat 
Hawaii, violated ltLwaiian constitutional rights . The decision of JU8tioe 
Bailey in Ootober, 1934, shocked not only the sugar industry but all 
Hawaiians. He wrote t •Under the territorial power of the constitution 
• • • Congreaa may discriminate oaBIDI8roially aga.:l.lut the Terri tory ot 
SLwa.:l.i as a whole, even though it is an organized terri tory." 15 In 
15Beariuga, H.R. 236, P• 24. 
\ .  
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December adjustments , il:acludi:ng revi sion of the sugar quota., benefit pay­
ments , and other favorable measures 1  were agreed upon by the sugar industry 
and the Secretary of Agriculture . A.a a re sult, the H. S.P.A.. dropped plana 
for an appeal of the oourt decision both because of the expense of further 
11 tigation and fear of another adnree decision. As a result, the ruling 
that Congress might discriminate oCIIIIleroially against the i slands re­
mained on the books . Subsequent legislation, as preTiouely noted, re­
mowd most of the ob jeotiona to the Jones-costigan A.ot. 
More favorable legislation, however, did n.ot erase tram Hawaiian 
business minds the implioations of the aot and the oourt deoilion. ' It was 
apparent that IDLwaii ' s  status as an integral part of the United States 
was still subjeot to a wide variety of interpretations , both in Congre88 
and the courts . Seoondly, if oamaeroial disorimination against Hllwaii 
was 'ftlld, what might the f'uture bring in viP' ot the de.ti.ni te trend 
toward greater federal supervision of business !  In the third pla.oe, the 
debate leading up to the enaoiment of the legislation and the following 
negotit. tiona 1d. th the e:xeouti ve depariment had emphaaized the impotence 
ot a non-voting delegate to proteot a..waiian eoonamio interests . Where 
mainland interests, represented by Toting Congressmen, clashed w1 th Bi­
wa.iian interests , the i slands were powerless.  The •Big Five, • wh:ioh had 
frowned upon the statehood efforts of delegates Kala.nianole and Houston, 
now made an about taoe .  Its adnrtiaing agenoy, the PQn Paoific Pres s  
Bureau, put ita full taoili ties behind the statehood movement. It has 
been charged that almost every book publl•hed about HAwaii from 1936 to 
1941 was subsidized by this agenoy. This agency has also been given 
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credit tor the two-to-one mainland sentiment in tavor ot statehood in 
1941, as reported by the Gallup poll. 
The sudden change in the attitude ot the •Big Five" aroused much 
suspicion in the islands and there has been sharp criticism ot the "econCIIic 
motive• in the 1t&tehood mo'98DleD.t. Censbre is certainly due the "Big Five, "  
it, as its activities before and after the pa.asage ot the Jones-costigan • . 
.Mt would seem to indicate, it plaoed eooncmio gain above the desire ot 
the Hawaiian people tor tuller aelt-gover.ament. HOwever, the desire tor 
greater representation in gc:rNl"DIIlent in order to protect eoonaaic interests 
has usU&lly been recognized as a T&l.id motive . Greater protection tor the 
HAwaiian suga.r industry also meant greater protection tor the econamio 
security or the Ba.waiian plantation worker, storebeper and housewife . 
Cll the evidence avai lable, it is impossible to ascertain whether the 
"Big Five" bad seriously retarded the statehood movement prior to 1934. 
i'o all appearances, general public opinion in Hawaii before the ea.rly 
thirties,  while favorable to statehood, had not been ·aware ot its great 
advantages over territorial 1tatua. Jg&in, perhaps "Big Five" opposition 
had muted that awarenes s .  ()le thing ia certai.D a in the "Big Five, " 
16 statehood proponents found a valuable and powerful ally. 
l�or information on the Jones-Costigan .Act, see letter, Delegate 
Samuel 1f1lder King to Chairman lfarvin Jones ot the House Cammi ttee on jgri­
culture, April 28 , 1937, Congressioual Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 
81, Part IV, �. 4007J Hearliiga, H.R. 49 and S. 114, P• 230J Vandercook, 
op. cit.,  165-168 J Furnas, loo .  cit .,  134J MObley, loc . cit., 7 J  Crawford, 
ioo .O!l'. , 59, 74J Creasey,-op. crt:, 6;  Barbe�f (§• cit-;;-91}-100, 110-lllJ  "'Si'aiian sta. tehood, " The JeW"RePiiSiio , Vol . 104 an'Ui:'i7 271 1941), 101, 
hereafter cited as "Hawaiian St&tehood, " J Clark, op. cit., 14-15 J Kuykendall 
and D&y, op� cit., 202, 222-224. See Barber, op ."'O't:-;-Tol-103, tor the 
relations'O? l.lle'"'buainess interests with Deleg&-eeslfo'iiaton and Ka.lania.nole 
oonoerning statehood. 
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Legislative discrimination, if of a len disturbing nature, was not 
new to Hawaii in the early thirties. The commission which framed the 
Orga.nic Act had thought that the law' s provisions would insure Hawaii a 
share in all national legislative benefits.  Yet, as early as May, 1910, 
Congress , anawering a Hawaiian plea, amended the Organic Act in an at­
tempt to guarantee the · extension ot general appropriation bills to the 
islands . However, two factors have consistently dogged all efforts in 
this direction a (1)  the neceesi ty to name specifically the territories 
in all national legislati on intended to cover them--a. step often negleoted 
in drafting bills and one whioh a busy delegate finds it almost impoesible 
to check in the myriad of laws mder consideration in both houses J and 
{2) the tendency in the past of the Attorney General and other executive 
department heads to di•quality Hawaii for bene1'1 ts on the grounds that 
it was a non-oontiguous area or an insular poseession. These arbi trar,y 
executive rulings were sametimes enforced even when bills specifically 
mentioned the te rritories .  As a re sult, Hawaii was deprived of federal 
aid in such fields as vocational a.nd agricultural education, farm loa.ns, 
and lvdrographic and topographical eurveys . By April of 1923, wary of 
badgering Congress for ammendments extending aid billa to the islands, 
the territorial legislature passed a Bill of Rights • lfi th an outline ot 
the historical basis for its claims, this dooument declared that Hawaii 
was an integral part of the Ullited states and, therefore , could not be 
discrim.in&ted against in federal legislation. It turther declared that 
Hawaii had inallenable rights which included a share tn all benet! ta 
197 
extended to states where •i ts :tunotions and nsponsibili ties are the 
aame.•17 Also provided ll&s a commission to work w1 th the delegate in 
washington to gain recognition o:f' theae olaim.a and to secure legislation 
to cover recent oversights. .Alter a study of this declaration, the Ccm-
mi ttee on Territories o:f' the House concluded that, in view of the failure 
ot the 1910 amendment to inaure Hawaii all benefits ot appropriation billa, 
there 118.8 no basic ra.edy. A bill passed in 1924 extended to Ba'ftii moat 
ot the beneticial legislation then in etteot, such aa the Sni th-Hughes 
J.ct for vocational education, which had been passed in 1917. 
The Universi t;y of Hawaii, a land-grant college, has been a par­
ticular victim of executive interpretation ot the law. Remedial legisla­
tion :f'inally extended federal aid to the university--but on a graduated 
basis providing full benefits only between 19� and 1950• 7hwl, tull 
beneti ta of national legislation were attained almost :f'orty-three years 
attar the agricultural and JLeohanioal a.rta college which preceded the 
university :f'irst applied for :f'ederal aid in 1907 • 
.A. t'armers t relief' bill was never extended to Hawaii .  Housing 
legislation was late in being applied to the islands. The Federal Aid 
Road �t :tor highway ocmst:ruoticn, passed in 1916, was not applicable to 
Hawaii until 1923• 
In April of' 1925 the territorial legislature found it necessary 
to pas s a Deola.ra.tion ot Rights in de:f'ense o:f' the equal rights o:f' ita 
17Bea.rings, HeRe 3034, P• 319. 
' 
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citizens as a<111pa.red with those enjoyed by mainlanders . rus action was 
prcmpted by Bureau ot Dmlligrat:lon regulations lwnpering the tree travel 
ot citizens ot .i.dat:la al'lCe stry between the islands and the mainland. .!gain 
a a CIII.Dli.ssion was appointed to aid the ove r-worked delegate in getting re ­
medial action. Ci tizena or Hawaii have had less than equal trea1ment in 
another matter. Because of the system ot allocating West Point and An­
napolis appoin1m.ents to mem�rs ot the Congress for di stribution, Hawaii '  a 
one delegate is never able to 1'111 as many appoilltaents as Ra...ai.i, on a 
population basis, is due . Between 1933 and 19� Hawaii was originally 
overlooked ill the Bational Seauri ty �t, wages and hours legislation, 
Fair Labor Standards J.ot, and war Demage Corporation and war inslU'I.llCe 
legislation. 
Particularly irksome has been neglect ot Hawaii in health legisla­
tion. Despite a serious tuberculosis problem in the Terri tory, the dele­
gate had to make a great effort to gain extension of the TUberculosis 
Control ,A.ot. IDl.wa11 has been omwistently le� out of public health 
studies made by goven:aent agencies . .Although the federal gover.am.en.t 
assumes all re sponsibility tor leper care on the mainland, the Territory, 
long troubled by this disease, has had praotiaally no federal aid in its 
control . The legislature appropriates an average of $80,000 bienially tor 
leper care . llhile the federal govel"DDlent has provided care tor indigent 
natives such as the Indiana and Samoans, it has lef't to the Terri tory all 
responsibility for medical care ot native Hawaiians. The federal govern­




The Congressional Record is spotted with pet.i tiona from the ter-
ritorial l�gislature for inclusion in proposed legislation or la� al­
ready in etteot. Sometimes Hawaii through long effort has gained legisl&­
ti ve benefits only to be deprived of' them in later action. SUch was the 
case in gaining e:xemption ot terri to rial govermnent e:11ployeea tram. federal 
inoane taxes. Only three years later, without any reference to the dele­
gate or the territory, this provision was repealed.18 
This long tale of' discrimination became the more intolerable · to 
the islanders in view of' their liability to the same federal taxes as 
their mainland brothers. As the former delegate, lfr. samuel Wilder ling, 
ruef'Ully noted in 1937, •tnoidentally such Clldnions seldom occur in 
revenue measures or other bills of' a restrictive nature, but they seem 
of'ten to ooour in measures extending certain benefits or gra.nts .n19 
Irritation over these various inequalities has always been tampered 
by the knowle�e that in practically all oases the discrimination was not 
deliberate . Yet, over a. half' century, these pin pricks of' discrimination 
have a.wa.kened the islanders to tull realization of' two f'aots a {1) Con­
gress has practically a.dmi tted that it is powerless to guarantee to Hawaii 
l8aear1.ngs, H.R. 3034, PP• 93-96, 102, 234, 21.,2, 312, 319-328J 
Hearings,  !.1. 49-56, PP• 37, 101, 155-156; Hearings ,  H.R. 236, �P· 43, 
64; Hia.nngs , H.R. 49 and s. 114, P• 75; Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 
l Session, Vol.  79 Part V, 4828J ibid., Part VII, 75Iil3J ibid. , 75 Congress, 
1 Session, Vol.  81, Pa.rt IV, !,oo3, Li009; ibid.,  Part v, 471i8J Kuykendall 
and Day, op. oi t.,  216, 219-220 J Fumaa, loo .  oi t . ,  l,3J.u Wilbur, loo . oi t. , 
495-496; Bo•••u, loo . oit., 353; llobley, loo . crt:, 7J  Clark, op. eit.;-14. 
- - _ __. - -
19congreasiona.l Record, 75 Congren, 1 Session, Vol.  81, Part II, 
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a tw.l, immediate share in all federal aid; and (2 ) one non-voting delegate 
cannot adequately protect �waii against this type ot di sc rimination, while 
requests tor an additional delegate have never been granted. 
But Hawaii soon had an opportlmi ty to apeak its mind. Follow:l.llg 
the ill-tated bill ot Delegate Houston in 1931, two more bills were in­
troduced in succeeding Congressional sessions . It was the year 1935, 
however, which brought bright hope to the statehood boosters . A.f'ter 
Delegate Xing' s introduction in January ot another enabling aot, there 
was a prel1m1nary hearing in Washington on May 31, atter which it was 
decided to send, tor the tirat time, a c CIIIID.ittee to inwstigate statehood 
po .. ibili ties . 
To Hawaii in Ootober came & six-man suboo:mmi ttee ot the House CCBIL• 
mittee on Territories . Under the ohaimanship ot Representative Eugene B .  
C rowe ot Indiana, hearings were held tor eleven days on oahu, Big Island, 
Jlaui, Kauai and Molokai . One hundred and ti ve wi tneue• appeared, ot wham 
ninety tavored statehood. Outstanding in these he&ringa was the Citi­
zens ' Bipartisan CCIDDli.ttee ,  appointed by Delegate Xing to turnish evidence 
relative to statehood. The large ma.jori 'by" ot these prcainent ci thena 
gave favorable testilaoey. .Also active was the Equal Rights Camni. ttee , 
ot which Governor Poindexter was a mt����.ber. This organization had been 
created by the 1935 territorial legislature as a tact-finding body to 
bolster Ha:wa:U '  s claima to e<lolal treatment in DAtional legislation and 
to support statehood. The legis lature had appropriated tlO,OOO tor this 
body' s work and later doubled the grant. The legi slature had tinancially 
supported the statehood cause in another manner. It had made t1 ve 
201 
appropriations prior to 1937 to pa.y the expenses of any Congreasicmal 
oommi. ttee or members who might wish to Tiai t Ba.widi in regard to state­
hood. This praotioe ot the legislature has continued down to the prese:a.t. 
Jberging trca the hearings were several main issues 1 the "Big 
Five,•  the Asiatic population, the strategic position ot the islands and, 
nth aCIIle, the tear that the people of BLwaii nre not yet ready tor state­
hood responaibili ties. Two other i tema engaged major attention. The first 
ot these was the question ot reapportiomaent of the territorial legisla­
ture . This is sue stemmed tram the Organic j&)t, which had provided the 
original election districts and repre sentative quotas and had also stip­
ulated that there should be periodic reapportioDment. Hcnrever, the act 
required tor reapportiomaent certain data ccmDerning ci tizenahip in the 
election districts which the regular United states Census tabulations did 
not include . AD appeal to the Camn.erce Department to supply the additional 
data had been refused, while Congress ignored a 1932 appeal to reappor­
tion the territorial house membership. It therefore became the reaponai­
bili ty of the territorial legislature to tinanoe the gathering of the 
information. By 1935 no appropriations had been made . Ccmaequedtly, the 
island of oahu, containing about titty-three percent of the population, 
had only forty percent of the representation in the territorial house and 
senate . 'lhis oondi tion would only be aggravated in time, since oahu' a 
population continued to grow taster than that of the other islands . The 
representatives frc:m the outer islands usually retused to vote tor re­
apportiODm.ent because it would give the island of oahu a majority vote 
in the legislature . Some charged, too, that the "Big Five, • . entreD.Ohed 
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in the predCI!Jinantly Republican outer islands, were not interested in a 
greater voice for oahu, which had Democratic leanings.  lJnderlying the 
whole issue seemed to be the familiar urban-rural jealousy over political 
power, since more power tor Oahu actually meant a greater political voice 
tor Honolulu. The investigating subcommittee found some witnesse s inais-
tent upon reapportioument prior to statehood or at least before any elec-
tion of' delegates to a constituent assembly. 
The other issue of' particular interest to the subeommi ttee was 
the abrupt blossaming of' statehood fervor in the early thirties, es-
peoially among the large eoonamic interests .  :Many witnesses obarged 
that the •Big Five" had re-versed its opinion solely for eoonanio reasons • 
.Uso, it was intimated, the IIJ3ig Five• wanted less interference from the 
federal go-verD!lent now that a strong Democratic administration was at the 
helm. As pre'ri.ously noted, •Big Fi Te• motives were suspect among many 
Hawaiian groups at this time. However, economic motives could not ex-
plain the overall change in the attitude of the general ci tiz8JU"Y'. For 
the testimony gi-ven the subcommittee indio a ted that many citizens shared 
w1 th the "Big Five" a rather sudden enthuaiaam for statehood. While state-
hood, like virtue, always bad general public support, the real need for 
it seems not to ha-ve been .felt until the early thirties brought the Rankin 
Bill, the Jones-costigan Act and a full realization of past legislative 
disorimination.20 
20ra;r�· llay, 1935, 1-2o; :aearinga .  H.R. 3034, PP · 1, 5-6, 8, 11, 
26, 35, 4. ,  - 4. 59, 6�, _63-64, 85, 91, 93, 102 , 104, 110-111, 113. 120-121, 124, 127, 134-135, �-141, 16o, 164-170, 197-198, 230, 239�, 243-
245, 254. 258-261, 265, 268, 275-277, 279, 306, 329; Bearings, Con. Res .  
18, P • 127; Senate Document � 151, PP • 1, 11; Heariiigs, H.R. 236, p. 11, 
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The final report of the suboamm:i. ttee included the following& 
(1) the oon"riction that a 11oomtortable majori ty• ot the island people 
favored 1tatehood; (2) praise tor the genere.l econcmrl.c and political con­
ditions in the islands, with special approval of the school system.; and 
(3) an expreasion of adm.ira tion tor Hawaii • s people and concern tor their 
W8ltare • But the majority opinion was as tollon 1 •Your subcommittee 
is  of the opinion, hawe"Ver, that considerable further study is neoe11aey 
before a favorable report be made on the King bill Lenabllng ao:J • • • • .21 
Hawa:U ,  on the whole , had came forth with honor from her first ex-
posure to Congressional investigation on statehood. However, she had also 
met tor the first time what would beoame a .familia� &dversaey--Congressicmal 
reluctanot to aot hastily. 
Largely due to the 1ni tia ti ve of Delegate King, who had introduced 
another enabling aot in June , 1937, a concurrent resolution was palled by 
both national houses in August ot 1937 to send a joint investigating com-
mi ttee to the islands . The expenses of this oamm.i ttee, incidentally, 
wre paid by the territorial legislature . 
Origi:nally oamposed ot twelve aenators, twelve representati"Ves, 
and Delegate King, the absence ot five senators reduoed the committee to 
twenty during the isl.&n.d hearings .  Senator William H. King ot Utah was 
181 J  Congressional Reoord, 56 Congreas, 1 Session, Vol.  33, Part III, 
2386J IUJkiDdall and Day, op. cit., 196-197, 288·2901 Barber, op. cit. , 
112-113. - - - -
21Hearings, H.R. 3034, P• 329 • Two mambers of the subcOIIDIIittee 
bad reoe�aenLd that the tull oamni ttee endorse the bill. 
204 
ohaiman. Hearings were held only on Oahu, Big Island and Molokai, but 
oommi ttee members Tisi ted all the major islands and many institutions, 
both publio and private . Sixty-seven witnesses testified in the hearings, 
held over a two48ek period. 11bile a major! ty of the w1 tn.esses again 
favored statehood, the percentage of those either opposed or desirous 
of postponaent was larger than in the previous i!lftstigation. 
Again •sig Five• dCIIdnanoe and the Japanese probl• gathered the 
lion's  share of attention, with labor conditions and lack of adequate 
labor legislation running a strong third. There was more discussion of 
reapportiomunt. !estilaon:y' revealed again the consciousness of ma.D:f oi ti-
zens of the need for a greater voice in national legislation. 
The lengthy report of the joint camni ttee made many reoCIIIJII8nda tiona , 
including enactaaent b;y the territorial legislature of same type of re­
apporticmment plan offering both more equitable representation and pro-
tection for the rural minority. Also recommended was an investigation 
of tre.naportation rates about 11hi.ch much ccmplaint had been heard. The 
suggestions w1 th regard to labor legislation have already been discuned. 
There was in the report high praise for the wide distribution of utility 
services, for the medical, social and W8ltare institutions of the islands, 
for the progress in Americanization of citizens of foreign desoent and 
for the public school syatsm.22 
22se:aate Document No. 151, PP• iii , 1-4, 11-12, 75-76, 87 • 69-92J 
Bearings, Con. Res .  16, PP• 4,--51, 61 , 64, 106-107, 109-112, 127, 136, 
139, 143, 203-204, 211, 234, 284, 324, 511J Congressional Record, 75 
Congress, 1 Seuion, Vol .  81, Part VIII, 9624=9626J ibid., 15 Congress, 
3 Session, Vol.  8,3, Part IX, AI327J Kuykendall and Da.y, op. cit., 290J 
Barber, � cit., 113-114. - -
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In its conclusions the joint o cami ttee emphasised the precedent­
shattering nature ot admitting non-contiguous lilwa.ii to sta.tehoodJ found 
the territorial govermnent both adequate and ef'tioientJ but reported dif-
ficul ty in probing Hawaiian sentiment with regard to statehood. 1fi th 
reauuranoe ot the oonoern of' Congress tor Hawaii • s rights and its desire 
that the i slands enjoy the fullest possible self'-govermaent, the oCIDDiittee 
recCIIIIIlended delay until a more def'ini. te expression of Hawaiian opinion 
could be obtai.Ded. This report was approwd by all the cCIIIID.i ttee mem-
bers except Representative Banlr1n, who favored indefinite postponement. 
While ncm-oontigui ty, unoerta.inty as to Hawaiian sentiment, and lack of 
adequate labor legi slation were high cards in this decision for delay, 
the ace was obviously the large Japanese element in the islands . For 
the cCIDIILittee reported that 
• • • the present disturbed condition ot international attain, 
while not a pemanent deterrent to the aspirations of the people 
of Hawaii, suggest.s the wisdca of further study and consider­
ation of this question, and possibly the holding of a plebiaci te 
at same future tillle .23 
Probably, too, the great amount of' conflicting testiacmy had made the 
committee think wll of delay. 24 
Fran the inwstigations of 1935 and 1937 came same good re sults, 
however, tor Hawaii .  She bad made many friends in Congress. A much 
larger D\DD.ber of national legislators were now conversant with island 
conditions and island probl•s• This gain the next session of the 
23ae•te Document !!!_ 151,  P• 95J see ibid. , 94-95. 
�lark, !E:. .!!.!.!.• 15; Barber, � oit�, 113-116. 
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territorial legislature recognised ill an appropriation to finanoe fUr­
ther Tiai ta by Congressmen. 25 
OUt of the 19;7 investigation came also a. rather backhanded reoog-
ni tion that " •  • • U.waii ha.a fulfilled every requirement for eta tehood 
heretofore exacted of Terri toriea . •26 While this statement was as true 
in 1937 a.s it is in 1950, the present discussion will use figures for 
later years in order to ,bring Hawaii' s  qualifica ticm score up to date . 
strangely enough, there exlata no set list of quallfioa.tions 
having legal aa.notion by' which to measure the readiness of a terri tor,r 
for statehood. The Northwest Ord1naJ:Jce of 1787 required a population of 
60,000 and the adoption of a. state oonsti tution pro'ri.ding for a. repubU-
oa.n .torm o.t goverDIBellt. Practice, however, ha.s made the latter action 
more of'ten the result of, rather than a. qualification for, an enablillg 
a.ot. The Conati tution set forth no qualificationa wba taoever for pros-
pective states. It merely pro'ri.ded that •11 ... States may be admitted by 
the Oongreaa into this U'lliOJ3. • • • .•27 fheref'ore , in effect, Ccmgresa 
has been given the ta.ak not only of e'ftlua� ti tneas for statehood but 
of setting up the atand.a.rds by which that fitness ia to be judged. These 
standards through the years have tended to be sanewhat fluid, but at 
least f'our cri teri& haTe beoCIIle wll established: (1 ) &rea., (2 ) popula­
tion, (3) eoonCIIlio resources and state o.t clewlopw1t1 and (4) ability 
of the people to maintain stable and orderly goven:aaent. ():1 these four cotmts 
BawaH, Ul1doubtedly qualifies. 
25Ibid., 116-117. 
26aariD.ga, :a:.R. 236, P• 3· 
27Art. IV, seo . III, 1. 
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Ba.waii • s  area exoeeds that of' three indi'ri.dual atates in our union, 
while the island population is greater than that of' tour. Oll y Oklahoma 
had a larger population at the time of' admission to statehood than Ha­
waii • a  estimated 5�,500 people ill 19.48. Furthermore, this population is 
almost ninety peroent citizen in oharaoter. 1I&Dy pre'vious entrants into 
the union had large Negro or D:ldian populations . Three had some Asiatics • 
.U to econcmdo resources and eoonamic deTelopuent, various indices 
give Hawaii a high ra.ti.Jl«. Sinoe ' 1845, the first year tor which figures 
are available, no territory at the time of' admission as a. state has ap­
proached Hawaii ' s  19.48 real property' wealth of' JM&rly t6oo ,000,000 except 
Okl&hCIII&, which had, at admiasicm, real property exceeding t700,000,000 . 
In value of' goods produced at time of' admission, only one former terri• 
tory oould claim as much as halt of' Hawaii ' s  &DD.ual production -.alue of' 
tll2,441,163 in the early 194o • s .28 
Moreover, Hawaii has always been self-supporting. Fran 1944 to 
191.1>, her collections of' interDAl revenue exoeeded the collections in 
eaoh of' fourteen of' our states , while in 1947 ahe paid more to the fed­
eral treasury in all revenues than did eaoh of' twel"nJ atatea . The per­
centage of' her oi tizens tiling indi 'ri.dual tnoame tax returns tor 19L.o 
was higher than in twenty-ai::a: states . In the first thirty-six years of' 
territorial lite, the islands oost the federal gowl"Dilent, exclusive of' 
military expenditures, approximately t64.ooo,ooo. In the same pe riod 
28Hea.ringa 1 R.R. 236, PP • 656-657 • 
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the islands contributed to the gow!"DDII.ent over 1207,000,000. Thus the 
United states govermnent realized a proti t ot almost tl50,000,000 in these 
;years . The large margin ot federal inoc:me over federal expenditures con­
tinues to pre'ftil. Since 1933 Hawaii haa never ranked below the eighth 
best oustc:mer ot c ontinental united States.  Ill 1939 and 19� she ranked 
titth, only the United l:l.ngdom, CaD&Cla, Fre.noe and Japan making more pur­
chase s in the continental Ul1i ted states .  
A. financial asset to the federal govermaent, 111waii has handled 
her own govel"DDIlent finanoing with c onsiderable suooe n .  In the 1920 's  
studies were made leading to the adoption of a uniform budget and aooolmt­
ing system for territorial and looal gowrmnenta . Hawaii established an 
income tax as early as 1901 and made it a suooeutul source of revenue 
betore fJZJ.Y of the states . In 19l.,o receipts for both territorial and lo­
cal goverma.ents surpassed expendi turea by ahaoat a halt million dollars. 
General. re"Rllue receipts of the territorial govenment for the fiscal 
year ending in June, �948, amounted to over two aillian dollars more than 
gover.Dilent coat payments . These tigurea for years directly precedi.Dg and 
succeeding World War II indicate the general stabi lity ot the territorial 
f'inancial aystaa. Unlike 111&J3Y states, the territorial gowruaent in the 
middle ot the depression year ot 1932 had over ti ve million dollars in 
oa.sh, tree ot all e:aoumbranoes, and an equal amount in liquid banda. 
If length ot experieDCe in territorial govel"DDD.8llt is any indica­
tion of abi lity in aelt-gowl"!!IUmt, only !lew Kexioo, a terri tory tor 
sixty-two years , has had a longer period ot tra1D1ng tor statehood. The 
average terri to rial lite has been on.ly tnnty years . M another sip of 
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poll tical maturity, HA118.iia.ns casting ballots in the 19!,2 election rep­
resented 13.9 percent ot the total popula.tion, a record higher than that 
ot ten states.  The median tor all states was 25 .9 percent. Honolulu, 
in 19�, tar outranked fifteen comparable mainla:a.d cities in the percent 
ot registrants voting . However, this showing is tempered somewhat by 
the fact that, in Hawaii, looal a:a.d territorial elections are held at the 
same time . Since 1900 never less than lixt7-six percent ot the regis-
tre.nts have voted in general elections . In ti ve elections the percentage
. 
has been above Dine-by, with a:a. onra.ll awrage in the eighties . Usually 
abou� torty percent ot the populaticm eligible to vote exercises the bal­
lot in comparison with the .national average of forty-two peroent. This 
record is the more significant in no ot the tact tba t Ha:waiia:a.a do not 
vote tor President or gowrnor. 29 
Fran the foregoing it beotmes obvious that Hawaii meets every 
standard that has pre'rlously been set up tor statehood candidates . How-
ewr, the same c�ttee which in 1937 Tirtually conceded this tact inti­
mated by its reoCIIDDend&tion tor delay that no condi tiona exact new 
quallticatio:a.s. Congressional action in general has tolland this prin­
ciple . .And, as has been pointed out, the Constitution has lett to Congress 
29tare&ele, •Report," loc . cit. , 15-161 Hearings ,  H.R. 49 a:a.d Rel.  
Bills , 15, 26, 28, 47J Bearin--gi;" T.R; 49-56, PP• 16, 39, 50, 99, lo4, 211 ; 
Hearings , H.R. 2,36, PP• 205, 288, 656-657, 658-659, 664, 696, 722-724; 
Cordon Report, 3, 11 ; Hearings , H.R. 3034, PP• 7-10, 44; House Report No. 
fbj:4 P• 7J Congressi onal Record, 75 Congress,  1 Session, Vol. 81, Pirt-n', 
; Annual Report, 66, 62, 65; Oliver Perry Chitwood and Frank IAwrence 
Onley, A Short History ot the aerican People (lin York a D.  Va:a. Nostrand 
Ccmpany,-Inc . ,  1945}, I,�"TJ:Kur&ndi11 and Day, op. ci t., 198;  DuPuy, 
� oit., 33, 35•  - -
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the c rel.tion of standards by which to judge statehood candidates . In 
the case ot Hawaii , Congress has considered more exacting criteria nec ­
essary. 
The need expressed by the 1937 joint investigating camnittee tor 
sane c c:aprehensi ve survey of !J$.waiia.n sentiment led the terri to rial legis­
lature of 1939 to authorize a plebiaci te to be conducted as part of the 
194D general election. The timing was unfortunate . Increased tension 
in American-Japanese relations and renewed Congreesional discussion of 
sugar control measure s led to island fears that the plebiscite would un­
duly emphasize Hawaii • s large Japanese population and the eooncmic moti vea 
involved in the statehood movement. Sane also mAy have felt that the in­
ternational a1 tuation was such that delay of statehood would be wise .  
While the "Big Five• spared no expense in the campaign for statehood votes, 
its stand was weakened by a retwsal to explain ita sudden espousal ot the 
cause in the mid•thirtiee . Added to suspicion of •Big Fi ve• motives were 
chArges that the w.rious meeting• conducted throughout the islands gave 
no opportunity tor expression of opinions opposing statehood. As late 
as the 1946 Congressional investigation there would be chargee that the 
issues in the statehood plebiscite had never been fUlly explained, al­
though other witnesses testified that the people were well aware of what 
they were doing . As to the ci tizena of Japanese ancestry, it has been 
suggested that they voted for statehood more to indicate their 1oy8.1ty 
than through any feeling that the new political status would aid their 
community standing. Others, it has been intimated, voted favorably be­
cause the islands would have looked foolish, if, a1'ter tiro Congressional 
investigations, Hawaii rejected 1tatehood. 
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Whatever their motives, 74.538 ot the 87,321 registered voters pa.r­
tioipa.ted in the plebiscite on November 5 .  O:f' these, 1.,6, 174 favored sta. te­
hood, 22,,428 opposed it, and some 6,000 either did not vote or had their 
votes invalidated. In a. survey of mainland edi toria.l rea.otion to this 
two-to-one vote, the Interior Department :f'olm.d an unfavorable sentiment 
in about the same ratio. The war dr1111s which certainly must have at-
:f'ected the plebiaci te were po�aibly responsible tor this edi toria.l view 
as the United States uneasily eyed the progress o:f' Japanese conquest. 
Hon-oont:l.gui ty a.nd the "Big Five" issue may also have played a. part. 
This adverse Tiswpoint was also present in a. 1940 survey by Fortune mag-
a.zine, in which soa.roely over halt those questioned were willing to fight 
tor Hawaii--about the same number who felt Mexico worth defending. It 
is difficult, however, to reconcile these findings w1 th the Gallup poll 
ot January, 1941, in 'Which forty-eight peroent favored statehood, twenty-
three percent opposed it and twenty-nine peroe:nt we re lm.deoided--about 
the same favorable ratio as in Hawaii. 'ft1 th allowances tor the falli-
bility o:f' public opinion polls, it seems fairly eTident that, in 1941, 
the mainland had not definitely made up its mind about statehood tor 
Hawaii . It there was any margin, it wa.s in favor ot Hawaii' s  plea.30 
30Hea.rings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, 27 J Jj)use Beport No. 194, 
P• lOJ Hearings, H.R. 236, PP• 887-889, 361-3(>2, 366, 368, 725J rar'ber, 
� cit. ,  14, 124-125 , 118-121, 253-255J Kuykendall a.nd Day, op. cit., 
290i"rurna.s, op. cit., 189·190J Clark, op. cit.,  15; "Hawaii,"""li.9tii""'State, " 
Newsweek, XVI-cJavem.ber 18, 1940 ), 22, li'i'iei'f't8r cited as "Hawaii, 49th 
state*J Furnas, loo ; cit.,  134J Mobley, loo � cit. , 7, 14J "HAwaiian State-
" 1  �- - -hood, � �� .LV.Le 
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As to the laok ot Oongresliona.l. aotion at this time, w.rioua ob-
servers offered these reasons : (1)  the inf'luenoe of the recQDIJD8nda.tions 
of the 1937 oommittee, (2 ) military authorities • hesitancy to make suoh 
e. change under existing international conditions, (3) doubt coDCerDing 
the loyalty of Hawaii ' s  Japanese, and (4) sane political opposition with­
in the Demooratio Party.31 
But Bl.waii was soon to t,.dd to her experience another great lesson 
in the superior! ty of the statehood status. Neftr bad she ocapletely 
rid herself of the pbantCD of military goftrDIII.ent. This phantCD, as 
previously suggested, had sane substanoe , although military and DA'l'al 
minds so inclined had been unable to toist upon the islands a commission 
tom of goverment. Howeftr, the events of one day brought to Hawaii the 
realization of her worst fears • On Deoember 7, 1941, Hawaii quietly laid 
aside her dreams of statehood until the war should be won. The same day 
she entered upon a period of mill tary rule perhaps lDlparalleled in length 
and scope in the histoey of Alllerioan goftl"DDltmt.32 
It has been suggested that only imminent peril and the belief that 
the emergency measure would be short-11 ved led Governor Poindexter on 
the afternoon of December 7 to sign a proclamation imposing martial law. 
31•Bnait, 49th state, "  loc . cit. , 22 ;  )(obley, loo . oit�,  7 •  - - -- -
32Boue Report Bo . 194, P•  11 ; Bearings, H.R. 49 and s. 114, P•  
1.,66 ; Furnas, loc . oit., 134J KuybDdali and Day, op. oit., 290 .  - - - -
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While the United States District Court remained open, henceforth all 
criminal oases were tried by military officers.  Even traffic violations 
came under the jurisdiction of military judges, who dispensed the law 
wi. thout beneti t of jury and without provision ot the right of appeal tor 
the detendent. Fines and sentences often exceeded the law-one measure 
was the involuntary donation ot blood, a practice condemned by many as 
degrading and brutalizing. While,  in the usual course ot judioial pro-
oedure, approx:lmately one-third ot the defendants will be found ilmooent, 
military courts fotmd not one innocent person among the 1,454 tried in 
!To'nlllllber ot 19�. Over two million dollars in tines were collected during 
the first two years ot military rule.  At first considered but a tempo-
rary hardship, llli.li ta.ry law and its va.garies1 as well as the high-banded 
a.tti tude of military persomel, did not greatly alarm. the civilian popu-
lation tor some weeks . ·  But the passage ot months and then years brought 
a rising flood ot resentment and protest. 33 
The courts were not alone in feeling military control.  Military 
ott.l.cers also entoroed censorship ot all communication facilities, the 
bl&okout, food rationing, and price, rent and tood control . Ordinary 
civil administrative duties, such as regulations on dog license tags and 
commi:taent ot the insane, wre shouldered by the military. Pa.rtioularly 
resented was the retention ot the blackout long a:rter areas :farther -qst 
were no longer darkened and while the Pearl Harbor area blazed every night. 
One w:l.tnese at a post-war inTestigation testified that the blackout not 
33u..,rin
£; 
H.R. 49 a.nd S. 114, PP• 35•37, 118, 127J Clark, � oit. , 183-192J kendall and Day, � cit. ,  236, 256. 
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only trayed nerves but was unhea.lthtul in a. climate where people made a. 
ha.bi t of staying outdoors as much a.s possible. Tuberoulosis rates in-
creased, While other deleterious effects upon health probably ensued. 
Military censorship of civilian mail, tar stricter than that on the main-
land, where it was under chilia.n control, was greatly resented. Funds 
originally allocated by the Interior Department tor the relief of Hawaii • s 
people immediately a.tter Pearl Harbor were used by the a.nny to pay its 
hosts of clerical and administrative eaployeea .  The restrictions upon 
labor have already been deaoribed.34 
Protests, especially against the detention of ci vilia.ns W'i thout 
oh&rges or trial, were not long in appearing . In February, 19h2, came 
the Zimmerman case, in which a. detained civilian appealed tor a. writ of 
ha.bea.s corpus . tJni ted states District Court Judge Delbert C .  Metzger 
ruled that the writ should be issued but that military law forbade him 
to take action. Upheld by the Ninth Ciroui t Court ot San Fra.noisoo, the 
decision was on the way to a. SUpreme Court bearing when the prisoner, 
supposedly an enemy ot the united states, was suddenly released in 
C&Utomia.35 • 
Ba.rly active against mili t&ry abuses ot the law was a. Honolulu 
attorney, J. Garner .Authcmy. In March of 1942 he warned that the Amy ' s  
order to pay overtime only atter forty-eight hours , rather than the 
34Ibtd.,  257J Hearings,  H.R. 236, P•  33J lita.rings, H.R. 49 and 
S. 114, P• 105; Clarlt, !f.! oit., 199-201. 
35Ibtd., 193-194J Kuykendall a.nd Day, 2.f!. oi t . ,  263-264. 
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forty hours stipulated in the Fair Labor standards .A.ot, would subject em­
ployen after the war to prosecution in which the penalty was double pay­
ment tor lost wages . He further protested army pocke� ot all court 
tines while the Terri toey bore increased expenses in maintaining mill tary 
priscmers. lfany noted that inadequate price control policies were unduly 
increasing 11 'Wing coats . These oCIIlpl&ints received no attention, while 
oenaorahip made appeal to mainland authorities difticult.36 
Persisting, .AnthpJ:Q' wrote an article on the illegall ty of the 
military rule, whioh he JDADAged to get through to the California � 
Review. When published in Jlay, 1942, it received muoh attention in main­
land newspapers . The first real blow had been dealt mill tary rule . The 
second came with the appoin1ment on August 24, 1942, of Ingram :u:. Stain-
back as governor to succeed Governor Poindexter whose tenn had expired. 
A former federal district attorney, with al:moat thirty 7ears • la.w prac­
tice in the Terri tory, Governor stainback had also had rich experience 
in mill tary law as an &l"DDY officer in the First World war. Appointing 
Anthony as attorney general, the gowrnor set about regaining civil rule. 
A trip by these two to Washington in December of 1942 elicited from Presi-
dent Roosevelt an order to the oO!!!JM.nding general in Hawaii to cease super­
vision of civil tunotions .37 
In February, 1943, a joint declaration by the gowrnor and General 
Delos c. Emmons restored by March same functions to civil authorities, 
such as prioe and food control. Civi lian censorship soon replaced that 
36 Ibid.,  26!u Clark, .2! cit., 195-196. 
37Ibid. ,  197-198J Kuykendall and Dq 1 .2!. �' 264-265. 
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by the military. An inquiry by oi'Vil authorities conoerlling the continued 
detention of oi 'Vilians brought the sudden release of about two hundred 
internee s .  But habeas corpus was still suspended, martial law existed• 
and the blaokout and ten o• olook ourtew cont.t.nued.38 
1'he appeal ot two detainee s, in prison almost two years, tor a writ 
of habeas corpus was gr&nted in the early SUIIIIIIS r of 1943 on the strength 
ot the governor• s announcement that the regular courts would again take 
up their usual duties . The refusal of the new OCIID!Md1ng officer, Lt. 
General Robert c .  Rloh&rdaon, Jr. • to produce the prisoners led to the 
1mpoai tion of a ts.ooo tine for contempt of court. Richardson replied 
with a military order imposing a heav;y .f'ine and/or impriaomnent against 
a:rsy court official attempting to process wr1 ts . Now in deep water. 
Richardson. with ad'Vioe fran the Justice Department. rescinded this last 
order and proved that his disregard of the writ had been ordered by Chief 
of staff, General George C. M!lrshall. The origina.l fine was reduced to 
tlOO by the court. but an appeal tor a pardon for Richardson was answered 
only in washington. AA in the Zimme rman suit, the sudden release of the 
prisoners preTeDted a review of their case by the SUpreme Court.-'9 
In the spring of 19W+, .Anthony, in a private case in which he rep­
resented a detainee • was able to break down the anqt s contention tha. t 
there was still an emergency requiring military prosecution of civilian 
38Ibid. J Clark, .2:. oi t. • 201 . 
�Ibid.,  20l-205J Kuykendall and Day• !E.! �. 265. 
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violators o:t civil law. The District Court c onsequently ruled that martial 
law had ceased after M!Lrch 10, 1943-. Therefore , writs could be processed. 
Howenr, the deci sion was reversed by the Circuit Court in San Francisc o .  
Finally, this case and another similar one were reviewed by the Supree 
court. Oddly, the hearings began on December 7, 1945, :tour years after 
martial law was first imposed. On February 25., 19¥, the Supreme Court 
in a six-to-two decision declared that martial law had been unconstitu­
ti�l.4D The Court ruled that, "Extraordinary measures in Hawaii,  h01r-
ever necessary, are not supportable on the mistaken premise that Hawaiian 
inhabitants are les s  anti tled to oonsti tutional protection than others . -41 
Justice Murphy wrote, "The uncanstitutiOD&U:ty of the usurpation of' civil 
power by the military is so great in this instance as to warrant this 
Court• s complete and outright repudiation of' the action. w42 
Hawaii had won its long battle against military rule . However, 
the very :tact that it had once more found it necessary to prove its right 
to c onstitutional protection only served further to impress upon the 
i slanders the insecurity of' territorial status . HAwaiians had not liked 
'trea-tment very similar to t.h.a.'t accorded occupied enemy 'territory. In a 
19� investigation a mainland judge wrote, "The general opinion prevails 
that 'these military courts were c onducted in a high-handed and ruthless 
manner.•43 The judge reported increased re spect f'or good civil courts . 
�Ibid. ,  �-266; Clark, op. cit . ,  206-208. - -
41Quoted in Kuykendall and Da.y, op. cit., 266. 
42Quoted by Clark, 2.f!. cit . ,  209. 
43carl E.  Wimberly, Circuit Court JUdge, State of' Oregon, to Senator 
Guy Cordon, February 12, 191JB, Cordon Report, 15. 
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The people of the islands probably would be quick to agree that the initial 
imposition of martial law was a neceuary measure in view of the sudden 
Japanese attack, the possibility of more attacks, and the impoasibili t;y 
of pre-gauging with certainty the loyalty of sane island i:r:thabi tants . 
The fact that this action later proved to have been unnecessary cannot be 
used as a basis for condeming military action. However, the manner in 
which the mili ta.ry dispensed law and the extension of martial rule long 
after any conceivable danger directly threatened the islands can hardly 
be excused. Hawaii realized that such an extension would have been far 
less likely had the islands been a state . As one observer, who had been 
in the islands previous to the war, noted, post-war Hawaii had a •new 
serioumess.•44 And statehood had new signit1ca.nce .45 
But the excesses of mi litary rule had not been the only war-time 
... 
impetus to statehood. The many contacts of the island people with oivil-
ians and soldiers from the mainland, the great number of island"'Dl&inland 
marriages,  and the gallant demonstration by Hawaii ' s  people of all racial 
extractions of their loyalty-all these tied Hawaii closer to the conti-
nent. Some of the new residents f'rom the mainland, too, were irked at 
the lack of full political rights. Furthermore, Hawaii had cane to full 
realization of its place as the hub of any .berican activities in the 
�lark, � �� 13. 
l6!&7lor, loc . cit.
49 
99 ;  Clark, op. cit.,  209-210; Furnas , loc . 
cit., l34J Hearings;-H. • and s. llli, pp7"'3'f-33, 43, 103; Delegiti'"" 
Joseph R. Farrington, "statehood for Hawaii, 11 address at 16th .A.mlual 
Forum of the New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1947 (Reprintt Hawaii 
Statehood Cammisaion, n.d.), 2-3. 
... 
Pacific a.rea--in war or peace . Aa it was an integral, vi tal part of 
219 
AJDsrioan cammeroial and military life, it wanted a similal;" place in AJuri­
can political life .46 
With ultimate victory of the United Nations a certainty, Ha:wa.ii 
again turned to the statehood question. Its legislature on May 4, 1945, 
pa.ased another resolution, in which Congressional camni ttees ware invited 
to the islands . Already, however, discussions by the House Committee on 
Territories had led to the decision for the entire committee to vi sit 
the islands in the fall.  A House resolution in April authorized suoh an 
investigation, but various developnents led to the appointment of a sub-
committee under the ohaimanahip of Representative Henry D. Laroade, Jr. ,  
of Louisiana, to make the trip. Five Congressmen, Delegate Farrington, 
and an advisor from the Department of Interior held hearings tram Janu-
ary 7 through Ja.nu&ey 18, 191.1>, on Oahu, llolokai, lbLui , Big Island and 
Kauai .47 
Just previous to the hearings, on December 22, 19�, Secreta.ey 
of the Interior Harold L. Ickes went on record as a strong advocate of 
statehood. 48 
46 Kuykendall and Day, op . oit . ,  269-2701 Clark, op. cit . ,  18-19. - - - -
47Hearings, H.R. 236, PP• II, 1-2, 4-5 J Laroade , •aeport, " loc . 
cit. , llu Eii&biilig the People of Hawaii To Form A Constitution and-sta'te 
G'O'Vermnent to be Adiiiitted into�e Uiilonon"'"ii1Eq'ua1 Footing withThe 
OrlgfiiAl sta.�8," Hearlng, 'Piiriuant to HOUSe Resolution 3643, "Cc1iiiii:i ttee 
on the Territories, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 1 Session, 1 .  
Hsreatter cited a s  Bearing, H.R. 3643 . 
�Hearings, B.R. 236, PP• 9-10 • 
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The subcammi ttee, whose investigation Delegate Farrington ohara.o-
terized as "one .ot the moat searching inquiries• ever made in &Lwaii , 
listened to testimony concerning labor, land distribution, the "Big Five,"  
Blwaii • s  place in national defense, Hawaii' s war reoord, the housing short-
age, the ever-present reapportiODment proble, and� as always, the raoial 
queation. The witnesses favoring statehood outnumbered those opposing or 
desiring postponement by almost tour to one. A nllliber ot those in oppo-
ai tion were mainland oi 'rllian workers in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, whose 
main c011.plaint seemed to be that they had to pay taxes in Blwaii as well 
as in their hCIII.e states.  The Japanese nre still teared by same opponents; 
the •Big Five" was still considered by a few as an obstacle. others felt 
simply that the islands were not yet ready. u in past investigations, 
the statehood proponent. nre muoh better organized and appeared much bet­
ter informed than opponents ot the movaent. This was in no small part 
due to the presentations ot the Bqual Rights CCIIIIDission. Many orga.niza­
' 
tiona expressed through re•clutions or representatives their desire tor 
immediate statehooda the Democratic and Republican parties of Hawaii ; 
the Honolulu Medical Society; the Pineapple Research InstituteJ the Pine-
apple Growers ._aooiation; the H.S.P.A. ; I.L.W.U. J various A.F. ot L. 
locals ; the Hawaiian Goverument JDnployeea Association; Hawaiian Chinese 
Civic Aseociation; various Chamber ot COIIDII.8rce units J the Filipino Federa­
tion ot .Aaerioa; the Bar Association ot Ha:nii and m.any others.49 
49Ibtd., 25, 29, 37-38, 40-41, 44-45, 47-53, 55-68, 103 109, 112-
114, 1�-1'35":" 1�, 181-182, 184-185, 212-213, 215, 242-250, 254-259, 261-
264, 295, 350, 451. For other extremely .favorable appraisals ot the work 
ot the !Arcade subcamm:l ttee, see Congresdonal Record, 79 Congress, 2 





After a lengthy &\.1JIIIDA1"Y of its findings concel"Ding Hawaiian eco-
nomic, social and political affairs , the subcommittee listed same sixteen 
conclusions . Telescoped, these c onclusions were as follows a (1)  Tha.t 
the people of Hawaii , despite their multi-racial character and the pre-
ponde rance ot Japanese, were ready tor selt-goveMIII.ent.; (2 ) That improve-
menta oould be  expected in land distribution and that the •Big Five• 
dominance was no bar to independent enterprise; (3) That labor organiza­
tion and labor...anageent relations were impro-ving rapidly; (4) That the 
school system had been successful in producing a d.em.ocra tic and capable 
citizenry; and (5 )  That a majority ot the citizens ot Ha:wa.ii wanted state-
hood. The subcCIIIIJDi ttee turther emphasized the loyalty ot the Hawaiian 
people, the historic American policy favoring selt-dete:naination ot peoples,  
Hawaii ' s  role in Paci.tic intern& tional af't'airs, and the tact that the United 
states govermaent in 'Various ways had led the . people ot Hawaii to expeot 
ultimate statehood. Finding Hawaii to have met all the necessary require-
menta , the subcommittee recommended immediate legislation to grant the 
islands statehood status .5° 
Dmnediately a:f'ter the hearings, on January 21, 1946, President 
Harry s .  Truman, in his annual message to Congress, recommended statehood 
tor Hawaii . 51 
On JUne 4, 1946, -the House Cammi. ttee on Territories held a hearing 
in washington to a.nnounoe the completian and a'ft.il&bi ll ty ot the printed 
50Laroa.cle , IIR,eport," � cit.,  14-21.  
5lcongreasional Record, 79 Congress, 2 Session, Vol.  92 ,  Part I ,  147. 
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report of' the investigation and findings of' the La.rcade subcommittee . 
Cha.i nnan Hugh Peterson of' Georgia noted that the interest shown in the 
statehood question was "surpris1ng.".52 A letter was introduced from. 
Secretary of' Interior J. A. Krug, strongly endorsing s tatehood • .53 Dele-
gate Farrington emphasized statehood as a corollary to aerica.n champion­
ship of' dependent peoples, especially with regard to those in the Pacific 
area. Inoluded in the hearing report was various correspondence referred 
to the o ammittee during 194.5 and 1946 in which sentiments tor or against 
statehood were expressed. These letters , mainly trom people who had been 
temporary residents of' the i slands during the war and from permanent res-
idents of' the mainland, overwhelmingly opposed statehood or wished post-
ponam.ent. The most frequent reasons tor opposition were charges of' poor 
law enforcement, bad treatment of' mainland civilians , seamen and mili ta.ry 
personnel, and the Asiatio population. On the other hand, the organize.-
tiona expressing views were heavily favorable, some thirty local and 
national organizations , both mainland and Hawaiian, advocating immediate 
statehood. cmly three organizations opposed.  The committee took no ac tion. 
Bmpha.sis was upon deliberation and consideration of' all information pos-
s1 ble . AB a reaul t, despite Delegate Farrington • s efforts and the ao-
ti'rlties of' the Hawaiian Statehood Commission, adjournment found statehood 
among the many measures lost in the rush to enaot post-war readjustment 
legi ala. tiOD..54 
.52litaring, H.R. 3643, P• 2. 
53xrug to Peterson, April 2.5, 1946, ibid. , PP• 2-3· 
54rhid. ,  5-7, 9-10, 13, 1.5-30, 33-� 37-42, 45�7, .53-64, 67-75J 
Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel .  Bills, 10-llJ House Report No . 254,p�5; K�ken-di11 and Day, op. cit.,  291 . - -
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On the 'opening of the Eightieth Ccmgreu, Delegate Farrington on 
January 3, 1947, introduoed an eDabling a..ot. Fin Republloans and three 
Democrats followd his lead in introducing similar measure s .  From lfaroh 7 
to »arch 19, the House CCIIIIIIittee on Publlo Lands held hearings in 1Jash:blg­
tcm in whioh the test:l.mq' for statehood was overwhelmingly favorable. 
!his investigaticm was aimed at di sooveri.Dg mainland sentimellt. Prao­
t1cally the anly di saentiDg note was in a letter tram liioholas Kurray 
Butler, President of Col\lllbia uniwreity, who opposed the admittanoe of 
uy non-oontiguous terri toriea to statehood. Two other opposing OOIIIIILuni­
oat1ons were not inoluded in the testim0Jl1'. Bo wi tDess appeared in oppo-
81 tion. Jacmg those teatityi.ng for statehood were Seoretary of Interior 
Krug, Governor Stainback, Robert t. Shinrs, Congres•en fran nine states, 
members of both parties traa the territorial house and seD&te, and repre• 
sentatives of the R.S.P.A.. and I.t.w.u. Other expressions of support oame 
frcm various ma1nland Chambers of CCIDIIIeroe , arm.y and na'9)" perscmnel, the 
Jl'a"'Y' Department, the Iia.ticmal Bduoation .Uaooiaticm, the uaticmal Jlnerioan 
Veterans CCIIIIIli ttee , and w.rious Lions• Clubs . The Delegate introduoed 
favorable editorial OCIIDilent from nenpapers 1n th1rt,y-•enn statss and 
Hawaii . Again highlighted was the international signitioanoe of the stats­
hood question. Seoretar,y Xrug, who had jut returned tram a trip to the 
Paoitio area, reported that General Douglas JfacArthur favored extensicm of 
Jmerioa:a. demoora.tio toms to the Paoitio area as an aid in his task of 
demooratizing Japan. The Genera.l, said Mr. Xrug, definitely favored state­
hood. CCIIIIIDi ttee member Clair BDgle of Califonlia reported that lBoArthur 
had not conaidered statehood in aey manner detrimental to the American 
defense s)"Stem. The heari.ngs ended w1 th the 1manimcus decision of the 
cCIDDli ttee to report the enabling act favorably- to the House.55 
In his report of recCB111118ndation of Jfarch 27, Chairman Richard J. 
Welch stressed the laok of objection tr0111 milltaey and DAval authorities, 
the support of the Interior Department, the faTOra.ble etteot of statehood 
upon aerican toreip relation• and world democracy, and the great degree 
of 1mf1.711mi ty of opi.Dion in the ialanda and on the mainla.nd. Chail'DI&D Welch 
reported• " .  • • the Committee on Public Landa is unanimously- convinced 
that the Terri toey ot B'awa.ii has met every neceasaey requirement to be 
admitted as a State of the 11Dion.•56 Weloh further stated, 
This cCIIDDlittee agrees tull7, atter a s� of all of the 
evide:noe, that Hawaii's  admission as a State and ita representa­
tion in the Congress would add an informed and experie:noed element 
in our DAticmal deUberationa, both on detenee and on our relatione 
with the Orient.57 
.A.ttel" debate luting leas than tour hours, the eDAbllng act pe.aaed 
the House on JWe 30, 1947. The vote was 195 to 133, with Republicans 
tavoring the bill by a large aajori ty. Kost of the Demooratio vote was 
aga.inat the measure, probably- due to Southern opposi t:l.on on racial grotmda . 
In the debate, however, the only- argument advanced strongly against statehood 
55Hearings, H.R. J.e-56, PP• l.,o, 43, 50, 79, 86, 139, 203, 214-220, 
310J House Report Bo. 254, P• 5 ;  "Hawaii, Star tor Good Behavior," lfewa-
1188k, ill (JUly- r4,--r94.71, 24. hereatter cited as •Hawaii, Star• J -
"!iij&ndall and Day-, op. cit., 291 . - -
56m,u. Report No. 194, P• 21; see ibid.,  1, 12-19. - -
57Ibid., 14. 
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was that of non-oontigui ty.56 This passage by the House was another mile-
stone in the statehood movsent. 
In July of 1947, a.tter a preliminary study of the enabling aot 
passed by the House, the Senate Cammi ttee on Publio Landa59 planned a sub-
cCXDJDittee investigation in the islands . A special session ot Congress 
internned, so the chainnan of the SUboo.mmi ttee on Territories and Insular 
.Af'tairs, Guy Cordon, was requested to make the inwatigation. With the 
aid ot Judge carl E.  1r.lmberly, Oiroui t Court judge of Oregon, hearings 
were held tram January 5 to January 20 ,  1948. on the islands of Oahu• 
Kauai , Kolokai. LaDai,Jiaui and Hawaii .  Subsequently, a hearing in Wash-
ington by the tull aubcammi ttee took place on .April 15 . 
Meanwhile President rrau.n had &gain advocated statehood. in his 
annual message ot January 7, 1946· Further, he included it as a part ot. 
his Ci nl Rights Program which· he presented to Congress in a special mea-
sage of February 2. 
. 
Despite a special effort by Senator Cordon and Judge ll1mberly to 
encourage expressions in opposition to statehood, 215 ot the 231 wi tneasea 
favored the step. Opposition amounting to forty peroent marked the mail 
received by the senator in the islands, titteen peroent ot which was baaed 
on the race question and eight peroent on the Commlmist threat. rhe 
58congresaional Record, 60 Congress,  1 Session, Vol.  93, Part 
VI, 7916-"1923J 7927-7§1.i'J.J Hearings , H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, lO·llJ House 
Report � 254, P• 5J "HaWBli, Stir," 25. 
59SUbsequently the name of this committee became Committee on 
Interior and Insular Atfaira. 
testimony c emcerning Ccmmunism will be di scussed later. Ill addition to 
the old iuuea ot the Japaneae, the •Big FiTe, "  and reapporticmaent, testi-
many oentered around the war-time mil1 tary govermaent and the interDA tiOD&l. 
signiticaDCe ot ata.tehood. As in pra.oticall;y all testimony ainoe the •r, 
the iaaues ot Japanese lo,al t;y, bloo TOting and .A.aiatio ottice holden 
11'8re treated taTOrabl;y by the majorit;y ot witnenes . .A. lazose number ot 
Hawaiian organizat1cma-stUdent, induatrial, labor, ed110at1em, raoi&l, 
Tete ran and sooial--pre sated reaolut1cma or representati Tel to expresa 
a desire tor statehood. 6o 
Reasons in opposition included tear ot the Japanese, bloo TOti.Dg, 
and the feeling that Hawaii did not haTe men capable ot holdillg high ot­
tioe . 61 Dapre asi � waa the testimony related to the interDAtion&l scene . 
Propementa argued that atatehood not onl;y would bring into Congresa men 
well aoquainted w1 th attaira in the T1 tal Paoitio area but also adept in 
interracial relati cma .  It wa s  further asserted tha t  the grantiDg
_ 
ot 
statehood to Hawaii, with ita large .Aaiatio populati on, would greatl;y 
enhance UD1 ted states prestige in the Yar Baat, as well as strengthen 
the toroes ot demoorao;y eweywhere . Bvidence ot the interest ot Scmoe. 
60cougreesional Raoorcl, 80 Congress ,  2 Seasiem, Vol .  94. Part I 
33, 929J Heartiigs, H. R. 49 ii1d s. 114; em bloc voting, 5, 13, 25, 28, £2. 
W.., 60, 65, 69, So, aa, 106, 125, 129, 152, 155, 165, 167, 185, 191, 202, 
219-220, 22'7J on Japaneae office holdera , 3-5, 26, 28, (fJ, em Japa.Dese 
loyal:t,', 11, 14. 29•30, 34, 45, �-50, 57, 67-68, 87, 89, 180-181, 210-
211, 221, 239, 250 1  on reapporti ODIIlent, 227, 238-239, 271, �3-�5. See 
also Cordon Report, 10; XU:ytendall and Day, op. oi t. , 293• 
. - -
61Bear1Dga, H.R. 49 &nd S. 114, PP• 7•11, 37·39, 93• 
&nd other south sea islands, as well as India, 1n the statehood movanent 
was presented. There 118.s the argument that statehood would be a weapon 
in fighting C<DIIluni811l 1n Asia. • 62 
SeDAtor Cordon' s  report oontained favorable OCIDD18Dt upon the 1Jallai-
ia.n judioial system, one ot the purposes ot the inT&stiga.tion being to 
reassess this 'Vi tal part ot JJaerioa.n govei"DDaent. 63 rhe SeDAtor found the 
olimate ot statehood opiDi.cm even more favorable than in 1940 . :JJe sug-
gested that longer failure to grant statehood would not only bring into 
question the •good tai th ot Congress, .64 but would depri n the tJD1 ted 
Sta.tes ot a.n opportunity' to shcnr that "• • •  it means what it says ADd 
praotioee what it urges when advooa.ting true demooraoy tor all peoplee • .65 
He ocmoluded tha.t Ba.waii wa.s re�dy tor statehood a.nd reoCIDIII.8nded that the 
eDAbling aot be tavorabl7 reoOIDIIended to the SeDAte tor immedia.te pa.sage.66 
The ensuing one-day hearing in washington in .A.pril brought ta."YOr-
able test:laOJ17 trcm tJnder Secretary ot the Interior Oeoa.r L. Chapaan, 
Mr. Seth Richardson, who made the 1932 inwstiga.tion ot orimina.l la.w pro-
oedure in Hawaii, a.nd Kr. Robert L. Shivers. There was a. review ot wrioue 
62 Ibid.,  4, 117, 166, 183, 231, 249, 268, ¥>1, 493· 
63 Judge 111mberlr made a epeoial 1nve.tigat1cm ot the Hawaiian ju­
dicial srsta, hie letter ot report, Februar,y 12, 1948, being inoluded in 
the Cordon Rllport, 12-15. 
64I'bid., a. 
65Ib1d�, 11. 
66Cordon Report, 1-2, 11. 
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mainland Gallup polla . The third poll in 1948 indicated that si%t1-six 
peroent favored statehood, fifteen peroent opposed and nineteen peroent 
were without opinions . In the 191.!6 poll, sixty peroent had been tavor­
able J in 1941, only forty-eight peroent. This was an indication that 
favorable Ba:waiian and main] and opiDion had i'Doreased in s:bailar propor-
tiOD8 . The Delegate preaented lists of twenty-tour :aaticmal and DiDetJ'• 
eight Hawaiian and mainland looal organisations favorable to statehood. 
:ao-ver, one se:aator expressed the idea that the cammittee should work 
alcnrly, ainoe the atep, cmoe taken, was irrevooable . 'nrl.a wae a tamiliar 
theme to ata tehood proponents . ID Jlay the COIIIIIli ttee on Interior and In­
sular .Utaira decided that no tllrther action would be taken until suoh 
time as thou JUIIII.bers of the committee ao de airing might make an inTeati-
gation iD Ba'Rii .  Se:aator w. F .  KDcnrland ot Calitol"Dia, ardent supporter 
ot statehood, took an unprecedented step in introducing a resolution to 
releaae the bill tram the cCIIIDlittee Slld place it on the Se:aate f'loor, bu� 
his mow was blocked. In June the ccami ttee authorized its chairman, Sen-
ator Hugh Butler of Bebrasb, to arrange tor an inwatigation in Hawaii. 
!he results of this i.nwetigation wre not reported until the �ext Jtme, 
and, since they dealt w1 th the question of C<DIIlUDi•, they will be dis­
ousaed later. 67 No turtber action was taken by the Senate in the Eightieth 
67BeariDga, R.R. 49 and S. 114, PP• �5, ¥;-!,64, 485-491, 495J 
statehoocl for ..---waii, Caamnmiat Penetration of the Hawaiian Ialu.ds, 
Lport, le'I&iiTe to InTeat1gatlon With Riteriiic'i"'W H.R. 49, BO Ccmgreaa, 
� Session, 2, hereafter referred to as Butler Report.a Xuybnd&ll and Day, 
� cit. , 294• 
Since the adnnt of a new Congress meant the introduction and 
passage of a new statehood bill, Hawaii had lost another rotmd in its 
battle tor a star. But the action of the Rouse in the Eightieth Congress 
had been the aoat pramisiDg step in the entire histor,r of the movement. 
Between January 3 ad Februaey 3. 1949, six enabling acta were 
introdUDed in the House. In the SeDAte one bill was introduced in Janu-
ary followed by another later in the session. There were other hopetul 
sigll .  President Tr1Dan. on Januar,y 5. in his a.xmual message to Congress 
ag&iD. requested passage of his Civil Rights Program as outlined the pre-
vious year. Since this program included the granting of statehood to 
B'a11'&1i• the Prelident• s message was a reiteration of his beUef that Hawaii 
wa.s read:y tor full partnership in the union. Incidentally, his tint reo­
CIIIII.endatton in 1946 had marked a departure trCD precedent. !io pre"rioua 
President had included statehood in his program of desired legislation. 68 
Further, there are indications that maiDla.nd sentiment was still 
highly favorable . Betwen 19lt6 aDd 19qa, tnnty-seftn nattonal organ!-
zations had passed resolutions favoring Hawaii ' s  bid. The Hawaiian State­
hood C(llllllisaion compiled a list of editorial OCIIIIIL8nts for the first three 
months of 1949, in which seventy-six edi tora wrote favorably of statehood. 
Only two D.Enrapa.pers, both in South Carolina• in thirty-two states a::presaed 
opposition.&:} 
68cT1aicmal. boord, 81 Congress. 1 Session, Vol . 95. No. 1, PP• 12 ... l,J�2, P• tf1 lo. 3, P • 96; No. 13. PP •  758. 84J.J !To. 79. 
P• 5732J ibid ••  Vol. 95. Part I. 76. 
69Ibid.·. No. 15. P• A533; Bo. 56, PP• 2077�078. 
Hearings held between Karch 3 and a, 1949, by the SUboammittee on 
Territorial and Insular Poseeseione of the House Cammi ttee on Public Landa 
again brought expressions of oTel"llhelming support for statehood. Long-
time supporters Secretary Krug and Representative Larcade again pled 
Hawaii ' s  cauae. SeOret&l"J' Charles H. Bre.mlaD of the Department ot jgri• 
culture endorsed the enabling act. The Department of Natione.l Defense 
interposed no objeotiau. Two pieces of opposing testilllcmy •re baaed 
upon fear of Cammunilllll in the islands • ODe of these was a letter from. 
island Senator lf. H. Hill who was the only territorial legislator TOting 
against a Jlaroh resolution in faTOr of immediate statehood. .Another let-
ter tram a mainland resident listed unsettled world affairs and the quea-
tion of non-oontigui t, as sufficient reasons tor delaying statehood. !he 
cCIIImi ttee chaizman did DOt feel thAt these ·requests for delay ot ccmDDi ttee 
action nre sufflciently substantiated to be given serious consideration. 
The international signitic&.DOe of the granting of statehood again got 
its share of attention. Probably mo1t sipitioant was the stataent, in 
a resume of past Congressional aoticm, that 
• • • the record on Hawaii il CCIIlplete . Virtually ewrything 
there is to lmow about Hawaii h&s been chronicled. • • • Her 
social, political, cultural, and econCIIlic structure baa been 
subjected to an eDDlination th&t was tmheard of when the other 
29 Territories were candidates for etatehood.70 
The eD&bliDg aot was reported to the CCIIIII!i ttee on Public Lande, 
which, on !larch a, 1949, -roted to report the bill favorably to the House .  
7°Beartnge, H.R. � and Bel. Bille , • lOJ see also ibid., 
12-17, 26, 34, 36, 16, 47· 
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The one dia.enting vote was based upon indecision as to the question of 
non-oont1guity.71 
despite the_ poll of CongresBicmal opinion bt a Hearst DeWBpa.per in which 
statehood was tavored three-to-one. Delegate P'a.rrington was reported to 
have blamed the inaotion upon Congressional leaders. who did not wish to 
consider the issue in the 1949 aesaion.72 
At the beg1Dning of the next Congreaaicmal eeasion. President Tru­
man. •pbaaiziDg its plaoe in his Ci"Vil Rights Program again recCIIIJII8nded 
statehood on January' 4, 1950. Six data later. presidential endorsement 
was strengthened bf the report of the HPuse Special Commi. ttee on Paoitic 
i'erritories and Island Possessions . This committee . just returned from 
an inspection trip of Pacific and P'a.r Bast areas . had• on two occasions. 
stopped in lilwai.i .  Ita report argued that statehood was the wish of the 
Hawaiian people . that the serious strike of 1949 indicated the need ot 
the islands tor a state goTerDilent which alone would be strong enough to 
cope with such •ergenoies • and that the grant of eta tehood YOuld aid 
Un1 ted states prestige in the Pacific and Far Bast bt presenting a re-
affimatlon of AIDerican faith in democrao1 to counteract CQIDJilunist propa­
ganda. •It Lawa1y." the c<lllllli ttee felt. •has been a lighthouse of 
damocrao1 in the Pacific • • • •  •13 •People ot the Pacific look to lllwaii 
nn,id ••  so. 
12congre88iOD&l Record. 81 Congress. 1 Session. Vol. 95. No. 143. 
P• A5�. 
73ccmgresaicmal Record, 81 Congress. 2 Session• Vol .  96. No . 8, 
P• A211J see also ibid.. A210-A211J ibid • •  No. 2. P •  65.  
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• • •  as the Frenoh do to Paris • • • •  •74 The oCIIIJDittee reoCDmended im­
mediate statehood for what it oonlidered the oultura.l oenter of the 
Fa.oifto.75 
Ill House debate on the eD&bling aot in IIAroh, Delegate Farrington 
pointed out that the aooounta of the 'ftrious bearings on statehood now 
filled 3,000 pages. There had been over 700 witnesses heardJ eighty or 
ninety a-.bers of C�ress bad inwetigated ata.tehoodJ and almost titty 
Congres•en had visited the islands . The delegate also referred to a 
mai.Dland opinion poll of February 22, wbioh indicated a ratio of tour to 
one in taTOr of statehood. Aa debate progressed, the out.taud1ng opposi­
tion arggaents were tears ot CaaUDi•, the queetion of extending state­
hood to non-oontiguoue terri tory, and the old raoial question. Hollever 1 
on lfaroh 7, the bill passed by a vote ot 262 to 110. F'or a second tlme 
the House bad given ita appro'ftl to sta�hood. The next day the Sen& te 
referred the bill to the Camm.i ttee on Interior and Insular Attain. While 
the results ot this CCI!Dili ttee• s bearings are not known at this writing, 
Preeident Truman on Jfay 5 oampl.iaented the oammi ttee ohairma.n on the 
thoroughlleu of the investigation. The same month the President aaaured 
Hawaiian statehood proponent. that he would make ewry eff'ort to gain 
pa.aaage by the SeDAte duriDg the session. However, in June, the threat 
ot opposition trcm Southern seuatora on grounds of raoe appeared when 
74n,id., No. 8, P• A210. 
75Ibid. ,  J210-A211. 
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SeD& tor .Allen Ellender of Louisiana announced his oppoli tian because 
Hawaii • a people •are quite different f'ram our people . • • .r•76 
By July a national magazine was reporting that the desire tor 
early adjourmaent in an eleotion year would prevet Senate consideration 
during the 1950 session. When, on June 30, the deciaion tor all-out aid 
to South Korea against CCIIIIII.unist inV&ders was azmounced by President Tm-
man, action on statehood became even less llkely. Not only would there 
be more pressing measures tor consideration, but, it the past record was 
any indication, a change in the form of government in Hawaii at a time ot 
extreme crisi s  in the Far East would not appeal either to Congress or to 
military and naV&l leaders . u this is being written, the Ukelihood is 
that statehood will be deterred until the next Congress, when the whole 
prooe,. of introduction of a bill and passage b7 both houses will be 
required. 77 
out of the myriad of hearings, reports ,  debate and discussion 
there had appeared b7 mid-1950 tour balic issues in the statehood que•-
tiona {1)  the racial OCIIlposition of the island populationJ (2 ) the ques­
tion of extenSion of statehood to nan-oontiguous territory, (3)  the a mount 
ot Ccamunist intiltra.tian in the island.s J and (4) the international sig-
nificance of statehood. 
76•f.be· Preiscope,• Newsweek, XXXV (June 19, 1950 ), 13; aee also 
ibid. (Jiay a, 1950),  15J Congressional Reoo� a1 Congress, 2 Session, 
io . li4, PP • 2821-2824, 2906=2§23, 2992J Bo. ,.p .. 3035J  No.  95, P •  .!3783; 
No. 194. P• 7023. 
77.'!he Periscope," Nft'BW8ek, XXXVI (JUly 3, 1950 ) ,  a ,  ibid. {July 10, 
1950 ),  17 . 
The racial issue, of course, continues to revolve mainly around 
the large n\IJlber of people of Japa.nese &:aoeatry in the islands. There 
is still in the islands a small taotion which insists that the Japanese 
are a menace . And, as pre'V'ioualy suggested, in an eooncmic orisis at-
tended by Ullaaplo,aent and limited circulation of money the tremendous 
competition which the Japa.nese•.Americans, by virtue of their numbers aloue, 
'WOuld otter other raoial groups might engender more wide-apread antagcmia. 
Furthemore, as the Canmmiat question has beoCIII.e praninent, there bAs 
been a alight but ob'V'ioua tendemy on the part ot a fflff to suggest that 
the Japanese element is more susceptible to CCIDJIIUDist influence than other 
racial groups. On the basis ot the limited information now &'ftilable, 
there aeema little reason to believe that, proportiOD&tely, those ot 
Japanese .a.noeatry are any more aoti ve in the CCIIIDlunist program tJlan per-
sons ot other raoial extractions. However, the very taot that such ideas 
are entertained by even a few indicates that the Japanese-.Alaericans still 
have a oertain amount of prejudioe to overoome in the islands.  By and 
large, howaTer, the reoord seems to indioate that the majority of Hawaii ' s  "' 
people are fighting a wiDning battle against racial a.ntagcmiam. No raoe 
riot bas ever troubled Hawaiian h\ID&n relations. The tradition ot racial 
harmony and tolerance ia long and probably unequalled in 8.'1J¥ part of the 
world. Therefore, 8.1J¥ potent opposi �on to statehood baaed on the raoe 
question will probably stem tram the mainland. · Even here euoh oppoli tion 
seems confined to the South, if expressions of Congreeaicmal opinion and 
newspaper editorials are any indioation. But, as in lina.ii,  raoial bias 
must intlue:ace only a small element, since numerous Southern netrspapers 
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haw advooated etatehood, wbile Congreuicma.l leaders such as Representa­
tive Larcade of Louisia.na and Se:aator Bates X.tauwr ot TeDnessee have 
been outapoken in their support. All indications lead to the conclusion 
that, while some opposition based on raoe will continue to be voiced, it 
alone will not block Hawaii ' s  realisation of statehood. 
Opposition based on non-contiguity otters a greater, it les s tenable, 
obstac le . In a radio debate on the Town Meeting of the Air in the tall 
ot 1949, Senator Harry P. Cain of the State of ashington, in oppoaing 
ianediate atatehood, dec lared that the SeDate would not act until a policy 
cODCeming the admisaion of non-contiguous te rritory had been formulated. 
"Ho such policy," he said, •has as yet been either seriously discussed or 
agreed to •" Until this •tundamentally important question• was 1ettled, 
he held a dim 'ri.ew tor statehood prospects. Thia stand was not new. Even 
though those most im.preased bf thia question no longer based their argu­
ments on mere distance . Modern t:ra.n.portation and cC'I!Il!Dmication facili­
ties han brought Hawaii closer, in time , to Wash.ington, D. c . ,  than were 
Jll&ll1 ot the early states . Fears based upon non-contiguity' rest U1'Qly 
on two points a (1)  to admit Hawaii would set a precedent which might 
morallY' obligate the Un1 ted Sta tea to admit other non-contiguous areas 
suoh Puerto Rico, Samoa and South Paoit1c islands under United states 
control ; and (2 ) to open the door to non-contiguous areas would increase 
the m.ebenhip in the alrea� umrieldy houses of Congress. In this op­
position there seams to be no te� ct ob&Dging the poll tical bal&DOe in 
236 
Congress, siD.ce , iD. post-war year a, statehood for Republican Hawaii has 
been coupled with that for predQ!Pinantly Deocratic .A.l.um.78 
In. hie rebuttal ' to Senator Cain's  argument, Delegate Farrington 
gave the tre.di tioDAl repl;y that this question bad been settled iD. 1900 
'When the Organic Act established a territorial goverDD.ent for Hawaii. In• 
volved also in this issue 11 the immemorial claim of sta.tehood proponents 
that the United States bad •promised• Hawaii statehood-at least by im• 
plication. 
The questions of non-oontigui t;y and the •promise• must be traced 
back to the amuaatian of Hawaii .  .Aotually these issues s tem  fr(lll. eTen 
earlier hiatoey. The BortlDMst Ordinance of 1787, passed by the Congre88 
of the Ccm1'ederation, established the prinoiple of adm.i tting western ter-
;n 
ri tortes, upon the meetiug of certe.in qualific&ti.Ol18 , to the union on a 
basil equal to the first states.  The Conati tution, as  preTioualy aug-
gested, was silent as to the admi ssion of new states other than. to grant 
Congress the power to reoei w new :members iD.to the union. Precedent, how• 
ever, bas taken on almost the force of law. .1'98ry continental terri tory 
of the UDi ted States has ewntually been granted statehood. Furtheraore, 
as statehood proponents are quick to point out, the Philippine Islands 
and Puerto Rico both came UDder aerican jurisdiction at the time when 
Hawaii was annexed. Yet, Hawaii a.lone was granted territorial s tatus, an 
indica.tion of apeoial consideration. 79 
78quotations iD. � :Meeting Bulletin, 12; see also ibid. , 10, 13, 22 . 
79chi twood and Onle;y, op. cit., 2lt>-247 ; cordon Report, 7 .J Bearinss, 
H.R. 49-56, PP• 18-19 . 
- -
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Much emphasis bas been laid upon the actions of the United Sta tea 
leading up to ume:ration in 1898 as implying a •premise• of statehood, 
and, consequently, inn.lida t1J1g the non-oontigui ty &rg1118Zlt. Despite 
many stat..ents to the ccmtra17, the treaty of azme:xation of 1897, like 
ita predecessor in 1893, did DDt provide statehood for Hawaii.  It did 
provide territorial status. The Hawaiian senate inoluded in its reaolu-
tion of ratification, September 9, 1897, the camplete treaty. Congress 
in the Newlands Resolution of 1898, by which anne:mtion was cona\B&ted, 
agreed to the following a "Besolftd E,l � Senate � House ot Represen-
tatives • • •  , That said cession is accepted, ratified, and conti:naed 
• • • • •80 Since •said cession• refers to the ratifying act of the Hawaiian 
semte, in which the treaty granti.Dg territorial status was incorporated, 
statehood supporters have al"gued that the Uni tad States thereby promised 
eventual statehood. The wording of the resolution was repeated by Kinis­
ter Harold M. Sewall in the oeraaonies ot August 12, 1898, when DL'W&ii 
was fo.naally &Dnexed. This rather tenuous logic, whatewr its w.lidi ty, 
seems superficial in the tace of muoh stronger cla.ima . •Promise" baa �lao 
been read into the debate and discussion regarding ume:ration in which 
CongressiOD&l and administrative leaders recognized that te rritorial status 
might lead to statehood. Honwr, these expressions clearly could not be 
considered b1ndi.ng upon succeeding Congresses or :a.ational administrations . 81 
80House Report llo. 194, P• 27J see also ibid., 25-26J Kuykendall and 
Day, .!f.!_ .clt., 287. For an attack upon the •prCiilse* arg\Dent by lllSilbera 
ot th��ongre�aioual inwstigating cOIIIIIli.ttee, see Bearings, H.R. 3034. 
PP• 6o-61, 111·112, 119, 152, 158-159, 169. 
81Ibid.,  324J Hear.t.ng , H.R. 3643, P• 3• 
More pertinent was the debate leading up to pas sage of the Organic 
.&Qt in 1900. Both in the House and Senate amendments stipulating that 
the extension of territorial status could not be c onsidered as a prom.iae 
ot atatehood were blocked. These rejections and n\ID.erous cCIIIIDents during 
the debate indicate that the Congress was wll aware that territorial 
status implied ultimate statehood. 82 .Again the statements were not bind• 
ing. Nor were the cOIIIDients and intentions ot the cCIIIIIlission appointed by 
President lloXinl.ey to drai"t the Organic .l,ot. Q1e oCIIIIIdssioner, SeDAtor 
John r. Morgan of .Alabama, made several speeches while in Bawaii in which 
he indicated that s tatehood would not be tar distant. !he only survi:ring 
lll8lllber of the ocami ssion in 1947, 11'8.1 ter F. Frear, wrote to Delegate 
Farrington that the oamaiaaion had decided upon territorial status at 
ita first mee ting and bad recognized the implication ot eventual state-
�od. However, another commissioner, Senator Sb.elby M. Cullum ot nlinoi a,  
in the debate on the aot, stated that he was not favorable to statehood­
at least in the near tuture •B3 
But none of the foregoing events actually established Hawaii' s 
right to statehood. The '98.lid claim of Hawaii stems traa the Organic 
Act, which s tates a " . • • that the oonati tution shall have the same 
82ooucreaaional Record, 26 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. ��. Part III, 
2024, 2181, 2166, 2188, 2194, 21#), 2MSJ Part IV, �704. �ilOJ Hearings,  
H.R. 49 and Rel. Billa, P •  26; Hearings, H.R. 236, P• 4J,2; Congressional 
Record_, 75 Congress,  1 Session, Vol. 81, Part III, 2592 ; Hearings, B'.R. 
3034, P• 324; Cordon Report, 7 ; Kuykendall and Day, 2.E!_ o!t. ,  287-288 . · 
83Hearings, Con. Res. 18, PP • 415-4J.6J Hearings, H.R. 23(>, P •  411 ; 
Congress10ii81 Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part III, 2189J 
Frear to Farrington, Jlaroh �. 1947, Bearings,  B.R. 49-56, PP• 1�7-1�. 
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toroe and effect within said Terri tory a.a elsewhere in the United �tea •• 84 
In this statement and in its provieiona for e. terri torie.l gowrmnent, the 
Organic J.ct legally recognized Hawaii' s  right to that status which his-
torice.lly implied statehood. SUch e.n interpretation of the Organic Act 
is confirmed by various SUpreme Court decisions . In the so-called Insular 
Cases, the Supreme Court ruled in 1903 that Hawaii �s an integral pe.rt 
ot the UD1 ted Sta.tes to which the Constitution applied in tull. It 
clearly differentiated between Hawaii and other isla.nd areas which haw 
status as dependencies. Further continuation came fran Chief Juatice 
Te.ft in 1922 'When he ruled that • • • •  incorporation has always been a 
step and e.n important step leading to statehood. w85 
The case or o•Donoghue .!!. un1 ted Sta.tes, in which the Supreme 
Court differentiated between the atatua of courts ot the District or 
Columbia a.nd those ot the terri toriea, brought a ruling that " . • • as e. 
preliminary step toward that foreordained end L•tatehooy -to tide over 
the period of ineligibility-Congress, tran time to time, created terri• 
torie.l goverments, the existence cf which � necessarily limited � �  
period 2!_ pupilage.• In this decision the court referred to two previous 
rulings . cm.e reada •The terr�torial status is one ot pupilage at best." 
The other st&teda •A terr1toJ'7, \Dlder the constitution and laws ot the 
United states is an inchoate sta.te ."86 
84n,id.,  37. 
85Hear:I.Dga, H.R. 3034, P• 162J see also Rouse Report No. 194, P• lOJ 
Bta�s, R.i. 49-56, P• 97J Hearings, H.R. 3034: PP• 126, '3Z;i Heirings, 
H.R�36. P• llu BOWIIIAn, loc . cit., 252-253; Crawford, loo . cit. , 60. - - - -
86Btari.D§s, H.R. 236, P• 14. Italics e.re those ot the source . 
Therefore. Hawaii's  claim to statehood by' 'Virtue of her territor-
ial statue reate upon three eleente a (1 ) the priD.oiples and praoticea 
of American political expansion. as established by the Northwest ordi-
nance of 1787J (2 ) the Organic .Act. which established Hawaii as a territoeyJ 
and (3 ) the decisions of the Supreme Court defining a territory aa an em-
bryo state . It follows that the decision as to whether non-contiguous 
territories would be granted statehood was made in 1900. BeTertbelesa, 
this objection to Hawaiian statehood continues to appear. Established 
legal right will not prevent members ot Congress fran hesitating to wel-
came into the union an area separated by over 2.000 miles of water 'fran 
the other states. The question of DOD-oontiguity is still an obstacle 
to sta. tehood. 87 
Before discussing the e'Videnoe concerning the iDtil tra.tion of 
CCIIIIIltmism in the islands, two other matters deserve oCB:�DDent. The tirat 
relates to .Auetra.liau•born Harry Bridges. president of the national I .t.w.u., 
and the man who always baa made the tiDAl decisions concerning not onl7 
west coast and lii:waiian shipping strikes but strikes in the I.t.w.u.-
dominated sugar and pineapple industries of Hawaii.  Dl April of 1950. 
atter two previous trials. Bridges was convicted in a San Fra.noisco Fed-
eral Court of perjury and evasion of naturalization laws in denying his 
member1hip in the CCIIIIIlUDiat Party. Two of his close associates. also 
I.t.w.u. leaders, also were convicted. Given a prison sentence of tive 
78&ra • Bridges • was subsequentlY' depri Ted of his oi tiseuhip. 88 
87•Bawati. Star. " 25. 
88• •Arry the ccamy. • li8'W8week. XXXV (April 17. 1950).  29·30· 
Closely related ie the second matter. On Jlay 1, 19�. the I.L.w.u. 
longehoreen of Hawaii struck for higher wages . This strike • lasting 159 
days. virtually pa.r&lyzed Hawaiian life a.nd eoon<DY• Moreowr. the wage 
illorea.se fina.lly gained by the workers ha.rdly compensated for their losses 
in -.ges. The strike. dealing a hard blow to the sugar. pineapple and 
touriat enterprises, cost Hawaii a.n estimated tloo,ooo,ooo. In taot. the 
only winner was Harry Bridges, silloe the new contract w1 th Hawaiian ship-
ping firms was to expire on the same day as those held by unions w1 th 
mainland ehippers . Bridges now 'Virtually ruled Paoitic ehipping. and• 
eoneequently • the lifeline of Hawaii . 89 
The strike was only thirty-Dine days old when Delegate Farrington 
reported to the House that it bad • • • •  created a. crisis  without parallel 
in the history of Hawaii. • • • The health and wlta.re of the people of 
the islands are in jeopardy. " The delegate explained the failure of the 
territorial govel"DIII.ent to make any progre sa in s trike settlement and 
called upon President Tl"\IDAn to force resumption ot eh1pp1ng.90 The fol-
lowing day he . introduced a. bill which would have authorized federal seiture 
of •hipping f'aoilities in case of strikes or other threats to the island 
lifeline. Despite the introduction ot three suoh bills • the delegate was 
\Ul&ble to enlist federal intervention. There was , h.onver, considerable 
69"VictorJ for Bridges. • Benweek. XXXIV (October 17. 1949), 28; 
Congressional Reoord. 81 Congress, 1 Session. Vol.  95, No. 116. P• A4334. 
90congreasional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session. Vol. 95, No. 101. 
P• A374S• 
expression ot alazm in the Senate . A letter wa.s introduced tran a IJA• 
..Uan citizen pointing out that only a tew Camm.lmiats with Bridges ' 
ponr could imperil the ialands .9l The washington Daily .!!!!!!. on August 4. 
1949, received a report that Mosccnr had praised the striking activities 
ot Bridges ' union. Meanwhile, a Scripps-Howard reporter, Edwin c .  Heinke, 
exp:resaed belief that the I.L.w.u. was def'.l.nitely under Ccmmlmist leader­
ah1p.92 
In the 1930 ' s  there had been little mention ot C<mmnmism in the 
islands . There had been, early in the century, a Socialist Party, but 
a w:l. tn.ess in 1937 said there nre then very tew Sociali sts in Hawaii. 
However, to the investigating commi. ttee ot that year was submitted an 
editorial trcm the Honolulu Advertiser praising the newly organized In-
cfustrial .Usooiation ot Hawaii, one ot whose aims was to tight CCIIDilu• 
nistic influence . In 191.JO C<111111UD1sts bad taken ad:n.ntage ot the practice 
blackout to distribute anti-.rar prop&g&Dda.93 
As on the mainland, serious c onsideration ot the Ccmmlmist me:DAOe 
did not deTelop until atter the war. It was in November of 1947 that 
Bl.waii was startled by the publication ot a pamphlet entitled � Truth 
.About CCIIIIIluni sm � Hawaii . More generally known as the Izuka Pamphlet, 
this account was written by an �rican ot Japanese ancestry who cla.im.ed 
9libid., Bo. 102, P• 7653J l'o.  88, PP • 6505-6506.; Bo. 114, PP• 
8578-8580, 6584,; No. 86, PP• 6�-6344,; No. 115, PP• 8701-8702. 
92Ibid. , Bo . 141, P •  10952; lDloxville !len-Sentinel, August 2-4. 
1949. 
93&,arings , Con. Rea. 18, PP• 385-366,; Barber, � cit. , 218. 
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mem.bership 1n the Ccmnunist Party tram 19;8 to 1946. The son ot planta­
tion laborers , whose lite he described under the headiDg ot "Fertile Soil 
tor CCIIIIIlunism, " Izuka traced his tirst oontaots with the CC'IIIIl\1D.ist1, among 
wham he Usted Jaok w. Ball, present regional director ot the I.t.w.u. 
1n Hawaii .  He described the tactics by whioh he claimed the CCIDDlunists 
gained o ontrol ot Hawaiian unions , the :majority membership ot whioh was 
unaware that it was a tool tor party action. In compa.ny ri th Jaok B!Lll 
he attended a training school 1n SaD Francisco until the outbreak ot 
World war II, when Camm.uni1t schools were discontinued. At that time the 
German-Soviet non-agreseion paot was 1n etteot and the Camm.unist Party 
teared scrutiny by the Federal Bureau ot Investigation. The Jil:waiian 
CCIIIDlunists tai thtully toll owed the about-taoe 1n propaganda following the 
Geman attaok upon Russia in 1941. During the war I&uka was detained tor 
aeveral months by the mill tary govel"DIIIent on charges ot inoi t1ng slow­
downs on defense work. During two hearings he denied CCIDDlunist attilia­
tion. 
Aooording to Izulr:a, the Camm.unist Party was rea.otivated 1n 1916 
atter a tront organization had been successtul, through "discussion groups , "  
1n eatabliehing a nl.lliber of party aembers as citizens highly re spected 
among the protessicmal and middle c lass ciroles of Hawaii . By' 1946 he 
olaimed there were Dine cells or groups on oahu and several on the other 
islands. AA is usual 1n CCIIDJlUDist organization, delegates tram each group 
made up an Executive Board which decided policy in the i &lands or handed 
down decisions tram higher, mainland echelDJlS • 
Izuka. wrote that the party got as many ot its members as possible 
into salaried positions in the unions and attempted to wean lmions away 
frc:m the .l.F. ot L. , which had proven more difficult to penetrate than 
the c .I.O. Izuka charged that praoticalq e"hry candidate endorsed by 
the P.A.C . in the 1946 elections was the choice ot the COIDJilUDist Party. 
It was a re sult ot this election that he left the organization. He 
dieapprond ot party support tor Republican Joseph R. Farrington tor 
the delegateship in oppoli tion to Democrat William Borthwick, wh<D 
Izuka described as an old triend ot labor in Hawaii . Izuk:a felt that 
the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, which Farrington owns, had been bought or 
duped into neutrality in the election in return for P.A..C .  endorsement 
ot Farrington. 
The Izuka. Pamphlet was followed in 1948 by � � �  Sovietize 
lkwaii, written by a Hilo radio oCIIDD9nta.tor, Thanas O' Brien. O' Brien 
charged that one I .L.W. U. local prohibited its members from joining the 
Hawaii National GuardJ that the fai lure ot the P.J..c . to win control in 
the 1946 eleotion and the opprobrilD. earned by its aotivities led the 
I.t.w.u. to take onr oontrol of the Democratic Party of Hawaii to t'Ur-
ther its political aims; and that the I.L.w.u. deliberately incited ita 
members to hatred of management, regardleu of industrial moves toward 
coopers. tion. 
01 Brien also reiterated Izuka 1 s charges ot some type of under· 
standing between the I .t.w.u. and the Honolulu star-Bulletin in the 1946 
election whereby Farrington received P.A.C . endorsement. It is only fair 
to note at this point that Delegate Farrington ran almost exclusively on 
a statehood plattorm in this eleotion. No one has charged him with pro­
CC�JDUD.ist leanings . Other than the ori ticisma ot Izuka and 0' Brien. ad­
nrae o0111Dl8Dt has generally been restric ted to Yr. Farrington' s  failure 
to repudiate I.t.w.u. support. To han alienated the labor vote would 
ban probably lost :Mr .  Farrington his seat in Congress at a time when 
he tel t almost certain be could wiD statehood tor Hawaii. 
There is an account by O'Brien ot the revolt ot one sugar workers ' 
looal on Big Island atter leaders oharged by Izuka to be C<WI!Dlmi eta re-
fused to deny party membership. To cCIII.bat this revolt. the I.L. w.u. 
held a "SUgar unity Conference" in J&llU&r,y ot 1948 at Bilo. At this con-
ference I&uka was ginn an opportunity to defend his chargee before a 
large group ot sugar workers . Howenr. according to O• Brien. the entire 
meeting was so closeq under the control of Jack BAll and one of Bridges• 
mainland associates that Izu.ka• s •bearing" was a taroe . The writer also 
claimed that the I.L. w.u. discouraged its members from rea.d:iDg newspapers 
or li•teni.Dg to radio programs not approwd by the union. .A.Dother indi-
oatlon to the author ot the C0111111un.ist leanings of the I.t.w.u. was the 
importation ot lett-wing singer Paul Robeson tor a fund-raising concert 
tour ot the islands . 
o• Brien wa.a convi:aoed that the I.t.w.u. supported statehood because 
it was certain to control the constitutional conwntion. Be felt that. 
" . • • until Hawaii kuon tor sure the strength of its cCIIDillmist-iD.oliDed 
labor \Dlion. " statehood should be deterre4.94 This writer reported that 
the I.t.w.u. tailed again in 1948 to gain control of the territorial legis­
lature .95 
· By this time Congreu was tald.ng muoh interest in the obarges of 
CCIDDlUD.ist intiltration in B!Lwaii.  In the hearings presided over by 
Senator Cordon and JUdge Wlmberly- in the winter of 19q8, 41soussion of 
Communi• in the islands was encouraged. ·Those who minimized the Ccamu-
nist aenaoe--and these were in the majority-usually expressed one or all 
ot the following ideas t (1 )  Communism would make no great headway among 
either labor or the general public of Hawaii, which •s alert to the danger� 
(2 ) statehood would strengthen HA.ti in its resistance to CCIIIIluniSDL, or, 
the CCIIIID.unist question bore no relation to statehoodJ (3 ) Cammunism was 
Hawaii ' s  problem to sol"" and it was no more a menace in the islands than 
on the mainland,; (4) Communism was a mainland importJ and (5 ) CQ11111l1m1am 
was a "red herring" •played by those who opposed atatehood.96 
An .A..F. ot L. representative felt there was sufficient evidenoe 
to pro"" that the I.t.w.u. was Ct1D1Dtm1 st-dCIIinated, but he felt that Ba-
waii probably could handle the problem. A university of Hawaii professor 
emphasized the growth of the right '!ing in labor organizations as a sign 
that Hawaii could meet the challenge. An .AJilerican Legion representative 
said that Hawaii could better handle the situation as a state. An I.L.w.u. 
95See ibid. • 1-79, with introductory mAterial, tor CCIILplete acco\mt 
ot O'Brien 's  ch&rges .  
96m.a,rtngs, R.R. 49 and S. 114, PP• 12·13, 20, 29, 45, 80, 77-78, 
89-90. 97=98. 118, 138, 144. 178, 164, 194, 221,  223, 229-230, 237' 277. 
259, 311-312, 324. 329. 346-347. 351, 385 · 
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representative pointed to the recent adoption by a sugar workers' con-
vention of a set ot principles including the idea that no political part.y 
would detemine its policies but that each union member's  own political 
ccmvict1ona would not be questioned by the union. !his, of oourae, 
meant the r.t.w.u. would make no attempt to rid ita lmiona of CCIDII1unists. 
A representative ot the H.s.P.A. stated that evidence of Communist at-
tempts to ga.in adherents among plantation workers had been folmd, but 
that the worlan:s were resbt:ing. The orga:aization felt that • • • •  
c<liiiDlunism will not glin an appreciable foothold in the rural portions 
of these ialand.a. •97 Others, iDcluding a lfethodist minister and the 
ed1 tor ot the Honolulu star-Bulletin joined in the general opinion that 
Ccamunistic inf'iltration 118.8 not atron.g among the rank and tile of workers. 
still others, iDoluding prominent businessman Walter F. Dillingham and an 
Hawaiian seD&tor, favored delay lmtil the extent of CCXIIDI.unistic influence 
could be better gauged. · Same spoke of infiltration among the Japanese-
a new tacet of the racial question. Several spoke of the apatey' of the 
island people toward the threat.98 
In his tinal Jleport, SeDAtor Cordon suggested that muoh of the 
tear ot CCIDDlunism had arisen as a resul4i ot the 19lt> sugar strike and the 
1947 pineapple strike. While he recognized• that in:tluenoes propelling 
these atrikes origina.ted on the wst coast of the mainland, he felt the 
97:aearings, H.R. 49 and s. 114, P• 20 J see also ibid., 27, 170, 
n-18, 89""96· . 
98Ibid., 30, W3, 70-71, 92-93, 132-133, 178, 184, 213, 323, 401-
1Jl7, 421, 469-470.  
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basic oontliot was not different frCIII. ma.inland labor disputes . He be-
lieved the strong bent of Rawaiian labor toward the I.L.w.u. •s the 
result of the traditional tie-up of HAwaiian industry with shipping and 
the eoonaaio bonds of Hawaii with the west coast rather than ezq attraotion 
for COIIIDI.unistio ideas. While Communists ha.d been aoti wly engaged in tr;r• 
ing to stir up ra.oe a.nd olass oonfliot within the UD.i.Olll, Cordon was oon-
'ri.noed that the Hawaiian people and workers were alert to the danger and 
resistant. Despite all efforts to estimate Cammunist �r, Cordon re-
porteda •The plain truth is that no one knows the extent of ccwmmmi st 
.suooess in Hawa1i.•99 He found no infiltration in the bra.nohes of the 
territorial or looal governments. His final oo:noluaicm was tha.t " • • •  
there will be ample proteot:l.cm against the intiltra.tion of Conmnmi st doo-
trines in the formation of the State ocmst:l. tution, wbioh must be approved 
by the President of the united States as well as the electorate of lJAwaii .•lOO 
Cordon's oo:noluaicm, howewr, was weakened appreciably by another state-
ment made later in the . same report that, because of the isla.nds' territorial 
status, 
• • • the people of Hawaii laok experienoe in handling the ordi­
nary, everyday problems of goverD�DeDt olose to the grass roots 
as on a State level. Whether there ia a laok of interest on the 
part of the people ia uncertain. The aaseument was diftioul t 
to make . The taot that they have not had as muoh experience in 
this respect as comes to the oit:l.zena of a State, while not their 
fault, is regretw.ble.lOl 
99cordon Report, 6J see also ibid., 5· 
lOOibid., 6� 
lOlibid. , 10-11. 
Yr. Shivers, war-time F.B .I.  agent in Hawaii,  who had made an 
inftstigation of CCIIDil'lmistic activities in liLwaii, said there was no evi­
dence ot CCDDLunist sabotage during the war a.nd that he believed Se:aator 
Cordon's  report was " •  • •  as accure.te as a�one could make it.wl02 In 
his opinion, Communists were no more active in Hawaii than in the 1Jni ted 
States, and, other than supporting certain candidates, were not represented 
in the territorial legislature or govel'DII8nt. He estimated there were 
about five revolutio:aar;y CamnUDists, wham he defined as thoee tek1ng 
orders tram Moscow, and from. 100 to 150 party msmbers who wre not revo­
lutionaries.103 
As previously noted, the Senate did not act upon the recc:muunda­
tion ot Se:aator Cordon tor immediate statehood in the spring ot 19�, 
but the C� ttee on Interior and Insular Affairs authorized its ohaiman, 
Senator Hugh Butler, to arrange tor further inftstigationa iD :BLwaii.  .A. 
apeoial innstigator, sent to Hawaii in August, contacted several hundred 
persons in field inspections lasting through almost two and one•h&lt months. 
Formal hearings by the committee, pl.amled for Hovamber, were oanoelled be­
cause of the Paoi.t'io coast maritime strike. Senator Butler, therefore, 
made a perso:aal investigation, holding same seventy-seven confidential 
interviews in November. Contacts by the senator with about one hundred 
other oi tizens were not recorded. Although listed in the investigation 
102Bearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, P• 486. 
103Ibid., 486-487. 
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files, the names ot witnesses are not published in the report. Senator 
Butler tel t much in.formation would not have been secured had the witnesses 
not been assured their DAUD.es would be bpt seoret.104 
According to Senator Butler' s report, the Hawaiian CCJDmunist Party 
is a part ot District No. 13 ot the Communist Party ot the United states 
of .America. District headquarters are in San Francisco. In the islands 
there are nine branches on oahu and one each on Big Island and Kauai . 
The Executive Committee, which directs party aot1vities when the geDeral. 
convention is not in session, is composed ot a delegate tram eaoh branch. 
This information, inoidenta.lly, tallies w1 th that ot the Izuka Pamphlet, 
as do liiAnY ot the names of alleged Cammuniats . Butler names the members 
ot the Executive Committee in 1947, among 'Wb.an is Jack BJlll. Others 
include the editor of the Hawaii star, a Communist-line, Japanese-language 
weekly, the territorial representative and director of public re lations 
tor the I.t.w.u. , an I.L.w.u. research worker, a former UDiversi ty of !ilwaii 
agricultural chemist, a secretary to an I .L.w.u. longshoreman• s local, a 
!IAui international representative ot the I.L.w.u. ,  and a national repre­
sentative tor a c . I.O maritime cook and steward union. 
Until 1947 the Hawaiian Communist Party's  activities, Butler as­
serts, wre secret • .  In September ot that year, at a district meeting in 
San Francisco, the !ilwaiian representative announced that, in close co­
operation with the I.L.w.u. leaders, the party pl.almed to use the Democratic 
Party tor political activities .  The dq following the a.rmouncement ot 
10lasut1er Report, 2·3· 
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this policy, the Honolulu star-Bulletin reported that the P.,A..C . ot the 
c . r.o. , active in 1946 and early 1947, was greatly restricting its ao­
ti"ri.ties and rec0DIIIl8Jlding the Democratic Party to I.t.w.u. members . Fran 
September to MeLroh, charges Butler, the I.t.w.u. made nery etf'ort to gain 
control of the Democratic Party under the guidance ot a recognized CCID.­
munist and I.t.w.u. leader. Through an unscheduled election of precinct 
club offtcers and convention delegates in lfarch, the I.t.w.u. got control 
of the territorial Democratic convention. Butler says that, as a result, 
•The to�er Democratic Party became the Communist ap�tus in the Terri­
tory of Hawaii • •105 The convention in May found forty-one CCIDD1unist Party 
members as delegates or alternates.  Soon af'ter the ooDTeDtion, :Mra . Vic­
toria x. Holt, Democratic National Camni ttee-woman am1ounoed in a radio 
address her candidacy for delegate to Congress, a move, she said, taken 
to oanbat C(Dllluni at control ot the Demooratio Party. She charged that 
the ordillary members ot both the Democratic Party' and the I.t.w.u. taoed 
the problem of' riddiDg themaelTes of control by the same comnnm1 st group. 
Long an advocate of' statehood, !Irs . Holt said that, because of' Communist 
inti.ltration, • • • •  I realize that we oa.zmot expect statehood--that we 
should not have statehood--until we prove to ourselves and to the rest 
of the United states that we oan solve the Communist problem.nl06 She 
warned that the I .L.w.u. , with its control of' shipping, pineapple and 
sugar, could wreck island economy by a general strike. She further stated 
l05Butler Report, 5 ;  also see ibid., 3-5. 
lo6autler Report, 7J see ibid., 5-7· 
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that CCIDDlunist success in infiltrating the Democratic Party presented the 
distinct possibility that it could• under statehood. control elected of-
ficiall. including the gowrnor and courts . TJnder territorial status there 
would a till be the safeguard ot CcmgreasioDAl review. She concluded. 
"We must prove that w can control the CCIDDlunist problem before we can 
expect Congress to grant us statehood.wl07 
Butler noted that several former Democratic Party members had 
indicated that the CCIIIIlunist-controlled I.L.W.U. group had a majority 
1d. thin the Democratic Party. 
According to Butler. the r.t.w.u • •  with its approx:l.mately 35.000 
members. had decided ac&inst a planned strike in tavor of pooling all 
' 
ettorts toward gaining c anplete m&�tery of the Democratic Party • since 
1948 was an election year.108 
Meanwhile the Camnunist Party oae into the open in October. 1948. 
w1 th headquarters in Honolulu. In a radio address the same month a Can-
munist leader announced party support tor brea.ld.ng up of large estates 
tor re-sale to small holders. reVised immigration laws to allOW' naturali-
zation tor all iDaaigrants. publio ownership of utili ties. and taxation 
on a basis of abili't7 to pay. He further stated• "We support the granting 
ot immediate statehood for Hawa.ii .•l09 There is• inoidentally. marked 
similarity betnen this platform and that of the P.A.c . in 19�· 
107Ibid ••  7. 
108Ibid. 
109Ibid •• 8 ; see also ibid • •  7 • For statement of Communist Ilarty 
program. •• Sari�J&s.  B.a. 4� ihd s.  114. PP• h82-�3· 
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.Uso described ie the Hawaii Civil Liberties Cammi ttee • which all 
evidence indicates is Ccnmmist-oontrolled. It sponsored a leoture tour 
by' a Calltornia CCIIDllUllist Party educational director in the islands. 
The lecture subject was CCIIIDluni8Dl1 and I.L.w.u. locals made considerable 
contributions to the f'unds sollci ted on the tour. This organization was 
supposedly started to get tunds tor defense ot an island school teacher• 
auspended for alle�ed Communist activities . 
Butler emphasized the vulnerability of Hawaii to shipping strikes . 
Not only did Hawaii sutter stoppage of tood, clothing. and construction 
supplies. which could br:l.Dg business to a halt, but strikes oould cause 
widespread unemployment. In the tourist season suoh strikes brought 
tremendous losses to hotels and island tran.portation. In addition, 
they inoreased export handling charges.  thus reducing greatly the margin 
of proti t on suoh prodwsta as sugar. Butler charged that the I.L.w.u. 
had o rea ted a strike pattern in whioh the settlament ot a Paoifio ooast 
strl:ke would be tolland by a Hawaiian shipping strike• in etteot doublin� 
the length ot the strike tor the islands . Further. by delaying tactics 
in negotiations and successive strikes. the san Fr&J:�oisco-dirwcted labor 
aoti vi ties would acaroel;y allow tinaDoial recovery frCIIl one crisis  be-
fore iDi tiatiDg another. Butler saw here 
• • •  the .familiar pattern of the Canmunist "so:rtening up• 
by eooDCIIlio attrition before the big push for the final coup 
d1 etat. If the Territory ot Hawaii oan be prostrated by this 
system of a low eooncmio bleeding. it must ul tiJiately beoCIIle a 
social bog ripe for the final wrecking blow of Communist seizure .110 
llOibid. , 11 ; see also ibid.,  8-lo. 
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Af'ter mnd ng Harr;y Bricl.ges as the Communist leader of Hawaii and 
stating that there was a record ot Cammm1st actinty in Hawaii as early 
as July, 1928, when reporta were made to Moscow, Butler recCXDmended the 
enforcement ot the Smi. th Aot ot 1940, which provided heavy pena.lties tor 
advocating overthrow ot the United states Goverment. 
Based upon Communi st documents seized in the islands, there is 
the further charge that •The Kremlin in Moscow • • •  regards Hawaii as 
one ot its principal operating bases in the campaign tor a CCIDJl1UD.ist 
Uaited states ot AJa.erica." It was Butler's  oonolusion that the COIIIlllu­
niat Party and the I .L.w.u. favored statehood because they could control 
the conati tutioml convention. After rec<IIIID8nding Justice Department 
action against Communists, territorial action to suppress unlawful ccamu­
nist aoti vi ties and Congressional legislation to protect Hawaii tram ex­
treme r.L.w.u. actinties, Butler proposed tbat • • • •  statehood tor 
Hawaii be deterred indef'initely, until communism in the Territory may 
be brought under effective control • • • •• 111 
The arg1.111ents ot those who do not feel that Camaunist activity in 
the territory, which they admit exi sts, is a valid basis tor postponing 
statehood are well expressed in a letter traa Edward R. Burke, counsel 
tor the Hawaii statehood Commission to Semtor Butler.  Parenthetically, 
this Cammission was created by the 1947 territorial legislature to fur-
ther the�statehood mowment. Its ottioe s  in Honolulu and 1Jashington, D. c . ,  
as well as all its activities, are supported by public funds. 
lllibid. , 14, tor quotations ; see also, ibid. ,  12, 14-15. 
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Mr. Burke oritioized SeDater Butler' s report as being inconsistent 
because it recommended delay of statehood on the grounds of possible Ccm-
munistio influence in the dratti.ng of a state constitution while it 
praised the abilities, devotion to demooratio principles and anti-cCIIIIIluniat 
attitude of the majority of the Hawaiian people . Kr. Burke pointed out 
that any proposed oonsti tution would have to be approved by the Hawaiian 
electorate and by the President. If Senator Butler believed in the loyalty 
and eelf-gover.rli.llg abilities of the Hawaiian people-why not trust their 
' 
judgment to discover a� Camnunistic ini'luenoes in suoh a oonsti tutionf 
He further oritioized the report for describing Canm.unist and I.L.w.u. 
moves through the Demooratio Party for poli tioal control of the islands 
in the 19148 elections while failing to report the results of that election 
in whioh " •  • • not a single follOW8r of the Camnunist Party line was 
elected to any office of importance • • • •  •112 Burke' s basio ideas, and 
those of others who de� the validity of the Ccmmlmist argument for delay, 
are a (1 ) There are adequate safeguards to prevent inclusion in any state 
oonsti tution of provisions either Canm.unistio in nature or oonduci ve to 
growth of Camnuni st poli tioal powarJ (2} Hawaii has an informed, intelli-
pat eleotora:te whioh will iDBure the adoption of a constitution based 
wholly upon .AJD.erioan political principles and wbioh oan handle adequately 
any threat of Ccmnlmist infiltratiODJ and (3) statehood would increase 
the pcnrar of the island people to meet the CC1!1DJ1m1 st threat.ll3 
112Butler Report, 1, 14-15J Burke to Butler, July 5, 1949, 3 (oopy 
of letter ruriilsbed author by Hawaii Statehood CCIIIIIlission} . 
ll3aurke to Butler, July 5, 1949, 1-3· 
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The statehood Commission made a compilation of editorial OOIIIJI18nt 
in seventeen states on the Butler report. Of the thirty-eight OCIDDlents 
reoei nd, thirty' were in disagreament w:l. th the conclusions reached by 
Butler. The central theme of these oritioisms of the Butler report was 
that delay on the basis of Cammunism was 'lmfair to the people of Hawaii, 
since the same threat existed on the mainland, and it was also an insult 
to the intelligence an� loyal t;y of the Hawaiian people . 
Pertinent is  the question as to what the islands have done to 
combat Ccmamunism. The legislature was oalled into special session in 
July of 1949 to deal w1 th the strike orisis . It might be pointed out 
here that this session authorized the Terri tory, through its harbor cam-
mission, to undertake stewdoring activities, a measure whioh relieYed 
som.ewha t the effects of the strike and aided, according to the editor ot 
the BPnolulu star-Bulletin, in bringing the stendoring oompa.niee and 
unions into agreement. But this legislative session also set up, by 
joint resolution, a no.u. ... pe.rtisan, faot-tindi��g cCIIIIIIi.seion •on Cammunist 
and Other Subversive A.cti vi ties .•  The results of this oammission' s in-
nstigation are not a"f&ilable, but its eetablislmlent exhibited an ef'fort 
by the Terri tory to evaluate the CCJDllllmi at threat. It also needs emphasis 
that the strike ot 1949 was settled through terri to rial measures w1 thout 
aid tram the federal go'ft:rmunt.ll4 
1�1ey H. Allen, Editor, Honolulu star-Bulletin, to author, Oot.­
ber 17, 1949; Ra3J11ond Coll, Editor, The Honolulu Adveraaer, to author, 
November 2, 1949. 
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In September ot 1949 the Town Mee ting of the Air broadcast tram 
Honolulu a debate on statehood. Both Senator Cain and Mr. Daniel G, 
Ridley, !ILwaiian lawyer. emphasized CCIDmunism as a bar to i.mmediate state-
hood. Jlr, Rl.dley• s arguments were based upon his belief that the large 
number ot Halraiian citizens ot alien parentage were not as yet thoroughly 
enough indoctrinated in American tra.di tiona to be able to meet the threat 
ot Ccmmunist propaganda and infiltration without the supervision implied 
in the territorial status. More important. in that it indicated the 
trend ot Senatorial th:l.nld.ng, 11B.s the statement ot Senator Cain that 
Until .Hawaii oan oonvinoe--and . this ia your job-both houses ot 
the Congress and the American people on the mainland that oom.­
muniiJil is no pre sent or future menace to the social, eoonamio, 
and political lite ot the islands, there will be no statehood 
tor .Hawaii. • • • This is the threat whioh must be done away 
with by the people ot Hawaii before Hawaii has earned its tul.l 
right ot statehood. ll5 
Delegate Farrington, in rebuttal. said that Hawaii 118.8 tully able to 
meet this threat, as she had in the 1946 elections . rhe editor ot the 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin o cmmented that neither Cain nor Ridley produoed 
evidence that CCIIImunism was a "major threat." He also rei tera.ted the ar-
gummts that Caumuni sm in .Hawaii was a mainland import and that it was 
unfair to deey statehood on the basis ot a nation""'Wide problem.ll6 
Meanwhile plana went forward tor the calling of a oonsti tutional 
convention. This aotion was based upon the tact that fifteen ot the 
115town Meeting Balleti.n, 12J see also ibid., 6-8, 20, 22. 
ll6Ibid, ,  13r Allen, � .!!!.:..• October 17, 1949, 3•  
tnnt;y-Dine territories admitted to the union had gained entrance through 
presenting completed state constitutions to the Congress  with petitions 
for approval. From the information available, it is understood that this 
convention was held in April of 1950, but the results of its work are 
not kn011D..ll7 
In the spring of 1950 also, a suboommi ttee of the House un-Jmerioan 
.loti vi ties Committee held hearings in Hawaii with regard to Communist in• 
filtration. At its first meeting, an Anerioan or Japanese a.noestry, who 
was a member of the board of super'l'isore of the City and County of Hono-
lulu and a delegate to the oonsti tutional convention, admitted he wa.s a 
fol!ller Coamumist. This admission demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 
requireent emoted ot delegates that they take an oath stating that they 
had :aot been members ot subversive groups in the last five years . During 
the hearings Jack w. Hall and four others refused to deey or aftim attili-
ation w1 th the Coamnmi at party and there were plans for indiotment of 
118 these men for oont.npt. 
'rwo late dewlopunts in the Ccamunist situation were the report 
of a split in the D811locratio Party' and the admission by Secretary of In-
terior Osoar L. Chapoan at a SeDAte hearing that there was Camnunist 
intiltration in the mLwa.iian Demooratio Party. The party split resulted 
ll7George H. Jlotane, Executive Seoretary, Hawaii Statehood Com• 
mission, to author, October 19, 1949, 2;  Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 
1 Seseion, Vol. 95, No . 12, P• A3.56J ibid'.,  8! Congress, 2 session, Vol. 
96, ll'o. 66, P• ¥38. 
118 4 Ibid.,  No.  72, P• 5119; ibid., No.  7 , P• 5227. 
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traiL the withdrawal ot the old-line Demoorats from the regular territorial 
oonvention when the lett-wing members gained control . The regular Demo­
crats then organized thei r own conwndiion.119 
As a possible indication ot the trend ot thinking in the islands 
regarding Ccnm•mi am. the following statements made last year are presented 
tor oanparieon. The Honolulu Advertiser on 1lay 31. 1949. was chiding 
the lfashington. D. c • • � tor its tailure to view seriously the Com­
munistic intluenoe in the islands a " •  • •  no matter how tflfl Hawaii' s  
Communists may be. they bave a strong underground leadership here tbat 
is destroying the sooial and economic lite ot the islands . • • • HAwaii • s  
lite i s  at s ta.ke .120 
On November 2, 1949. the editor ot the Honolulu .Advertiser. a 
statehood supporter. wrote the tollcnr1ng a 
The dock workers strike which lasted tram May until the 
middle ot Ootober to sane extent cooled enthusiasm tor Statehood. 
1'here UDdoubtedly is sane intiltration ot CCIIIIIlunism in the Islands . 
Just to what extent this move prevails no one can be certain. 
There are two investigations underway • one set up by the Terri­
torial Legislature and one by the CongreesioD&l Un-.American M-
ti n ties Ca:ami ttee . We will know more when their reports are 
made .l21 
This latter statement seems to indicate a calmer outlook on the situation. 
The chargee and counter-charges coDOerning Camm.unistic aoti n ties 
are dittioult to asse11 . There seems. however. little doubt that the 
Communists baw been very aotive in the Territory. :Moreover, the Territor;y 
119Ibid • • No . 91. P• 6674. 
120coD§resdona.l Reoord. 81 Congress, 1 Session. Vol .  95. No . lo6. 3883• 
12'-coll, � !!.!!.• November 2. 1949 . 
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is partioul.arly vulne rable to Communist propaganda and aotivitiee on 
tour oounts a (1} a long tradition ot grie'9'&DOes, real or imagined, againat 
the powerful eoonCIIIio interests in the islands and "the still-recent mem• 
ory ot strongly paternalistio employment polioiea--a wide openiDg tor 
inoitement ot class hatredJ (2 ) the lack ot the people ' s  experience in 
local goverDIDe!lt, !!!.:.• experience in choosing and ew.luating looal 
leadera--a laok that seems to extend into the unions where the laboring 
man is new to the responsibi lities and problems ot union organization 
and -..agament: (3} the presence ot a heterogeneous population, offer-
ing great opportunities to the Caamunists tor developing raoial hatred 
and antagoniSIIll , and (4) the eoonc:mio vul.nerabili ty ot the islands to 
strikes, either in shipping or the basic industries .  untortua.ately, 
the islands present a tempting target to the CCIIIIlunists . Probably this 
taotor has had much to do with Senate delay on statehood during the last 
three years . It seems very likely that Hawaii will be asked to meet a 
new qualif'ioationt indisputable proof ot her ability to withstand any 
Caamunist threat to her econcmy, her goverllllent and her society. 
The fourth main issue which has played a part in the post-war 
ata. tehood movement ia the tremendous emphasis upon the international 
signitica.DCe ot statehood. Supporters have been eager to point out the 
following ideas a (1 } to grant statehood to Hawaii with ita large Asiatic 
population would greatly enhance united State s presti�e among the Asiatic 
nations by ettectiTel;r demonstrating A:merioan belief in the equality ot 
all men: {2 } to confer statehood would emphasize jJaerica.n support ot the 
principle of selt-cletel"'Bination of peoples; (3) to act favorabq upon 
statehood would be a powerful. move in counteracting Communi811l in A.sia; 
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(4) to approve statehood would mean the entry into the national legislature 
ot men conversant with the problems, cultures ani conditions of the Pacific 
and the Far Eastern areas, as well as men rltb. rich experience in inter­
racial relations . 
The se are not onl1' valid arguments bu.t extraeq tempti:ag one s. 
They have been supported by the statement of Acting Secretary of State 
James E. Webb that statehood would "• • •  serve to support Allerican foreign 
polic, and strengthen the position of the United State s in international 
atfairs . •122 
. 
lot oncy would statehood be a great advantage in international 
relations, but it most cert� would bolster the morale of the average 
American citizen. For it would be a reaffirmation not onl.7 of belief in 
democractic principles but of faith in the intrinsic strength of those 
principles. However, until the islands have de110nstrated clearq their 
ability to cope with Communist tactics and untU further investigation 
bas fumisbed a somewhat clearer outline of the extent of CoiiiiiUDist 
intlltration, statehood would seem to involve a calculated risk. Despite 
argtllll8nts to the contr&171 an appointed executive and judici&l71 as wll 
as Congressional review of legislation, lend to the territorial status 
safeguards not present in a state govermaent .  Evan it it were granted 
122 
Congressional Record, 61 Congress, 1 Session, Vol . 95, lo . 961 
p .  3597. 
262 
that a territoey is as susceptible to CoDIIIlUDist control as a state, a 
Communist coup in a territoey would be far less damaging to United States 
prestige than Conmrnaist OYerthrow of a state gove�nt . lnd, as the leading 
democratic nation of the world, the United States bas the responaibilit;r 
of aaintaining ita prestige at a high level. In the cold war prestige has 
become a weapon. 
Conclusions 
A. I!IWIIIDa1"7 of this stu� of the statehood movement is in order. The 
7eara from Cook• a discoveey until annexation in 1898 constituted a period 
of intensive P.ericanization of the islands. A.s ear]¥ as 1830 the .berican 
domination of the fur and sandalwood trade , the beginnings of .baerican 
:aisaionaey endeavors, and the unofficial diplomac;r of AJBerican naval 
officers bad given an '-rican slant to the aai.la of the Hawaiian ship of 
state . This was accoaplished in tba face of a strong Britieh 1.nfluence, 
a definite thrust b)" the French for an island foothold and an unofficial 
feeler by the Russians . From 1830 to 1890 internal Hawaiian development 
was marked b7 pOlitical growth in which AJErican principle a of governaent 
became basic through the influence of the mis aionaey councillors of state . 
In the later 7ears of the period there was a trend toward abaolutia, 
intensified b7 growing native nationali•, a trend llhich reached ita 
cli.Jux in the Revolution of 1893. Economic development included the rise 
and fall of the wbaling trade, numerous experiments in agriculture, and 
the final emergence of a hi� organized sugar induatr.r as the dominant 
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factor in the econow.r. In all econoJii.c denlopments American leadership 
and capital predoainated. In the .field ot international relations Hawaii 
��&intained a pre�ious independence, made tenable � by the tbre� 
rivalrT o.f the British, French am .blsricans. The two greatest props to 
iDdependence were Hawaii • s policy of welcoaing foreign commerce and economic 
enterprise and, after late 18421 almost continuous au.pport b7 the United 
States through the Tyler Doctrine . Later came the Reciprocity Treat7 and 
its renewal which, in effect, permanently' united the Hawaiian econoJiiY to 
that ot the United States. After the Revolution or 1893 had established 
the econoJii.c� and politically dominant American interests in power, 
annexation was a foregone conclusion. The years !rom 1778 to 1898 thus 
had marked the development in Halraii ot a political system, econoJQ" and 
culture basicaJ.l1' Ulerican. As a territol7 Hawaii had the problem at 
assiailating a large Asiatic population, o.f' making the most o.f' limited 
economic resources, and ot coping with the social and economic probleu 
created by a restrictive, paternalistic two-crop econOJI3'• Despite theae 
handicaps, Hawaii b;r 1937 had not o�U¥ met enr;y previousl3 recpired 
qualification for statehood, but her people had deTeloped a strong desire 
.for full maabership in the union. The movement tor statehood developed 
from the desire tor a voice in the economic policies of the nation to 
which Hawaii contributed so IIU.ch tinanciaJ.l¥ 1 the feeling that Hawaii 
. 
should have an equal share or the benefits or national legialation ani 
the desire tor that political equalit7 and dignity resident in tull 
selt-govenment. World War II not o�U¥ proved Hawaii more woz-tlv' of 
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statehood but intensified the desire tor that political status which would 
prevent the recurrence of extended .Uita.ry rule . Post-war Congressional 
investigators have , with fn exceptions, unqualitie� endorsed statehood, 
as have maD1' national leaders. The onq arguJ��ants outstanding against 
statehood have been a lingering doubt concerning the Asiatic element in 
Hawaii' s population, the fair]¥ potent, if invalid, objection to admitti.Dg 
non-contiguous territorie s to the union and the threat of Communtst 
intiltration. 
From the surve;r of those factors in Hawaiian histor,y and devel�nt 
which are pertinent to the statehood question, the following conclusions 
have been reached a 
1. B.r every standard ot measurement previous]¥ established 
Hawaii qualifies for and deaerTes statehood. 
2. Bawa11, despite a popal&tion representing man;y race• 
and cultures is todq in f!IVer,y respect an .AJaerican comunit7. 
). Statehood for Hawaii 11'0Uld not onq enhance the inter­
national prestige of the United States but effectiveq 
daonstrate the vitality' and strength of democratic 
principle s of life and goverDJMnt. 
4. Eventual statehood for Hawaii is practicaJ.l¥ a certaint7. 
HoweTer, due to the latitude granted Congress by the Constitution in 
setting up the qualifications for proepective states, the gradual develop­
ment of the principle that new conditions exact new qualifications and 
the vulnerability of Hawaii 1 s location, eCODOJQ" and social organization 
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to international stre ss and Collllllmist inf'Utration, it is very like� that 
statehood will be deferred until two conditione prevail. Firat, there 
IIU.st be strong evidence that Hawaii can protect herself against subversift 
thrusts for economic or politic&l control of the islands . Secondq, inter­
national co:oiitions IIU.st be such that the change 1n govermaent can be � 
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